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THE ANGLICAN CAREER

OF

CARDINAL NEWMAN

THE ANGLICAN CAREER

OF

CARDINAL NEWMAN

BY

EDWIN A. ABBOTT

> "This goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory. . . . What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! how infinite in faculty, in form and moving how express and admirable! . . . the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust? man delights not me; no, nor woman neither. . . ."
>
> *Hamlet.*

> "I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. . . . The sight of the world is nothing else than the prophet's scroll, full of 'lamentations and mourning and woe.'"
>
> NEWMAN'S *Apologia.*

VOL. II

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CHAPTER XIX

THE LEADER AT HEADQUARTERS

§ 78. *Newman in the pulpit*[1]

"The Tracts," says Dean Church, "were not the most powerful instruments in drawing sympathy to the Movement. None but those who remember them can adequately estimate the effect of Mr. Newman's four o'clock sermons at St. Mary's. The world knows them, has heard a good deal about them, has passed its various judgments on them. But it hardly realizes that, without those sermons, the Movement might never have gone on; certainly would not have been what it was. . . . While men were reading and talking about the Tracts, they were hearing and reading the sermons, and in the sermons they heard the living meaning and reason and bearing of the Tracts, their ethical affinities, their moral standard."

If this be so, it is to the sermons, not as printed but as uttered in the pulpit of St. Mary's, that we must look for the main source of the strength and direction of the Tractarian advance; and since we cannot "remember them" ourselves, we must try to remember them at second hand; through the reminiscences of those who have recorded their impressions of them. Varied as these are, they all testify to a sense in the hearers that they were in the presence of a unique personality bringing them closer to invisible things. Oral tradition in Oxford still preserves the confessions of "fast men," altogether unprepared for deep religious impressions, who dropped in from curiosity some afternoon to hear the Vicar of St. Mary's, and who never afterwards forgot the half-hour of cold terror into which they were drawn by his plain, quiet, irresistible statements of what seemed to be, when thus stated, undeniable facts and substantial realities. Many, it is said, of a very different type, who found themselves unable to follow the preacher to his dogmatic conclusions, none the less gratefully acknowledged that they had been penetrated and animated by his religious principles, and believed that they had lived better lives, and had striven to do their duty more steadfastly, because of his teaching. Some lay stress on his mien, voice, and manner, as accessories or instruments of his inexplicable fascination. Thin, pale, and with large lustrous eyes, piercing through this veil of men and things, as if hardly made for this world, the slight, tall, bent figure is described as a spiritual apparition gliding in the dim afternoon light through the aisles of St. Mary's, rising into the pulpit, and then, in the most entrancing of voices breaking the silence with words which were, of themselves, a religious music, subtle, sweet, and mournful.

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[1] References and dates will be found in the Notes at the end of the volume: *, and †, call special attention to them.

There were none at all of the arts or instincts by which an orator draws men into sympathy with himself by showing his sympathy with them, and first arrests and then retains the attention of his audience. Action there was none. The figure unmoved, the eyes bent down upon the sermon, the motionless arm and hand, even the features rigidly kept under control, and the voice itself restrained from varied inflections lest it should do more than suggest the emotions which the preacher felt bound to suppress in the immediate presence of the Creator, the rapidly though clearly enunciated sentences, followed by a pause (a thing fatal to most oratory) as if to give the speaker time to ponder the divine precept or warning—all these things were characteristic rather of a priest delivering oracles than of a speaker addressing an assembly. Yet, says one of his hearers who has a right to judge, there was a stamp and seal upon the man as a whole, a solemn sweetness and music in the tone, a harmony between voice and figure and manner, all resulting in a completeness that exercised on his hearers an indescribable attraction.

To others the prominent charm was the versatility and clearness of his exposition, his knowledge of human nature, and his instinctive power of saying what appealed to the very heart of each of his hearers. "His illustrations," says Mr. J. A. Froude, "were inexhaustible. He seemed to be addressing the most secret consciousness of each one of us, as the eyes of a portrait appear to look at every person in the room. They appeared to me to be the outcome of continued meditation upon his fellow-creatures and their position in the world, their awful responsibilities, the mystery of their nature strangely mixed of good and evil, of strength and weakness A tone, not of fear but of infinite pity, ran through them all." A sermon from him is described as entering into all the hearer's feelings, ideas, modes of viewing things; realising vividly and almost sympathetically, the feelings of people who might have been supposed most alien from him—the coarse man of the world, for example, who craves sensual excitement, and the pushing tradesman who is all for money-making, as well as the ambitious youth who is intent on cutting himself a path and making himself a name in the world.

It was not Newman's Tractarian doctrine, say some, it was his plastic self-adaptiveness to the manifold infirmities and temptations of his hearers, that undermined and captured their hearts. You might attend his sermons for weeks together, and hear little allusion to disputed ecclesiastical points: what there was of High Church teaching was implied rather than expressed; his power showed itself chiefly in the unlooked for way in which he touched into life old truths, moral or spiritual, which all Christians acknowledge, but few feel: as when he spoke of "unreal words," or "the individuality of the soul," or "the Cross of Christ the measure of the world," or "the Church a home for the lonely." Others again find the secret of his spell in something latent and hard to define; one, for example, perceives behind (as it were) the preacher's will, and pressing upon it, a torrent of feeling which, at times, would burst forth in the streams of a rich, ardent and imaginative illustration; another notes a perplexing charm in the pathos of an inexplicable undertone of forlornness. Negatively, almost all agree in being wholly silent as to the preacher's power of encouraging, heartening, strengthening, uplifting, or—to use a word that is found on almost every page of St. Paul's Epistles—"comforting." Positively, they are as unanimous in attesting that few, after hearing him, failed to be drawn towards him; none could afterwards believe him to be insincere; not many, that had once heard him, failed to love, or at least to entertain a liking for him; many, who differed from him on religious points, retained a feeling of loyalty to him throughout their lives; some felt that to him they owed their spiritual life itself.

Newman called himself "the rhetorician" of his Party. And so he was; and, as a writer, he was not much more. But as a preacher, he was far more. His style, his manner, his audience, his nature, are all inconsistent with the notion that he was a mere rhetorician in the pulpit. Yet as his influence was not that of an orator, sweeping away masses in a flood of contagious enthusiasm, so neither was it quite that of a prophet seeing the things of God distinctly and enunciating them with fervid force. He did not see, and did not profess to see, the principles of invisible things with distinctness; he saw but their manifestations in the Scriptures. He saw merely enough to grope and to help others to grope, in fear and trembling. But he had this double merit, first that what he saw, he saw with quite enough clearness for the purpose of some kind of immediate action; secondly, that what he saw, this, and no more, he professed to see. He sometimes took his hearers into his confidence. It was clear to him, and sometimes he made it clear to them, that he and they were, so to speak, in the same boat, or on the same frail raft, striving after the same faintly-discerned and scarcely accessible harbour. He was pondering or pleading, rather than preaching, pleading his own cause, as well as theirs, blaming his own weaknesses, chiding and suppressing his own doubts, dictating the course of action needful for himself as well as for them.

To this was added, that he knew their minds—or, at least, all the obscure, unswept, and ungarnished corners of their minds—all their infirmities, vacillations, tortuosities, defects, and sins, as if he had been inside them and made a map of them. In church, this made men accept his preaching; and out of church this made them attach a singular weight to his good opinion—especially if they really were prone to the faults for which he had the keenest eye—self-introspective, or selfish, or fickle, or weak, or inconsistent. For then they knew themselves to be what he thought them: and this made them believe in him, the more they disbelieved in themselves; and so some came to lean wholly on him (more than he himself would have desired) as their moral and spiritual director; and one at least of his admirers was wont to put down in his journal records of his greater or less "kindness," on this or that day, as if *that* were a kind of spiritual barometer testing the writer's moral condition! This was Mark Pattison. But Arnold, too, a man of very different type, open-hearted, fearless, sympathetic, and full of insight, paid a tribute to Newman's fascinating power when, after an evening spent by his side at the Oriel table, he told Stanley that "it would not do to meet him often." On this point, however, the strongest evidence comes from one of Newman's pupils, who, if any one, had a fair right to complain of his teacher; for Newman (as we shall see hereafter) extorted from him, during the young man's oscillation between the two Churches, a promise not to join the Church of Rome (and thereby, possibly, to imperil, in his opinion, the safety of his soul) for a period of three years.

Yet this is the testimony of Father Lockhart (who very justifiably broke his promise and preceded his teacher by two years in secession) to the influence exerted by Newman on him during his pupilage at Littlemore:

"To put into one sentence what struck him as the character of his whole teaching and influence,—it was to make them use their reasoning powers, to seek after the last satisfactory reason one could reach of everything, and this led them to the last reason of all, and they formed a religious personal belief in God the Creator, our Lord and Master. This was the first thing that Newman did for those young men under his care. He rooted in their hearts and minds a personal conviction of the living God. And he for one could say he never had had that feeling of God before he was brought into contact with Cardinal Newman. Who that had experience of it could forget Newman's majestic countenance?—the meekness, the humility, the purity of a virgin heart 'in work and will,' as the poet says, a purity that was expressed in his eyes, his kindness, the sweetness of his voice, his winning smile, his caressing way which had in it nothing of softness, but which you felt was a communication to you of strength from a strong soul—a thing to be felt in order to be realized. It was when Newman read the Scriptures from the lectern in St. Mary's Church at Oxford that one felt more than ever that his words were those of a seer who saw God and the things of God. Many men were impressive readers, but they did not reach the soul. They played on the senses and imagination, they were good actors, they did not forget themselves, and one did not forget them. But Newman had the power of so impressing the soul as to efface himself; you thought only of the majestic soul that saw God. It was God speaking to you as He speaks to you through creation; but in a deeper way, by the articulate voice of man made in the image of God and raised to His likeness by grace, communicating to your intelligence and sense and imagination, by words which were the signs of ideas, a transcript of the work and private thoughts that were in God."

§ 79. *The Message of "The Wrath of God"*

What was the message, which the preacher's marvellous personal influence helped to bring home to the hearts of his hearers? It may be described in those apostolic words which—as the last of three reasons for being "not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ,"—remind us that "The wrath of God is revealed" thereby "against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who keep down the truth in unrighteousness." This aspect of the Good News, most important but still subordinate, in St. Paul's doctrine, to the revelation of God's love, is so exalted by Newman that—except perhaps during a brief period which will presently be considered—it may be regarded as at least co-ordinate, in his preaching, with the higher revelation, and far more frequently and prominently mentioned. The "wrath of God" is the main topic of his sermons; but it is of course regarded in several aspects and illustrated with the richest variety. Sometimes he refers to it as being *what we call* "the wrath of God," sometimes as *being called in accommodation to our weakness* "the wrath of God"—as though to indicate that, after all, it may be a mere anthropomorphic "economy," and that God may, possibly, not be *really* angry, even though He acts *as if He were* angry. But, however described, the meaning is much the same. It is a certain divine aversion from evil, a turning of the face of God away from sin, which results in all the effects that would be attributed (in man) to revenge. In other words, God's punishments are regarded as being inflicted on sin, as sin, vindictively—quite apart from expediency, or from the general good of mankind, or from any ultimately corrective or remedial results of such punishments.

This doctrine seemed to him taught in the Bible, consistent with the analogy of Nature, and all the more necessary to be inculcated because it was opposed to the cheerful form of Christianity then coming into vogue among educated people. The last of these three reasons was perhaps not the least effective. Whenever he felt quite certain that he saw his way, as he seemed to see it here, Newman was rather pleased, than not, to find that the way was painful. By bearing pain now, there seemed to him a better chance of avoiding it hereafter. Present fears, boldly faced and endured, were even, perhaps, a sort of propitiation of the Future, Why would men ignore plain, disagreeable, facts? The New Testament predicted that men would grow worse, not better, before the coming of Christ: why then did modern false prophets dare to anticipate good when the Gospel foretold evil? Why did they say smooth things and prophesy peace, when there was no peace, but war, already, between the Church and the rebellious world? Why were some impious enough to base hopes on Reform and Free Trade, when Mount Olivet, like a second Sinai, had laid it down, as the Law of Christ, that Christians must fix their thoughts on the Son of man, soon to come in Judgment? And why would even religious people speak with such a perverse sanguineness about the spread of the Gospel abroad, or its deepening influence at home, when it was certain that, in all ages, though "the many" might be called, only "the few" would be chosen? Might not the Judge at any moment appear upon the clouds? And, if He did, what would He find the English nation doing? Simply what Noah's foolish, faithless countrymen had been doing—eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage—up till the day when the deluge swept them to destruction! How was it, then, that men would not practise some abstinence in these matters which, however lawful in themselves, the Son of God

Himself had, by implication, called worldly and dangerous?

And besides, there were other reasons for such self-restraint. How could men bear to read in their Bibles, and recognize with their lips, the absolute necessity that a Christian should "take up the cross" for Christ, and yet refuse in any regular way to practise self-denial, even in so simple a practice as fasting, and that, too, dictated (so Newman maintained) by the Bible, and enforced by the constant tradition of the Church? Again, why did men speak emotionally of readiness to give up everything for Christ, yet grudge Him a few hours on a week-day now and then to attend His appointed service? It was of no avail to allege against this wilful and rebellious neglect of prescribed duties, that the disobeyers had found by experience that a full and formal observance of the old fastings and saints'-days had not altogether worked well for religion itself in times past; that now, the revival of these in full force would be likely in some cases to injure health, in others, so to slacken labour as to increase the poverty of those already poor and to interfere with the prosperity of the whole country: all this would seem to Newman mere expediency—an impious plea to put forward against the express commands of Scripture! As for any growth of justice, humanity, and mercy, if anyone had pointed to these, or to plans for well-directed alms-giving, or to systematic attempts to prevent destitution and disease, as tokens that the Spirit of Christ was even now at work among those who had cast off the discipline of the mediæval Church, he would have replied that such a superficial philanthropy as this was part of the religion of "this world," little better than a device of

Satan to mislead us into a disobedient self-complacency. Yes, the modern alms-giving itself was a proof that modern men were serving this world and not Christ: for He had enjoined *two* duties, fasting and alms-giving; and now-a-days men practised the latter but neglected the former. Why? Because men believed the former to be, but the latter not to be, for the good of society—in other words, for their *own* good! What could be a clearer token of men's worldliness and hypocrisy when, of two commands of their Lord, they adopted the one that the world approved; rejected the one that the world disapproved; and yet professed to be serving, not the world, but Christ!

To all who accept the Authorized Version of the New Testament as constituting a kind of Second Law for Christians—no less binding upon us than the Levitical Law upon Israel—Newman must seem, at first sight, to occupy a strong position. His weak point he just hints at (of course unconsciously) in a passage in which he quotes St. Paul's saying that it was "good for a man" to remain unmarried. St. Paul's actual meaning is indicated by the context in his Epistle. The Apostle was giving the Corinthians no general precept, but special advice fitted for special circumstances; that is, in his own words, for "the present distress." But Newman will not allow even the Apostle himself to limit his own words: for, if such limitations were once to be permitted, he saw that there would be no end to them, and that his Christian "Law" would melt into mere literature. If, he protests, the words "present distress" have not a bearing upon the present day, "the New Testament scarcely applies to us and will have to be re-written."

This alternative—which Newman refuses even to entertain—represents what will appear to many (not excluding High Church theologians) *the actual fact.* The New Testament precepts *do* need, if not to be re-written, at all events to be interpreted and, as it were, proportionized, before they can be wholesomely and wisely applied to the special needs of our, or any, generation. Nothing in Newman's sermons is more frequently or more effectively used as a motive for modern Christians than the Apostolic antithesis between the Church and the World. Yet among recent English theologians few have more frankly recognized than Dean Church, that the Spirit of Christ " has in many respects transformed that society which is only for this time and life ; and, while calling and guiding souls one by one to the Father, He has made His gracious influence felt, even where it could be least expected. Even war and riches, even the Babel life of our great cities, even the high places of ambition and earthly honour, have been touched by His Spirit, have found how to be Christian."

§ 80. *A Religion of Fear*

How different is this conception of the modern world of men, as leavened by the Christian spirit, from Newman's imagination of it as a thing wholly evil in itself, like the prophet's scroll, written, within and without, with lamentation, mourning, and woe ; and conveying to him no reflection whatever of that Creator who occupied his whole soul and absorbed his every thought ! In Newman's view, mankind is incapable of spiritual progress. We cannot rise on the shoulders of our forefathers : the brain, but not the heart, can be improved as the cycles roll onward ; the many will always perish ; none but the few will escape ; not even the Gospel itself has ever greatly improved, or can improve, the spiritual condition of the multitude, who will in all ages be the prey of Satan ; and the lapse of time is more likely to obscure than to increase, or illustrate, religious knowledge. The Primitive Church, though not perfect, attained a standard of truth and holiness which it is a mere dream to imagine that we can ever exceed. Why the so-called scheme of Redemption was ever planned by its Divine Author, or what was His final object therein, this—says the preacher—we neither know nor, in this world, ever can know : but so much is certain, that it was *not intended to procure the salvation of the world.* The Scripture tells us that His final object was His own glory : but this, he confesses, is not intelligible to us. Yet it is all that we are permitted to know. Such are the spiritual prospects—or such our knowledge of the prospects—of "the human world," in the eyes of the man whose utterances from the pulpit of St. Mary's gave life, and force, and penetrative vigour to the Tractarian Movement.

I do not see how it can be denied that the message, thus summarized (mostly in Newman's words), was a message of fear. Regarded from any point of view, whether as news about man, or about God, or about the relations between God and man, it seems to be permeated to the core with religious dread. Not content with insisting that the majority of the human race are doomed to everlasting destruction, it practically ignores the Fatherhood of God except as a special privilege for a chosen few. Even for these it is sometimes spoken of in language suggesting that the doctrine is but an anthropomorphic "accommodation" to our weak understandings. Nor is it enough that he hides God's attributes from us under a veil of "economy." Newman is at his worst when he praises God, as he sometimes does, for not doing things which any moderately just man would be ashamed to do, *e.g.* for not altogether casting off the human beings (whom He had Himself created) when they first went astray; or for not making their life a source of unmixed misery, and their very senses avenues of pain! Must a Christian be thought to have no command of his temper if he calls such praise as this altogether abject, servile, abominable? What should we say of the servant of some great English nobleman, who should extol his Grace to his Grace's tenants, because his Grace, out of his great kindness, had not built all their cottages so that the chimneys might keep in the smoke, and the roofs let in the rain?

The joyful side of the Gospel, Newman almost entirely ignores. We are told that we are not in a condition to rejoice in the Lord; His very gifts are poisoned to us by our sickness. Fear is to accompany us to our graves as well as to overshadow our childhood. The only period during which a Christian can say, "I am safe," is the period after baptism, and before he is old enough to say anything. Even if we happen to be in the right path to-day, we cannot feel safe about to-morrow. Nor even about to-day can we feel confident. For without faith we are lost; yet "whether we have faith or not we can but guess." Instead of the strengthening stimulus of Christ we find pervading Newman's doctrine and precepts a perpetual anxiety as to the best means of facing our dreadful Redeemer on the Judgment Day.

Yet, says Mr. J. A. Froude, "a tone not of fear but of infinite pity" ran through all his sermons. The expression reminds us of Bacon's description of the venerable Priest of Nature, in the *New Atlantis*, who "had the aspect of one that pitied the miseries of mankind." And it was in point there. That venerable philosopher was supposed to see, not only men's miseries, but also their remedies. He, therefore, might pity without any overpowering fear. But what did Newman see, so far as concerned mankind, except their all but universal ruin? In him, not to fear would have argued the grossest insensibility. How, then, could the "tone of fear" in his teaching, so patent to those who read his sermons, have been imperceptible to Mr. Froude, who heard them?

In part perhaps, fear was then in the air, common to large numbers of religious persons in those days, so that a doctrine of fear did not seem fearful, relatively, to those who assumed it in every sermon as a matter of course. When men like Arnold thought that the end of the world might be at hand, we cannot be surprised if many others of deep religious convictions were impelled in the same direction by the spirit of unrest that was abroad moving in all the churches. The Evangelicals, in making men anxious and alarmed about their souls, had prepared serious people in England to think that no preaching could be true that did not fill men with heart-searching anxieties—anxieties, very often of a non-moral and highly selfish nature. Science might have helped some. But there was little science in Oxford, at that time. Newman and his friends had a legal sense of system, *i.e.* external order, but very little sense of internal order, *i.e.* living law. Science, if it affected, enlarged their fears, making them talk of God as the "Creator" with bated breath because the world had turned out to be bigger and more curious than it had been known to be before. Hence we shall actually find one of Newman's principal followers deliberately describing the right attitude of man (even of a Christian man) to the "Creator" as "abject"! We all think, now, that men (not to say those who call themselves God's children) should approach God with reverence and devotion, but not with "abjectness"; the very word conveys to us a sense of servility, a distrust in God's justice, a despicable fear, a creeping, fawning faithlessness, which repel and disgust people now; but something approaching to these feelings seems to have been thought not blameworthy, but even pious, then. If therefore Newman's religion was "abject," it was perhaps what he intended it to be. He often prefers the language of the Old Testament (not the New) to describe the relations of men towards God. There he might read that man is made in God's image; or that we are God's "sheep," or even God's "children." But the metaphor for which his frequent use evinces his special fondness, is that of "worms"; once, at least, "grovelling worms*."

§ 81. *Yet a practical Religion*

Only recognize that the Gospel is a misnomer, and that Christianity is, and ought to be, a religion of fear, and it will be easy to discern much in Newman's message which would explain its power over those who heard it. Admit his hypothesis, and we must admit the good sense of the advice which he gives to the bewildered and troubled souls that resorted to him. Besides, who can fail to admire the uncompromising fairness and plainness with which he states unpleasing truths; not supposing for a moment that his hearers like them; indeed assuming, almost sympathetically and commiseratingly, that they do *not* like them, and scarcely professing to like them himself; but still laying them down, as facts, without the least exaggeration, and as it were saying, "Since we cannot deny these to be *facts*, why shut our eyes to them? We cannot undo them. Let us then recognize and make the best of them. Is not this the nobler course as well as the wiser?" It was to this appeal, perhaps, that young men at Oxford most keenly responded. They felt it *was* the nobler course (or at least the less ignoble), since they were in such extreme peril, to face it resolutely; and they trusted in Newman, because, instead of hiding the worst from them, he showed them how there was at least a chance of escaping from it. There were even in the Bible—he did not deny it—bright and cheerful and hopeful sayings about man, and about what might be man's life and prospects, even in this present world; but these needed no priest or prophet to expound or enforce. Any one could find out and realise these for himself. His business was not with fair weather but with storms: he was a spiritual pilot holding in his hand a chart of the straits through which the soul must pass on its way to life or death; and the use of a chart was to mark the rocks and quicksands—not the safe places.

It was as if some vessel, far out at sea, had caught fire in the night, and there was no hope of quenching the flames, and no boats for more than a fraction of the crew, and these leaky and unfit for use; with a captain who lay in his hammock, disabled and sickly, and with no orders to give; and an emotional first lieutenant, who could say much that was eloquent, but nothing to the point ; and suddenly there stepped forth one among the younger officers, who alone seemed to realise the danger, and yet retained his presence of mind ; bidding them not talk as yet about drawing lots as to who should have the boats, but first make the indispensable repairs and prepare the machinery for lowering them, and meantime keep back the flames so that they might all gain a few more minutes of respite from the expectant sharks, and might increase the chance for a poor handful of them to attain ultimate safety—not blinking the peril, but bidding them meet it like men :—would not the wiser and more manly sort among the sailors, in a prospect so full of terror, discard their superior officers (the talkative Evangelicals and the torpid High and Dry) turning from those who could see nothing and from those who could say nothing, to this man, as their last hope, who seemed to them to see everything and to hide nothing, and who took his chance with the rest, knowing it to be but a chance ?

For indeed, though in his poems, and letters, and private utterances, Newman is revealed to us as one groping amid uncertainties, he does not appear in this character in the sermons. There, he checks himself, generally, from contemplating the "distant scene," and limits his view to the "one step" before him which sufficed for the present needs of himself and others. Within this very limited scope, he seemed to have taken in every detail with a perfect clearness and certainty which gave cogency to all his exhortations. Who, after receiving his short, definite, practical precepts, would any longer trust to his own mere feelings and professions, as a means of rescue from spiritual peril ? As well cast oneself into the deep with a swimming belt and trust to that for deliverance from the jaws of the sea-monsters! In the anxious enquirer, passionately craving to know what he must do to be saved, how great a confidence—at least comparatively, for men encompassed by such terrors—would be inspired by the precision with which he marked out the steps to be taken and the order of taking them! His answer was, in effect, "First, *do something.* Do not be content with feelings, or words. Then, do something in the way of *obedience to authority,* where you cannot possibly go wrong. Obey the *precepts of Scripture.* Come to Church; pray; fast; give alms; come to the Holy Communion. Here are definite precepts; and, even if you do not at present realise all that is implied in these acts, yet at least you can *do the acts.* You may object that you do not at present love or trust God; that you are wholly, or almost wholly, wrapped up in yourself; in a word, that you have no faith; and that works without faith are dead. But I reply that faith is not what you suppose it to be. Faith is not the feeling of trust in God, nor any other feeling. Faith is *the temper of obedience to the precepts of God.* It may be almost identified with obedience itself; certainly, it cannot be separated from obedience. No doubt, the thing to be aimed at is *a habit of mind,* and not mere acts. But then a habit of mind cannot be formed except with the aid of time, by a prolonged succession of acts. Therefore begin by acts, even though you have at present no love of God or trust in God; and begin by *these* acts, not as being dictated by love of man, nor out of any notion that they will in themselves do any good to anybody, but as being *dictated by Scripture.*

"At first, you will find all this a kind of servitude.

God's 'commandments' will be, *to you*—just what the Apostle declared them *not* to be, to *him*—'grievous.' So they ought to be. Prayer you will find irksome, tedious, monotonous; and so of the rest. This must be so. God's commandments *must* be, at first, 'grievous' to you. You have *made* them grievous to yourself by your past life of self-will and rebellion; and you must now bear the burden patiently. Better to find them 'grievous' and obey them, than to explain them away so as to disobey them. Nor is it safe for you to discriminate between the greater and smaller precepts of the Christian Law, between, for example, precepts as to fasting and precepts as to alms-giving. Do but note the importance of the exact enunciation of a few words in the form of Baptism. Upon these depends the regeneration of an immortal soul! This being the case, how can *you* tell that, in God's sight, though not in man's, the principle, say, of Episcopal Succession, may not be as important as that of the Unity of God itself? Cease, then, to discriminate; learn to obey. The only safe course is to obey *all* precepts that come to you with authority; obey readily, blindly, I might almost say, abjectly; not because this or that is right, or rational, but out of *faith;* that is to say, out of the mere temper of docility and obedience which is ready to obey any command of God, however wrong or irrational it may seem. Christianity happens to be a rational religion. But it need not have been. It would have claimed obedience just the same. This, as I have admitted, is a yoke. But, by degrees, out of this mechanical obedience you will rise into a freer and higher state. By *doing* you will be enabled, in some cases, to understand, and in all, to *believe*."

Presently we shall find Newman modifying this doctrine. Church going, alms-giving, fasting, and participation in the Holy Communion, are all compatible with a servile terror (absolutely void of love or real reverence) which might make the superstitious observer of these duties, after each observance, say to himself, "There, that is over! That is so much to my credit. Yet, alas, have I done enough? Am I safe? No, and I never shall be. Always this weary round of distasteful acts, and yet never to feel safe! Yet it is my only chance, so I must persevere." In such a religious mill-round as this, the performer makes himself worse, not better, by every performance. Never will he be free. He is riveting on himself the chains of superstitious fear, hardening faithlessness into the solidity of a habit, making himself chronically blind to God's light, and permanently callous to the tender visitations of His love. Recognizing this danger, Newman will be found hereafter striving, though most inadequately, to meet it. But in his earlier teaching it is scarcely recognized at all. The nobler among his hearers might perhaps supply for themselves what was wanting. To them, his realisation of the tremendous struggle of life might give nerve and vigour; and they would so tinge the fear with which he thrilled them that, in them, it might become wholesome awe. Yet his doctrine, in itself, is a doctrine of terror; and for commonplace and vulgar minds one secret of his success is that, along with the danger, he indicates a method of deliverance which, though wearisome and in some respects apparently wasteful, yet at least shifts on to Scripture much of the burden of individual responsibility, and dispenses with the pain of thinking for oneself.

CHAPTER XX

THE SECRET OF THE LEADER'S POWER

§ 82. *Pusey's Tract on Baptism*

YET our question is not yet fully satisfactorily answered. To say that Newman's teaching attracted many of the most promising young men at Oxford, because, being austere and repellent, it was plainly and uncompromisingly stated, seems rather paradox than explanation. Nor indeed have we been able to do full justice to the austerity of the Tractarian teaching, following as we have followed, the chronological order of things: for it was not till the end of 1835 that the inherent darkness of the New Anglicanism was made fully visible by the publication, in the form of a Tract, of Pusey's discourses on Baptism, with special reference to the effects of post-baptismal sin. Mozley had heard him preach them and has described the effect they produced. "Irreparable," "irreparable"—terror fell on those, even the religious and devout, who heard these awful words from the pulpit, warning them that sin after baptism could never in this life be fully pardoned. To think that almost all Christians must consider themselves, in spite of the Gospel and its promises of forgiveness, merely respited criminals up to the last day of their lives! This doctrine startled some of the most devoted adherents of the Movement; but Newman unreservedly defended it as the teaching of the Fathers:

> "Pusey's doctrine—that is, that of the Fathers—is this: That in Baptism there is a *plenary remission* of all that is passed. That none such occurs again in this life, none such till the Day of Judgment. But it does not thence follow that there is no *kind of Absolution* besides promised us. There is; and of it the Collect for Ash Wednesday, &c., speak. It is this: we are admitted, as a transgressing child might be, not to the same absolute election, but from time to time, according as we pray, repent, and are absolved, to a lower state in our Father's favour. We are admitted to Church ordinances, Church privileges, and the state of grace which is in the Church, a place of rest, refreshment, respite, of *present* help; without more, however, than the *suspension* of our sins over our heads. Now think of this, and see whether both Prayer Book and Pusey do not teach this concordantly."

Like an advancing fog that might spread its darkness no one knew whither, this doctrine threatened to cast its gloom over the whole of the application of the Christian religion to the life of man. Newman himself, in a previous letter to the same enquirer, admits this, though from an ecclesiastical point of view. He does not think of the horror or the injustice; his mind is bent on working the doctrine into a symmetrical system: "I do not say he (Pusey) has *finished* his subject; rather he has opened a large circle of subjects." This indeed was no more than the truth. Confession, and Penance, are, at once, thus "opened." If Pusey's theory was correct, it became of the utmost importance to distinguish between venial faults that did *not*, and sins that *did*, wash out for the time baptismal grace. To draw this distinction fairly, who would be sufficient in his own case? How useful, how indispensable, to confess one's sins to some spiritual director who could tell one how to manage one's own soul, and who would suggest works of penance appropriate for each occasion! Then, again, as to Absolution itself, what a new and vast importance it would assume! If the act was needful, after each sin, to restore the sinner even to "the lower state" of "respite"; if a man who died unabsolved, after the commission of some sin not "venial," died "unrespited," cast out even from the lower class of reprieved criminals into the lowest of all, the class of sinners under sentence of eternal damnation—how natural and right to be alarmed during every hour of one's life in which no absolver was at hand, and how cheap at any price the prompt services of a duly ordained priest! Further, as to the priest himself, how much more than ever important to ascertain that he had the right to absolve! How dear, at any price, the services of an absolver who, though he possessed all the virtues and graces of which non-sacerdotal humanity was capable, yet, by no fault of his own, but through some fatal break in Apostolical Succession at any point in the spiritual chain, had been cut off from the source of the special grace of absolution!

The question of the validity of Orders was thus brought up again, and there loomed in the close future the contrast between the historical continuity of the Apostolic Succession in the great Church of Rome and the disputed transmission of sacerdotal grace in the dislocated and insulated Church of England. But, apart from these doubts in prospect, there was enough at hand to fill the anxious enquirer with terror. God, it seemed, might forgive through his duly-ordained Priests; yet still, there remained a remnant of displeasure for the sinner. Whoever had sinned after baptism—and who had not?—was incapable of receiving full forgiveness till the Judgment Day. God "forgave"—but, as it were, in inverted commas; with a forgiveness *of His own;* not as human fathers forgave. He was still angry; or at least He appeared to be so. Do what a Christian might, his sins were still "in suspension" over him. Even after the most orthodox and unimpeachable of absolutions, this was the most he could ask for: "I will arise and go to my Father and will say unto Him,—'Make me but a respited criminal in thy sight'."

§ 83. *The Tractarian Protest for deeds against words*

Is not such a religion as this repellent? And to say that Newman did not conceal its repulsive nature—is this to be accepted as a reason why it did not repel? There must be other reasons. One has been just touched on above; but it deserves more than a mere passing reference.

Beneath some perversions and exaggerations, Newman's doctrine of the wrath and holiness of God contained, and did not quite conceal, a good deal that was both true and new to that generation. God *does* require from us righteousness; righteousness *does* (though not in theory, yet in practice, and if we deal with life as a whole, and not with a few isolated and exceptional cases) require outward acts; and there *is* a danger that emotion, expressed ostentatiously, or even indulgently and unreservedly, may let off, and suffer to escape unused, the energy which should have been expended in action. Again, the *consequences* of some sins—even though the sins themselves may be forgiven—are in some cases manifestly not remitted. Moreover, cause and effect *do* hold good, in the spiritual, as in the material, world. Habits, and states of mind, *are* caused by a series of acts ; and a series of acts needs time ; and this applies to the state of mind of a confirmed Christian ; so that, as a rule, the formation of the Christian character is *not* the affair of an instant nor the mere result of one supernatural impulse. Further, God's love and benevolence to men—if they are of the same kind as His love towards Him who taught us the full meaning of the divine Fatherhood — are compatible with the imposition of terrible trials and burdens even upon the most saintly of mankind. Much more, as regards the sinful and unrepentant, may we be prepared to believe that, in proportion to the depth of His love, will be the penetrative power of His punishments. How wide may be their scope we know not ; we only know (through faith) that not one drop of the cup of pain will have been wasted or drunk without His supervision. But we expect no indulgence. We are sure that He will spare us no anguish that may amend our sinful souls. It may be that what our planet suffers, other planets may behold and take warning from it, so that they may not suffer : but all such thoughts as these are as far off and visionary as imaginative romances about four or five dimensions, and the only justification for either is, that they keep us intellectually modest and truthful and sometimes uplift our weary souls a little when we find our flight drooping and bringing us within view of that gulf of gulfs, that only heresy of heresies—the thought that God can be less good, and less just, than the best, and most just, of men.

In such spiritual truths as these any man may believe with awe yet without servility; and from their contemplation he will arise with an increased sense of the hatefulness of sin; of the mystery of the conflict between good and evil; and yet with as profound a conviction as ever that God is most truly revealed to men as "unmixed benevolence," or as it is expressed in the New Testament, as "Love." The obstacles in the way of his belief he will not deny; but he will point out that the faith which he cherishes does not commit him to any falsification or glossing of *facts*. It merely commits him to what nothing in heaven or earth can prove or disprove—a belief in *motives*. But the mischief of Newman's view of spiritual things was that it distorted all these truths by taking them out of the province of morality into that of authority. Hence it is that we have found him not daring to sever himself from the literal meaning of Scriptural precepts; hence also he is disposed to deny, or ignore, the facts of modern life and science which show the inapplicability of his Scriptural rules to present needs. It is on this account, too, that he lays so strange and undue a stress on frequent Church-going and fasting, as compared with those acts of kindness (or even of mere thoughtfulness and consideration) which come naturally in the path of social life. His argument is clear. The former are specially Scriptural, the latter are not; "this world" regards the former with disfavour, while it favours the latter; therefore it is "safe" to prefer the former. Hence, too, when circumstances hereafter force him to attempt to formulate his notions about God's justifying forgiveness, we shall find him actually venturing to say that it consists in God's saying as to our past lives what, as a fact, *is not* *true.* The time will come indeed when he will be driven to perceive that all his system is likely to fail for want of a basis, and that, as a basis, love is "the one thing needful." And this, for a brief season, may seem to drive authority to the wall. Yet even then we shall find him soon repenting of this relapse into Evangelicalism and into "trusting one's own feelings"; so that he will protest, almost immediately after uttering the fatal word "love," that he has not really meant what he said, and that he must explain himself in Latin, for, after all, "love" *does not mean love precisely;* but it is *pia affectio*, or *voluntas pie credendi*, or whatever else some scholastic authority may have made it out to be.

§ 84. *Newman, his own "secret"*

Such a "system" as this cannot have succeeded by its own merits. Like many other theologians, Newman was superior to his system: and the superiority which we can only here and there perceive in the volumes of his printed sermons may have been far more perceptible to those who heard him. It is nothing new that the presence of a man should transmit his spirit to others in a degree not attainable by written words. And, deep down beneath the doubts and fears as to the means of obtaining divine grace, and as to the amount of reality, or unreality, in "economies," and "accommodations," and the claims of contending churches, there was always, at bottom, an unvarying conviction, not only of the existence of a God, but also of One in whom, whether he himself was to be saved or damned, he could not but feel whatever trust he was capable of feeling. Precluded though he was (as he thought) by Scripture from teaching that this Being was good or just, in accordance with human notions of goodness or justice, yet in his heart of hearts he did, however tremulously, cling to the faith that God in the end would be seen to be really good, even in the human sense.

Noble passages in his sermons—few, but conclusive on this point in their passionate earnestness—breathe the spirit of him who cried, "Though he slay me, yet will I put my trust in him." Others, which suggest a kind of austere and cruel Retribution in the background as the real Ruler of the Universe, nevertheless take us (for a short time at all events) out of that depressing dread with which the preacher mostly leads us to regard the Saviour. These represent Christ as being, so to speak, under coercion ; as passionately begging us to trust in Him ; as assuring us that there is nothing that can be done for us that He would not gladly do ; nay, even as protesting that, in the strict final Judgment, He will judge us with the most anxious solicitude to give full weight to all that may weigh on our side, and with a longing to enlarge the fruits of His Passion by returning the verdict of "not guilty," wherever we ourselves, or the demands of Justice, will allow Him to do so. Others again, with a tender and compassionate sympathy, without concealing or lightening the possible horrors of our impending doom, yet urge on us that, even if we should lose everything, it would be better to lose it while trying to please God, than to gain what this world can give, leading the life of the flesh. The illustration of a merchant's or a gamester's venture is elsewhere brought to bear ; and we are told that there is something noble-minded as well as possibly lucrative, a kind of mercantile heroism, and a generosity at once magnanimous and profitable, in risking everything on "God's word." Best of all, men are sometimes bidden to rejoice and thank God for one another, and especially for the friends whom, after giving them to us for a time, He has taken to Himself, that we, by them, may be drawn closer to Him. Such passages as these are necessarily rare, for they are inconsistent with his formal and usual doctrine that, as we cannot be sure about our own salvation, so neither can we about that of others; that we have enough to do with thinking and fearing about our own eternal concerns; that, as before God, no man can help another, for we must not only die alone but live alone, nor can there be any spiritual contact between soul and soul in this life*. Yet at least on one occasion his feelings were too strong for his dogma. When Froude drew near to death, Newman refused to fear for his sake. With him in his mind he would not use his favourite metaphor of "grovelling worms" to describe the relations between the human and the divine. Casting away all reserve, all doubts, and all terrors, he shoots up to a Miltonic height in the confidence that God *cannot waste* this immortal soul which He has made. Thus he writes to Froude himself—

> "It . . . made me think how *many* posts there are in *His* kingdom, how *many* offices, Who says to one, Do this, and he doeth it, &c. It is quite impossible that, some way or other, you are not destined to be the instrument of God's purposes. Though I saw the earth cleave, and you fall in, or Heaven open and a chariot appear, I should say just the same. God has ten thousand posts of service. You might be of use in the central elemental fire; you might be of use in the depths of the sea."

The same passionate conviction, based not upon Authority nor upon Scripture but upon his own sense of what *must be right*, finds expression also in a sermon, written about the same time. Once more, his feelings are too strong for his "system." On grounds of logic and probability, if "the many" perish everlastingly, and if outward life affords no certain criterion as to the inward state, the preacher ought, I suppose, to calculate the odds against a man, and to shudder in silence over his grave. But a better faith constrains him to pour forth his trust in God as to the destinies of the dead, while he conjectures that they may be ordained in some way to help the living.

> "They are taken away for some purpose surely; their gifts are not lost to us; their soaring minds, the fire of their contemplations, the sanctity of their desires, the vigour of their faith, the sweetness and gentleness of their affections, were not given without an object. Yea, doubtless, they are keeping up the perpetual chant in the shrine above, praying and praising God day and night in His Temple, like Moses upon the Mount, while Joshua and his host fight with Amalek."

This Newman may possibly have called "trust" and not "faith"*: but it seems to savour far more of real faith than did his determined acceptance of the doctrine—whether Pusey's, or Patristic, or both—about "respite" and the "lower state of favour," and the "suspension of sins." And this feeling of fundamental trust in God—though not always, perhaps, consciously present in his heart, and still less frequently expressed in the printed pages of his sermons—may have been far more often manifest to those who then heard him than to those who now read him, and may largely account for the wholesome influence attested by so many of his hearers. "Here," they said to themselves, "is a man who, in his heart, believes in God." Some of them perhaps added, "He believes, or thinks he believes, a great many hard sayings about God which we cannot accept; but that matters little. The point for us is that he believes in God, and that, in his presence we too feel better able to believe." Some went far beyond this. "My creed," said one of his followers, who will soon attract more of our attention, "is extremely simple, *Credo in Newmannum.*" He meant, of course, "I have been helped to believe in God by Newman, so that, while believing in him, I am as it were believing in God." Yet, however we may water down this strong saying, there remains in it enough of the dangerous. It is a bad thing when a crowd "believes" in a political orator rather than in a cause; but a much worse, when the orator is a preacher, and the cause is spiritual truth. Generally we blame an orator of that captivating character, who centres the thoughts of his audience on himself and not on something higher. Was Newman to blame that some of the young Oxford men, after hearing him at St. Mary's, went back to their rooms saying "I believe in Newman"?

Nothing in his printed sermons would suggest that he was to blame. He called himself, as we have seen above, a "rhetorician." And he certainly had an irrepressible instinct for discerning at a glance all the audacious assertions, and all the frank admissions, by which he could strengthen his position, because he could justify the former, and more than neutralize the latter—wholly ignoring any really weak point in his case or weak link in his argument. Yet, in his sermons, he is never guilty of popular rhetoric. If he deceives others, it is never without first deceiving himself. A great gulf divides him from the popular orator. The orator addresses the multitude; but

Newman, even when speaking *to* his hearers, is almost always really speaking to God *about* himself and them. The political speaker is said to reproduce in rain what he has gathered in mist from the audience whose opinions, while appearing to guide, he largely obeys; but the preacher we are considering, mostly speaks as though there were no audience at all, discoursing about *facts*, as they are—as an explorer might describe seas unknown to others—about shoals, rocks, quicksands, engulfing whirlpools. The former courts the favour of his hearers: the latter seems ever on his guard against the charge of pleasing them or even falling in with their opinions. If he does not offend them, or startle them, or make them uneasy or afraid, he has done nothing; nay, he has done worse than nothing; he has been false to his trust. One who heard him has told us that the preacher's "eyes were bent upon his sermon." But a later witness, who lived for seven years under the same roof with him, adds something that means more than this. "Newman," he says, "never saw his congregation."*

That is trebly true. The preacher's bodily and mental and spiritual faculties were all concentrated upon invisible things, not upon visible human beings. An illustration of this may be drawn from that most subjective of novels, *Callista*, in which Newman himself clearly speaks through the Christian priest, Cæcilius. When the priest is attempting to convert her, the pagan heroine abruptly reproaches him with soliloquizing instead of addressing her: "Father, you are thinking of yourself and not of me"; to which he replies, that when he is pleading for souls to God, he desires to feel alone with God, nothing intervening. It is in this mood that Newman for the most part preaches. The *words preach;* but the *preacher* is not preaching, but *pleading*—"solus cum solo": for himself first, and then for others; for humanity, in, or with, himself. Hence it is that, although he is always thinking about himself while preaching, yet it is without the slightest trace of that conceit which Arnold (so Newman tells us) wrongly imputed to him. He is anxiously revolving his own problems and doubts and dangers, not his privileges or successes. If his friend lies dying, he comforts himself with the thought of the mission of the dead to the living; if his own life seems a tissue of disappointments, he exhorts himself with a sermon on Jeremiah; if the woods of Dartington tempt him to forsake his pilgrim lot, he reminds himself that the pleasant sights of this world are "to try us." Or, to look forward a little, if his Party is prosperous and making a noise, and a little too much noise, in the world, we shall find him preaching about "unreal words"; and when he receives the first ghost-like summons to Rome, he tosses to and fro the questionings of his doubting heart in the sermon on "Divine calls."

How came it to pass, then, that a teacher, so intent on truth, caused some of his followers to fasten their belief, not on the truth, but on himself? So far as this happened, it was the system, not the conceit of the teacher that was to blame. "The truth," as Newman preached it, did not require his hearers to use their own thoughts, but rather to beware of thinking. It bade them be docile; believe on authority; distrust their own powers of judging; do certain acts; repeat certain words; and, by means of these doings and these repetitions, it encouraged them to hope that they might, in time, believe. Hence, a frank and honest man, when called on to accept a great mass of propositions (many of them new, or regarded in a new light), feeling that he could not honestly say he believed all this, and yet feeling a strong confidence that the preacher could not be deceived, thought that the best description of his creed was, "I believe in Newman." A short creed, indeed, but not "extremely simple." How little those who committed themselves to it knew to what they were committed! Compared with this unwilling misguider, the most fallacious of Sirens was but a beginner in deceits. All the more deceitful, because so unwilling to deceive; so complex and tortuous in reality, yet so fatally attractive by an obvious transparency of thought and superficial smoothness of expression—here was a leader who seemed to see clearly whatever he spoke about, yet in reality saw but one step before him, and not always even that. Yet are the language and the grammar of religion, and especially of a new and reformed religion, of so very elementary a nature that the teacher can afford to be but one or two lessons in advance of his pupils? Was not Tractarianism an affair of books? And was not Newman undertaking to teach it before he had "prepared his books"? What was the difference between him and other teachers who attempt to teach what they have not yet themselves learned?

There was this great difference. In Newman there was a something that he had not learned, yet knew without learning, and could communicate to those who were in sympathy with him, not by written but by spoken words. In his voice some heard echoes of truths from distances far beyond the reach of their own souls—truths cold, and pitiless, and painful to hear, but still truths, and therefore not to be neglected. His countenance seemed to reflect a light, terrible sometimes and awful, yet at least not of this world, a light that showed them to themselves, and made them shudder at the sight. Through him some felt that they had been irresistibly drawn out of their old carnal and contemptible existence into a purer and nobler, if somewhat sombre, region, whence there was good hope that they might rise in time still higher towards that ineffable Holiness beneath whose shadow the preacher himself seemed to stand, pleading for himself and them. These, owing to him their own better selves, would not deny him their future selves. Out of him they were—what they were loth to think of. In him they seemed to be near God. Believing in him, they thought they believed in God. What more? Whithersoever he might hereafter draw them, thither they had no choice but to follow.

CHAPTER XXI

THE FIRST TRACTARIAN ATTACK

§ 85. *Timing the assault*

Dr. Hampden has come before us already. In the struggle between the Provost and Tutors of Oriel, he it was whom the former called in as a lecturer, and thereby gained the victory. He had succeeded Whately as Principal of St. Alban Hall, and was identified with him in religious opinions. In 1832 he had delivered the Bampton Lectures. They had attracted no special attention at the time, but were of a liberal tendency, and replete with learning. In 1834 he was appointed to the Professorship of Moral Philosophy, against Newman, who had sought the office for the sake of its influence.* Subsequently he had taken an active part in advocating the admission of Dissenters to the University of Oxford. It was not surprising, therefore—not, at least, to the outside world—that when the death of Dr. Burton (in the winter of 1835) threw open the Regius Professorship of Divinity, the Prime Minister nominated Hampden to fill the vacancy.

But to the Tractarians it came as a shock. We have seen that it was a part of their policy to organize petitions against appointing "lax men" to high posts in the Church. Accordingly, as soon as he heard that Hampden was thought of, Newman urged both Pusey and Keble to do what they could to prevent his appointment. He himself got up at Oxford a petition to the King, which he forwarded to the Archbishop. An unofficial reply from Rose, the Archbishop's chaplain, informed Newman that every step had been taken to rescue the University from this evil, but the determination of the Prime Minister was too strong. In his official answer, the Archbishop "retained" the petition, saying that "it was desirable to avoid so strong a step as presenting it." A separate protest from Pusey to Lord Melbourne was received with a rebuff. Newman now resolved to appeal to the Oxford Convocation. They could not turn the Professor out, but they might stigmatize him and force him to resign. He had already made preparations. Two days after the appointment had been announced, he had begun (10 February) a "pamphlet against Hampden," and "sat up all night at it." Three days afterwards it was in the hands of those who were to be asked to condemn the new Professor.

It was entitled *Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements*, as set forth in his Bampton Lectures (and in some *Observations* subsequently published). Hampden's lectures had been delivered in 1832. They were now, for the first time, attacked in 1836. To this delay the opponents of the Tractarians pointed as a proof that the attack was prompted by mere spite. But this was certainly not the case. In 1832 Newman and Froude, the two fighting spirits of the Party, were out of health, and on the point of leaving England; the Party itself had not yet been organized; Whately had not yet incurred their enmity, and Hampden, Whately's ally, seemed hardly heterodox enough, or important enough, to need opposition; Bampton Lectures were presumably orthodox, mostly dull, and took time to read and digest; and Newman —abroad, or occupied with the Movement, in 1833— would not be likely to have read them till 1834 or 1835. I shall give reasons hereafter for thinking that he probably did not read them till 1836.* But assume that he read them in 1834 or 1835, and found them heterodox. Still, it was rather late to attack them; and, having delayed so long, he might naturally have refrained from attacking them altogether, but for the following unforeseen incident.

In 1834 there had been a debate in the House of Commons on a Bill for the admission of Dissenters to the University of Oxford, and Newman had been vehement in getting up petitions against it. In the following year an attempt had been made in the Oxford Convocation to obtain their admission by a compromise. Undergraduates were to be released from the obligation to subscribe the Thirty-nine Articles and were simply to sign a Declaration of Conformity to the Church of England. This had been defeated by a majority of 459 to 57; and the Tractarians had been prominent on the winning side. But Hampden, who had all along actively supported the admission of Dissenters, had sent a pamphlet of his, in favour of the measure (November 1834) to Newman, who had frankly replied that, while acknowledging "the tone of piety" † in which it was written, he strenuously objected to its principles and regarded it as a declaration of war. The Government, therefore, seemed now to be forcing Hampden's appointment on the University as a punishment for their resistance. It was in this light, at all events, that the Tractarians regarded it—as a challenge from the enemies of the Church. Why, they asked, should they not meet it? Last year they had contributed a small but energetic contingent to the victorious side. Why should they not now take the field again, and try, by discrediting Hampden, to beat the Government and Liberalism a second time? There was nothing blameworthy either in the attempt, or in the time chosen for the attempt. It was a party fight. The only question is, whether the battle was fought fairly. To answer that question, we must take a view of Hampden's position.

§ 86. *Hampden's Bampton Lectures*

The controverted Bampton Lectures may be described briefly as an extreme statement of what every one knows to be laid down in the Anglican Articles, viz., that the Scriptures alone are to be accepted as the basis of Christian dogma; that General Councils (*i.e.*, the Church) may err, and have erred, "even in things pertaining to God"; that even those venerable monuments of ancient Christian faith, the Creeds themselves, are to be accepted, not because they have been handed down by the Church, but because "they may be proved by most certain warrant of holy Scripture"; that the Church is "a *witness* and *keeper* of Holy Writ" (and, by implication, *not* an infallible *interpreter*); that nothing is to be thought requisite or necessary to salvation unless it is "read in" the Scriptures, "or may be proved thereby"; that the Churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, Antioch, and Rome (and no exception is made of the Church of England) have erred, not only as to discipline and ceremonies, but also "in matters of Faith."

Proceeding on these lines, Dr. Hampden drew a marked distinction between the statements on matters of faith in the Bible, and those in Creeds, or Articles. The former he called "facts"; the latter he called "doctrines"—a somewhat pedantical use of the words, not to be defended in point of style (except perhaps in a University sermon), but not likely to deceive any educated person who had read a dozen pages in his Lectures consecutively. He had mainly in his mind—and the very title* of his Lecture showed this—the vocabulary, and the logical deductions of the Schoolmen. The impress, he said, of the technical or scholastic terms, and of the Aristotelian Logic, with which theologians and Schoolmen had made war against the heretics of different ages, stamped the later Creeds and the ecclesiastical formularies of all Churches, not excepting the Anglican, with an inferiority and inadequacy which distinguished them from the directly inspired language of Scripture. Creeds and Articles, he fully admitted, were necessary; but it was because of the infirmity of human nature, and the need of some order and unity in each Church; they could not claim equality with the propositions of Scripture. The three Creeds, and the Anglican Articles, he himself frankly received; and since it would have been dishonest *for him* to reject them, he admitted—and here his reasoning is curiously similar to that of Froude's quoted above—that *for him* the Creeds contained things "necessary to salvation."

But he refused to make the same assertion about *other* Christians. If men received the "facts" of Scripture, that is to say, not the mere historical facts, but all the statements of Scripture about the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost, the Atonement, the Lord's

Supper, Baptism, the Forgiveness of Sins, the Resurrection, the Judgment, he could not deny to them the name of Christians, although they might interpret these "facts," and draw inferences from these "facts," in a manner that seemed to him erroneous. No one can fail to see the application of these views to the admission of Dissenters to the Universities. They, as well as Anglicans, were all to be covered under the common term of "Bible Christians," differing widely among themselves in discipline, ceremonies, and perhaps even in matters of faith, but not so differing that Churchmen could say to Nonconformists, "We deny your right to use the name of Christian, for you have no real part or lot in Christ."

It is not our business to attack or defend this position. If it were, I should prefer to attack it as illogical, and to defend it as Anglican, charitable, and, on the whole, working fairly well. The briefest dialectic would show the inconsistency of the theory. But, against dialectic, common sense might make answer, for the framers of the Articles, "What would you have? You must begin somewhere. Even in science you must assume your own existence and the existence of matter. What would you have liked us to begin with in religion—attempting as we were to build up the National Church on the sixteenth century? With Tradition? It had been distorted and corrupted. With the Churches? They had brought us to idolatries and purchaseable forgiveness of sins. We thought we would try the Bible—nay, we will even admit that we practically based our new system on the English version of the Bible, as being a great religious reality appealing to the national conscience. Indirectly, we felt that we should be quite enough influenced by the Churches and Traditions, even though we rejected their direct influence. We therefore took the Bible as the legal basis for our National Church; and, having regard to the mischief of Tradition, we would not impose even the Creeds themselves as *having been once* proved from Scripture, but we imposed them as to be believed because they *may be* proved from Scripture. And this is what we meant when, in our Twentieth Article, we gave to the Church 'authority in controversies of faith.' By this, we meant that the English Church should from time to time decide what may, and what may not, be *legally taught by its Ministers,* not because the Church is infallible, but because it must keep some kind of order. Thus we established an appeal to 'proof,' and reason, and judgment, for all time, in the English Church. But the Bible was to remain our basis."

How distasteful this "Bible Christianity" was to the Tractarians we know very well: but it does not seem so obvious how they could attack with controversial advantage an exposition that seemed generally in accordance with the first principles of the Anglican Articles. And, besides—as appears from Hampden's Introduction subsequently appended to the second edition of his Lectures—he went, in practice, a little nearer to the Tractarians and a little further from "Bible Christianity" than his strict system allowed. He protested, for example, that such a proposition as that Christ is truly God as well as man, and united the human and divine natures in one Person, is "nothing more than what has been already affirmed in Scripture;" and he added "whatever can be thus argued from Scripture is as true as Scripture is true"—meaning by "thus argued," that kind of argument in which the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises.

This was inconsistent. It would have been more consistent to have said that the language of St. Paul, or St. John, or St. James, or St. Peter, or of our Lord Himself, in stating divine truths, was so immeasurably more adequate to the truths than any human interpretative, or deductive, expressions of them, that the latter *could not possibly be regarded as so true as the former*; the latter must always bear the stamp of inadequacy. Now what is inadequate must, to some extent, give a false impression and be untrue. All later ecclesiastical statements therefore about spiritual things ought to be declared by a strict "Bible Christian" to be not quite faithful to the truth, and indeed to be (relatively) untrue. If Hampden had said that, he would have been consistent, and would have at once laid himself open to the cry, "Dr. Hampden declares that the Creeds are *untrue*." That he did not *mean* this, would not have prevented the outcry. That he did not *say* it, was—at first sight, and to ordinary minds—something of a difficulty.

§ 87. *Newman's "Elucidations"*

But it was not a difficulty to Newman, "sitting up all night" at his *Elucidations*. He swooped at once on the enemy's weak point. Hampden had not been heterodox from the Anglican point of view; but he had been pedantical—or at least too learned for the non-resident members of an Oxford Convocation. He had used the word "facts" to mean *spiritual* facts, spiritual realities, as distinct from scholastic speculations or theories. The very title of his lectures, "The Scholastic Philosophy considered in its relation to Christian Theology," might have prepared any ordinary reader for a somewhat scholastic use of terms:

and Hampden, perhaps, had fondly imagined that any one who would take the trouble to read his lectures would also try to understand his meaning. Indeed for any one desiring to get information from them the sense of the term is patent.

No fair critic could quote a page of Hampden's remarks on "facts," without doing one of two things. He must either do as Dean Church always does, put the word in inverted commas; or else he must explain that Hampden meant to use the word in a philosophic sense, meaning spiritual realities. Doing either of these things, he might then, fairly enough, have scoffed at the pedantry of the new Regius Professor of Divinity whom the Government proposed to inflict on the Oxford youth. A third course was open, decidedly unfair—to use the word "facts" without any warning as to its peculiar meaning, and with the result of puzzling all and misleading most. Newman did none of these things. He resorted to a fourth course, even more unfair than that last mentioned—so unfair or else so careless, that, whatever may be the explanation, it must always form one of the most discreditable incidents in his life. Stating Hampden's theory about "facts," *he inserted the word "historical"*!

This he does at the very outset; which alone would suffice to make the whole of his pamphlet fatally fallacious even though he did not repeat the error. It is—to use one of Newman's own controversial phrases which he used with such effect against Kingsley—a veritable "poisoning of the wells." But, that the reader may have the means of judging for himself, I will quote the first nine lines of the *Elucidations*, simply italicizing, after Newman's controversial fashion, the important words:—

"Here first it is necessary to explain Dr. H.'s views concerning Theological Statements.

"He considers that the only belief necessary for a Christian, as such, is belief that the Scripture is the word of God; that no statement whatever, even though correctly deduced from the text of Scripture, is part of the revelation; that no right conclusions about theological truth can be drawn from Scripture; that Scripture is *a mere record of historical facts.*"

Subsequently he again interpolates the misleading word in a passage in which Dr. Hampden is made to declare the Apostles' Creed to be "defensible only when considered as a record of *historical facts.*" Yet such further "poisonings" were hardly necessary. The reader had been led hopelessly astray from the very beginning: and by inserting (for the third time) the words "historical and moral," but omitting the word "spiritual," the writer misleads him to the very end, till he reaches the following "*conclusion,*" as he calls it, in which I again italicize the important words:—

"*Conclusion.*

"Dr. H.'s views then seem at length to issue in the following theory: that there is one and only one truth; that that truth is the record of facts, *historical and moral*, contained in the text of Scripture; that whatever is beyond that text, even to the classifying of its sentences, is human opinion, and unrevealed; that, though a thoughtful person cannot help forming opinions upon the Scripture record, and is bound to act upon and confess these opinions which he considers to be true, yet he has no right to identify his own opinion on any point, however sacred in itself, with the facts of the revealed *history*. . . ."

Besides thus putting the reader on a wrong scent by inserting what Hampden did *not* say, Newman also omits what Hampden *did* say; with the result of making him appear to say what he did *not* say. Thus —whereas Hampden is at some pains to distinguish the Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity from the technical language in which it has been expressed in later times, and describes "*the truth of the Trinitarian doctrine*" as *emerging* "from these mists of speculation" *like land from fog*—Newman omits all this; inserts nothing but Hampden's attack on the "speculative" doctrine; and then leaves the reader to infer that Hampden practically *rejects the doctrine altogether.* Commenting on these tactics, Arnold, in the *Edinburgh Review*, declared that "these omissions happen so unluckily to fall upon passages which would have altered the whole tone and character of the quotations, that there is no possibility of acquitting the compiler of deliberate dishonesty." I do not accept this judgment. But the reader may be glad to see Hampden's statement in full, with the omitted portions bracketed:—

> "[The examination then, I would observe, has forcibly impressed on my mind the conviction, that the principal, if not *the only, difficulties* on the doctrine of the Trinity, arise from metaphysical considerations—from abstractions of our own mind, quite distinct from the proper, intrinsic, mystery of the holy truth in itself. Perplexities from the nature of Number, of Time, of Being; in short, all those various conceptions of the mind which are its ultimate facts, and beyond which no power of analysis can reach; these, I think, the course of the present inquiry has tended to show, are our real stumbling-block, causing the wisdom of God to be received as the foolishness of man. These have forced themselves on the form of the Divine Mystery, and given it that theoretic air, that atmosphere of repulsion, in which it is invested.
>
> "The truth itself of the Trinitarian doctrine emerges from these mists of human speculation, like the bold, naked land, on which an atmosphere of fog has for awhile rested, and then been dispersed.] No one can be more convinced than I am, that there is a real mystery of God revealed in the Christian dispensation; and that no scheme of Unitarianism can solve the whole of the phenomena which Scripture records. But I am also as fully sensible, that

there is a mystery attached to the subject, which is not a mystery of God.

"Take, for instance, the notion of the Divine Unity. We are apt to conceive that the Unity must be understood numerically;[1] that we may reason from the notion of Unity, to the properties of the Divine Being. But is this a just notion of the Unity of God? [Is it not rather a bare fact, a limit of speculation, instead of a point of outset? For how was it revealed in that system, in which it was the great leading article of divine instruction? When Moses called upon the people:—'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord:' —was it not a declaration, that Jehovah is not that host of heaven,—that multiplicity of the objects of divine worship, which heathen idolatry has enshrined, but the God in heaven, and in the earth, and in the sea,—not the Teraphim of domestic worship, but the Universal Governor, overshadowing all things with the ubiquarian tutelage of his Providence?] Surely the revelation of the Divine Unity was not meant to convey to Israel any speculative notion of the oneness of the Deity; but, *practically*, to influence their minds in regard to the superstitions from which they had been brought out. [It was no other than the command, 'Thou shalt have no other Gods but me']."

Although "deliberate dishonesty" is not the explanation of these omissions, they are certainly somewhat unfair, even in themselves; and all the more when considered in conjunction with Newman's effective comment—in which he declares that Hampden regards the doctrines of the Trinity and incarnation as merely "unrevealed opinions" and "pious deductions." He also catches at Hampden's antique phrase, "solve the phenomena which Scripture records," to suggest that the lecturer regards them, *not as realities but as "phenomena," i.e.*, mere appearances. Again, he describes his opponent as admitting that "there is some mystery," but what it is, "is not revealed"* ; Hampden declares, he says, that it is "not scriptural or necessary to insist upon the numerical or real unity of the Supreme Being." Here, by the audacious insertion of "real," he altogether misses, or ignores, the fact that Hampden *did* insist upon the *real* unity, but protested that the merely numerical unity was *not* the "real" one, which was of a spiritual nature. What the Lecture is attacking, is not the doctrines, but the later metaphysical expositions of the doctrines, as may be seen by its conclusion, in which Augustine is quoted as confessing himself unable to distinguish between "begotten" and "proceeding" when applied to the "Persons" in the Trinity :

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[1] "In Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.* 45, p. 417, the question is proposed, 'If the nature of God is simple, how will it admit the number three?' &c.

"Again, 'Integer, perfectus numerus Trinitatis est.' *Concil. Sirmiens.* A.D. 357. Hilar. *De Synodis*, Opera, p. 466.—Πρὸς δὲ καὶ φυσικῇ ἀνάγκῃ μονάδα εἶναι δυάδος ἀρχήν. Damasc. *De Fid. Orthod.* I. c. 5.

"The Valentinian system was a play of numbers. The Pythagorean part of Platonism, the philosophy of Numbers, it cannot be doubted must have exercised great influence over the minds of the early philosophic Christians. So also would the Jewish mystical application of Numbers, on the converts from Judaism."

> "The only ancient, only Catholic, truth is the Scriptural fact. Let us hold that fast in its depth and breadth—in nothing extenuating, in nothing abridging it—in simplicity and sincerity ; and we can neither be Sabellians, or Tritheists, or Socinians. Attempt to explain, to satisfy scruples, to reconcile difficulties ; and the chance is, that, however we may disclaim the heterodoxy which lurks on every step of our path, we incur, at least, the scandal at the hands of others, whose piety, or prejudices, or acuteness, may be offended by our words.
>
> "I should hope the discussions in which we have now been engaged, will leave this impression on the mind. Historically regarded they evidence the reality of those sacred facts of Divine Providence which we comprehensively denote by the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity. But let us not identify this reality with the theories couched under a logical phraseology. I firmly and devoutly believe that word, which has declared the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. But who can pretend to that exactness of thought on the subject, on which our technical language is based?

Looking to the simple truth of Scripture, I would say, in the language of Augustine : *Hæc scio. Distinguere autem inter illam Generationem et hanc Processionem, nescio, non valeo, non sufficio.*[1]*— Verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur.*"[2]

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[1] "*Contra Maximin.*" III. p. 237. 4to. ed

[2] "*De Trin.* VII. c. 4."

CHAPTER XXII

VICTORY

§ 88. *Which side was the more Anglican?*

USING the word Tradition in its broadest sense, many who may not sympathize with Newman in this assault, may feel some sympathy with his cause. We may admire Hampden's charitableness, and yet doubt whether the Bible-Christian theory, however useful once, is well fitted for the present age. It worked well for the sixteenth century, but will it work for the twentieth? The Reformers had to repair, or rebuild, and that in haste, a Church that was partly falling, partly already in ruins; to patch, to touch up, prop, besides pulling down what seemed quite unsound and building the fragments into the restored edifice. For them, nothing could be better than to take the Bible as the basis for religious doctrine, and the whole nation (not the clergy merely) as the judge of such interpretations of the Bible as any man must accept if he was to receive the authority of the nation with the view of publicly teaching religious truth in a national pulpit. They could not have *said* this; for it would have been an anachronism. But this was what they *did*.

But in 1832 it was time, perhaps, to go further than this. The hour had almost arrived when it was needful to add that Christian Tradition is the handing on, from age to age, not only of the letter, but also of the interpretation of the Christian Scriptures, and this, not always without some change; so that "interpreting" the Bible might include revising or re-editing the Bible. Hampden's views tended rather in the opposite direction. His marked distinction between the "facts," or realities, of Scripture, and the speculative deductions of interpreters, would lead us to lay more stress than ever on the former as the sole depository of religious truth. This would confirm many in the belief that every word of the Bible was so dictated to its writer by God Himself as to be spiritually or morally true if it related to matters of spiritual or moral truth; and historically or scientifically true if it bore on facts of history or science. It may be urged that, as against the Tractarians, this view was not distinctively Hampden's: they held it as well, and Newman as decidedly as any of them. But they supplemented it so as to prepare the way for something different. They admitted that some of their most cherished beliefs could not be found in Scripture, unless Scripture were interpreted by Tradition. Practically therefore they did—what Froude was prepared to do in theory as well as in practice—they agreed that Tradition must be accepted, not only as the "witness" and "keeper," but also as the "interpreter," of Scripture.

In this way they did good, though unintentionally. Some of them would have liked to confine "Tradition" to the first three or four centuries; but when the principle was once admitted, this arbitrary limitation became difficult. Pressed by Rome, on the one side, and by rational Christians on the other, what answer could they make to the questions, "Why stop at the fourth century?" "Why stop at the fourteenth or fifteenth?" "Why at the eighteenth?" Thus, we may imagine an ultra-Traditionist cordially accepting Tradition, but stating his views somewhat to this effect: "Tradition is doctrine so based on experience and reason as to obtain acceptance of a kind that does not necessitate constant appeal to private judgment; and this must not be limited to any century nor to any people, nor to any class:— not, for example, to Greeks or Romans of the later Empire, nor to the clergy merely. Even in the nineteenth century a 'tradition' may be established; and Englishmen and Germans may help to establish it. And the laity may play their part. Scripture must be interpreted by Tradition; but 'interpreted' must be used freely and amply so as to include more or less modification in the light of fresh discoveries. Thus, some expressions that have been supposed to be literal or historical may have to be regarded as metaphorical, or poetical, or inaccurate; others that were regarded as inaccurate may be shown to be literally true. Precepts, again, that may apply in the letter to one age, may apply in the spirit alone to another. And the moral judgments of some of the Scriptural writers may, under the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit, be perceived not only to be wrong for us now, but even to have been wrong for the writers then." As a preparation for such a view of the Scriptures as this, the Tractarian attack on Dr. Hampden was indirectly not without some use.

But it is altogether a different question whether the Tractarians as a whole, and Newman in particular, deserved to triumph on the purely Anglican merits of the case. To speak, first, of the Tractarians. They, on their side, might complain that, whereas Hampden had pledged himself to belief in the Athanasian Creed, he practically rejected it. For the Creed repeatedly says that whoever "will be saved" must "think about the Trinity" as the Creed dictates, and that this is "necessary to everlasting salvation"; but Hampden declared that belief in this detailed and technical exposition, although, in a way, "necessary" for his own salvation—because he believes it and would be acting dishonestly if he professed to reject it—yet is not "necessary" for the salvation of those who, with equal honesty, cannot find these propositions either in Scripture, or in any conclusive deductions from Scripture. So far, the Tractarians appear to be the more orthodox. And perhaps they may also seem to be more consistent: for it certainly does seem absurd to say, "Such and such a belief is *'necessary' for the salvation of those who believe it, but not 'necessary' for the salvation of those who disbelieve it.*"

Yet Hampden would have a defence, too, and, from the Anglican point of view, not a bad one. As to orthodoxy, he might reply that, in the Anglican Church, the Anglican reasons given for the acceptance of the Athanasian Creed indicate an ultimate appeal to Scripture; and that plain and simple people—who heartily accept all Scripture, but cannot even understand the meaning of the Athanasian Creed; much less, understand the proof of it *from* Scripture; least of all, find it *in* Scripture—cannot be supposed to be condemned to "perish everlastingly" on account of their inability. More forcibly still, he might argue that the Anglican Church claims no more infallibility for herself, even as to "matters of faith," than she allows to the Churches of Antioch, Alexandria, and Rome; so that, even when she says to her members, "Believe this, or perish everlastingly," she always adds *sotto voce*, "But, remember, I may be in error as to any matter of faith, and therefore as to this." Hence, at the worst—he might argue—all Anglican threats of damnation are always to be taken as merely conditional or provisional. Besides, as against the Tractarian leaders, if he had access to the cabinet in which Newman kept Froude's letters, Hampden might have said that his position with reference to "things necessary to salvation" was precisely the same, in principle, as that of Froude. For Froude had said that everything that a man honestly believed was "necessary" for *his* (the believer's) salvation, and nothing was "necessary," *for him*, that *he* could not honestly believe; but that the Church might impose certain beliefs as necessary *terms of Communion*. "This," Hampden might have said, "is precisely my view. Only, whereas Froude would have accepted every clause in the Athanasian Creed as 'necessary' in this sense, and would have 'waived' the *Articles*, I, being an Anglican, prefer to 'waive' some of the Athanasian clauses and abide by the Anglican Articles: and this I conceive to be, from the Anglican point of view, the more orthodox of the two positions."

This seems plausible. Nevertheless there remains the obstinate fact that every Anglican minister who takes Froude's and Hampden's view of these apparently uncharitable expressions in the Athanasian Creed does so explain them as to explain them away. It would be better to disuse the words than to use them thus. On the whole, let us say that, as between Hampden and the Tractarians, the Anglican merits of the case are about evenly balanced.

§ 89. *Did the Victor fight fairly?*

But we can hardly say the same as between Hampden and Newman. Of these two, there can be no doubt that the former was by far the more faithful to the spirit of the Anglican Articles ; and the latter ought to have at least tempered the fierceness of his attack by recognizing this. Newman must have been conscious that his *Via Media* depended upon an ability in his new Anglican Church to say to Dissenters, "We are, in matters of faith, practically speaking, infallible ; within our pale, you are safe ; step outside it, and we cannot call you even Christians." But he knew also that this was totally antagonistic to the Article which declared that General Councils have erred and may err "in matters pertaining to God." So well did he know this that we shall presently find him explaining away that Article by asserting that it *did not apply to General Councils called together in the name of Christ*—an evasion so gross that even his devoted follower W. G. Ward could not accept it, nor has Dean Church found himself able to defend it.

Moreover, even in the haste in which he composed his *Elucidations*, it was unpardonable in him to take advantage of Hampden's disparagement of the metaphysical and numerical expositions of the doctrine of the Trinity in order to suggest that his opponent had no *practical* belief in the doctrine at all. His own experience of the results of pondering over these mysteries ought to have made him more charitable. When he was writing and re-writing *The Arians*, he himself had been "fussed" and "fagged" in those labyrinthine speculations. To such straits had he been driven that he hardly ventured to make an assertion, and had confessed to a friend that he should resort to "hypotheticals" in dealing with the Incarnation and the Trinity: "your *if*," he had said, "is a great peacemaker." Did it become one living in a house so transparently fragile to be so prominent and so violent in throwing stones at a fellow-theologian who honestly confessed that, though he believed the doctrine in a spiritual sense, he could not accept all the technical phraseology with which it had been enveloped by a polemical scholasticism borrowing the language of Aristotle to confute heresy?

Still, Newman's flagrant fault is the controversial unfairness with which he poisoned the minds of those who read his *Elucidations* by the insertions and omissions which have been mentioned above. Some allowance must be made, perhaps, for the indirect effect of political feeling at Oxford in connection with the proposed admission of Dissenters to the University, and for Newman's sense of "provocation." Certainly, in these days, it would be thought shocking to quote extracts from an opponent and *to omit passages without inserting marks of omission*: yet Newman, in two consecutive quotations, makes three* such unnoticed omissions (I have not searched for more). Yet even for that polemical age the collective injustice of Newman's *Elucidations* was too gross. What Arnold said of it, has been quoted above, imputing "deliberate dishonesty" to the author; but Arnold was not only a theological opponent but also personally unacquainted with Newman's character. Far more surprising is the testimony of Whately. Partisan though he may have been, up to certain limits, Whately was nevertheless a man in whom the logical element was more potent that any polemics; and he was pre-eminently just. If Newman, by fair logical measures, could have convicted Hampden of heresy, Whately might have extenuated the fault, or censured the criticism as bitter and spiteful: but he could hardly have brought against Hampden's opponents, and against Newman in particular, the following accusations:—

> "A 'pure and holy man' is one who fasts twice in the week but neglects the weightier matters of the law, 'judgment and justice and mercy.' I think the 'holy men' who garbled and distorted Hampden's Bampton Lectures with the deliberate design of holding him up to the hatred and persecution of unthinking bigots, are the genuine descendants of those Roman Emperors who dressed up the early Christians in the skins of beasts and then set dogs at them to worry them to death."

And again in a letter to Hawkins in 1843:—

> "It is several years now since the *Elucidations* of Hampden was published; and I cannot conceive anyone either writing or reading that tissue of deliberate and artful misrepresentations (comparing it with Hampden's own volume) without perceiving—unless he were a downright fool—that it consisted of the 'suppressio veri' so contrived as to amount to the 'suggestio falsi'—the kind of lies which Swift justly calls the worst, 'a lie guarded.' The author and the approvers of such a work (as many as were acquainted with Hampden's) could have nothing to learn from the 'Slanderer' himself."

Archdeacon Hare is another witness, not indeed against the *Elucidations*, but for the value and general orthodoxy of Hampden's work. He wrote twelve years after the controversy, when people had time to review it coolly; and he speaks of it as "learned and thoughtful," and as distinguished by "philosophical candour and sobriety." Hampden's use of the word "facts" he regards as "one of the chief causes of the suspicion he has incurred"; and he says that "in preaching to a common congregation" it would have been very injudicious to use such a term in any other than its ordinary sense; but, "as he was preaching to the University of Oxford, he thought he might assume that, notwithstanding their adherence to the philosophy of Aristotle, they would understand the Baconian use of the word which the context in several places plainly sets forth": and then he quotes from the Lectures a passage about "those sacred *facts* of Divine Providence which we comprehensively denote by the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity." Proceeding to discuss some of the documents circulated by Hampden's enemies in 1836 as summaries, or as condemnations, of his lectures, he conclusively shows their unfairness, and charges them with "effrontery," "clamour on the part of the accusers, ignorance on that of their hearers," describes some of their propositions as "dishonest," and goes through the detailed process of "untying one knot of falsehood after another." This evidence is rendered important by the character and learning of the writer, his detachment from the time and scene of the original conflict, and his careful study of the Lectures. The reader will note that, although he makes no mention of the *Elucidations*, he indirectly condemns it by censuring its chief fault, that is, the misrepresentation of Hampden as having said that Scripture is *a mere record of historical facts*.

Francis Newman (who tells us that he, too, had been misled by his brother's *Elucidations*) adds an interesting story about Samuel Wilberforce and his change of opinion as to the merits of the controversy. About a dozen years after he had been attacked as a Professor, it was Hampden's fate to rouse a second controversy as a prospective bishop. Samuel Wilberforce, then Bishop of Oxford, came up on a visit to Hawkins, prepared to listen favourably to a protest from the clergy against Hampden's consecration—and this, simply on the same grounds on which, as a curate, he had voted against Hampden in 1836. He had read Newman's *Elucidations.* It had seemed conclusive. There appeared no need to read the Lectures, and he had never read them. In answer to the Provost's remonstrance, he said that he could trust Newman for the facts and quotations, and that they spoke for themselves; there was no answering them. But he was persuaded to spend an evening over the Lectures, and that evening convinced him that he had been grossly deceived.

§ 90. *The result*

If this was the case with two men of such ability and opportunities for getting information, we may easily understand that a good many of the country clergy who flocked up to Oxford to support the Church of England by voting against heresy, were not only deceived at the time but never undeceived. Was it in accordance with human nature to buy and read an expensive book, and what might seem to most of them a dull book—a book of 548 pages, written by an enemy—when they could read all of it that was necessary for their purpose in a pamphlet of 47 pages, containing the objectionable passages in large, clear, print and in separate paragraphs; with a summary of them, in still larger and clearer print; beginning with an introduction which told them that the Regius Professor of Divinity whom Lord Melbourne intended to inflict on the University, had stated the

Scripture to be "a mere record of historical facts," and ending with the following peroration :—?

> "What may be the issue of the present anxious conflict of opinion in this place, He will order according to His wisdom, who has promised that all things shall work together for good for those who love Him. But should it end in the appointment of Dr. H. to the theological Chair, he* believes that ten years hence, those who are in no way protesting against his appointment now, would, if then alive, feel that they had upon them a responsibility greater than has been incurred by Members of this University for many centuries."

The result was what might have been expected. Hampden indeed became Regius Professor, for the Government would not give way. They did not intend to allow Oxford to exclude Dissenters for ever, and they therefore refused to accept the resignation which he placed in their hands. But, as far as Oxford was concerned, the Tractarians gained a complete victory. The *Elucidations* elucidated Hampden most effectively, and this, not only for the country clergy but for the residents also*. The Heads of Houses brought in a proposal to stigmatize the new Professor by depriving him of his vote in the choice of Select Preachers till the University should otherwise determine. The veto of the Proctors in March served only to delay their triumph ; and in the following May Hampden was formally humiliated by the splendid majority of 474 to 94. I call the triumph a Tractarian one for it was theirs by right. Numerically, the High and Dry, and the Evangelicals, constituted, of course, the larger portion of the victorious band ; to which the Tractarians sent but a small contingent. But the inspiring force had proceeded from the Tractarian Leader. The hands were the hands of the orthodox :

but the voice that had moved them was that of the author of the *Elucidations*.

No rational person, reviewing the facts, can maintain that the victor had fought fairly. But it does not follow that he was guilty of the "deliberate dishonesty" imputed to him by Arnold and Whately. There was very little, if any, more unfairness in the *Elucidations* than in the *Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles*; and in both cases it sprang from mental, rather than from moral deficiency. Subtle and keen though he usually was, there were seasons when Newman lost all patience, all steadiness of thought, all power of suspending judgment. This was always a fault of his when he worked under unusual pressure. At such times he simply *could* not see his adversary's position. Probably he had not read Hampden's Lectures with any attention till he looked at them in order to detect heresy in the newly-appointed Professor. As he broke down in the Schools as an undergraduate, and again as an examiner, and then, once more in his *Arians*, and afterwards in his *Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles*, and after that in his *Essay on Doctrinal Development*; and, in each case, through excessive haste, and inadequate steadiness in persistent preparation, so here: he broke down with a mental rather than a moral collapse, succumbing to theological prejudice, and party spirit, and to the excitement of consciously championing what seemed to be a noble cause, "sitting up all night" and trying to summarize a learned, thoughtful, and scholarlike work of more than 500 pages, in such a way as to ruin the prospects of its author. But he was not "dishonest," nor was he—what Whately suggests as an alternative—a "fool." The true explanation, in the main, of this and some other of Newman's aberrations, was given by Sir James Stephen, as follows:

> "As for Newman himself, I am sorry that his integrity should be impugned. I am convinced that a more upright man does not exist. But his understanding is essentially illogical and inveterately imaginative; and I have reason to fear that he labours under a degree of cerebral excitement, which unfits him for the mastery of his own thoughts and the guidance of his own pen."

Not a week after the *Elucidations* had appeared, Newman wrote to Bowden: "I suppose I shall soon hear something from Hampden in answer to my pamphlet—though that must be in other words, in answer to himself, since I do but quote him." This is, surely, a convincing proof that Newman was not conscious that he had done his adversary any injustice. Yet that he had violated some of the most obvious rules of literary controversy, must be apparent to all who now give five minutes to the dispassionate consideration of the question. The inference is, that on questions of this kind, Newman's conscience did not guide him rightly. He obeyed it, so far as he heard it; but either its voice was silenced by other voices within him, or, if not, then his conscience itself led him wrong, being what he calls somewhere "a sort of bad conscience." Morally, as well as intellectually, neither of these alternatives appears to represent a wholly satisfactory state of mind; for moral honesty cannot say to intellectual dishonesty, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther." But where "cerebral excitement" steps in, there irresponsibility begins; and we gladly acquit Newman of the tremendous charge expressed in Whately's reprobation, by recognizing that in this and other cases, in spite of his skill in logical fence, he was incapable of reasoning fairly upon evidence, when he was under the influence of strong desire.

CHAPTER XXIII

PRESSING FORWARD

§ 91. "*A Cardinal Point of Time*"

"MARCH, 1836," says Newman, reviewing his own career, "is a cardinal point of time." Among other important events which clustered round that "cardinal point," he mentions his mother's death which took place in the following May. Its suddenness, and his consequent inability to exchange last words with her, add to the pathos with which he deplores the recent estrangement between them :—

> "What has been to me distressing in my work, is, that it has been one of the causes which kept me from being much with my mother lately. But there was another cause. I mean of late years my mother has much misunderstood my religious views, and considered she differed from me ; and she thought I was surrounded by admirers, and had everything my own way ; and in consequence I, who am conscious to myself I never thought anything more precious than her sympathy and praise, had none of it."

The editor of the Letters appends a note of explanation. Mrs. Newman, she says, was uniformly kind and amiable to all her children and to their friends ; but the stir and tone of the Movement might well disturb her inner thoughts. She was not constituted to throw herself into it, either by temperament or by circumstance; and she could not give her son what he missed—her sympathy: "He sorrowfully confesses to his sister, looking back, that his manner, under the change, might sometimes ill express what was in his heart."

Deprived of Froude, and now of his mother, with one sister married, and the other to be married a few months afterwards, Newman must have felt alone indeed. Yet he assures his younger sister she must not *think* of him as lonely: "God intends me to be lonely; He has so framed my mind that I am in a great measure beyond the sympathies of other people and thrown upon Himself. . . . God, I trust, will support me in following whither He leads." Similarly to Harriett: "at the worst", he says, he is but returning to the state in which he was before he knew Froude. "Ever since that time"* he had learned to throw himself upon himself; and, after all, life is short; it is "better to be pursuing what seems God's will than to be looking after one's own comfort"; "I am learning more than hitherto to live in the presence of the dead—this is a gain which strange faces cannot take away." How much this feeling of communion with the departed had been growing in Newman may be seen from the only two poems of 1835—the last until we come to the Roman period—both of which bring before us the intercession of the Dead for the Living. There can be no doubt whose voice Newman was henceforth to hear most distinctly amid all the earthly din and uproar of the conflict of the Tracts: it was that of the man whose Breviary—assigned to him by a chance utterance of some friend which he accepted as a message from heaven—lay always on his study table—destined to lie there for half a century, to the possession of which he attached such importance that, besides minutely describing the incident in the *Apologia*, he records it in the Letters, along with his mother's death, as one of nine important events of this critical year:—"my knowing and using the Breviary."

From his youth, Newman took a pleasure in being alone. But whatever was pleasurable he generally suspected as a snare. Hence we might have supposed that he might sometimes regard his love of solitude as a temptation to egotism, self-exaltation, or theological hardness. But the precedents of saintly solitude in the ancient Church—besides the deep and bitter pain attending this new solitude—would dispel such doubts. Thus, therefore, confirmed and hardened in his unsympathetic detachment from the common world by the belief that "God intended it," he plunged with fresh ardour into the battle for the Church. Everything was full of promise. The skirmishing of the Tracts having thinned the enemy's ranks, it was now proposed to complete their rout by the heavier artillery of larger treatises. Attacks were to go on from all quarters. The *Lyra Apostolica* was to be printed; a Library of the Fathers to be started—at Pusey's suggestion, but Newman was to help, and to write the preface; Hurrell Froude's *Remains* too were to be edited by Keble and himself; and he was also laboriously working at a series of lectures which was to be published next year under the title of *The Prophetical Office of the Church, viewed relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism.*

The confidence he felt at this time is described in a passage of the *Apologia* which records the beginning of the Library of the Fathers. It was a confidence not in anything that *was*, but in what *was to be*, in "the event." He did not very well know what the Fathers would be found to teach; but he felt that the Church of England was substantially founded on them. There could come no harm from the project. If there was anything in the Fathers of a startling character, that would be only for a time; it might be explained; or it might be altogether on the Anglican side; in any case "it could not lead to Rome." These views he expressed in the preface to the first volume, in which he bade his readers go forth hopefully and not indulge in criticism till they knew more about them; they must "look forward steadily and hopefully to the event," when, as they trusted, all that was inharmonious in the details would at length be practically smoothed. It is this perfect confidence in the not-yet-existent, which led him to make the large concessions which we shall soon find him making to Romanism in the conflict which he was beginning to wage with it. *It could not lead to Rome*; and the present condition of the English Church seemed to him so ultra-protestant that to Romanize it a little, or even a good deal, could not but do good. To use his own metaphor, "no harm could come of bending the crooked stick the other way in the process of straightening it; it was impossible to break it."

§ 92. *Rose asks for an explanation*

Yet when Newman sat down quietly to review the grounds of his confidence—not for an enemy who might be lawfully answered "according to his folly", but for a perplexed friend—he lets us see the weaker side of his operations. Already, we perceive, he had before his mind at least *two* "events," and his plans and tactics suffered a little from distraction between the two.

He was contemplating *two* positions, one *inside* the Church of England, and one *outside* it ; and he wished to be ready for either.

Another obstacle prevented him from clearly realizing his views. Ever since, if not before, the beginning of the Tractarian Movement, he had used words "economically" or tactically ; asking for example, more than he expected to get, in the hope of getting more than he would have otherwise got ; and sometimes choosing phrases rather to frighten adversaries than to express exactly his own meaning. Hence, of course, when he came to reconsider why he had said this or that, he could not always remember whether it was because he meant what he said, or for some other reason. All this appears in a letter of this date to Rose, the Editor of the *British Magazine*, who had expressed uneasiness about two papers of Newman's entitled "Home Thoughts Abroad," which had been published in that and the preceding month. No. 2 had been sent to Rose for publication nine months before. It was to appear—so Newman had informed Froude in September, 1835—"directly Rose finds room" for it. This did not convey the truth ; which, in Froude's illness, Newman perhaps desired to conceal from him. Rose had written in June, 1835 about No. 2, "As you will certainly seem to good Protestants to leave our Church in an awkward position at the end of your present paper, would it not be well to give the answer which you are about to do to the difficulty, along with the difficulty itself—to give, in short, No. 3 with No. 2 ?" This was a polite way of declining No. 2 without No. 3 : and though Newman told Froude there was "not much in" No. 2, we find Keble thinking that the Roman view of "development" in it was so "plausible" that he proposed to "tackle" it in some Bampton Lectures.

At last, in 1836, the "difficulty" and the "answer" had appeared in consecutive numbers of the *British Magazine*; but apparently the Editor thought the Anglican, so much weaker than the Roman article, that he wrote* to Newman to ask for some explanation. Like Pusey, Rose seems to have regarded the Tractarian campaign as defensive—"stationary" Pusey called it—and he did not enter into, or understand, Newman's determination to go forward, he knew not exactly whither. He wanted to know Newman's definite goal. His contributor seemed to have absolutely killed Protestantism, and to have raised up on the other side an imposing figure of a Church of Authority which many of his readers would identify with Rome: what did it all mean? To take one instance, they had started with the understanding that the Anglican Liturgy was not to be altered; yet Newman was proposing in "Home Thoughts" to revive the Romanizing forms retained in King Edward's First Prayer-Book but subsequently discarded: how was this to be explained?

Newman's reply (as set forth in rough notes) claims that he must not be thought inconsistent if at different times he gives different reasons for his published statements. He seems to have before himself, he says, "vast and complicated truths," and "perhaps I have not realized to myself in the simplest form the end or object which I feel"—a curious use of "feel" which however (no doubt) exactly expressed Newman's meaning, viz., that he was groping (or "feeling") *not seeing*. There were, he goes on to say, two prospective dangers; the first, from Rome, on the subject of Church authority, power, claims, &c. ; as to which, half-solutions would no longer suffice ; they must "forestall objections and their answers."* On this point,—using language somewhat less confident than that quoted above, "it could not lead to Rome"—he says, "There appears to be *that* in the Church of Rome, as it is at present, which seems utterly to preclude our return to her." (Let the reader note, by the way, these ominously cautious qualifications, "appears" "as it is at present," and "seems"—which are by no means neutralized by the "utterly.") The second danger he describes as a levelling "crash," *i.e.* disestablishment, for which he would provide by causing the Church to attract the middle classes—and not merely the aristocracy and the poor *through* the aristocracy. If neither of these dangers should occur, he points out that his theory would be dismissed as a dream, and could do no harm ; but if either fear were realised, his sketch might at least suggest some remedy ; and even though it might be ineffectual against the second danger, yet, as to the former, "*if something* of the sort is not drawn out against the Romanist, surely he will puzzle us."

As to the alteration of the Liturgy which he had suggested, he does not deny that this was inconsistent, as Rose had pointed out, with the tone of the early Tracts ; but in one at least of these Tracts it had been stated that the reason for being contented with things as they were, was that every one had "crotchets of his own." Well, his object was, *in a sense*, to keep things as they were. The only way to stop the desire of the innovators to alter the Baptismal Service was "to talk of King Edward's First Book." By throwing out threats of this kind, they might be of use to men high in the Church. Already they had forced their enemies to take a lower tone, to drop their aggressive innovations, and to defend themselves. The great principle he would ever maintain, was, to remain satisfied with what they had, and to contend for that; but, if once they *were* dislodged from their existing position, to try to get a better. In conclusion, he touches on "excitements." Rose absolutely disbelieved in them and regarded them as a cause of "certain mischief" in propagating religion. Newman was far too much alive to the infirmities of human nature to accept a doctrine that would have been fatal to the *Via Media*, which he had sketched for himself as likely to compete successfully with Rome. But he rests his defence of them on Scripture. "As to 'excitements' it is a very large subject: but I do not think the utter repression of these is the Gospel way of dealing with them. The Roman Catholic Church stops the safety-valve of excitement of Reason; we that of the excitement of Feeling. In consequence Romanists turn infidels, and Anglicans turn Wesleyans."

Perhaps the most interesting sentence in this long letter is one that is cancelled. It occurs immediately after the passage in which he protests that the Romanist "will assuredly puzzle" them, *if something* is not done of the kind which he has attempted in "Home Thoughts," to anticipate and answer the Roman objections. Then come these words: "[*I conceive I suggest an answer, I feel myself to do so, to his strong points*]".

"Conceive," "suggest," "feel," and then the cancelling—how characteristic, this, of one who does not believe in words! At this very time Newman was busy with the Roman controversy—finding it "hard head-work," we are told—writing, cancelling, and revising his Lectures on *Romanism and Popular Protestantism,* which he is said to have re-written some five times. For a man who feels that the reasons he puts before the public are not the reasons that move *him,* so that their cogency or want of cogency, with himself, is no criterion at all as to their effect on others, it was dramatically fit and right that he should at first feel that he had crushed his Roman antagonist; then, that he should "conceive" that he had at least "suggested" an answer to his objections; and finally, that he should feel quite uncertain about the whole matter, and therefore cancel the sentence. Besides this general haze of uncertainty, the consciousness of two objects—the one, to contend for the *present* position, the other, to contend for *a better*—must have conduced to bewilderment, at times, both in himself, and in those who followed him and strove to understand him. For, in "talking of King Edward's First Book," if he had regard to the *first* object, he could say, "My object is only to frighten the Evangelicals; I do not really aim at restoring the First Book": but, next day, perhaps, in a different mood, anticipating the *second* object and the "better position," he would say "Yes, it expresses what I am really aiming at. I want to bend the stick backwards. Edward's First Book is just what I desire." This was scarcely a position where he could long stand still; he was bound to be moving towards the "better position"; and the death of Rose was destined, before long, to increase the rate of progress.

§ 93. *"The Forgiveness of Sins"*

Among the events of this "cardinal point of time," might very well have been included the circulation and discussion of Pusey's Tract, of which Newman's summary has been quoted above. "Nothing," he said in 1876, "had had greater weight than Pusey's Tract on Baptism."

Its effect is manifest in the first sermon preached by Newman after his mother's death, and entitled "Peace and Joy amid Chastisement." Gloom, logical and consistent, pervades almost the whole discourse. It declares that a man is not "to take up a notion that God has forgiven him," if he has repented of a sin and besought forgiveness, and made such amendment as he can. "Who is to forgive him? How is he to know it? No, I see no certainty for him. . . . Memory tells him that he has had sins upon his conscience; he has no warrant that they are not there still; and what has come, what is to come of them, what future consequences they imply, is unknown to him." If a man brings "penury" on himself by past extravagance he is to consider that—

> "God has not absolutely forgiven the sin past; here is a proof He has not,—He is punishing it. It will be said, He has forgiven it as to its eternal consequences. Where is the proof of this? all we see is, that He is punishing it. If we argue from what we see, He has not forgiven it at all. Here a man will say, 'How can He be gracious to me in other ways, unless He has been gracious so as to forgive? Is not forgiveness the first step in grace?'"

To this—as one might have thought—irresistible objection, Newman replies, "It *was*, when we were baptized; whether it is so since, must be decided from Scripture." And he urges that reason, as well as Scripture, is *against* the objection:

> "Nothing is more compatible with reason, judging from our experience of life, than that we should have God's present favour and

> help without full pardon for the past. Supposing, for instance, a child has disobeyed us, and, in disobeying has met with an accident. Do we at once call him to account, and not wait awhile till he is in a fit state to be spoken to, and when we can better decide whether or no what has befallen him be a sufficient punishment?"

The parallel is no parallel. The offender, in the former case, is supposed to have repented, to have expressed penitence, and to have made what amendment is possible. In order to constitute a true parallel, we should have to suppose that the child had done the same thing: and then, what parent is there who would not at once say, "I forgive you. Put away all thought of my being any longer angry: I may have hereafter to do certain things for your good, to prevent your offending again; and these things may be what *the world* calls punishment and may make *the world think* I am angry, but *you* must not think so. You are forgiven." But Newman seems incapable of seeing that *perfect forgiveness is compatible with the infliction of punishment;* and that remission of punishment is merely a sign—and not a necessary sign at all, not a sign to the spiritual, but only to the worldly—of the remission of sin. In this confusion of thought, he naturally gives up the parallel, almost as soon as he has suggested it, by telling us that we *know nothing about* God's method of forgiveness, except as it is taught in Scripture:—

> "No exact parallel can be found. We do not even know what is meant by saying that God, who sees the end from the beginning, pardons at one time rather than at another. We can but take divine truth as it is given us. We know there is one time at least when He pardons persons whom (*sic*) He foresees will afterwards fall away and perish; I mean, the time of Baptism."

Then, step by step, he destroys the last hope that

God will ever, in this life, fully forgive, or restore fully to the filial position, any child of His who ever commits a sin after the unconscious period of babyhood, when the infant received "its first step in grace." First, he cuts away any hope that we might base upon repentance. Scripture, he admits, declares that those who repent shall be forgiven; but he replies, what *is* repentance? If we are distressed, that is the work of God's Spirit, but does not show that we have *duly* repented. Next, as to the efficacy of faith, it must be "living faith," and that can only be ascertained by works; and what works can possibly bring the assurance that our faith is able to do this great thing? If men say that "they have an assurance," they are asked, where does Scripture tell them that such an "assurance" comes from God? If they quote "Ask, and ye shall receive," the retort is, "Where is it said that we shall gain by *once* asking?" Do we not say in the Church Service that "the remembrance of our sins is grievous, the burden of them is intolerable"? and "is not this to confess that we are not sure of their pardon? Else why are they a burden?" So at last he brings us to this conclusion, that, as long as we live, we must bear a burden of sin which will *increase* to our life's end, and that we cannot but feel insecure as to the eternal issue. We are "at present most happily circumstanced, in the midst of God's choicest gifts."—he means, by this, "church privileges"—"but with evil behind us—and that, through our guilt, ever increasing—and a judgment before us." We say, "Forgive us all that is past":—

> "Does not that 'past' extend back through our whole life up to infancy? If so, up to the day of our death, up to the last awful celebration of this Blessed Sacrament in our sick chamber, we con-

> fess that our sins all through our life are unforgiven, whatever be the effect—which, we know, cannot be little, of the grace of that ordinance and the absolution therein pronounced over us. . . . We are to be *judged* at the Last Day, and 'receive the things done in the body, whether they be good or bad.' Our sins will be then had in remembrance; therefore they are not forgiven here."

To some extent, the letter of the Prayer Book justifies these views. Public worship must adapt itself to all sorts and conditions of men, and to all sorts of moods and thoughts as well. And the Anglican confessions of sin do undoubtedly rather a little neglect the rest of the flock to suit themselves to the hundredth sheep which has strayed far away into the wilderness. Therein they follow the highest Example. And even the best of men are so far conscious of deviations from the path, that when they speak of their lapses, they must always feel, for the moment, a tingling of shame and a bitterness of regret. But—although far too sparingly—our Church teaches us also that throughout its services we are to be "unfeignedly thankful," and to feel conscious of, and grateful for, our "redemption." There is nothing, therefore, Pharisaic or arrogant in feeling (even at the moment when we speak of the "misery" of our sinful state and of the "intolerable" burden of our sins) that, thank God, the old misery is a thing of the past; that Christ has healed our trouble and is bearing our burdens.

In such a mixture of sorrow and thankfulness there may well be many different shades of feeling. But assuredly none ought to feel that, because we are reaping the consequences of our sins, *therefore* God has *not forgiven them.* If poverty, or disease, or loss of influence, or disgrace, falls on us as the natural consequence of our evil-doing, surely a Christian may await such penalties with more than resignation, and ought to feel that it is a dishonour to the loving-kindness of God to suppose that His gracious infliction of these wholesome penalties is a "proof," or even in the least degree a suggestion (to one who believes in the Gospel), that He "has not absolutely forgiven the sin past," or that his sins "all through life are unforgiven."

To those, on the other hand, who accept the consequences of their sins, not as tokens of God's love, but as a "proof" that their offences are remembered vindictively against them, it must be hard indeed to feel "peace and joy amid chastisement;" and the peroration of this sermon, in which the preacher seems to be trying to work his audience up to a feeling of joy, sounds somewhat hollow and contains an example (almost unique in Newman) of something approximating to bathos. He bids his hearers glorify the Lord God in the fires of chastisement: "They may circle us but they cannot really touch us; they may threaten, but they are as yet restrained." First, *cannot really touch*, and then, as a climax, *are as yet* restrained! What does this mean but, "they *cannot hurt us; or rather, I should say, they do not hurt us at present*"—with the obvious inference that they may *not* be "restrained," and *may* "hurt us" to-morrow! No, in his heart, Newman could not but feel that this doctrine of the non-forgiveness of sins, Patristic and orthodox though it might be, brought a new terror into life, a new disgust at "half solutions," and made it all the more imperative to seek for that "better position" where at least might be ensured the most definite and efficacious means of respite and refreshment through sacramental grace. Hence the question of Church Authority comes to the front, and we see at once the full meaning of the passage in his last letter to Rose :—

> "There is a *probability* of the whole subject of Church authority, power, claims, &c. &c., being opened. I am persuaded that the half solutions, which have hitherto really been enough, will not do in time to come."

§ 94. "*The Prophetical Office*"

The Tractarian Movement was now spreading everywhere, and Newman was in exultation ; almost as much over the attacks of enemies who were advertising the Movement by attacking it, as over the adhesion of new friends or allies. He is delighted that the *Edinburgh Review* has attacked them in force ; he hopes to tease the *Christian Observer* to death or insanity, and he rejoices over the Editor's froth and fury because it arose "from witnessing the spread of apostolical opinions." But their friends seemed rapidly equalling their enemies. Even at Cambridge, there was "a flame," he hoped, "tiny, but true." The *Quarterly Review* was about to admit a Tractarian article, finding that it must have "an infusion of Oxford principles ;" they "took" so well. The Tracts too were selling. The one on the Breviary had come to a second edition in six months. The *Lyra Apostolica* was in circulation. Froude's *Remains* were all but ready. The clever arrangement* of the Tractarians, to connect the Movement with Oxford, so that—as in the phrase quoted above from James Mozley—they could speak of "*Oxford* principles" and "the *Oxford* Tracts," was gradually leading the outside world to suppose—in the silence of the Oxford authorities—that the University itself was originating, or authorizing, what was in reality the action and utterance of a very small minority. Give them ten years more of progress at the present rate, unchecked by the Heads of Houses, and unreproved by the Bishops, and it seemed quite within the limits of probability that all England would identify the Movement with Oxford, and that a large (perhaps even the larger) portion of the clergy might be converts to the new Anglicanism.

Carrying out his policy of supplementing the old leaflet Tracts by larger treatises, Newman now published early in 1837, his *Lectures on Romanism and Popular Protestantism* which was also known as "The Prophetical Office of the Church." It was dedicated to Routh, the President of Magdalen, now more than eighty years of age, noted for "his learning,"—so Newman wrote as an undergraduate—"his strange appearance, and his venerable age." But his character, though respectable, was not exactly venerable; and Newman was nervous about the dedication[*]. Keble, who did not see it till the book was out, blamed him for it; and Newman, in reply (14 April), assures him that it had been on his mind for a long time, and had made him "very anxious"; he would have sent the dedication to Keble, he adds, "had there been time." Considering that on 5 January, *very little had passed through the press*, and that on 7 January he sent Rogers the Dedication, and begged his opinion about it, without any indication of haste, it would seem that Newman's memory must be here (as so often) in fault. He knew that people were beginning to accuse him of Romanism. He knew that "The Prophetical Office" would intensify that accusation. He therefore wished to shelter his new work under a name associated with orthodox and solid learning. He dedicated it to Routh, as E. T. Mozley says, "for policy's sake," and he perhaps felt doubtful about Keble's approval. Afterwards, he may have felt that Keble—whom he consulted on all cases of conscience—ought to have been consulted on this. That he could have been deterred from consulting him by anticipating his disapproval, he did not like to believe, and therefore contrived not to believe. This is only our conjecture. But it is possible, if not probable. His own theory, that he was prevented by want of time, seems quite inconsistent with the facts.

The book itself might excuse some "policy" in seeking the shelter of dedication to some authoritative person; for he describes it as "hitting Protestantism a hard blow in the face"; "Pusey," he says, "had declared that it would put people out of breath"; "Everything else that I have yet said," he tells his sister, "is milk and water to it, and this makes me anxious." Its object was four-fold; to attack Protestantism, to attack Romanism, to construct or re-construct the true Anglicanism, and to supply himself with "a basis in reason" for his belief in the latter. But the work itself will not detain us. We need only, for reasons that will soon be apparent, touch on the introduction, and the conclusion, both of which are given in the *Apologia*. The former, besides distinctly admitting that "the *Via Media*, viewed as an integral system, has scarcely had existence except on paper," and that it "remains to be tried whether" it "is capable of being professed, acted on, and maintained in a large sphere of action,"* practically admits that the task commenced by Anglican theologians is to be achieved by the selective faculty of a few Oxford men in the nineteenth century:—

> "Primitive doctrine has been explored for us in every direction and the original principles of the Gospel and the Church patiently brought to light. But one thing is still wanting; our champions and

teachers have lived in stormy times; political and other influences have acted upon them variously in their day, and have since obstructed a careful consolidation of their judgments . . . . We have more than we know how to use; stores of learning, but little that is precise and serviceable; Catholic truth and individual opinion, first principles and the guesses of genius, all mingled in the same works, and requiring to be discriminated. We meet with truths overstated or misdirected, matters of detail variously taken, facts incompletely proved or applied, and rules inconsistently urged or discordantly interpreted. . . ."

A moment's consideration will show that the position, difficult for any Church Reformer, was absolutely hopeless for one whose whole nature already revolted against what he called in later days, "picking and choosing the contents of Christianity." Substitute "pick and choose" for "discriminate and select"; and we have Newman himself here gravely proposing that he and a group of Oxonian friends of his should set up that which he regarded as an abomination of desolation, that portentous impiety called "Private Judgment," by sitting in a Commission of Inquiry into the great Divines of the Anglican Church: "it remains for us to catalogue, sort, distribute, *pick and choose*, harmonize and complete"; and again, "we have Catholic truth and individual opinion, first principles and the guesses of genius . . . . requiring to be *picked and chosen*." Summing up the requisites for the task, he continues:

"What we need at present for our Church's well-being, is, not invention, nor originality, nor sagacity, nor even learning in our divines, at least not in the first place, though all gifts of God are in a measure needed, and never can be unseasonable when used religiously, but we need peculiarly a sound judgment, patient thought, discrimination, a comprehensive mind, an abstinence from all private fancies and caprices, and personal tastes—in a word, Divine Wisdom."

Is there not some involuntary irony in these last two words? We do not need this, or that, or the other, or "*even* learning"—such is the meaning the words might convey—we *only* need "Divine Wisdom." As though such "Wisdom" were a small thing, instead of being so truly "divine," that, for want of it, the Fathers and theologians of eighteen centuries had been unable to accomplish the task now proposed to be entrusted to a little group of Oriel men in 1837! And yet, without such "divine wisdom," what availed the "vast inheritance," the treasures "in profusion," locked up in the Anglican divines, if Anglicans themselves could not agree as to what was bullion, and what was base metal?

Under these circumstances it was not strange that, even in the moment of completing his long and weary task, the author himself was seized with a misgiving that all his labour might be in vain. "This circumstance," he says, "that after all we must use private judgment upon Antiquity, created a sort of distrust in my theory altogether." It is not often that a religious Reformer concludes a great work by avowing his "distrust" in it, and a disposition to feel "that what has been said is but a dream, the wanton exercise, rather than the practical conclusions of the intellect." But Newman, besides making this avowal, actually proceeds to surrender the whole object of his struggle in his parting words. They are as follows: "After all, the Church is ever invisible in its day, and faith only [*i.e.* alone] apprehends it." On which his comment (in 1864) is, "What was this, but to give up the Notes of a visible Church altogether, whether the Catholic Note or the Apostolic?" What indeed? But why publish a book in which the last paragraph "gives up" all for which the previous paragraphs had contended? It is all very well in this fashion to "relate oneself to paper," as Bacon used to do, when a man wishes to think out his own problems for his single self. The words are honest, transparently honest; but ought not the responsibilities of a Guide and Leader to have prohibited such published and inconsistent soliloquies? This work need occupy us no further. It is a Book of Oscillation, and should prepare the reader for oscillating utterances which will shortly follow.

§ 95. "*Justification by Faith*"

The *Essay on Justification by Faith* (published early in 1838) was aimed, as Newman tells us, at the Lutheran dictum that justification by faith only was the cardinal doctrine of Christianity. He considered that the doctrine was either a paradox or a truism—a paradox in Luther's mouth, a truism in Melanchthon's; that the Anglican Church followed Melanchthon; and that, in consequence, between Rome and Anglicanism, high Church and low Church, there was no real intellectual difference on the point.

The truth of "a truism" would not—we might suppose—be very difficult to demonstrate: yet this treatise seems to have perplexed and mystified some of Newman's admirers who were far from being dull. In answer to his sister Harriett, who complained of its difficulty, he says that "the great difficulty was to avoid being difficult; it is so entangled and mystified by irrelevant and refined questions"; to others he confesses that he has been "a good deal fussed with it"; and the reason he gives is, that in this matter he could not follow authorities, but had to think for himself; it is a *terra incognita*, he says, to the Anglican divines; and, hence, it took him incredible time and he was "quite worn out with correcting it." One of the ablest and most sympathetic of his biographers thinks it was intended to show that in certain points "The Lutheran and Anglican theology is right" and that it was an "elaborate effort to reconcile the Lutheran view of this subject with the Catholic view," whereas Newman himself tells us that he intended to *attack* the Lutheran view, and maintains that the Anglican theology did *not* follow Luther but Melanchthon. This would indicate, that if the writer found the subject a *terra incognita*, he left it—for many of his readers—what he found it.

If it is indeed a *terra incognita*, and if men are to be driven to thinking for themselves about it, an intrepid layman might suggest that, even in common, non-theological life, there is such a thing as helping a man to become honest by treating him as honest, and making him righteous by calling him so. Bacon tells us that even a dog puts on a kind of "generosity" "when he finds himself maintained by a man, who to him is instead of a god or *melior natura*." If this be so, a simple person, not versed in theology, might find no great difficulty in conceiving that, when a man has been once so impressed by,—others may use other metaphors and say "possessed by," or "taken into"—the character, or spirit, of the incarnate Son of God, as to feel a perfect trust in this *Melior Natura*, he, too, may put on a more than common "generosity" and may be, sometimes even in a moment, made capable of new moral greatness. If he feels the burden of his sins falling from his shoulders (as John Bunyan felt it standing at the foot of the Cross), or if he hears a Voice saying, "Thou art righteous," followed by a sense that he *is* righteous, he may asseverate that this is no "economy," but the simple truth: the Voice at once proclaims and thereby makes him righteous. But, of course, all this is far too simple. It is only Shakespeare, and Bacon, and common sense, *terra incognita* indeed to genuine "scribes": who—in their impotent use of unmeaning words that may carry conviction to others but not to themselves; in their neglect of the healing and helpful processes of human nature ordained by the Eternal Word since human nature was; and in their disparagement of the natural canons of human law as compared with ecclesiastical rules and theological fictions—find a fitting condemnation in the words of one of our older poets:—

> "We study Speech, but others we persuade;
> We Leech-craft learn, but others cure with it;
> We interpret Laws, which other men have made,
> But read not those which in our hearts are writ."

The biographer whom I quoted above confesses that he has found this treatise of Newman's "somewhat straw-chopping and dry." Perhaps he has not sufficiently entered into Newman's materialistic feeling about sin as an indelible stain, so that a person who has once sinned can never be really righteous, although, of course, if it pleases the inscrutable God to *call* him righteous, we must accept the fact, on authority. Bishop Thirlwall, also, speaks of Newman's discussion as dealing mainly with "questions of words."

Neither this, nor the charge of "dryness," seems quite adequate criticism. Forgiveness, surely, is not a question of words; nor is that process above described, of making people righteous by treating them as righteous, a question of words: they are both realities. The forgiveness of children, for example, by parents, is a sublime spiritual fact: it is not a mere forgetting; it is an uplifting, not to be achieved without some parental faith, sympathy, and sorrow, nor without some spark of trust, as well as regret, on the part of the child. But to what does Newman reduce this "law which in our hearts is writ"? To a mere sham forgetting: "When a parent forgives a child, it is on the same principle. He says, 'I will think no more of it this time; I will forget what has happened; I will give you one more trial.' In this sense it is all one to say that he forgives the child, or that he counts him to have been, and to be, a good child*. . . ." Now when a theological treatise reduces parental forgiveness to an imposture, and this by way of justifying a still more gross imposture imputed to the Father in heaven, it is no sufficient condemnation to call it "dry," though, in a sense, that is true: for it is the "dryness" of a skeleton substituted for the living form. Yet Newman is at least consistent. Once more does his all pervading "economy" come into play:

> "Justification is 'the glorious voice of the Lord' declaring us to be righteous. That it is a declaration, not a making, is sufficiently clear from this one argument, that it is the justification of a *sinner*, of one who *has been* a sinner; and the past cannot be reversed except by *accounting* it reversed. Nothing can bring back time bygone; nothing can undo what is done. God treats us *as if* that had not been which has been; that is, by a merciful economy or representation, He says of us as to the past, what in fact is otherwise than what He says it is."

It is hard to see how asserting that "*God says as to the past what, in fact, is otherwise than what He says it is:*" differs from imputing an untruth to God. In some this would be blasphemy. In Newman it is only the result of a consistent abjectness, a resolute determination to believe that the "Almighty" is what He is called; that, as His justice differs from ours, so does His truth; and that He can make what would be false in us true in Himself.

Another treatise, published in 1838 as Tract No. 85, deserves a word or two, as showing, a further progress —we may almost call it a sceptical advance—from "Bible Christianity." It consisted of some lectures on "Holy Scripture in relation to the Catholic Creed." We have seen that Newman in his correspondence with Froude, seems to have admitted that the special Tractarian doctrines could not easily be *found* in Scripture; they could be deduced from Scripture with the aid of Tradition, but not otherwise. He now make this admission publicly; he does not deny that it had caused him uneasiness: but he meets the difficulty by what he sometimes called the kill-or-cure method. He urged on his Protestant objectors that if they rejected these Tractarian doctrines, they ought, on the same principle, to go further and reject some of what they themselves regarded as fundamental truths of Christianity.

This is perhaps the first clear manifestation of the strategical device, so to speak, of breaking down the bridges behind his advancing army so as to make it impossible to retire. He had once manifested a desire to believe that all fundamental Christian doctrine must be either in Scripture or at least capable of fair logical deduction from Scripture. But henceforth he is committed to Tradition. Give up Tradition, and the Tractarians must be driven back into the deep waters of Atheism. There was nothing for it but to go forward. These lectures also illustrate his indifference, just now pointed out, to the moral and spiritual revelations of Scripture, as compared with the revelation of a definite ecclesiastical scheme for the salvation of souls by sacramental grace. For he now suggests that, without the interpretation of Tradition, Scripture cannot really be of *any practical use* to us ; it tells us nothing of importance. In behalf of those who find God's will revealed in Tradition, he suggests that "there is no antecedent improbability in His revealing it elsewhere than in an inspired volume." But against "Bible-Christians" he urges that their position is absurd : for "there is an overpowering improbability in Almighty God's announcing that He has revealed something, and revealing nothing."* I do not see what this can mean but that, to a "Bible-Christian," rejecting what Newman called the interpretation of the Church, the Bible reveals "nothing." Yet that he should have meant this seems almost impossible. The character of God, as revealed in Christ ; the working of the Spirit of Christ as seen in the life of St. Paul ; the resurrection of Christ—even, though it be accepted on, and interpreted by, the testimony of St. Paul alone—all this, nothing ! Grant that he means, *nothing to the purpose ;* nothing that adequately teaches the application of the Sacraments to the diseased soul, nothing that could make a man feel *safe :* still it is an astounding statement.

§ 96. "*Hippocleides doesn't care*"

Disappointed in, or at least doubtful about, his prospect of piecing together a New Anglicanism, with paste and scissors, out of the Anglican divines, Newman was naturally led to ask himself whether there might not be some less tedious and more spiritual path towards the attainment of the truth. As a child, he had believed that the elements were "fellow-angels" deceiving him with the semblance of a material world; as a man, instead of putting away childish things, he developed them. He considered, so he tells us in the *Apologia*, that there was a middle race of demons or spirits, neither in heaven nor in hell; partially fallen, capricious, wayward; noble or crafty, benevolent or malicious, which gave a sort of inspiration or intelligence to races, nations, and classes of men.

Now, if he had contented himself with saying that in the supreme review of things hereafter, we may look back and trace a kind of personal identity and human growth in nations; so that it is not wholly imaginative or poetic, but philosophically suggestive, to regard them as organic growths—as Plato personified his "Republic," and St. Paul his "Church"—there would have been much to say for this, though it would hardly deserve to be called a "theory." But Newman raises his "theory" into the position, not of an illustration, but of a *cause*: "*Hence*," he says, "the action of bodies politic and associations, which is often so different from that of the individuals who compose them." A man who seriously means this, is almost necessarily led to reject lessons of history. For how can history teach us anything except through recognition of cause and effect? and how can we recognize, and why should we care to study, cause and effect, in the French Revolution, for example, if it was brought about, not by the old *régime* and other causes, but by "the Spirit of Jacques Bonhomme"? Or the Reformation and the Revolution, in our own country—what can they teach us, according to this "theory," except that "the Spirit of John Bull" rebelled against "the Spirit of Rome" or laid prostrate "the Angel of Monarchy"? It is so difficult to speak temperately about this part of Newman's teaching and yet to give an adequate notion of its extreme puerility, that it will be best to quote his own account of it from the *Apologia* :—

> "In 1837 I made a further development of this doctrine. I said to an intimate and dear friend, Samuel Francis Wood, in a letter which came into my hands on his death, 'I have an idea. The mass of the Fathers (Justin, Athenagoras, Irenæus, Clement, Tertullian, Origen, Lactantius, Sulpicius, Ambrose, Nazianzen), hold that, though Satan fell from the beginning, the Angels fell before the deluge, falling in love with the daughters of men. This has lately come across me as a remarkable solution of a notion which I cannot help holding. Daniel speaks as if each nation had its guardian Angel. I cannot but think that there are beings with a great deal of good in them, yet with great defects, who are the animating principles of certain institutions, &c. &c. . . . Take England, with many high virtues, and yet a low Catholicism. It seems to me that John Bull is a spirit neither of heaven nor hell. . . . Has not the Christian Church, in its parts, surrendered itself to one or other of these simulations of the truth? . . . . How are we to avoid Scylla and Charybdis and go straight on to the very image of Christ?" &c. &c.

To this extraordinary extract Newman appends a word or two, not of apology, but of defiance. He is aware, he says, that all this will, with many men, do credit to his imagination at the expense of his judgment : "'Hippocleides doesn't care' : I am not setting myself up as a pattern of good sense or of anything else : I am but giving a history of my opinions, and that, with the view of showing that I have come by them through intelligible processes of thought and honest means." This is not an ambitious object: but he does not attain even this. The "processes of thought" are *not* "intelligible" as they are here exhibited: nor are they intellectually "honest." In describing the reasons that led him to these wild "theories," he has wholly omitted one most important factor—*the desire to arrive at orthodox conclusions by short methods.*

He had been confronted with the problem of Scripture interpretation, and had been forced to confess to himself that he knew very little about it, and could not at present grapple with the "neologians." To do it, even hereafter, would involve a long, close, and accurate study, largely dealing with details, for which he was, and felt himself to be, wholly unfit. But on the other hand he was, and felt himself to be, admirably fitted to take broad and picturesque views, not of things, but of the aspects of things; of possibilities; of things as they looked to the world; and also of things as they might turn out to be hereafter. A mere babe in dealing with facts, he was a giant in wielding the two-handed sword of "It-may-be-that," or "What-is-to-prevent-our-believing-that?" This he could do well. This therefore he liked to do. And by doing this, he could, as it were, take Reason in the flank; push Understanding, parenthetically, out of the field; discard (instead of discussing) evidence; and bear onward the ensign of "Faith" in an unimpeded and triumphant advance. Add this factor, and then, and not till then, his "processes of thought" become perfectly "intelligible," but not so perfectly "honest." Intellectually, they are dishonest.

One word on "Hippocleides"—a nobleman of Greek antiquity who took "doesn't care" as his motto, and bequeathed it as a legacy to a limited posterity among whom Newman has here enrolled himself. The story goes that this worthy went to woo a lady of noble birth with every prospect of being accepted, because of his wealth and noble birth. But whereas other Greeks were wealthy and noble, he excelled them all in an art of which he was specially proud: he danced on his head to perfection. This therefore he liked to do, and sometimes unseasonably. So it came to pass that he spoilt all his chances by practising this accomplishment on the dining-table of his proposed father-in-law. Naturally he lost his bride. With equal naturalness—being an intrinsic buffoon—he replied, "Hippocleides doesn't care." Whether his friends cared or not, Herodotus does not tell us. Not Newman's friends alone, but even those who feel themselves to be, from an intellectual and theological point of view, his implacable enemies, must feel some touch of regret, to see a man of so many and such choice faculties, one who was specially bound to the honourable wooing and wedding of Truth, thus disporting himself in her presence, and thus ensuring failure. For, in him at all events—however it might have been with others—such views meant failure. They could not but result in a still further development of an already monstrous imagination and the still further subordination of the starved and almost extinguished faculty of judgment. Patient students of fact, careful observers, calm and judicial writers, might hold notions of this kind, perhaps, at arm's length, sporting with them in the sphere of possibilities, without being influenced by them in the region of material cause and effect; but this was not possible for the author of the *Elucidations*.

Yet, after all, beneath this exasperating defiance of common sense, there is latent a motive very different indeed from that of Hippocleides. "A man's perfection," taught St. Philip Neri, "lies in the space of three lines," and, so saying, he placed his finger on his forehead, indicating "mental asceticism," what the Italians bluntly call "the sacrifice of the intellect." Newman did not as yet know much about St. Philip (who was hereafter to be his patron in the Oratory at Birmingham): but he was preparing to know him by acting in his spirit. This it was that supported and prompted him—the feeling that in sacrificing the understanding he was propitiating God. His fear of the Creator and his abject anxiety to please Him were even stronger than his hostility to the world. Soon we shall find him openly avowing the need of such a "sacrifice," and thus making a twilight in his mind. Then, when the twilight has given place to night, the "doctrine" of angels will do its work; spirits will appear, and there will be war in the mind of the dreamer, the spirit of England, "John Bull," contending against the spirit of Rome, the City that sits in sackcloth bearing the sins of men. Which will prevail, is it difficult to predict?

CHAPTER XXIV

DIVIDED COUNSELS

§ 97. *The first check*

THE spring of 1838 indicates the high-water mark of the Tractarian tide at Oxford. Once more Newman rejoices in the flood of literature which was irrigating England with "right principles." He himself, in default of anyone else, was on the point of taking the Editorship of the *British Critic.* His only fear was as to the younger Oxonians: "One must not exult too much. What I fear is the *now* rising generation at Oxford, Arnold's youths. Much depends on how they turn out." But these too, or some of them, Newman was influencing. On the whole everything was going well.

But at this point came the first check to the advance. In his episcopal charge (August 1838) the Bishop of Oxford expressed disapproval of certain expressions in the *Tracts for the Times.* He feared more, he said, for the disciples than for the masters; but he warned and conjured those who were responsible lest they should mislead others. For this, Newman ought to have been prepared. He had recently avowed his intention to use extreme language with the view of "frightening" people. Even in 1833 he expected to be "denounced" for this: "I expect to be called a Papist when my opinions are known. But (please God) I shall lead persons on a little way, while they fancy they are only taking the mean, and denounce me as the extreme." This being the case, he ought not to have been surprised that his Bishop, no less than Rickards, objected to some of his language. How could the young men and women who read Newman's Tracts, know that the author would be well pleased, even if they did not accept all that he said, but were led on only "a little way"? When, for example, he "talked of the First Book of Edward VI.," how could they know that he only "talked" hypothetically, meaning that he would like it *if* the Church was disestablished, or *if* the Tractarians were expelled from her pale? In truth, the Bishop was extremely lenient in his expostulation. But Newman, who ought to have been prepared for much worse things, winced when the time came, under a censure so mild that the Bishop himself protested it was not a censure, but only a warning.

This inconsistency we shall witness repeatedly hereafter. It was one of Newman's sayings to his Oriel pupils that "a man cannot eat his cake and keep it"; yet he is constantly attempting this incompatibility. He wishes to use extreme language, which will, he knows, make many call him a Papist; yet he is angry with the people who call him so. He trades on the chance that the silence of the Bishops may imply a sanction of his principles; yet he is irritated when they refuse to give this tacit sanction. He makes much of the name of the University,* and of the deference paid to Oxford, and of the consequent authority reflected on the "Oxford" Tracts and "Oxford" principles; and yet we shall find him aggrieved at an attempt on the part of the University authorities to dissipate this popular delusion. Finally, before he quits the English Church, he will be seen avowing that he is attempting an enterprise of no less hazard than "proving a cannon," yet the explosion will shock him as much as if he had been innocently trying to do no more than fire an ordinary shot.

But to return to the episcopal charge. For one who held, as Newman did, the strong views of Ignatius about the unquestioning obedience due from the clergy to their Bishop, even a warning was a rebuff. A true Ignatian might well take it for something even more serious. What if it was a "sign" that he was on the wrong track? Newman, on this occasion, acted consistently. He at once offered to suppress any of the Tracts of which he had the literary ownership. The offer was not accepted. The Bishop declared repeatedly he had not meant to censure, but only to warn; and the kindness of his assurances helped to dissipate Newman's alarm. But, though he and Keble were satisfied, others of the party were not. Thomas Keble (Keble's brother) spoke of it in a way Newman "did not like," and both Pusey and Bowden were "annoyed." It seems that Thomas Keble blamed Newman for being too impulsive, hasty, and controversial. Like Rickards, he seems to have thought (and even Pusey and Bowden were partly of his mind) that Newman's language was sometimes "irritating and irritated," or else extreme, bringing discredit on the cause. Whatever may have been the cause of Thomas Keble's dissatisfaction, it was not dispelled by the Bishop of Oxford's assurances of goodwill, but soon broke out more violently than ever, in consequence of another incident.

§ 98. *Quarrel between the Leaders*

We have seen that Froude's legacy to Newman was "the Breviary." Newman was now purposing to publish it as one of the Tracts. However revised, such a publication was, at any time, likely to renew the accusation of Romanizing against the Tractarians; and just now, immediately after the Bishop's remonstrance, followed by his kindly assurances of goodwill, such a project seemed peculiarly unseasonable. Accordingly Prevost, an old friend of Froude's, sent Newman a letter of remonstrance declaring that he, Thomas Keble, and another, were greatly distressed by the project; he also spoke of those who "used" to sympathize with the Movement (implying that Newman's advanced views had alienated them) and he offered to pay the expenses of the printing, if it was stopped at once. Newman then consulted a friend (Wood) who agreed with Newman's own suggestion, that he ought not to continue the publication without Keble's "leave." To obtain this, it would have been necessary to mention to the latter the quarrel between himself and Thomas Keble, which Newman felt to be "awkward." Meanwhile Keble, who seems to have been informed of the affair by others, wrote to Newman, who replied as follows:—

> "Your letter has saved me the awkwardness of writing to you on the subject. What I proposed to Wood was to correct the 'Breviary' by *some standard.* I confess I much dislike correcting it by my private judgment, or by the vague opinions of the day, or by what people will think. I mentioned to him the Thirty-nine Articles, entitling it 'The Breviary reformed according to the Thirty-nine Articles,' but the Thirty-nine Articles will not cut out the legends. Then I thought of the preface to the Prayer Book. What would

> you say to both together? After all, is there any one of our standards which would keep out such as 'May St. Mary and all saints intercede for us to the Lord,' &c.? Are we bound to cut out what is of unknown antiquity and not forbidden by our Church? I do not think it will do to attempt to correct it by history. None of the parties concerned are strong enough in facts to do so.
>
> "The sooner I have your answer the better. They go printing on, but this at present will involve very little cancelling."

The abruptness in this letter speaks for itself. In the recent episcopal trouble, Keble alone, said Newman, had encouraged him: but now even Keble was against him. So strong an opposition made him unusually obstinate, the more, perhaps, because he associated his purpose with the memory of his friend Froude. Rogers, who sided with the moderates, felt, for a full fortnight, what he humorously calls the "flintiness" which, on occasion, the Leader knew well how to assume. "Cerebral excitement" and nothing else, can explain the extraordinary imprudence—to say nothing more—of committing the Tractarian Cause to an Anglican Invocation of Saints which differed from the Roman merely by substituting the Optative for the Imperative Mood! Somewhere in a letter to Rogers, Newman suggests a treatise on the Subjunctive Mood, apparently with some reference to theology. A great many such treatises, specially illustrating the force of "may," would be needed to show ordinary Anglicans (especially in those days) the difference between "*May St. Mary* intercede" and "*St. Mary*, intercede." The former was in use a few years afterwards in Newman's Monastic House at Littlemore. But things had moved on then; and, besides, a formula for the private use of oneself and one's friends was one thing; published to the world with the sanction of the whole of the Tractarian Party, it was quite another.

By degrees Newman calmed down. But he had been made not only angry but uneasy. He could forget mere interference or even opposition; but he had been wounded in a more vital part. The old wound of self-distrust had been opened and would not so readily heal. What with the charge of the Bishop and the opposition of his best friends, he began once more to suspect himself, to fear that he had no right to meddle, that he was not in his place as a leader, and that he might be misleading himself and others. He tells Keble that he is sorry he has annoyed Prevost by his sharp reply, and he hopes Prevost has got over it, as, he trusts, he himself has got over the annoyance of Prevost's letter; he is ready to do anything he can to smooth matters; but he implores the other side to recollect the effect of their suspicions on one who "soon begins so to suspect everything he does as to have no heart, and little power, to do anything at all."

In this state of mind, jealously scrutinizing his own motives, and dreading lest he may be unawares guilty of the unpardonable sin of *wilfulness*, he places himself unreservedly, and almost abjectly, at Keble's disposal: "If you tell me to make any submission to any one, I will do it. . . . . If you will tell me what not to do, I will not do it. . . . . Is it to stop writing? I will stop anything you advise. Is it to show what I write to others before publishing it? It is my rule already. Is it to stop my weekly parties? I will gladly do so." A "Decemvirate of Revision" is suggested. He foresees the difficulties, the impracticability; "it is virtually," he says, "enjoining silence." Still, he accepts it. Even to Bowden, his second self, the most affectionate of all his friends, he writes, not indeed without a certain vestige of the "flinty" humour, but with still more self-distrust. Bowden, who sided with the moderates, had asked him whether the Invocation of Saints had not led to great corruptions. "I do not like," replies Newman, "to give my opinion. . . . . It seems to me, if I must speak, that saint-worship, as it practically prevailed in the middle ages, is a very great corruption; but how far the formal acts of the Church involve such worship, and what are its limits, I cannot say: and I am so bothered and attacked on all sides by friends and foes that I had much rather say nothing, and had I my own wish, I certainly should say nothing and write nothing more. I mean I distrust my judgment, and am getting afraid to speak."

What it was precisely that made him "afraid to speak" Newman himself probably hardly knew. In the earlier stage of the quarrel he wrote as if, though perfectly willing to be silent, he still retained his convictions unchanged. He was resolved, he said, that people should not blame him for stubbornness, nor for anything except *being himself*—that is, "having certain opinions and a certain way of expressing them." But to Bowden, above, he confesses that he distrusts his own judgment. In two later letters to Keble, he goes beyond that. The first of these brings clearly before us a fact hitherto hidden, which largely explains both the quarrel and Newman's perplexity.

§ 99. *Newman feels "a sort of bad conscience"*

The Leader had been gathering around him a circle of younger friends. In Oxford and Cambridge, three or four years make a generation; and, after half a dozen years, an M.A. going round his old college will read fresh names on every staircase and find himself in a new world. Even among the graduates, waves of thought succeed each other more rapidly than elsewhere; and the younger men come sooner to the front —at least in any movement of innovation and enterprise, which has no charms for older men of solid reputation supported by substantial endowments. It was not surprising, then, that a younger and advanced school of Tractarian thought was now assuming importance. Newman in his "weekly parties" would see and fascinate these men. They, in turn, would hear, and be fascinated, and be receptive, and ask such questions as friendly admirers might ask, and put interrogative inferences, and imperceptibly lead Newman onward. Not having faith in the teaching of experience, Newman admired youth at the expense of age. But besides, every one likes, and he liked, freshness and unworldliness. These young men's ignorance of cautious, prudent, and temporizing arts, he might sometimes take as a rebuke to himself for his want of vigour in following out the course which in his heart he felt to be Froude's and the true one. Here is the passage in which, for the first time, Newman describes to Keble this young progressive party, contrasting them with the country clergy, and pointing out that *his* work lies with the former:

> " . . . Your brother knows the country clergy, and makes their feelings his standard. I do not deny, though I have no means of knowing, that it is as he says, but I do not write for them. Of course, as is natural, I write for those I do see: namely, the generation lay or clerical rising into active life, particularly at Oxford. That I am useful to them by the very things that may be injudicious in view of the clergy, I am certain, whatever ultimately comes of it. I do not consider that for them I am going too fast. The character of a place of this kind must be considered before men can fairly undertake to

judge about what is best or not best. One cannot stop still. Shrewd minds anticipate conclusions, anticipate objections, oblige one to say yes or no, to defend oneself, to anticipate the objection. What your brother calls unsettling is not my work, but of others here, who must be met and treated lest they do harm. It is better surely to refute objections than to let others be the prey of them. In fact, in a place of this kind if one *is* to speak (which is another matter) one must be prepared to pursue questions and to admit or deny inferences."

Yet he does not put this forward as a sufficient reason for continuing his present course. On the contrary, he doubts whether he ought thus to speak out to these young Oxford men "at the expense of the country clergy." He has "no *call*," he says, he is not "in station." When, therefore, a man like Thomas Keble virtually says to him, "What business is it of yours, and are you doing it in the best way?" he puts, says Newman, the very question that his own conscience puts to him. Why not, then, be silent? Why not do other work, read the Fathers, for example, and prepare for writing on them, and, with this view, give up the Tracts, the *British Critic*, and St. Mary's? This he repeats in a second letter. Keble, it seems, had explained Newman's constant "fidgetiness" as arising from a desire to "see things clearly and to get others to see them." Newman thinks it is not so: it arises, he thinks, from a general dependence on "external things"—in other words, on what he accepts as "signs" of divine guidance. When, therefore, men of his own party protest against him, he feels bereft of this guidance, and is attacked by "a sort of bad conscience and disgust" with what he has done. Hence, what would give him "most peace of *conscience*," would be to give up the Tracts.

"My constant feeling, when I write, is, that I do not realize things, but am merely drawing out intellectual conclusions, which, I need not say, is very uncomfortable [*vide* a passage in my account of Sicilian illness]."

The "passage" is the one (see above i. 283) in which he called himself "nearly hollow" and condemned himself as "not possessing the truth." To this add that "realise" * and "uncomfortable," * in the Tractarian vocabulary, have a technical and religious significance quite different from that which is implied by the common use of the words. The reader will then perceive that this is a very serious and distressing kind of self-distrust, penetrating far more deeply than a mere doubt as to whether one has expressed one's convictions in the most suitable and seasonable way.

§ 100. "*Conscience*"

Four days after writing (5 December) to Keble about the "sort of bad conscience" which distressed him, and about what would give him most "peace of *conscience*," he preached a sermon on conscience in its bearing on faith. At this time, there were many reasons why faith, and the inner tests of faith, and the reconciliation of faith and reason, should claim his consideration. Success was beginning to bring its dangers to "the Apostolical Movement." Tractarianism was now fashionable at Oxford, and its young zealots were beginning to become formal and manneristic. Even in 1837 their leader had expressed a fear that their "fasting &c., may get ostentatious."

Besides this, the controversy between Anglicanism and Romanism was turning on the question of the Faith and its relation to the Church. In 1838 Newman illustrated it by the contrast between the Madonna and Child, and a Calvary. The peculiarity, he said, of the

Anglican theology was this—that it "supposed the Truth to be entirely objective and detached, not lying hid in the bosom of the Church as if one with her, clinging to and (as it were) lost in her embrace, but as being sole and unapproachable, as on the Cross or at the Resurrection, with the Church close by, but in the background." This beautiful illustration must have gone far to attract towards Rome such a mind as Newman's. If, as he tells us, he was naturally led to his theory of the Angels of nations by his "preference" of the Personal to the Abstract, the fascinating representation of the Church as the Mother with the growing babe of truth in her arms might be well "preferred" in choosing between two Personalities. As a deliverance from religious fears, the Roman "view" is infinitely superior to the Anglican, as Newman conceived it. But time would be needed for this thought to work. Meanwhile, it clearly shows us how prominently there stood before his mind at this time the question of faith, and of the means by which it is to be received, retained, developed, and tested. We have now to see how, in the testing of faith, the part played by conscience might claim his attention.

The sermons of the autumn and winter of 1838 reflect the incidents of the time and the varying moods of the writer. While the "Breviary" quarrel was still pending, they are on the old lines, inculcating fear with the usual vehemence, and teaching that Faith must expect to have the world arrayed against it, because the world is in itself, and not by accident, evil. Later, he urges that, as some kind of "poor return" for the mercies of God, we ought to trust the Scriptures—by which he means, accept all Scriptural statements whether as to science, history, or morality—even against the evidence submitted to our understanding: "when these two informants, the one natural, the other revealed, oppose each other, we should trust for a little while," *i.e.* till death, "the latter."

But the sermon on "The Testimony of Conscience" (9 December) introduces a different phase of thought. He had, in his past sermons, laid great stress upon works as the test of faith, and especially on such definite works as fasting and church-going. But for some time he had been alarmed lest his followers, practising these works in a formal, pompous, way, might remain hollow at heart. Was it—he might ask—perhaps his fault? Had he omitted to lay sufficient stress on inner tests, such as peace and the sense of a good conscience? Certainly during his own wretched conflict of the preceding month, he had felt that he had not known peace, and that he had been harassed with "a sort of bad conscience." Would it not be well, then, that he should teach both himself and his younger disciples that peace was one of the notes of a true Christian, and that a good conscience bore witness to a genuine faith?

Accordingly, he puts the question, "What is the *test* of true faith?" Works, he says, are its *evidence*: but they cannot be thus used till after the lapse of some time. Even then, they are evidence to others, rather than to oneself. They can scarcely be considered an evidence, definite or available for a man's comfort, at any moment when he seeks for one. Finally, he exhorts his readers, to aim at that which, "though it can claim nothing, can beg everything:—an honest purpose, an unreserved, entire, submission of ourselves to our Maker, Redeemer and Judge." Here we have the explanation why Newman so unreservedly, so almost abjectly, submitted his action in the matter of the Breviary to Keble's dictation. It was *in order that he might submit*—to somebody, at all events. "I do so fear lest I may be wilful"—he had written to Froude a few years before when he was resisting the suppression of the Tracts. That was what he also feared now—wilfulness; "the sin of Saul." It seldom occurred to him that it may be a duty to judge for oneself, and that an even greater sin than *wilfulness* may sometimes be *will-lessness.* He wanted to submit, to God. Not able to trust the voice of God in his own heart, he took Keble instead as his spiritual director. Having submitted to him, he had done all he could; and for the present, his fears were quieted and he was at peace. The same is the tenour of the next sermon on "Sincerity and Hypocrisy" which describes "an honest and unaffected desire of doing right," as "the test of God's true servants."

But with this phase of thought he could not long rest satisfied. For was he not "going by his own feelings"? Was there not a danger that he might relapse into his old Evangelical state, a mere subjective religion? No proposition, in Newman's mind, was really "objective." Even Scriptural statements about God might be "economies." All human statements about Him must be therefore, in some sense, hypothetical. God is in every place *if* a Spirit can have relation with Space; loving, *if* we may consider Him other than simple Unity; One, *if* the idea of Him falls under earthly number. And so on. Yet still, there was a medium between the "objective" and the "subjective." There was the "external"; there was "authority." There was "the Church."

It happened that just at this time a friend returned from Cambridge, bringing doleful accounts which suggested this very danger of making religion a mere matter of "one's own feelings." The "tiny flame" was not burning well—it had not air enough, or perhaps it had too much air—in that home of scientific industry. Maurice, it seemed, was "the great doctor" there, and Merivale was going to publish four apparently "Maurician" sermons, which "seemed to make subjective religion all in all": "What a set they are! They cannot make religion a reality; nothing more than a literature. . . . An external *bond* is what they want "[*i.e.* need], "and what they shrink from. Are they not like Greeks, and we like Romans?" 'Grai ingenium', &c., 'Tu, Romane, memento. . . . parcere subjectis et debellare superbos'" There is a good deal of truth in this condemnation of the sister University. Newman and his Oxford friends were probably far superior to anyone at Cambridge in their knowledge of the world, and of the arts needed for making rapid conquests of the minds of men, and for binding them together, at all events for a time, in chains that seem indissoluble. Yet the Oxford Leader, perhaps, hardly sufficiently realised that, in the end, Nature, whether material or spiritual, can only be permanently subdued by those who have the patience to study and obey her laws; and that in theology, as in science, the lot of those great conquerors who would take short cuts to success, is ultimate failure. Internal, not external, must be the bond that is to produce real union; and this takes time to forge.

It was like a poet, and almost like a "Greek," to feel on 5 December that he had a "sort of bad conscience," could "realize" nothing, and guide no one; and then, on 28 December, that he and his followers were of the true Roman breed, fitted to subdue and organize a world! But Newman was just now suffering from one of his fits of reactionary exultation. Having endured the depression caused, first, by his Bishop's apparent disapproval, and then by his quarrel with his own friends and fellow-workers; he was now enduring the rebound. In old days, during one of these spasms of complacency, he had avowed himself able to "root up St. Mary's spire and kick down the Radcliffe": now he felt himself capable of similar achievements in the sphere of religious philosophy: "I really do think," he writes to Rogers (14 January), "I have defined Reason." He had been preaching two sermons which, he says, had greatly enlightened himself, perplexed his hearers, and opened a very large subject which he only wishes he could treat.

These must now engage our attention. They were written by one still suffering from the recent shock to his faith in himself—his faith, so to speak, in his own faith—and desiring at the same time to satisfy the "shrewd minds" of the young advanced Tractarians, who "anticipated conclusions," and obliged him to defend himself. They show him, accordingly, on the defensive, marking out, as it were, entrenchments, and fortifying a camp for a halt. His method of fortification will be short and simple—not the tedious process of alleging new or forgotten facts, or combining old and well-known facts in new relations. His ramparts will simply be new arrangements of words. He will *so define Reason as to include Faith;* he will then urge that faith *is consequently reasonable;* and he will thus lead us to the implied inference that it does not much matter on what grounds we believe; for Faith *must* be in accordance with Reason, even when it believes on very little evidence and almost on no evidence at all. This done, his forces are safe from present attack, and prepared to advance, on the morrow, toward the full Tractarian doctrine—and possibly on the next day, towards something beyond that.

CHAPTER XXV

ENTRENCHING A CAMP

§ 101. *What is Faith?*

In Tract 85, published in 1838, Newman had admitted that many require "more explicit *Scripture proof*" of this or that doctrine; "this," he said, was "one of the main difficulties, and (as I think) one of the intended difficulties, which God's providence puts at this day in the path of those who seek Him, † for purposes known or unknown, ascertainable or not": and he exhorted his readers not to be deterred from believing, even though the evidence, &c., "might be given more explicitly and fully, and (if I may say so) more consistently." This thought he works out more fully in the sermons we shall now consider. Amplifying and emphasizing the assertion that God *intended* this "difficulty," he will lead us to the conclusion that Faith is just this:—*believing without proof*, or *with very little proof*, out of love for God.

This last proposition is all the more misleading because, with certain qualifications, it is true. *Nothing* external can *prove* God's Fatherhood to a cynic or a sensualist; for, first, he has formed no conception of it; and, secondly, even though the dogma were written in the sky, he might say it was written by an evil spirit, who took a pleasure in fooling men; or that it came there by accident. *Nothing* external can *disprove* it to a Christian; not martyrdom, not earthquakes, not wars, not the human phenomena of our crowded cities, nor even the quarrels and corruptions and fictions with which the Churches have polluted sacred things. Here, then, is one large province in the region of right Faith, where we may believe, on what we should call—if we were investigating historical or scientific fact—little evidence. Not that there is not *some* evidence; evidence from the order and beauty of nature; from the history and developments of mankind; from the history of Israel; from the life, death, and resurrection of Christ; from the history of the Church; from the believer's experiences of the workings of this belief in people around him and in his own heart. Yet, though there *is* this evidence, the believer, in time, reaches a stage where he ceases to regard his belief as based on evidence. The fact is, that it is *still so based*, but that the last kind of evidence, the internal, has now superseded the others.

He believes, at last, mainly because it is as necessary for the noblest part of his nature to believe, as it is necessary for his animal nature to breathe. The evidence derived from *fact* may have contracted in some directions and expanded in others. He may have reformed altogether his notions of the history of Israel; he may have largely altered his notions of some of the acts of Christ. Although they may strike him as more spiritually marvellous and morally impressive than ever, yet he may have come to regard all of them rather as divine fulfilments, than violations or suspensions, of fixed law. On the other hand, he may be now much more impressed than before with awe, and hope, and trust, when he thinks of the growth of things from a protoplasm to Shakespeare or to Newton; and this awe and trust may be tinged and even penetrated with affection, when he contemplates the beauty and the power of domestic and friendly and social love, and notes how this oppressed and despised and outraged faculty has been by kind and quiet means getting the better of "blood and iron" and gradually inducing at least a few to enthrone it as their Lord. Above all, as he grows in experience of life and in marvel at the divine possibilities in man, especially in Christian man, he may find it more and more natural to believe that Christ is, of all things, the most like God; and if he has once touched, as it were, the Spirit of Christ, and felt that this represents the Ruling Principle of humanity, the Highest Spiritual Power, he may feel that he *cannot* give up this belief—not even though he may have been led to conclusions on the historical facts of the Bible different from those accepted by the orthodox, and indeed to some that, at first, may have caused him such distress that nothing but conscience could have forced him to accept them. On the whole, it may very well happen that his new basis of *fact* may be narrower than it was before—so that he may be said to retain the same belief but upon less evidence. Thus, in a sense, faith *is*, as Newman wishes us to believe, the art of readily believing.

But this goes a very little way. For the next question is the all-important one—"the art of believing *what?*" Faith, in itself, is no more a virtue than love. Both take their nature from the object. Just as love is no virtue, if it be the love of money, or of fame, or of a friend because he is rich, or of a wife because she is pretty, so faith may be no virtue too, but rather a vice, if it is faith in money, or in advertising, or in a policy of "blood and iron," or in the power of persistent repression, or in a Deliverer simply because He works miracles, or in a God simply because He is Almighty. But the faith extolled in the Bible, seems to mean, in the Old Testament, faith in the Righteous Judgments of God ; in the New Testament, faith in the Fatherhood of God, as revealed in Christ ; and, as a consequence of either, faith in the ultimate triumph of Good over Evil.

Such a faith as this is clearly moral ; by no means mainly intellectual—except so far as it requires something above an ape-like intellect, even to conceive that right can be stronger than might, and, of course, all morality presupposes an intellectual as well as a physical basis. Its morality is also altogether without taint of dishonesty or untruthfulness. It looks, full in the face, all the evidence that would tend to show that facts have turned out otherwise than we should suppose God to have desired them ; all facts that show Him *not* to have interposed where, as children, we might have thought He would have interposed, and where perhaps our forefathers assumed that He *did* interpose ; it does not try to explain away expressions in the sacred writers which indicate that they believed the sun to move and the world to have been made in six days ; it does not even try to get over these difficulties by suggesting that the consideration of them may be adjourned to the next world, when they will be found to be reconcilable with the facts of science.

Such devices as these, true faith rejects. It does not reject miracles, if proved ; but it does not bid us *try to believe* that miracles have happened, that we may *construct for ourselves* a basis for belief in God. True faith warns us *never to try to believe anything to have happened* as to which God has given us *definite means of ascertaining whether it happened or not;* and it commands us to trust in God on the basis of God's own truth, and not in that of our own fiction. False faith says, "It is our duty, imposed on us by God, to believe, in religion, that certain facts have happened which, according to ordinary rules, evidence would either not prove, or would even disprove:" True faith says, "This, so far from being a duty, is a sin. We are to love God practically with our mind and understanding, as well as with our heart and will: and we cannot better serve Him than by using the former faculties to ascertain Truth of Fact, and the latter to love, and trust in, Righteousness." The one is faith in the All-powerful; the other is faith in the All-righteous. The one is credulous without trustfulness; it cries, "Except I see signs and wonders, I will not believe; but I will make up for my unbelief by persuading myself that I see any number of signs and wonders, upon next to no evidence." The latter is trustful without credulity: "It is not Thy will that I should say I see what I do not see: but I will believe in Thee because of that which Thou hast revealed to me of Thyself. Thou hast rooted in my being the love of Thee and the trust in Thee, and, if I can be true to myself, to Thee I shall not be false."

§ 102. "*Faith and Reason contrasted*"

It will be seen that in his sermon Newman wholly ignores this vital distinction between faith in *fact* and faith in *motive;* and he consequently uses expressions, here and there, which tend to justify, or even excuse.

a culpable carelessness in ascertaining matters of fact. In his mind, he often seems to be already dimly feeling after a conception of faith as an altogether non-moral quality, as he defined it in his Roman period: "Catholics hold that faith does not imply love, obedience, or works. . . . In fact it contemplates a gift which Protestantism does not imagine. Faith is a spiritual sight of the unseen; and Protestantism has not the sight; it does not see the unseen." As if any one could have "a spiritual sight" of God without "love"! But even those who would disclaim the Roman view are really adopting or approaching it when they try to distinguish faith from trust, and do not recognize that no belief in fact is of any spiritual profit except so far as it conduces to trust in God first as being Righteous and then as being Mighty.

When Faith and Reason are contrasted, the former, he says, means easiness, the latter, difficulty of conviction; and he proceeds to explain why the former demands less evidence. Faith "is influenced by previous notices, prepossessions, and (in a good sense of the word) prejudices"; and he points out how often we are obliged to act on little evidence, having no time for minute investigations; we take statements and even reports continually on trust without any investigation at all; men are largely influenced by their desires, *so that they readily believe reports unfavourable to persons they dislike, and confirmations of theories of their own.* "Trifles light as air" are all that the predisposed mind requires for belief or action: "Whereas reason then (as the word is commonly used) rests on the evidence, Faith is influenced by presumptions; and hence, while Reason requires rigid proofs, Faith is satisfied with vague or defective ones." This view, he says, confirms the doctrines that "faith" is "the substance of things hoped for"; that it must be "formed by love"; and that it must be "a supernatural principle." "Love of the great Object of Faith, watchful attention to Him, readiness to believe Him near, easiness to believe Him interposing in human affairs, fear of the risk of slighting or missing what may really come from Him: these are feelings not natural to fallen man, and they come only of supernatural grace; and these are the feelings which make us think evidence sufficient which falls short of a proof in itself." Among "inferences and reflections" to which this doctrine "leads," he mentions the tendency of physical science to infidelity because it creates a liking for clear, and full, and a dislike for vague, and defective, evidence.

Now, in all this, some things (1) are not to the point; some (2) are ambiguous; some (3) are not true.

(1) That men "readily believe reports unfavourable to persons they dislike, or confirmations of theories of their own"—just as the Jews believed "reports" about Jesus, or "confirmations" of their theories that He "had a devil"—is true, but not to the point. Such a habit is, as the case may be, either reckless and lazy, or conceited, or uncharitable and malignant. So far from encouraging us to believe upon slight evidence, this blameworthy habit is a warning that we ought *not* thus to believe.

(2) "Love of the great Object of Faith, watchful attention to Him, readiness to believe Him near, *easiness to believe Him interposing in human affairs*"—this is ambiguous. Undoubtedly, true Faith loves and heeds its Object, and readily believes Him near:—"If I climb up into heaven, thou art there; if I go

down to hell thou art there also:" it feels sure that He is "near," even amid pain and sin and death; and even when these evils (the source of which we know not) are doing their worst, it still trusts that He is subordinating them to His highest purposes. But this is quite a different thing from easiness to believe Him "*interposing*" *in human affairs*. To the faithful Christian God does not seem to be occasionally "interposing," but to be *always* present. If a man refuses to believe in the earthquake of Lisbon because he is convinced that God must have "interposed" to prevent such a mass of destruction and misery, and because his faith in God would be shaken by recognition of the fact—that is not faith but infidelity.

(3) Faith "does not demand evidence so strong as is necessary for what is commonly considered a rational conviction . . . . because it is mainly swayed by antecedent considerations." This is not true, except in a loose and superficial sense. A man believes, in spite of *some* evidence *for* the charge, that his friend is not guilty of theft: true, but he has *other* evidence *against* the charge—the character and habits of a life-time. He cannot put this latter evidence into a terse *effective* shape for legal purposes; but even the law recognizes "evidence to character" and gives weight to it. Juries and judges cannot, and must not, give so much weight to it as the friend; partly because time and space forbid that it should be fully placed before them; partly because they are not in the friend's heart, so that they do not know his veracity. But the friend knows both these things, 1st, *all* the evidence, 2nd, the veracity of the witness, *i.e.*, himself. Consequently, if such a friend were said to believe, "*against the* evidence," in the innocence of the ac-

cused, that would be a mere pardonable and convenient (because brief) inaccuracy. The truth would be that he believes "*upon the* evidence"; only *the* "evidence," in his case includes, beside the "evidence" given in court, a good deal more that was not given in court; so that *his* is the fuller and stronger of the two. To say therefore that he "does not demand evidence so strong as is necessary for what is commonly considered a rational conviction," is not really true.

Instead of "antecedent considerations" let us use the term "evidence to character." The latter will be found (for our purposes) to apply to the cases covered by the former expression; and our minds will be much cleared by the substitution. Applying it to human beings, we see, 1st, that "evidence to character" seldom applies to proof that a person *has* done, but almost always to proof that he has *not* done, this or that; 2nd, that it applies with still more force to *motives* than to single *facts;* for a good man *may have done, for once*, almost anything that is (outwardly) bad —under the influence of drugs, liquor, hypnotism, or temporary cerebral derangement. But that his character and motives should thus suddenly be transmuted, is most improbable.

The same thing holds when we apply this kind of reasoning to our thoughts about God. "Antecedent considerations," or "evidences to character," will hardly go far to show that God with His own hand, and by any special "interposition," must have stopped the sun, cast down the walls of Jericho, written a literally inspired Bible, or established an infallible Church. Nor will they go far to show us what He has *not* done, *e.g.*, that He has not wrought the plague of London, or the French Revolution. On the contrary, when we see how good arises from these evil things, as a clearer air after storms, we are disposed to stop short, and say simply this, "Whatever is good in things that seem evil, comes directly from God." For here, of course, the divine problem differs from the human in two respects. God must be always Himself: He cannot be turned from His course. That simplifies. But the presence, the sometimes defiant presence, of evil in the world contending against good, complicates: "an Adversary," we say, "may have done this or that." Here, then, Faith steps in, and, without contradicting evidence, fastens on a *Person* as its province: "We will not deny any facts that are proved to be facts. We will not presume to say always, or perhaps often, what facts have proceeded directly from God or from Evil. If we did, we might have passed, and might be continually passing, all sorts of hasty judgments which experience would compel us to reverse. All that we know is this, 'The good that is done in the world, God doeth it Himself.'"

(4) Besides these three positive faults in Newman's sermon, there is a negative one, a fault of omission. Newman indicates, and truly, that Faith is a much more common basis for action in ordinary life than is sometimes supposed. But he omits to state *what is the object* of that kind of faith which is absolutely essential to our physical and social life and to its rudimentary actions. It is, *Faith that what has been, will be*, in other words, Faith in the stability of the Laws of Nature, or, as we may call them, the Promises of God. Without this we could not form a single plan, we could scarcely move a limb. Destroy this faith, and you destroy mankind: "I, the Lord, change not, therefore ye, O sons of Jacob, are not consumed."

Even in the most elementary discussion of the subject some mention should have been made of this all-pervading Faith. But to insert this, would not have prepared the reader for those encroachments and annexations which Newman desires to achieve for Faith at the cost of Experience and Reason.*

§ 103. "*I really do think I have defined Reason*"

The second sermon contains the famous definition of Reason. It is as follows:—

> "Reason does not really perceive anything; but it is a † faculty of proceeding from things that are perceived to things that are not perceived."

Under "things that are not perceived" he includes, of course, not only things *accidentally*, but also things *essentially*, removed from the action of the senses. A friend *may* be, but a thought *must* be, of this class. Then, after saying that the senses are deficient, because their action is limited by conditions of time, space, and intervening medium, he repeats his definition:

> "Now reason is that † faculty of the mind by which this deficiency is supplied, by which knowledge of things external to us, of beings, facts, and events, is attained beyond the range of sense."

The object of constructing this ample definition of Reason is *that it may include Faith*. And now he is able, almost syllogistically, to prove that faith is reasonable, or—which is his way of looking at the matter—that it is sometimes conformable to Reason to accept less evidence than Reason generally requires. He assumes, of course, that Faith is a process, not only by which we *may*, but also by which we *do*, arrive at truth. The rest is simple :—

(1) *Faith is a process by which we arrive at Truth in things beyond the range of sense.*

(2) *Reason is that faculty of the mind by which we attain knowledge of things beyond the range of sense.*

(3) *Therefore Faith is an exercise of Reason.*

He now proceeds to give us different "processes of Faith," or "exercises of Reason" :—

> "—the process being such as the following : ‘I assent to this doctrine as true, because I have been taught it’; or, ‘because superiors tell me so’; or, ‘because good men think so’; or, ‘because very different men think so’; or, ‘because all men’; or, ‘most men’; or, ‘because it is established’; or, ‘because persons whom I trust say it was once guaranteed by miracles’; or, ‘because one who is said to have wrought miracles’ or, ‘who says he wrought them,’ ‘has taught it’; or, ‘because I have seen one who saw the miracles’; or ‘because I saw what I took to be a miracle’: or for all or some of these reasons together. Some such exercise of Reason is the act of Faith, considered in its nature."

Could we regard this as a mere dialectical game, this would be amusing enough. If you choose to define "a heavenly body" as any inanimate mass, moving, or suspended, in the air, and then go on to argue that a cannon-ball and a balloon are "heavenly bodies," nobody can find fault with your logic but only with your abuse of leisure. And it comes to much the same thing here : Reason is so defined as to include Faith. Then Faith is pronounced to be "an exercise of Reason." Then, of course, it becomes "an exercise of Reason" to "assent to a doctrine because a man has been taught it." A very cleverly selected instance ! For sometimes it *is* reasonable to assent in this way. But why ? Because a person has found *by experience* that those who have "taught" him, have told the truth; so that such "assent" has been justified by results. Then, and only then is it "reasonable" (we should hardly call it "an exercise of Reason" except in extreme cases where evidence for and against assent had to be weighed) to assent to doctrine on no other grounds but the authority of the "teacher." But Newman, by giving this the first place among his "processes of Faith," or "exercises of Reason," and then by suppressing the evidence and experience on which the act is based, prepares his readers for hereafter regarding as "an exercise of Reason," what will in fact deserve no better title than an exercise of blind, almost wilful, and sometimes really immoral, credulity.

§ 104. "*God exercises us with less evidence*"

Out of this misleading definition (which Newman abandons in future sermons) arises a cloud of vagueness under cover of which the preacher makes a number of assertions, some of them true, but with qualifications which he does not insert; others true, but only in a sense, and that not a common sense; others not true at all. Thus we are told that "in practical matters, when their minds are really roused, men commonly are not bad reasoners," "they may argue badly, but they reason well." I do not deny that in some instances it may be true. But it ought to have been explained and qualified. For take the mob in Shakespeare's *Julius Cæsar*: their minds were "really roused" by Mark Antony; they certainly *did* "argue badly" about the character of the Dictator—

—"he would not take the crown:
Therefore 'tis *certain* he was not ambitious."

But did they "reason well"? Had not their "reasoning" a good deal to do with certain pecuniary considerations about "Cæsar's will"? And is not this a type of the "reasoning" of many multitudes when "their minds are roused"? If the sentence had been altered to "when they are left to themselves, and their minds are *not* roused," there would have been more sense in that. Perhaps Newman might retort, "In *Julius Cæsar*, men's *passions* were roused; I said, 'their *minds*.'" In other words, he meant "their reasons or understandings," *i.e.*; "a man reasons well when his reason is roused." Was that worth saying?*

Again, "As then the senses may and do deceive us, and yet we trust them from a secret instinct, so it need not be weakness or rashness, if, upon a certain presentiment of mind, we trust to the fidelity of testimony offered for a revelation."

In the first place, how do our senses deceive us? Say, by reporting a spot on a window-pane, as a bird; or a piece of paper, as snow; or the sun, as moving. But how could the "report" about "bird," "snow," "sun," "moving," come before our minds at all without some exercise of memory, comparison, and judgment in other words without some exercise of Reason? It is not therefore our senses, but our inferences from our sensations, that (sometimes) deceive us, When we find by experience that particular inferences of this kind do not "work" we correct them till they do "work." In the next place, it is not "from a secret instinct," but (at all events very largely) *from experience* that we place this "trust" in our senses and in our common inferences from them. Similarly, so far as "testimony" relates to facts (whether connected with Revelation or not), we are not to trust it "upon a certain presentiment of the mind," but upon experience and reason.*

Newman's next step is to urge that, in proportion to the "desirableness" of any knowledge, will be the "subtlety" of the evidence for it; so that in religion, the highest of all subjects, common people ought to be prepared *not* to have the power of appreciating the evidence, and to believe without it. And he calls this a "law." But what knowledge is more desirable than that of the art of living well? Is not this attainable by the most simple-minded? Opposite "laws" seem to hold for intellectual and for moral subjects. For astronomy and the highest mathematics, the evidences, or proofs, are "subtle"; but as to morality or righteousness, is it not true that theological and sacerdotal specialists, pretending to minute discriminations of the means of propitiating God and of attaining various stages of sanctity, have very often gone wrong, and have been beaten out of the field by plain people who shrink from making such pretensions?

We are next led on to see that it is a *merit* in itself to believe *anything* about God that comes to us with the authority of Tradition and upon small evidence. "God exercises us," he says, "with less evidence when He might give us the greater." I have pointed out above that it is somewhat doubtful and hazardous to say "God does," in any special way, this or that, when "this" or "that" may be the result of evil. And is it not also a little presumptuous to say that "He *might*" do this or that which He has *not* done? But passing over this, surely we may find another way in which God "exercises us with less evidence" than Reason demands. We *are* thus "exercised" repeatedly. But what is the lesson we learn from the "exercise"? It is this: *that conclusions based on inadequate evidence are almost always untrue, so that it is wrong to draw them.*

However, Newman goes on to say that we are to examine the evidence indeed "with our best judgment, reject this, and accept that, but still, all the while, as loving Him in our turn." Love of God, certainly is not to be excluded from any study of facts. But when he adds that we are to study them, "not coldly and critically, but with the light of His presence, and the reflection that, perchance, by the defects of the evidence, He is trying our love of its matter"—here is an obvious *non sequitur.* Why should not God, by "the defects of the evidence" be "trying our love" of *the truth?* Why may He not be trying whether we will love and trust Him upon a basis of His truth, instead of a basis of our fiction? Grant that, to some people, a particular incident is evidence of God's "nearness": grant that by the removal of that incident, there will be for them a "defect of the evidence": what then? May not God, by this very "defect of the evidence," be "trying their love of its matter," *i.e.*, of His "nearness"?

Proceeding, however, on the supposition that it is filial, generous, and almost noble, to believe readily in any statement about God that comes to us with some kind of ecclesiastical authority, Newman hence argues that light is thereby thrown on "the indirectness of the Scripture proof on which the Catholic doctrines" rest. Then he argues, "According as objects are great, the mode of attaining them is extraordinary!" Is that so? Why should an extraordinary object be attained in none but extraordinary modes, any more than fat oxen should be driven by a fat driver? or any other cause produced by some effect similar to it? Men of great genius often attain great objects by very simple and ordinary means and modes. Even if it were not so in science and art, yet in religion we are led to suppose that the highest communion with God is attained by very plain and simple methods open to all; by obeying "the still small voice," by offering the "widow's mite," observing the "trivial round" and the "common task."

§ 105. *The Understanding, a "sacrifice" to God*

But Newman's view of Faith, as a kind of noble sacrifice, not to say self-mutilation, makes him regard religion as a kind of commercial speculation, in which, if you engage at all, you had better do things, not like a pedlar, but like a merchant, in a large, liberal, and even magnificent way. It is, after all, a kind of "venture." The following passage would indicate his belief that even the teacher and prophet of religious truth may not feel certain. Or his certitude may be only felt by fits and starts. No matter. He has made the venture, and must now go through with it. And here he seems not to be speaking without some reference to his own occasional difficulty of "realising things," and his painful sense that he is sometimes dependent upon others for convictions:

> "The religious enthusiast bows the hearts of men to a voluntary obedience, who has the keenness to see, and the boldness to appeal to, principles and feelings deep buried within them, which they know not themselves, which he himself but by glimpses and at times realizes, and which he pursues from the intensity, not the steadiness of his view of them."

Hence follows the conclusion :—

> "He that fails nine times and succeeds the tenth, is a more honourable man than he who hides his talent in a napkin ; and so, even though the feelings which prompt us to see God in all things, and to recognize supernatural works in matters of the world, mislead us at times, though they make us trust in evidence which we ought not to admit, and partially incur with justice the imputation of credulity, yet a Faith which generously apprehends Eternal Truth, though at times it degenerates into superstition, is far better than that cold, sceptical, critical tone of mind, which has no inward sense of an over ruling, ever-present Providence, no desire to approach its God, but sits at home waiting for the fearful clearness of His visible coming, whom it might seek and find in due measure amid the twilight of the present world."

If this passage were attacked as being a recommendation of credulity, we can easily imagine the effective reply of the preacher : "I said nothing of the kind. To say that drunkenness is, after all, far better than murder, adultery, or theft—surely that is not praising drunkenness. I only said that a faith that sometimes degenerates into superstition is far better than a cold scepticism." True. Yet by the words "fails nine times and succeeds the tenth," he prepares us for a "faith" that leads us repeatedly astray and hardly ever right. By "honourable" and "generously" and "prompt to see God," he *implies* praise. By his description of "cold" scepticism, with "no desire to approach its God," waiting for the "fearful" clearness of His coming, he altogether ignores that other legitimate and trustful scepticism which is born of reverence and love of God ; and which is sceptical, not of God's spiritual presence, but of the legends or lies upon which ignorance and faithlessness have erected a crumbling fabric which they call His "interpositions." I do not know how to interpret with strict exactness the words "*partially* incur ring *with justice* the imputation of credulity": but it appears to be a loose way of saying "guilty of credulity, only with extenuating circumstances," and the preacher evidently extenuates more than he condemns.

The whole of the passage, and its context, not only excuse, but almost justify, false anticipations and false explanations—which are almost sure to lead to false accounts—of facts connected with religion. We are led to suppose that it is "honourable" to believe—and this as to alleged facts—nine times wrongly if one believes right the tenth time; a "sacrifice" of what is commonly called reason is described as "the condition of honour"; we are to "sow" our credulity broadcast in order that here and there it may turn out to be legitimate faith; we are "to launch out into the deep" (that is to say, the sea of "it-may-be," and "who-knows-if?" and "what-is-there-to-prevent?"), and to "let down the nets" of a capacious superstition for "a draught" of anything that may appear in the shape of an "interposition"! Doubtless God demands from us a sacrifice, but not such a sacrifice as this. What has He done to us that we should think so meanly of Him as to suppose that He bestowed on us the gift of reason in order that, when we use it to draw near to Him, it may guide us into nine falsehoods, for once that it leads us to the truth?

CHAPTER XXVI

NEWER ALLIES

§ 106. "*The most prominent person*" *in the New Contingent*

"I do not consider that for them I am going too fast":—so Newman wrote to Keble toward the end of 1838. By the emphatic "them," he meant the young and rising Tractarians; and the tone of the letter implies that he did not at that time dislike their forcing the pace a little: "One cannot stop still. Shrewd minds anticipate objections, oblige one to say Yes or No." These men entered late into the Movement and knew it only as a success. The differences of opinion that had prevailed, at starting, among the leaders; the slow up-hill progress at first; the immense debt which the cause owed to its association with the name of Oxford; the anxiety with which the Leader had avoided extreme expressions and actions that might have provoked opposition from the University authorities; the need that still existed of caution, temporizing, and "economy"—of all this they had had no experience.

In 1833 Newman hardly ventured to disown the name of Protestant and call himself a Catholic, except to private friends, or else with careful explanations:

but the young auxiliaries who joined the Tractarian forces in 1839 began as "Catholics" from the first. Eager, acute, incautious, uncompromising, they saw no reason why they should not move on at once to a high Catholic ideal; and the nearest approach to this they found in Rome. There they saw a system not on paper, but in full working order; imperfect certainly, but with its imperfections hidden, and its grandeur enlarged, by the mist of a partial knowledge. There is a quiet and hardly unintentional irony in the antithesis of the *Apologia* which tells us that these young men *knew* nothing about the *Via Media*, but had *heard* much about Rome. Though some of them are said to have had "shrewd minds," their shrewdness mainly took a logical turn and did not deal with facts. Their knowledge was not in proportion to their dialectical skill. Of average human English nature, and of its deep and rooted anti-Roman prejudices, they do not seem to have known much; and even in that province of ecclesiastical Antiquity where they might have been expected to be experts, the shrewdest and keenest of all these new allies was fond of confessing himself portentously ignorant. This was W. G. Ward, Fellow and Mathematical Tutor of Balliol, whose "accession" to "good principles" Newman mentions as "very important" in a letter written in the spring of 1839.

If we are to trust the *Apologia*, however, Ward was not "the most prominent person" in the new contingent. This title is reserved for another, not expressly named * in the first edition of that work, but described by the insertion of just those characteristics which Ward had *not*, so as to make it quite certain that, whoever else might be meant, the author did *not* mean Ward.

This person is described as "of elegant genius"; whereas Ward was rough and uncouth in style, though vigorous and incisive in conversation. His age is said to have been nearly Newman's, whereas Ward was eleven years younger; and the title, "almost a typical Oxford man," none would apply to Ward's striking, odd, original, and irregular character. Again, he is credited with a "classical mind" and "a rare talent in literary composition"; Ward was an able mathematician, and his composition was cumbrous. "Both in political and ecclesiastical views" the former is said to have been "of one spirit with the Oriel party of 1826–1833"; Ward, even when he joined the Tractarians, was still a pronounced Radical. Lastly, whereas we learn from Ward's biography that there were "later differences" between him and Newman, when both were in the Roman Church, the *Apologia* somewhat pointedly says, about this "most prominent person": "Quite recently, he has been taking several signal occasions of renewing that kindness which he ever showed towards me when we were both in the Anglican Church." Clearly, then, if we are to trust the *Apologia*, there is no use in spending much time over Mr. Ward.

But there is reason to think that the *Apologia* does not represent the facts. Indeed that very work, after thus elaborately describing "the most prominent person" in "the new school of thought" which "was sweeping the original party aside," goes on to indicate that this "person" played a passive rather than an active part. He would have been—says the *Apologia* —of one mind with the Old Party—*but*, as he entered late into the Movement, he was *naturally thrown together with* "that body of eager, acute, resolute minds who had begun their Catholic life about the same time as he; who knew nothing about the *Via Media*, but had heard much about Rome." The obvious conclusion is that "thrown together with" means "absorbed into," and that this "most prominent person" was led, rather than a leader.

Other evidence confirms this conclusion. Later editions of the *Apologia* supply the name omitted in the first. It was Oakeley, afterwards minister of Margaret Chapel in London, who is described by Dean Church as "without much learning, but master of a facile and elegant pen"; "a man who followed a trusted leader with chivalrous boldness, and was not afraid of strengthening his statements"; and as one of *Ward's allies*, but inferior to the latter in "force and originality." This agrees with what we learn from other sources.* Oakeley's gentle and more passive nature was guided by his stronger friend, whose theological principles he adopted to the full. Humorous contrasts were drawn between this Damon and this Pythias, so different in manner and gifts: the one so impetuous, abrupt, and logical; the other elegant, literary, quiet, reticent; between Ward's large figure, heavy tread, loud voice, and hearty laugh, and Oakeley's spare frame, halting step, and shy demeanour, when the latter, in answer to his "Come along, Oakeley," "hopped" after him like a magpie after an elephant, following his chief to do dialectical battle along with him in some Tractarian conflict. They were an inseparable pair, but Ward always in front.

Oakeley was not, and Ward was, the possessor of one of those "shrewd minds" which would not let Newman stop still, and obliged him to "say Yes or No." It is interesting to find that the only mention of Ward in the *Apologia* is in a letter in which this very phrase is mentioned, though not so complacently as before. In 1842 Pusey wrote to ask Newman whether he agreed with Ward. The latter replied that he did not know the limits of his own opinions: "If Ward says this or that is a development from what I have said, I cannot say Yes or No. . . . It is a nuisance to me to be *forced* beyond what I can fairly accept." Many of Newman's friends resented this "nuisance" much more vehemently than Newman himself. "There is no doubt," says Dean Church, "that Mr. Newman felt the annoyance and unfairness of this perpetual questioning for the sake of Mr. Ward's theories": "I regard him," says James Mozley, "as a sort of Frankenstein—a person made differently from other men; just to teach us how badly people get on who are guided simply, as they think, by reason; despising instincts, sympathies, and all the nameless humanities that make up a man." No one attacks Oakeley, every one attacks Ward, for thus "forcing" Newman's hand. These attacks, of themselves, would suffice to show who was the leader of the advanced band. It is to Ward and not to Oakeley that we must turn, as "the most prominent person" among the new allies—the Yes-or-No contingent—of the Tractarian forces.

§ 107. *W. G. Ward*

Yet there is some difficulty in perceiving how such a man as this should have done what Pusey scarcely did at all, and Keble in only a slight degree. In dialectic keenness, impatience of conventionality, and love of straight courses, Ward resembled Hurrell Froude: but he had not Froude's inner fire, nor his concentration, nor his severity of stern asceticism, nor his self-dependence and freedom from fitful moods and passions, nor his dignified grace of manner. Never could he, for Newman, fill Froude's place.

Ward's chief influence was a social one, from his bright conversation flashing with paradoxes, and from his perfect skill in logical fence, combined with perfect recklessness of consequences. As he had little sense of beauty of form (actually needing a friend like Clough to "interpret" a landscape for him), so too he was deficient in intuitive recognition of the grace and bloom of life; so that no awe for the abysmal possibilities of humanity, no loving reverence for the inexpressible lessons conveyed by domestic intercourse, deterred him from attacking every position with the scaling-ladder of his logic: "Why," he would ask, "should a man be fonder of father, mother, brother and sister than of strangers?" To say that Nature dictated it, provoked, at once, the retort, that, if *his* nature did *not* dictate it, no one could *prove* that *he* was bound by what other people's nature dictated to them.

This story takes us to what was fundamental in Ward's doctrine. He had no belief in, and no respect for, "nature," in himself or others. To an argument based on the Fifth Commandment he would have listened deferentially, but would have pointed out that "honouring" does not imply "liking." That it is a law of healthy nature that men love one another the more they know one another—as much a law as that particles of matter attract one another in proportion to their nearness—perhaps never occurred to him, or seemed not to the point. "Why should it be a great matter to me that I and another sprang from the same womb?"—said a young philosopher to an old one some two thousand years ago, and was promptly rebuked for his unnaturalness. Yet this exactly expresses Ward's temper: he did not mind being unnatural, provided he was logical.

Unnaturalness pervaded even his Christianity. No Mohammedan could have more completely ignored than he, in one of his *dicta*, the revelation of God's Fatherhood. Our attitude towards Him, he taught, must be that of a creature towards its Creator, and therefore "abject." When a foolish person would have corrected him and have substituted "deference" for "abjectness," we might have expected that Ward would have flashed up into pious indignation at this ill-chosen, and almost profane, attempt to express "filial devotion"; but here again the nature of the man broke out. Though he was always trying to be "abject," he seldom succeeded in being, at heart, even decently reverent for many minutes together. The whole thing was a game, a dialectical contest. Instead of being horrified at the profanity of this advocate of "deference," or genuinely saddened, or seriously alarmed by such spiritual ignorance, the mistake was to him "intensely ludicrous"; and "his delight and sense of its absurdity was unbounded." Was not James Mozley right, and was there not something of the "Frankenstein" in such a man as this, who, while calling on humanity to prostrate itself abjectly before the Creator could feel an "unbounded delight" that He was misinterpreted by one of His own creatures?

The comic element in Ward might well be supposed to have told against him with Newman. His love of paradox made it difficult to take him seriously. "Make yourself clear that you are justified in deception and then lie like a trooper"—has a wholesome honest ring about it; but it would repel a mind conversant with questions of "economy," "reserve," and the like. Not less startling was his dictum: "If any man be called 'moderate,' or 'venerable,' beware of him; if he be called both, you may be sure he is a scoundrel." He would smile on a man with the most affectionate sweetness and assure him in the gentlest and most genial tone that his views were "base" and "detestable." This he could do, of course, because the whole thing partook of the nature of a contest of skill; so that in the most ardent discussion of the deepest subjects he could always keep his temper. But though this gave him a great polemical advantage it did not help him to persuade: and sometimes he gave his friends more trouble than his enemies.

His manner, too, as well as his mind, was essentially comic. At Winchester his schoolfellows noticed his elephantine ways, and when he came out at Oxford as a conversationalist, his personal clumsiness is said to have set off the vivacity and nimbleness of his joyous moods. He was a great musical critic and an admirable buffo singer. He delighted to intersperse his mathematical lessons with talk about the operas, in which he was well up. Prevented by weak health from fasting, he once determined, at Pusey's suggestion, to observe Lent by abstaining from music; but an amusing story tells how his resolution gave way, and how he was led by downward steps from unimpeachably sacred music to one of the merriest and raciest of buffo songs, till one of his companions in this musical debauch suddenly reminded him that Pusey lived next door. On another occasion, when a Balliol tutor was alarmed by unusual noises over his head, he was reassured by a tolerant scout, "It's honly Mr. Ward, Sir, a-hacting of a cherubim."

All this, one would have thought, would have made a great gulf between him and a man so reserved, so essentially non-social as Newman. Nor can it be said, in explanation, that Ward supplemented Newman where the latter was weakest, that is, in knowledge of ecclesiastical, and especially mediæval, history. Of facts of almost every kind he knew very little. When he was a boy of twelve, he asked *where soles "grew."* But of history he delighted to confess a portentous ignorance. He "took his facts," he said, "from Newman." Just before formally joining the Tractarians, he had an interview with Bonamy Price at Rugby, in order that he might go through the form of hearing what was to be said on the other side. Hereon, Price elicited from Ward that he was in total ignorance as to the facts on which the Tractarian doctrines were based. Ward demonstrated, on his side, that, since Price's teaching led logically to infidelity, the facts on which it was based *must* necessarily be false. So the combatants parted; Ward none the less confident than before, as was natural; for he did not care so much about facts as about a logical system.

Still, this deficiency of Ward's makes our problem the more difficult. That Ward, knowing nothing of anything except music, plays, logic, and mathematics, should have formulated as his creed, "*Credo in Newmannum*"—this is intelligible enough: but it is not so easy to understand how the keen and subtle logician who led the Tractarian Party was forced to deviate from his route, or to accelerate his march, by one who, logician though he was, was not perhaps, in this respect, far superior to himself; and this, too, a man of such a restless, discursive, motley disposition, who was so habitually given to bewildering and startling his friends by his abrupt and uncouth transitions from religious metaphysics into the realms of the very lightest and frothiest merriment, that they familiarly likened him to "Thomas Aquinas dancing a ballet"!

§ 108. *How it came to pass that Ward made Newman say "Yes" or "No" when he did not wish to*

Yet a closer examination would show that Ward's superficial qualities a little deceived his Oxford friends, and concealed a character which, in some points, might well claim affinity with Newman's, or at least might appeal to it. Newman was given to melancholy; and Ward had fits of depression that almost amounted to disease. Like Newman, Ward had never been a boy, and had never known the free delights of childhood. The charms of country life seem never to have attracted him; he had no eye for beauty of form, either in nature or in art. Games, too, he never cared for. The theatre was the great delight of his boyhood—till the curtain fell; and then came a reaction, sometimes moving him even to tears. Between the acts, he could not chat, or wait, but must needs be reading something, mostly mathematics. At a party, he would sit by himself, silent, biting his nails, looking bored to death; and on one occasion he bluntly told his hostess that he not only looked, but *was*, bored—after which he fled home by himself through the mud. Poetry and novels he despised. What had such a boy as this to do with boyhood?

When he went to Winchester things were but little better. The morality of the place was then bad, and the recollection of it filled him with "horror," which he carried with him to the grave. But he did not try to stem the stream. Not that he could have done much. A true "forty years in the wilderness" are four years in a public school, when, against a few who love evil, and amid the many who love neither good nor evil, one alone stands up for the good. But there is no evidence that Ward ever put himself out of the way to make things better. He was "content if he could follow his own ways quietly without caring much for those of others." Except to abstractions, he was always blind. He never could fasten up a parcel or a package; and once he returned to a scout an uncut pencil with the remark that it would not write. But his chief blindness he reserved for human nature. In time, he became Senior Prefect; and then he was forced, in the way of duty, to enforce some kind of order. But he knew so little of what was going on around him that, under his prefectship, there was—a thing almost unheard of at an English Public School—an outbreak of the lower boys against the rule of the upper ones; and he seriously injured one of the rebels in defending himself against their attacks. With so many avenues of natural and almost necessary happiness thus closed against him, did he exaggerate his own disadvantages when he declared that he had never known what it was to be a boy and that melancholy was the background of his life?

There was, however, a great difference between the melancholy of Newman, and what, in Ward, we ought perhaps rather to call intermittent hypochondria. With Newman melancholy was almost voluntary; he rather liked to be alone; and if solitude brought dejection, he found a sweetness in it; he "seemed never to be so near heaven as then." Ward's feeling was quite different. He had immense capacities for enjoyment, accompanied by constant headaches which forced him to seek enjoyment, not in work, but in the lightest amusement. At Winchester there was a kind of Saturnalia once a year, when the junior boys were allowed to "peal" (*i.e.*, "appeal," or bestow some characteristic "appellation" on) their masters the Prefects; and the "peal" for Ward, the Senior Prefect, was "'Three three-halfpenny oranges, a bun, and a halfpenny fig,' in memory of his habitually exact distribution of sixpence in eatables sold at the gate before going into morning school." Boys are great portrait-painters, and we may infer that, even at a public school—where the public fare was hard, and supplemented from private sources—this daily dissipation in a Senior Prefect struck them as odd. His father, besides being an authority on finance, was a man of splendid constitution and an unrivalled cricketer; his mother, a great mathematician: and this Winchester "peal" perhaps may help us to understand the struggle between a strong, heavy, and somewhat sluggish physique, and an uncontrollable restlessness of abstract and unimaginative thought. It was as though Caliban and Ariel had to draw up a programme for joint amusement; and now it was "three three-halfpenny oranges" and comic opera, and "hacting of a cherubim"; and presently it was mathematics, and Suarez, and complines, and vespers, and *The Ideal of a Christian Church*: or, sometimes, the pair agreed on a piece that could please them both, and then it was "Thomas Aquinas dancing a ballet."

Hence it was that in religion, as in other distractions, he required to be immediately and incisively impressed. Otherwise he was bored. Long before he joined the Tractarians, he used to go to mass in a Romanist chapel for the sake of the music and its aid to his devotions. If he was asked to supply such aids from his own imagination, he could not do it; for he had not the faculty. The Anglican Communion Service, he said, bored him to death; if he must needs go to it, he must be allowed at all events to go to the theatre first. So little notion had he of real spiritual awe, that, to the last, he seems to have retained the belief of his youth that "to excite any degree of reverence an instantaneous effect must be felt."

The quiet processes of nature, the gradual developments of things, the slow lessons of life, the still small voices in humanity and history—these instilled into him no awe whatever: he was impervious to everything except what we may call the slap-bang impressions, which nature seldom deigns to convey. But nature's recalcitration was no objection to our Frankenstein. If Newman was on his guard against nature, Ward was absolutely dead to her: the one may be called anti-natural, the other (in a sense) unnatural. Authority therefore, in religion, which attracted the former, would prove absolutely irresistible to the latter, if only it could instantaneously captivate him. Nor would he be in the least repelled by any seeming violations of nature or nature's laws. The one thing needful was that the aching void within him should be filled by something satisfying to his physical nature, and not at variance with the laws of logic and abstract thought. As for "facts" he knew nothing about them. They "bored" him. If the doctrines of a religion were true, it seemed certain that the facts on which it was based could not be false.

Yet there had been a time when he had admired the teaching of Arnold. Its freedom from cant attracted him, its genuine recognition of true liberty and the claims of the poor, its deep, sober, and pious earnestness. Newman's Lectures on "Popular Protestantism" he had heard and admired, but they were too controversial, perhaps, to touch his heart. To friends who urged him to hear one of Newman's sermons at St. Mary's, he replied, "Why should I go and listen to such myths?" But, one afternoon, passing St. Mary's porch, he yielded to a repeated request and went in. That moment was the beginning of a personal influence on the part of Newman, such as Ward had never felt before. The publication of Froude's *Remains* early in 1838 brought matters to a head, and this, perhaps, caused Ward's formal adhesion; but, before that time, he was ready to be convinced, only feeling that the *Via Media* did not go far enough. Practically, therefore, Newman himself, and nothing else, was the secret of Ward's conversion. It was not Newman's controversial or intellectual powers, it was that he brought home to the heart of his new follower the reality of a definite system more satisfying to him than the doctrine of Arnold. Suggested by Newman, this was more fully and outspokenly developed in Froude's *Remains*, the publication of which made him "leap for joy," and declare that he had now found what he wanted. But Newman, and no one else, he owned as his intellectual parent in religious matters. Probably he owed him more than this: something beyond a "system," something of that debt which Lockhart avowed—a sense, clear or vague, that, through Newman, he felt, as he had never felt before, that inexpressible Presence which seems to betoken God.

Is it not intelligible that such a convert as this should have appealed powerfully to Newman's responsive sense of what was due from a leader to followers, especially to one who trusted him so blindly that he accepted facts at once on his authority and took him almost as his very Creed? Coming to Newman as to a fountain of freshness, as to the shadow of a great rock in the barren and dry land of his own solitary depressions, was it strange that Ward found him ready at least to listen sympathetically? And, after listening, when it came to answering, who can be surprised if the Leader, being what he was, tried to answer sympathetically too? Did it occur to him that Ward was deficient in reverence? But how? If his new follower was a little too much given to trampling on men's conventions, yet, as a set-off, was he not ready to be "abject" towards God? Nor was it likely that the mixing of things sacred and grotesque, the conversion of religious discussion into sportive polemics, the abrupt transitions from "Thomas Aquinas" to "dancing a ballet," would be obtruded on his spiritual parent. If Newman now and then caught glimpses of it, he knew enough of his own nature to be well aware that a man might be superficially mirthful, and yet, at heart, "shudder at himself."

To a leader largely dependent upon externals, given to wait for "signs," and doubting whether to advance or stand still, this new ally may well have appeared as a kind of token that it was "intended" that he should go forward. For here was one who, in thoroughness, straightforwardness, unflinching honesty, and hatred of shams, appeared to recall the dead friend whose Breviary always lay upon his table. Under a very different shape, and with many contrasts of expression, in Ward's progressive interrogations, and progressive suggestions of conclusions following irresistibly upon premises, Newman might think he heard nothing less than a message from Hurrell Froude, once more urging him to speak out, and protesting against his "economies." Could human being be more honest? Did he know any one more free from prejudice? Who could be more open to see logical difficulties and yet more ready to believe in religious Authority? Who was less disposed to put a vain trust in the teachings of nature or in the promptings of his own heart? Were there not in Ward almost all the elements needed for the attainment of truth? When such a man, noted throughout Oxford for his social brightness, his genial vigour, and his skill in controversy, came to the head of the Tractarian Party in the attitude of a pupil asking whether the teacher meant this or that, was it strange that the latter should feel bound to say yes, or no, to the best of his ability, and that having said yes, he should feel bound to adhere to it, if possible?

§ 109. *Who was to blame?*

So natural was all this that neither pupil nor teacher would seem to require excuse, the one for asking questions, the other for trying to answer. Yet one of Newman's ablest friends declares that Newman "felt the annoyance and the unfairness of this perpetual questioning for the benefit of Mr. Ward's theories, and there can be little doubt that, in effect, it drove him onward and cut short his time of waiting." The

Tractarian chief is condoled with, because in this case, the simple rule of "answering a fool according to his folly" could not be put in use. "When the asker is no fool, but one of the sharpest-witted of mankind, asking with little consideration for the condition or the wishes of the answerer, with great power to force the answer he wants, and with no great tenderness in the use he makes of it, the situation becomes a trying one."

Why "trying," for a teacher to answer questions, for a leader to lead? The only contingency that would make it "trying" would be, if the leader had not made up his mind about the route and would not confess it. But who could have supposed that? Surely it would have been, at that time, an insult, at all events in a devoted disciple, even to suspect such a thing for a moment. Grant that Ward, with his general blindness, did not perceive Newman's embarrassment and annoyance; grant that he was a little inconveniently loud in proclaiming through High Street what he had heard in Oriel: yet, after all, what is a leader supposed to do except lead? Why, if he means "halt," does he not say "halt"? Who expects "tenderness" or "consideration" in a colonel sending to his general for orders in some crisis? In 1838 we found Newman, not without a touch of complacency, avowing that he was writing for those progressive and shrewd thinkers who were "obliging him to say Yes or No." He did not *then*, apparently find it a "nuisance" to be thus questioned, and even to be pushed on by questioners. "One cannot stop still," so he wrote to Keble, but without a word of complaint or regret. He did not write, he said, for the country clergy, but for these Yes-or-No young Oxford men, to whom he felt sure that he was of use; and he added, "I do not consider that for them I am going too fast." What blame, then, attached to these new disciples, if finding a teacher who was willing to be questioned, they questioned freely? And when he found that they had reached a point where he could, for the present, answer no further questions, was it not for him to say so?

But a false sense of duty seems to have forced Newman to say something when he had nothing to say. "When I wanted to be in peace and silence," he writes in the *Apologia*, "I had to speak out." How "*had to*"? Does this mean anything more than "I *thought* I had to"? or, "It seemed expedient to"? Again, "This phase had a tendency to bewilder and upset me;" and, "Instead of saying so, as I ought to have done, perhaps from a sort of laziness I gave answers at random, which have led to my appearing close or inconsistent." This avowal is repeated at great length, and in different forms, through several pages; sometimes with a "perhaps," or "might be," or other qualifications showing that the author in later years found it difficult to recall his exact motives. Sometimes, he says, when he was asked whether certain conclusions did not follow from a certain principle, he "might not be able to tell at the moment." That is, of course, intelligible; and the natural inference would be that, if he was not able to "tell," he did not "tell." But then he goes on, "Or it might so happen that my head got simply confused . . . . and thus I gave my sanction to conclusions which really were not mine;" and then he "had to unsay them." As another possibility, he adds, "Perhaps I did not like to see men scared or scandalized by unfeeling logical inferences." He also felt with St. Ambrose, he says, that salvation does not come by dialectic, and he "had a great dislike of paper logic." Or again, "Great acts take time. At least, this is what I felt in my own case; and therefore to come to me with methods of logic had in it the nature of a provocation, and, though I do not think I ever showed it, made me somewhat indifferent how I met them, and perhaps led me, as a means of relieving my impatience, to be mysterious or irrelevant, or to give in because I could not meet them to my satisfaction." And then comes what seems intended as a thrust against Ward: "A greater trouble still than these logical mazes was the introduction of logic into every subject whatever, so far, that is, as this was done. . . . One is not at all pleased when poetry, or eloquence, or devotion is considered as if chiefly intended to feed syllogisms."

The meaning at the bottom of all these confessions is a little hard to elicit. But it seems to amount to this. The new phase of the Movement introduced by the young Tractarians under Ward was permeated with Logic; it bewildered and upset the Leader; instead of keeping silent when he knew not what to say, he committed himself to speech. His motives for this he describes variously: sometimes it was out of a friendly sympathetic feeling towards those who were loving and loyal to him as well as to the Cause; sometimes it was because he wished to retain useful allies, who, otherwise, would have taken a course of their own; sometimes it was mere bewilderment during which he lost his head and hardly knew what he said; sometimes it was impatience or recklessness under "provocation;" or it was a sense of helplessness; or it was "a sort of laziness."

We should think meanly of a teacher of anything, and very meanly of a teacher of religion, who gave reckless answers to pupils because he was, in any sense, "lazy." Newman was *not* "lazy;" but he had no reverence for words, and was always too much disposed to use them at random.* Providence had placed him in the position of a leader; lead therefore he must; and, being a leader, he must not refuse to speak to those who asked for instructions. True, that he had no instructions to give; but that must not be allowed to make him "wilful"; he must say what was given to him to say. Add to this a touch of the practical leader's instinct, the feeling that it *would not do* to be silent; the flock would be scattered; the young men would create a scandal by doing something extreme, so as to bring discredit on the Cause. Lastly, there might be a sense that silence was contemptible. There was, he always felt, an intellectual cowardice in not ascertaining, and a moral cowardice in not avowing, the logical basis of one's belief; and this perhaps was in his mind (though not on the surface) when he wrote, two or three years afterwards, "keeping silence looks like artifice."

Still, taking Newman's own confessions, and the most favourable view of them, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that he was more to blame for allowing himself to be pushed on, than Ward for pushing him on. And, in arrest of the severe condemnation passed on Ward for his want of insight into Newman's feelings, we ought to consider that Newman is admitted by most of his admirers to have been extremely difficult to understand and follow. An indirect mind clothing its thoughts in indirect expressions resulted in continual surprises for all his well-wishers. He could not tell anyone—he could seldom tell himself—exactly what he meant. Even his dearest friends and chosen co-operators (all except Froude) he left very much in the dark about his feelings and phases of thought; Keble partially, Bowden very largely, Pusey and Rickards altogether. The implied attack in the *Apologia*—implied both in what is said and in what is not said—is so bitter, so groundless, and so widely diffused, that the brief and moderate defence made by Ward's biographer ought in fairness to be placed before the reader :—

> "In this state of things he failed to see that after a time his guide became embarrassed and unwilling to pursue the discussion, as having reached a point where he was unprepared to talk until he had had more time to think. When, years later, the *Apologia* appeared, this came on Ward as a new light. He considered indeed, that later differences had accentuated the feeling there indicated—had, as it were, led Dr. Newman to look at the past through glasses coloured by more than recent events ; but nevertheless he was pained at discovering an element in their Oxford relations of which he had been at the time wholly unconscious."

This helps us to construct that picture of the actual facts for which we vainly look in the *Apologia*. Reviewing what had happened, a quarter of a century after it happened, Newman realized vividly how it *ought to have* happened. The pace was forced, he could not deny that, by the new auxiliaries. But for their precipitate ill-timed movement on his left wing, the whole army might have gone steadily onward, and might, perhaps—who knows ?—have acted together till the last. However explained, this intrusive incident —exhibiting the Leader not as leading but as being thrust forward by one of his *aides-de-camp*—introduced into the history of the Movement a little of the grotesque and undignified. But, at least, it was a relief to connect the memory of the unpleasing fact with one who, like Oakeley, was in the front of the new allies, and who—by his age, attainments, tone of mind, sacrifices for the cause, and well-known reputation in London—might seem worthy to be their leader. This person was also commended to his memory by recent pleasurable events; Ward, on the other hand, was discommended by recent painful relations. It was a habit of Newman's, when he was to blame, to lay the blame, at least in part, upon some one else, and especially on some one whom he had already treated unfairly.* The rest followed as a matter of course. What *ought to have been* in the past, *was*, in the *Apologia*. The abrupt, uncouth, odd, straightforward, veracious, acute logician, who had done all the work, was quietly put back into oblivion; and as long as Newman's famous self-defence is read with a confidence in its accuracy equal to the admiration for its style, so long will "a typical Oxford man," of "elegant genius" and "classical mind" be supposed to have been "the most prominent person" in that band of shrewd young thinkers who forced Newman to say Yes or No—when he would have preferred (and would have done well) to be silent, because he had nothing to say.

CHAPTER XXVII

FEELING THE WAY

§ 110. "*Last words as an Anglican*"

IN April 1839 Newman wrote an article in the *British Critic* with the view of showing that there was no permanent basis of belief for serious and rational persons in Puritanism, or orthodox Protestantism, or what was called "sound Church of Englandism": and that, between Rome and Rationalism, there was nothing except the *Via Media*. The article was entitled "The State of Religious Parties." Looking back to it in after years, he describes it as containing (although he was not conscious of it at the time) the last words that he spoke as an Anglican to Anglicans.

The year had opened with attacks in the press from all quarters on the Bishop of Oxford for favouring the Tractarians. Newman also himself was not spared. But he was not discouraged. In a confidential letter (January) to Rogers, he says that if he were in the world, he might possibly be disheartened, but there he could not "realise things enough either to hope or fear." And then—"the world," perhaps, suggesting to him the Apostolic use of the word—he drops for a moment into his old self-introspective mood: "It sometimes comes on me as an alarming thing, almost a sin, that I doubt whether I should grieve though all that has been done melted away like an ice-palace. I do not mean, of course, that I should not grieve in the case of individuals I knew, or should not be annoyed about opponents, whom I knew, triumphing—but I speak of the whole as a *work*. I wish I lived as much in the unseen world as I think I do not live in this. The fear is, lest one lives in a world between the two, a selfish heart."

Yet immediately after he has given us this glimpse into the shifting tide of distrustful and oscillating thoughts in the depth of his mind, he shakes off this mood, and the next sentences breathe nothing but hope. "Poor Gladstone" is being attacked for his book on Church and State ; he feels as if he could do anything for him ; it is "so noble" of him to brave "the tempest" for the good cause. The Tracts are selling faster than they can print them. Extracts from the Tracts against Popery were to be stitched into the February magazines, and Pusey was going to write "a manifesto of principles." No good might come from that, perhaps, "for the avowed object," but it would encourage and strengthen *friends*, who would know what to say. It was rumoured that the Irish clergy were going to protest against them *en masse* ; but "The corn laws, the Belgian question, Canada and Afghanistan will, in a while, divert people's thoughts. They will tire of wondering—we shall not tire, so be it."

It was a natural division of labour that Pusey—with whom one great merit of the Tractarian system was its "stationary" character—should undertake "the manifesto of principles" which would defend them against the charge of Popery, while Newman in his "State of

Religious Parties" felt the way for a further advance. The *Apologia* gives us a full account of the latter, Newman's last Anglican word. It begins with almost a song of triumph, composed from the testimonials of their opponents, who mourned over the "fearful progress" which had now extended beyond the great cities to every town of note, and even to the remotest districts in the Highlands. To what, asks the writer, was this success due? To a reaction from the dry, superficial religious teaching and literary thought of the last century; to the same causes that had won the ear and heart of the public for Scott, Coleridge, Southey, and Wordsworth, who, by instilling a higher philosophy into enquiring minds, and by appealing to high principles and feelings, indirectly interested the genius of the age in the cause of Catholic truth. Some such a Movement was not only natural; it was necessary; it had been actually predicted twenty years ago: how absurd, then, to attribute it to the machinations of a few Oxford men—and these, too, so differently circumstanced, Keble coming from a country parsonage, Pusey from the German Universities and Arabic MSS.; himself "much indebted to the friendship of Archbishop Whately"!

The article then points out that, as a mixed multitude went out of Egypt with the Israelites, so must it be in the present Movement. There must be youthful, unwise, too zealous adherents, who would discredit the Cause, and for whose conduct the Cause must not be considered responsible. Thence it proceeds to the Cause itself, the *Via Media*, which, though based on Antiquity, was to be such a "reproduction" of the old as would be "really new." Then follows a plain warning that the Movement was a tentative one, that the leaders were feeling their way and that the enterprise was of the nature of a venture :—

> "We have good hope that a system will be rising up, superior to the age, yet harmonizing with, and carrying out its higher points, which will attract to itself those who are willing to make a venture and to face difficulties, for the sake of something higher in prospect, On this as on other subjects, the proverb will apply, 'Fortes fortuna adjuvat.'"

The future, the author did not venture to predict. But he had no doubt about the present duty. Since Rationalism was out of the question, Puritanism powerless, and sound Church-of-Englandism absolutely illogical—there was no choice between Rome and the new Anglicanism. The Movement might end in "some miserable schism or still more miserable compromise"; or, on the other hand, the newly-revived principle might prevail and bring about a new birth of the ancient Religion in the Anglican Church ; but, in any case, it was their part to press on. Thus the article concludes, leaving its readers under a twofold impression, first, that the predominance of Rome was a great and imminent danger ; second, that if the new Anglican experiment failed, Rome was certain to prevail :

> "The spirit of Luther is dead ; but Hildebrand and Loyola are alive. Is it sensible, sober, judicious, to be so very angry with those writers of the day, who point to the fact, that our divines of the seventeenth century have occupied a ground which is the true and intelligible mean between extremes? Is it wise to quarrel with this ground, because it is not exactly what we should choose, had we the power of choice? Is it true moderation, instead of trying to fortify a middle doctrine, to fling stones at those who do? . . . Would you rather have your sons and daughters members of the Church of England or of the Church of Rome?"

Want of straightforwardness or plain speaking is the last fault that can be brought against this "progressive" manifesto. Chronologically retrogressive, it avows itself to be "really new"; and the words "have occupied a ground" scarcely attempt to conceal that the "ground" may prove untenable. To some it may seem a fault that it combines an audacious and almost insolent aggressiveness against the Evangelicals (who had done so much for England), and against the High Church party (which, at all events, was a fact), with an almost puerile exultation over the possible achievement of a new system that as yet did not even exist on paper. This, however, was no fault, but part of a calculated and deliberate design. The leader wished to burn the boats for his party, and to make it impossible for them to fall back either into the Evangelical or into the old orthodox camp of the High and Dry. As for the Church of Rome he uses it as a bugbear to frighten his readers into the New Anglican pale. He does not say, here, that to join Rome involved anything ridiculous, or illogical, or immoral. But he knew that many of his readers thought so, and he assumes, and takes advantage of, their prejudices; to which indeed he appeals when he claims support from all who do not wish to be democratic, or pantheistic, *or "popish."*

In his own mind he knew that something approximating to Rome (not Popery) must be his ultimate goal, and within a few weeks we shall find him quoting *tendimus in Latium*, as the recognized war-cry of the Party. Yet there is no concealment of his opinions here. The fault is—what he perhaps considered a virtue—his blind confidence in his paper Church, which at present did not exist on paper, nor even in his own brain with any sufficient clearness. Presumably he called this faith, or at least would have described it as being of the nature of faith; and this enterprise he perhaps had in view when, in his recent University sermon on Faith, he declared that "its anticipations will ever seem to the world irrational and despicable"; that "if we were intended for great ends, we are called to great hazards," and that "great objects exact a great venture and a sacrifice is the condition of honour." These considerations might, perhaps, lessen our impatience at what must otherwise seem a reckless and egotistic confidence. Yet it is a strange position—to be acting as a guide towards a *Via Media*, and yet, at this very time (as he tells us himself) "feeling about *for* "an available *Via Media*": as though the Leader of the Exodus, leaving the mixed multitude of Israel asleep in their tents were to slip out secretly by night and grope his way a mile or two in the dark, feeling about for an available road to Canaan, and then to return prepared to act as guide for the morrow.

§ III. "*The comforts of life*," "*the main cause*" *of our* "*want of love to God*"

Newman's duty at this time was two-fold, tentative and preceptive: by night, as it were, and in his own mind, to "feel about" for the route of the morrow, but by day, and in public, to keep "the mixed multitude" in order. We have seen how deeply he was impressed, nearly two years before, by the appearances of moral failure following on numerical accessions and successes. "The State of Religious Parties" vehemently rebukes some among his adherents who "do odd and fierce things, display themselves unnecessarily, and disgust other people." How was he to check these excesses?

Still more, how was he to prevent them for the future, by creating a spirit that should render them impossible? He had tried, not long ago, to temper his former inculcation of works by laying some stress on "the testimony of conscience" as a test of true faith; but that had not gone to the root of the matter. Many of these voluble and somewhat ostentatious young men could point to lives free from grave reproach; they could appeal to the testimony of their conscience as well as to fasting and church-going, and yet– there was something wanting. What was it?

A sermon on "Love the one thing needful" gives the answer to this question. It echoes the self-distrust expressed in the letter written a few days before to his friend Rogers: "I wish I lived as much in the unseen world as I think I do not live in this. The fear is, lest one lives in a world between the two—a selfish heart." "Serious men," it tells us, "though they are, to a certain point, keeping God's commandments, yet feel that their love is not proportionate. . . . . They feel themselves to be hollow, a fair outside, without a spirit within it." Men act "from a sort of concientiousness short of love; from some notion of acting up to a law; that is, more from the fear of God than from the love of Him." Even "strict obedience is no evidence of fervent love"; and consequently men have to ask themselves in perplexity what proof they have that "they are not after all deceiving themselves and thinking themselves religious when they are not."

Nothing could be more plainly or truly put than this. And the natural conclusion, bitter, yet wholesome, to many a student, would seem to be this, that he has only a limited capacity for being truly religious; that his habits of criticism and of retirement have intensified disadvantages possibly great already, arising from temperament and taste. He cannot, as some simple folk can, in a natural free-hearted way, be loving and helpful to all around him. He is sorry, and he tries to make the most of opportunities for curing his fault, or for receiving the grace that may help him to cure it : but he does not strain after any spurious substitute for this inexpressibly precious gift of love or charity. What little he has of the pure coin, makes him shocked at the thought of accepting a great treasure of base metal in its stead. Not loving men as he should, he cannot love God as he should. He knows his place. He is content to take a low seat in the kingdom of God.

But Newman draws a different conclusion. Evidently—as will appear hereafter—"love," in his mouth, does not mean what it is commonly supposed to mean, but some religious faculty, not easily defined. Consequently, after leading us to suppose that love is the test of true Christian faith, and that asceticism, without love, is vain, he relapses into the notion—if not, that asceticism can cause love—at all events, that, without asceticism, love is not possible. Apparently, he does not believe that the wear and tear of the duties of social life, the attempts to do the right thing amid perplexities and temptations, and to do the kind and wise thing (at some sacrifice if need be, of one's own inclinations, but not necessarily with any sense of deliberate sacrifice) constitute the best kind of asceticism. "Mortification of the flesh" *i.e.* "putting to death the brute selfishness within one," seems to him achievable, not by doing what is right and kind to others, but by doing what is unpleasant to oneself. Hence, he brings us round to the conclusion that "the comforts of life" are the main cause of "our want of love, and that it would be "shocking" to meditate on the sacrifice of the Saviour on the Cross without habitual preparation of the heart by denying oneself comforts and inflicting on oneself pains. People must agree to differ, perhaps, on these things. Yet there are those who would also think it "shocking" to suppose that sitting in a cold room, or fasting, or sleeping on bare boards, would enable one to enter into the meaning of that Agony which caused the Saviour to pray that the cup might pass from Him.

There is, at all events, a consistency in Newman's habitual severance of Christian love from human goodwill, affection, or kindliness. It pervades the sermons of this period of oscillation. Love is brought forward into an unusual prominence, but he will make it more and more clear that he does not mean human love. Already he tells us that, in the ordinary amiability and friendliness of men to each other in word and deed, "our love is not enlarged . . . . the presence of Christ is not in it ;" and again, he speaks of "charity" as *unacceptable to men*. "If," he adds, "we do not afflict ourselves in light things, God will afflict us in heavy things ;" and "as certainly as temporal prosperity is the gift of the Law, so also are hardship and distress the gift of the Gospel." It was at this time that he laid down as a rule for *present* use, that "it is good for a man" to remain unmarried. As for any guidance, or lesson, to be derived by Christians from nature, art, or literature, he appears not only to ignore or deny the possibility of such help but even to assert that they are hindrances : "No, never while the Church lasts, will the words of old Jacob be reversed—all things here are against us but God."

§ 112. *Present Blessings* †

There follows a sermon in which Newman makes one of his very few attempts to express that feeling of thankfulness which is so exuberant in the Epistles of St. Paul. It is entitled "Present Blessings," and was written or preached on the day "when we first catch sight as it were of the Forty Days of Lent,"* being apparently intended to caution some of "the mixed multitude," who were wont to do "odd things," against excessive austerities. St. Paul, he reminds them, "did not look on this life with bitterness, complain of it morosely, or refuse to enjoy it;" gloom is no Christian temper; we must live in sunshine even when we sorrow. As the Three Children called on all the works of the Lord to rejoice, so we may imitate them at least "so far as to look abroad on this fair world." Nay, he ventures to say—in a spirit quite contrary to his general precepts enjoining an attitude of hostility or defence—that we may *hold communion with* "what we see there, while we seek Him who is invisible:" we may "admire it while we abstain from it." And then he proceeds to reckon up the gifts of God for which we may be thankful.

Here he is, I will not say, at his worst, but not at his best. Thought, Reason, and Imagination; to have been made in God's image; to have the power of loving and being loved; domestic affection, and social good-will; these high gifts or faculties, revived, strengthened, consecrated to the highest purposes, and blessed with the noblest hopes, by the Revelation of Christ;—there is no mention at all of these things, except so far as a comparatively brief and cold tribute is paid to them as forms of "Christian brotherhood." * But four or five pages are not thought too much to extol the goodness of God because He has not caused food to taste like medicine, and has not made wounds and blows the necessary means of attaining health and strength. Nay, He has even made life itself, and food, and sleep, pleasurable—whereas He might have ordained it otherwise!! And then a page more, to show that there is authority for *eating:* it is sanctioned by the high precedents of Abraham, Melchizedek, the Angels, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, the Seventy Elders, David, Elijah, and St. Paul!

> "Let us now thank God that He has not put us into an evil world, or subjected us to a cruel master, but has given us a continual record of His own perfections in all that lies around us. Alas! it will be otherwise hereafter with those whom God puts out of His sight for ever. Their world will be evil; their life will be death; their rulers will be the devil and his angels; flames of fire and the lake of brimstone will be their meat and drink; the heaven above them will be brass; their earth will be dust and ashes; the blood in their veins will be as molten lead. Fearful thought! which it is not right to do more than glance at. Let us utter it, and pass by. Rather it is for us to rejoice that we are still in the light of His countenance, on His good earth, and under His warm sun. Let us thank Him that He gives us the fruits of the earth in their season, that He gives us 'food out of the earth, and wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make him a cheerful countenance, and bread to strengthen man's heart.' Thus was it with our fathers of old time, thus is it with us now. After Abraham had fought with the kings, Melchizedek brought forth bread and wine to refresh him. The angels who visited him made themselves men, and ate of the calf which he dressed for them. Isaac blessed Jacob after the savoury meat. Joseph's brethren ate and drank" &c. &c.,

It adds to our perplexity that we are here called on to thank God specially for these very "comforts which he has told us, are "the main cause of our want of love to Him"! The only explanation that suggests itself for this sermon is that Newman may have been using the arguments that would have most weight, not with himself, but with some of those who were "too young to be wise and too warm to be sober." But, nothing, surely, justifies the juxtaposition of exhortation to thankfulness for wholesome meat and drink, with a description of those who are to eat and drink in hell. This does not encourage gratitude or awe, but creeping adulation or abject dread.

§ 113. *"We feel more joy than we know we do"*

From this attempt—so inadequate as almost to make us prefer the preacher's terrors to his gratefulness—the pendulum oscillates back, in the next sermon, to "The Difficulty of Realizing Sacred Privileges"—a virtual avowal that the asceticisms of the recent Lent have, or may have, failed to help many to "realize" (*i.e.* to believe heartily in) the Resurrection of Christ. "When we are told a thing," says the preacher, "we assent to it; we do not doubt it; but we do not feel it to be true; we do not understand it as a fact which must take up a position or station in our thoughts, and must be acted from and acted towards, must be dealt with *as* existing; that is, we do not realize it."

This is very serious indeed. In some, it means, "We never grasped Christ's Resurrection in our hearts, as having any spiritual significance and harmony with spiritual law": in others, "We accepted this, along with a mass of other facts, upon authority. In some of these our faith has been, or may be, shaken; why not in this too?" In both cases, the remedy is the same—to apply faith, not to the facts but to the Person behind the facts. Then Faith and Reason combine to produce a confidence that the actual details of the fact—whatever they may be ultimately shown to be—are the outcome of a great and real spiritual Resurrection, the source of life to mankind. But look at the consequence of Newman's theory. He prefaces his confession by describing—but it means nothing—himself and his hearers as "knowing and believing this truth entirely." But in fact, they do not "know" *it* at all, and do not even *spiritually* "believe" *it*, but only assent to catechisms, books, &c., that have told them of *it*:

> "And here we are, even on this great Day, this Day of days, on which Christ arose from the dead—here are we, on this very Day, as infants, lying helpless and senseless on the ground, without eyes to see or heart to comprehend who we are."

How does he encourage himself and his hearers to shake off this terrible faithlessness? In effect, his remedy is that they should say over and over again, "We *do* believe in the Resurrection, because we have kept Lent so well, and therefore, by the laws of our Religion, we *must* be really believing in it, even though we are not conscious of our belief."

> "While then we feel keenly,† as we ought, that we do not honour this Blessed Day with that lively and earnest joy which is its due yet let us not be discouraged, let us not despond at this. We *do* feel joy; we feel more joy than we know we do. We see more of the next world than we know we see. If we have duly improved the sacred season which is now past; if we have in good earnest, and without trifling with ourselves, denied ourselves in meat and drink, and other indulgences, according to our strength; if we have been frequent in prayers according to our opportunities: it cannot be but that a blessing has come upon us, and is upon us now. We may not be sensible of it, but by and by we shall know it, when we look back upon it."

Thus, in one and the same sermon, he seems to admit that asceticism is not the way to Christ and yet that there is no other; that we may be dead to Christian faith and yet really alive to it; that when our hearts tell us we feel no joy, we are to believe, and to say, that we *do* feel joy; and our reason for saying so is to be that we have "denied ourselves in meat and drink and other indulgences"! St. Paul teaches us that, by living to Christ, we die to the world; but Newman, converting the clauses, maintains that, by dying to the world, we live to Christ: "Let us only put off the world and we put on Christ. The receding from one is an approaching to the other." That does not follow. One cannot produce a cause by producing the effect; you may exactly imitate thunder, but you will not have made lightning. "Recede" as he may from the City of Destruction, the Christian pilgrim will find, before long, that there is a branching of the ways, and how can you feel certain whether he will go up-hill to the New Jerusalem on his right—or to the left, down-hill, to the city of Superstition?

CHAPTER XXVIII

TWILIGHT

§ 114. *Faith is "practically to colour evidence"*

THE same month which witnessed Ward's formal accession to the Tractarians saw Newman endeavouring, in a sermon before the University, to distinguish between Faith and Superstition. It was entitled "Love the Safeguard of Faith against Superstition." At the outset, he deserts his famous definition of Reason for what he calls the popular one. In its proper sense, he says, Reason *includes* Faith; but in the popular sense, Reason "is contrasted with Faith, as meaning in the main such inferences concerning facts, as are derived from the facts in question themselves,* that is from Evidence, and which lead us consequently to Knowledge." This seems slip-shod. Reason is not "the inferences," but the faculty by which we derive them. And, if "which" refers to "inferences," does it express the truth, generally, to say that our inferences from facts *lead* to knowledge? Do they not often constitute *the knowledge itself*—as when, from certain facts, we derive the inference that a man has committed murder? But passing by this, we have to complain that Newman not only risks confusing himself and us, by introducing a new definition of

Reason, but also implies his intention to use the word sometimes according to *both definitions;* he will use it popularly, he says, "for the most part"*!

Besides, it is misleading to say that reason derives its inferences about facts "from the facts in question," unless you carefully explain that by "the facts in question" you mean *all facts that bear upon the truth or falsehood of the statement* of fact in question. It is important that this should be seen clearly.

Here, for example, is a statement of fact:—"A. stole a penknife." Among the facts bearing on the truth or falsehood of this, are, we will suppose, (1) A. was seen to take it up; (2) he was heard to remark that he usually carried one like it; (3) he was found with it in his pocket; (4) he had often done similar things, where no one supposed him guilty of theft; (5) he was a man of great wealth, liberality, and strict integrity. Part of this evidence would be described as "evidence to character," but it is *evidence to facts that have a bearing on the fact in question.* It may be said, however, that "theft" implies *taking with a motive,* and that it would be better to take a case of *mere fact.* Well, then, suppose that (1) B. and C. say they "saw A. take a penknife"; (2) there is no other evidence that A. took it; (3) B. and C. have been previously convicted of felony upon A.'s evidence; (4) A.'s character has never been before impugned. Who will assert that the two last-mentioned "facts" are not part of the "evidence" for every one who wishes to arrive at a correct conclusion? All this suggests a truer definition of reason, as "deriving its inferences *as to an alleged fact from all facts bearing upon the truth or falsehood of the fact.*"

But Newman has here unduly contracted the province of his popular Reason, as he before unduly widened the province of his philosophic Reason. He has a purpose in doing both. Then, he wished to show that Faith was included in Reason; so he defined Reason too amply. Now he wishes to show that Faith is superior to Reason, though antagonistic to it; so he defines Reason too narrowly. This undue circumscription of Reason will prepare the way for an undue enlargement of the province of Faith. It will be said that Faith (not Reason) proceeds on "presumptions;" and then it will be ignored that "antecedent presumptions" are *not justified except when based on preceding facts and experiences.* Reason, in other words, will be forced to cede the province of antecedent probabilities to Faith; who, after annexing it, will demoralize it by bad government and let it fall into a state of anarchy. In the end we shall be led to the conclusion that faith may "presume" pretty much what it likes, even about facts, without any regard to any evidence of any kind at all.

The first step towards this confusion is to say that Faith, or "the antecedent judgment with which a man approaches the subject of religion," "practically colours the evidence" for the believer, "even in a case in which he has recourse to evidence." By the last words, the writer is apparently speaking of those cases in which we have recourse to evidence to prove, not moral conclusions deduced from our religion, but facts alleged all through our religious books. But many will contend that neither as to these, nor as to any other facts, is Faith to "colour" evidence; and some will say that such "colouring" is immoral. There appears to be also something immoral in excusing the careless misuse or abuse of Reason, as in the following passage: "When we come to what is called Evidence, or, in popular language, exercises of Reason . . . there is as little virtue or merit in deciding aright as in working a mathematical problem correctly; as little guilt in deciding wrongly as in mistakes in accounts, or in a faulty memory in history." Is that so indeed? When we decide rightly or wrongly about the guilt of a fellow-creature, are we to feel no more moral responsibility for our verdict than about the product we bring out in an attempt to multiply twenty figures by twenty? Does not "evidence," in all human affairs, appeal not only to our patience, concentration, classification, memory, and other intellectual faculties, but also to our insight into character and freedom from blind and selfish prejudice? and does not this freedom very often arise from the sympathetic power of throwing ourselves into the position of others? And is not this a moral qualification?

Yet Newman really does seem to believe that it does not matter, and that we are not to blame, if through laziness or prejudice we allow ourselves to be led by evidence to quite wrong conclusions as to matters of fact. He assumes that when we use our reason on evidence we clear our minds from prejudice; but he never, perhaps, says—hardly ever * implies—that it is *wrong not* thus to clear our minds. As (in a previous sermon) he spoke lightly and calmly about the habit of crediting rumours unfavourable to people we dislike, so here he declares that, in political and social matters, we decide largely on faith—and ignores the fact that *such faith is immoral, unless based on evidence*: "Act we must," yet we seldom "have means of examining into the evidence of the statements on which we are forced to act." And then, after thus condoning a great fault in social and political life, he goes on to *encourage us to commit the same fault in religion*: "And so in religious matters, on hearing or apparently witnessing a supernatural occurrence, men judge of it this way or that, according as they are credulous or not, or wish it to be true or not, or are influenced by such or such views of life, or have more or less knowledge on the subject of miracles."

This encouragement he follows up by an argument of the it-does-not-follow-that-it-may-not-be kind. Nature, or God, as a fact, is continually teaching us by experience, that presumptuous and *a priori* judgments—when they are not based on indirect antecedent preceding evidence, and when they disregard present evidence—*mislead* us; but Newman urges us to disregard this analogy. *It does not follow*, he says, "because in the insignificant matters of this world *a priori* judgments run counter to judgments on evidence" [what does this mean but "run counter to *truth*"?] "that therefore, in the weightier matters of the next, a merciful Providence" *may not have so ordered the relation between our minds and His revealed will* "that presumption, which is the method of the many, may lead to the same conclusions as examination, which is the method of the few."

§ 115. *Love is to be "The Safeguard of Faith"*

Having allowed Faith to neglect evidence, he has now to shield it from any further interference on the part of Reason, and also to protect it from degenerating into Superstition. He begins with a denial that is either a truism or an error. He denies "that any intellectual act is necessary for right Faith besides itself." Of course, if "right Faith" means "the faculty of attaining what is right and true in religion" this is so true that it is waste of time to state such a truth:—"Nothing is necessary for the attainment of religious truth but the faculty of attaining religious truth." But this is nonsense. The fact, which he ignores, is, that we attain religious truth through the right use of *all our faculties*, physical, mental, and emotional, and that faith is based upon the right use of our reason (in every sense of the word) as well as on the right use of our senses. Indeed Newman himself, for once inconsistent, seems so far to distrust his own reasoning as to stop short of his logical conclusion. For if Faith owes nothing to reason (in the popular sense) we should expect him to conclude that it *is no more* "than a presumption"; but he stops short of this, merely denying that *it need be* MUCH *more* "than a presumption."†

He then confuses his readers by a sentence shading off one assertion into another so as to leave the impression that the last—which he will introduce with a "that is"—is equivalent to the first. I italicize the misleading words. He denies (1) "that any intellectual act is necessary for right faith besides itself. . . (2) *that is*, that Reason is the safeguard of Faith." These two propositions are quite distinct. Reason may be "necessary" as the scaffolding to build up Faith. But it does not follow that it may be afterwards necessary as Faith's safeguard. When therefore he thinks he has shown the untruth of the last proposition, he has not shown the untruth of the first. Yet he speaks as if he had. The very first line of the following extract exhibits him denying that exercises of Reason were necessary *in order to believe.* That denial is not true; and it is quite a different thing from denying that exercises of reason are needed to *retain* belief. *

However, assuming that he has got rid of Reason, Newman now asks, What, if not Reason, is the safeguard of Faith? And his answer is "a right state of heart." The sheep, he says, know the Shepherd; others believe not because they are not of His sheep:

> "What is here said about exercises of Reason, in order to believing? What is there not said of sympathetic feeling, of newness of spirit, of love? It was from lack of love towards Christ that the Jews discerned not in Him the Shepherd of their souls. 'Ye believe not because ye are not of My sheep. My sheep hear My voice and follow Me.' It was the regenerate nature sent down from the Father of Lights which drew up the disciples heavenward,—which made their affections go forth to meet the Bridegroom, and fixed those affections on Him, till they were as cords of love staying the heart upon the Eternal. 'All that the Father giveth Me, shall come to Me. No man can come unto Me, except the Father which hath sent Me, draw him. It is written in the Prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man, therefore, that hath heard and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto Me.' It is the new life, and not the natural reason, which leads the soul to Christ. Does a child trust his parents because he has proved to himself that they are such, and that they are able and desirous to do him good, or from the instinct of affection? We *believe* because we *love.* How plain a truth! What gain is it to be wise above that which is written? Why, O men, deface with your minute and arbitrary philosophy the simplicity, the reality, the glorious liberty of the inspired teaching? Is this your godly jealousy for Scripture? this your abhorrence of human additions?"

§ 116. *But "love" "does not mean love precisely"*

All this is perfectly true, and, in Newman's mouth, perfectly misleading. About *one kind of Faith*, which he hardly deigns to call Faith, it is true; about another, which is uppermost in his thoughts, it is false. It is perfectly true about that kind of Faith which is a *trust in the Person of Christ*—that magnetic force which attracted His disciples so marvellously before His death, and so much more marvellously after it, and which, in a degree, has been transmitted from Christ through them to us. But it is not true about Faith when it means *belief in the whole mass of Tractarian doctrine.* Concerning the doctrine of Episcopal Succession, for example, it is false to say "We believe because we love." Moreover, even Faith in Christ and faith in parents *are* built up with the aid of Reason and experience. Words and acts, yes, and even looks and gestures, supply evidence on which Reason works, and by which, with the aid of Reason, Faith is constructed. Untruthful parents, or those who are exceptionally weak and silly and always in the wrong —these may be loved, after a fashion, but are *not* trusted. Experience forbids it. But experience Newman always ignores—naturally, because it belongs to the world ; which (he thinks) may be all a delusion.*

So keen a mind as his could not have fallen into all this confusion but for another fundamental error which prevented him from relying on experience, and forced him back upon books. The reader cannot have failed to note the stress laid by Newman upon the clearness of his great principle, "We *believe* because we *love*." The beautiful simplicity of it strikes him. He almost obtrudes the plainness of it on his readers. "How plain a truth!" he cries. Why "be wise above that which was written"? Why foist your "human additions" on "Scripture"? And yet he himself has afterwards, *in a later edition so to explain "this plain truth" in a footnote as to explain it* *altogether away!* To the "love" mentioned in "the Scripture" he appends "a human addition," from the schoolmen or the theologians, which reduces the grandest of truths to a nonentity! The language of Shakespeare being inadequate to set forth the sublime doctrine that "we believe because we love"; he resorts to Latin and tells us that it DOES NOT MEAN "LOVE PRECISELY"! It is "the virtue of religiousness, under which may be said to fall the *pia affectio* or *voluntas credendi.*"

Away goes at once every vestige of good that we may have derived from the sermon about "Love the One Thing Needful," or that we might possibly derive from "Love the Safeguard of Faith against Superstition." If love means *not love precisely*, Newman has been talking all the while about the dog-star, while we thought he was talking about the dog on earth, the faithful companion of men! Nor is he really giving us any information, even when we have allowed him his celestial interpretation of the word "love." "We *believe*, because we love. How plain a truth": substitute for "love"—which, he tells us, the word does *not* mean—*voluntas credendi*, "a desire of believing" —which, he says, it *does* mean. What is the result? "We believe, because we have *a desire of believing*. How plain a truth!" Plain indeed! Every law-suit makes it patent. But did it need a sermon before the University of Oxford to tell us that?

§ 117. *The Faith of Mesha, King of Moab*

In adding that footnote which explained that "love" did *not* mean "love," Newman entirely gave up the position that "Love is the Safeguard of Faith against

Superstition." "Love," he now says, means "the virtue of religiousness, under which may be said to fall the *pia affectio*, or *voluntas credendi*." What is there in *this* "love" that might not be claimed by anyone who is passionately devoted to the service of Moloch or Ashtaroth? Take for example that King of Moab, Mesha by name, who, in the days of Jehoshaphat, offered his son in sacrifice upon the walls of his beleaguered city. "The virtue of religiousness"—who can deny it to this poor father, who gave the best proof possible of it by sacrificing his son for religion? "*Pia affectio*" too—was he not as "piously disposed" towards his gods as he probably was cruel towards his enemies? As for his "*voluntas credendi*," the priests of Moloch would have attested his readiness to believe anything they told him to believe. Surely, then, the Moabite king might claim to be called both "holy" and "devout"—if holiness and devotion mean absolute obedience to religious authority, and have nothing to do *with what we call human "love precisely*." "Enlightened" he might not claim to be—from the point of view of a philosopher, or of a student of cause and effect, or of one who argues from the noblest parts of human nature to the attributes of the Divine. But all this has to do with Reason. As for the "light of revelation" King Mesha *has* it, in a sense:— that is, he knows what his priests tell him to be the revealed will of Moloch. That being the case, it seems doubtful whether the King of Moab might not fairly assert that he was not excluded from "right Faith" by the following definition of it, in which I italicize the three defining words:

> "Right Faith is the faith of a right mind. Faith is an intellectual act, right Faith is an intellectual act, done in a certain moral disposi-

tion. Faith is an act of Reason, viz., a reasoning upon presumptions; right Faith is a reasoning upon *holy*, *devout*, and *enlightened* presumptions. Faith ventures and hazards; right Faith ventures and hazards deliberately, seriously, soberly, piously, and humbly, counting the cost and delighting in the sacrifice. As far as, and wherever Love is wanting, so far, and there, Faith runs into excess or is perverted."

The only words that might exclude the royal sacrificer from claiming "right faith" would be those that describe him as "delighting" in the sacrifice. But, after all, it is not impossible he would "delight" in it after a fashion, if he were superstitious enough: just as men "delight" in flagellating and lacerating and mutilating their own bodies. At all events, he might assert that, in Newman's theological sense of the word, he had "love":—not, of course, ordinary Moabite "love precisely," but a *theological* love. Nay, more, to some free-thinkers, who might blame his superstition, the Moabite might very well reply, in words of Newman's that almost immediately follow; "Of the two, it is more probable that what professes to be a Revelation" [*i.e.* what my Priests have told me to be the will of Moloch] "should be or should contain, a Revelation, than that there should be no Revelation at all." And then, commenting upon the facts (elsewhere alleged by Newman) that God, in Nature, punishes mere carelessness or temporary fault with excessive severity, the King might observe, and largely in Newman's words: "If Almighty God interposes in human affairs, His interposition will not be in opposition to His known attributes, or to His dealings in the world, or to certain previous revelations of His will [such as my Priests have given me]; and it will be worthy of Him who not only punishes children for no fault of theirs, but also casts them out of the scope of His covenanted mercies because a Priest has enunciated inaccurately some words in the baptismal form."

I do not see what case against the Moabite, Newman would have, having once deprived his theological system of the foundation of real genuine human love, and having substituted in its place a theological figment, a *pia affectio*, or *voluntas credendi*, or "virtue of religiousness." It is quite useless for the preacher to make passionate disclaimers, and to point to passages which tell us that, love being the safeguard of faith, "love towards man will make us shrink from cruelty and love towards God from false worship;" or that "love towards man will cause the mind to recoil from cruelty and impurity." The answer is: "The 'love' *you* mean will do nothing of the kind. For it *has nothing to do with 'love towards man.'* Your 'love' is only 'the virtue of religiousness' which, in some people, may even imply *hate towards man*, not love at all."

§ 118. "*Surely you must also say something more*"

How absolutely Newman is willing to apply Faith, as a mere presumption, to *facts*, is seen by the reason alleged in this Sermon for his contemptuous rejection of Ecclesiastical Miracles. He simply puts them all aside, on a "presumption," because *he does not want them*, and he even ventures to call them "external to the revealed system." There is no pretence of considering evidence :—

> "And here we see why it is not Faith, but credulousness and superstition, to listen to idle tales of apparitions, charms, omens, and the like, which may be current even in a Christian land; viz., because we have already received a Revelation. The miracles, which

we believe, indispose us to believe the report of other miracles which are external to the revealed system. We have found the Christ, we are not seeking."

At this point, if not before, the thought may well occur to us, What did Newman's hearers think of all this? Dean Church tells us, for example, that Ward was continually "forcing on Newman so-called irresistible inferences from his own doctrine, 'If you say so-and-so, surely you must also say something more.'" Was it not unavoidable that Ward should "force an inference" here? Earlier parts of the discourse were calculated to make a logical mind wince. But here, not only the hearer's logic but his religious sentiments, so far as they were in sympathy with those of Froude and Newman, would be outraged as well. "How," he might ask, "can Newman venture to draw so arbitrary a line between the Primitive Church in which he accepts miracles, and later ages of the Church, in which he rejects them? True, he has expressed it thus, that Faith refuses to listen to *idle* tales of apparitions, &c.: but that, of course, was mere rhetoric. His *meaning was* that Faith rejects all tales of modern heaven-sent apparitions, *e.g.* an apparition of the Virgin Mary in France during this or the last century. How is such a rejection consistent with what he taught us not long ago, viz. that Faith implies a readiness to see God 'interposing'? He calls them 'external to the revealed system' because he keeps up his old theory that miracles were given for the *planting* of revealed truth: but why should they not be given for the *watering* of it as well? 'We have found the Christ,' he says. True, but do we not want also to *keep* the Christ? Were not mediæval, and are not modern miracles useful for that purpose? If they are, is not that enough?

Why pry into evidence? Does not Faith believe upon 'presumptions'?

"Newman," he might continue, "has been too timid all along. After practically proving that Faith was *nothing* more than a pious presumption, he then drew the lame conclusion that it *need* not be *much more than* a presumption! And now—apparently deterred by mere Protestant prejudice and by Protestant scruples about evidence—he would have us reject all ecclesiastical miracles, thereby making a breach between the Catholic Church as it now is, and the Catholic Church as it was in the first ages. All this, from a failure to carry his principles to their full logical conclusions! Having said so much, surely he must also say something more."

If such were the "so-called irresistible inferences" which Dean Church had in view, does it not seem that the "so-called" might be dropped? For a man in that twilight condition of mind into which Newman had brought himself by playing with words and giving the reins to imaginations, they *were*, and were bound to be, "irresistible": and with Ward to urge them, and Newman to receive them, it was not likely that they would be long resisted.

CHAPTER XXIX

A NIGHT ALARM

§ 119. "*All is not well*"

The feeling that there was something hollow in the rapidly increasing Tractarian prosperity seems to have been pressing upon Newman—if we may judge from the sermons—ever since he gave us (through Rogers) that glimpse into the abysmal self-distrust which revealed him to us as finding himself unable to be sorry if all his work should pass away like an ice-palace. He had that uneasy presentiment to which all but shallow minds are liable when some rapid success is built up for them on what they recognize (though the world may not) to be an unstable, and perhaps ill-constructed foundation, or on no foundation at all. There must come a crash, they say; Providence will not be trifled with; there must be Retribution in the air. What is precisely amiss they know not; they can only vaguely say, with Hamlet, "All is not well."

Of course these occasional fits of deep depression did not prevent a general superficial satisfaction at the apparent progress of the Cause. On the last day of March, for example, exulting over the Tractarian converts, the Leader of the Tractarians rejoiced in St. Mary's that God was "leading numbers on to the full truth," and he added, "They do not know it themselves." It is thus, on the stage, that great men unconsciously predict their fates; the Leader, too, was being led on, and "he did not know it himself."

Early in June, he preached on "Unreal Words." The subject was a natural one. There had been a great many visitors at Oxford from Easter to Commemoration, and more talk than ever about Tractarianism. Ward was now one of the talkers, and that would account for a good deal of talking—not, all of it, real. Newman's theory of Faith and Reason was of course under discussion: what, for example, was Faith, since it had been declared to be "not *much* more than presumption"? What was the difference between Reason popular and Reason philosophic? What was the meaning of "love" in theology? Ought it not to be explained that it "did not mean love precisely"? If good works, without love, were of *no* avail, what was the use of good works to a man conscious of the want of love? If good works *were* of avail, even without love, as a means of producing love, how could love be said to be "the one thing needful"? Again, as to miracles, if they were to be accepted in the early Church, almost entirely, or entirely, on "presumption," out of a desire to see God "interposing" and to feel Him near, why not welcome them also in the mediæval and modern Church?

These and other matters would be discussed: sometimes, perhaps, solemnly and seriously; sometimes, if Ward was present, with no great solemnity, but with zest, good humour, fearlessness of consequences, starting of paradoxes, hammering out of ideas, pushing of inferences, trying, testing, and cross-questioning everyone and everything. Arthur Stanley was at this time Ward's companion: and with the former to question his facts, and the latter to test his logic, Newman would have much to occupy him. And how unreal it would all seem! "Words, words, words!" --to quote Hamlet once more. Yet words, however logically arranged, were not the means by which the Kindly Light was leading *him* onward. He was obliged to use them, but they bewildered him.

Once more, too, that terrible *Arians*, which had so fussed and fagged him years ago, rose up before his conscience: "Those sharp fellows, Ward, Stanley and Co. will not let me go to sleep"—so he wrote, a few months afterwards; and we can well understand that, under Stanley's goading, the memory of that inadequate work became insupportable; he must rewrite it, he said, and that would take him a good year. Besides all this, we must try to realize the small talk, and the irritating and irritated talk, of some of the rank and file among his followers, whose hollow imitations of earnest conviction would cause their Leader to suspect himself as well as them. Nor must we forget that either now, or not long afterwards, Newman himself felt guilty of some degree of recklessness and unreality—of what he calls "a sort of laziness"—in speaking when he ought not to have spoken, or in saying what he did not mean, in response to the pressure put upon him by some younger members of his Party. Then, and not till then, can we understand the feelings of disgust and dissatisfaction which about this time, forced from him what, without a knowledge of the facts, seems the inexplicable exaggeration of bidding his followers abstain from *talking at all*: "Let us avoid talking, of whatever kind." By this, however, he means talking for talking's sake

—a fault of which he never was guilty: but he touches himself more nearly in the exhortation, "Let us aim at meaning what we say, and saying what we mean; let us aim at knowing when we understand a truth, and when we do not." And other words in this sermon read as a kind of plea for more time to make up his mind: "It takes a long time really to feel and understand things as they are; we learn to do so gradually"; unreality "is the sin of every one of us in proportion as our hearts are cold or our tongues excessive;" when we do not understand something that we are bound to believe, we are to "take it on faith and profess to do so."

A week afterwards (June 9) intense weariness causes him to cast himself and his troubles upon the Foundation of things. "The Thought of God the Stay of the Soul" is his last utterance as a convinced unshaken Anglican. But it is leavened with the preacher's inveterate conviction that *self-knowledge* is the basis of all spiritual knowledge. A thrilling description of the deep peace arising from communion with God concludes by telling us that this springs—not from the certainty that He sees us as we are, and loves us as mortals love their children with all their faults making allowance for them—but "from a feeling that there is nothing in us which we need be ashamed or afraid of." Good-bye, then, to all hope of peace with God! The sermon is an exquisite dream from which the conclusion awakens us to feel our desolation more bitterly than ever:—"Are we allowed to put ourselves under His guidance? This surely is the only question. Has He really made us His children, and taken possession of us by His Holy Spirit? Are we still in His kingdom of grace, in spite of our sins? The question is, not whether we should go, but whether He will receive." Truly, if that is indeed the question, it is the question of questions; but, as long as that *is* the question, the thought of God is, not "the stay of the soul," but its terror.

§ 120. "*The Ghost*," *as described in* 1850

With such burdens on his soul, from all the stir and bustle of Commemoration he turned with relief to the Long Vacation, and solitude, and hard continuous reading on the theological controversies of the early Church. What followed must be given as far as possible in his own words. But there are two distinct accounts of it. One, written in 1850, during the polemical fervour of his recent conversion to Rome, appears to aim at giving a generally intelligible description, that shall not seem fanciful or eccentric. According to this, his vision of the power and truth of the Roman Church was the result of a quiet and sustained investigation into "the history of the Monophysites." As he sat at his studies, turning the pages of the past, the Spirit of Rome rose up before him, revealed as an Angel of Truth, making war, and prevailing, against the Spirit of Heresy which was revealed to be one with the spirit of modern Protestantism. Such is the account given in 1850 and reproduced in the *Apologia* in 1864.

> "It was difficult to make out how the Eutychians or Monophysites were heretics, unless Protestants and Anglicans were heretics also, difficult to find arguments against the Tridentine Fathers, which did not tell against the Fathers of Chalcedon; difficult to condemn the Popes of the sixteenth century, without condemning the Popes of the fifth. The drama of religion, and the combat of truth and error, were ever one and the same. The principles and proceedings of the Church now, were those of the Church then; the principles and proceedings of heretics then, were those of Protestants now. I found it so,—almost fearfully; there was an awful similitude, more awful,

because so silent and unimpassioned, between the dead records of the past and the feverish chronicle of the present. The shadow of the fifth century was on the sixteenth. It was like a spirit rising from the troubled waters of the old world, with the shape and lineaments of the new. The Church then, as now, might be called peremptory and stern, resolute, overbearing, and relentless; and heretics were shifting, changeable, reserved, and deceitful, ever courting civil power, and never agreeing together, except by its aid; and the civil power was ever aiming at comprehensions, trying to put the invisible out of view, and substituting expediency for faith. What was the use of continuing the controversy, or defending my position, if, after all, I was forging arguments for Arius or Eutyches, and turning devil's advocate against the much-enduring Athanasius and the majestic Leo? Be my soul with the Saints! and shall I lift up my hand against them? Sooner may . . . &c. &c."

§ 121. "*The Ghost*," *as it was in fact*

The *Apologia*, which tells us that all this happened in August, adds that by the end of that month he was "seriously alarmed." Unluckily no letter of August is preserved to throw light upon this crisis. Not till the middle of September do we find a letter to Rogers, which, although it indicates a certain amount of suppressed uneasiness, has not one word to suggest "alarm."

> "Your account of your priest is amusing. *Can* the R.C.'s have any tender feeling towards Anglicanism? Who among us ever showed them any kindness? Are we not the pets of a State which has made it felony to celebrate Mass even (I believe) in private, a law which (Ward declares) remained in existence till 1780 . . . "

If things were to come to the worst, he says, he should turn Brother of Charity in London. The two friends had apparently been reading or discussing the *Promessi Sposi*, and he protests that "That Capuchin" in the novel has "stuck" in his heart, "like a dart. I have never got over him. Only I think it would be, in sober seriousness, far too great an honour for such as me to have such a post, being little worthy or fit for it."

A week afterwards, follows another letter (22 September) to the same correspondent, which is not reconcilable with the account given in 1850; for the letter declares that not till *after the middle of September* did he receive his "first real hit"; and then, *not* from the study of the Monophysite controversy, but from something quite different.

> "Since I wrote to you, I have had the first real hit from Romanism which has happened to me. R. W., who has been passing through, directed my attention to Dr. Wiseman's article in the new *Dublin.* I must confess it has given me a stomach-ache. You see the whole history of the Monophysites has been a sort of alterative. And now comes this dose at the end of it. It does certainly come upon one that we are not at the bottom of things. At this moment we have sprung a leak; and the worst of it is that those sharp fellows, Ward, Stanley, and Co. will not let one go to sleep upon it. *Curavimus Babylonem et non est curata* was an awkward omen. I have not said so much to any one.
>
> "I seriously think this is a most uncomfortable * article on every account, though of course it is *ex parte* . . . I think I shall get Keble to answer it. As to Pusey, I am curious to see how it works with him.
>
> "And now, *carissime*, good-bye. It is no laughing matter. I will not blink the question, so be it; but you don't suppose I am a madcap to take up notions suddenly—only there is an uncomfortable vista * opened which was closed before. I am writing upon my first feelings."

Of course, this letter, written at the moment, must outweigh the account (above quoted) written eleven years afterwards. The fact, then, appears to be, that Newman's six weeks of study merely prepared the way for what happened. It was the article that really flashed the conviction on him. But as dramatists will do—"jumping o'er times, turning the accomplishment of many years into an hour-glass"—so Newman, in 1850, *dramatically attributes to one cause what was really the effect of two:* the six weeks of study were the "alterative," the article was the "dose," or, to express the same thing in a phrase from *Hamlet*, which furnishes us with so many singularly interesting parallels to our narrative, the article was the real "omen"; the study of "the Monophysite controversy" was only "the prologue to the omen coming on."

§ 122. "*The omen*"

Yet in one point the *Apologia* gives a more correct impression than the letter. For who would have guessed from the letter that Newman had seen this article *already*, and was quite untroubled by it; indeed, "did not see much in it"? Yet this was so.* Here once more an extract from the *Apologia* is inevitable, because any account not given in Newman's own words would be condemned as fanciful and incredible:—

> "But my friend, an anxiously religious man, now, as then, very dear to me, a Protestant still, pointed out the palmary words of St. Augustine, which were contained in one of the extracts made in the Review, and which had escaped my observation, '*Securus judicat orbis terrarum.*' He repeated these words again and again, and when he was gone, they kept ringing in my ears. '*Securus judicat orbis terrarum*;' they were words which went beyond the occasion of the Donatists: they applied to that of the Monophysites. They gave a cogency to the Article, which had escaped me at first. They decided ecclesiastical questions on a simpler rule than that of Antiquity; nay, St. Augustine was one of the prime oracles of Antiquity: here then Antiquity was deciding against itself. What a light was hereby thrown upon every controversy in the Church! not that, for

the moment, the multitude may not falter in their judgment,—not that, in the Arian hurricane, Sees more than can be numbered did not bend before its fury, and fall off from St. Athanasius,—not that the crowd of Oriental Bishops did not need to be sustained during the contest by the voice and the eye of St. Leo, but that the deliberate judgment, in which the whole Church at length rests and acquiesces, is an infallible prescription and a final sentence against such portions of it as protest and secede. Who can account for the impressions which are made on him? For a mere sentence, the words of St. Augustine, struck me with a power which I never had felt from any words before. To take a familiar instance, they were like the 'Turn again, Whittington' of the chime; or, to take a more serious one, they were like the '*Tolle, lege,—Tolle, lege,*' of the child, which converted St. Augustine himself. '*Securus judicat orbis terrarum*'! By those great words of the ancient Father, interpreting and summing up the long and varied course of ecclesiastical history, the theory of the *Via Media* was absolutely pulverized."

This is hard to follow. That a theologian should read an article, and not see much in it; that he should afterwards "seriously" think it "most uncomfortable" (which, as I have above indicated, means, "spiritually distressing and unsettling"); and yet that he should be able to give no better account of the reasons for its influence, than the allusions to "*Tolle, lege,*" and "Turn again, Whittington," makes us involuntarily recur to Sir James Stephen's theory of "cerebral excitement." In an ordinary person the avowal of such reasons would certainly lead us to suppose some degree of mental derangement. But in the present instance there had been a deliberate and studious preparation for this sort of imaginative receptiveness.* The theory of Angels had been brought to bear on the subject, and the Angel of the Anglican Church was an unpromising one, "John Bull," hardly fitted to cope with the Angel of Rome, the city that sits in sackcloth bearing the sins of men. Then, also, Reason had been, throughout a series of University sermons, pushed into the background, while Faith had been so amplified that it might seem a duty, as well as a pleasure, to believe in vast conclusions on little evidence; to venture hazardously in response to some omen or sign from heaven; and to exult in offering up the Understanding blindfold and bound as a sacrifice upon the altar of God.

Nor must we omit the special circumstances at work. During the solitude of the Long Vacation, while he was recalling all the corrections to be made in the *Arians*, all the additions to be made to this theory of Faith and Reason, and all the answers to be prepared for "those sharp fellows, Ward, Stanley, and Co.," "his head," might (as he says himself elsewhere) "have got simply confused;" he was "bewildered," and "upset," and in a state to believe anything that would give him peace and a firm stay for his soul. In such a state, how refreshing to think of a Church where all this sort of thing would be done for one! Even in imagination, to contemplate the dream that—after one plunge, after one act of faith in the Catholic Church—all these troubles, fusses, fags, and the like, would at once vanish into space! Amid these mental fever-fits, to recall his recollections of Rome, and St. Peter's, and the tombs of the Apostles, and the home of Gregory; yes, and even of Palermo, and the soothing influences of its churches, how sweet a restorative! Once more also would recur that oft-recurring Sicilian memory when he saw himself as he was, and pronounced his self-condemnation. Then, too, by the side of that despised apparition, would rise the shape of the Capuchin Friar, of whom he was not worthy, whose image he could not remove from his heart. How plain, how easy, how peaceful seemed his path if he could attain to be as that Capuchin! On the other side, how vague, uncertain, shifty and modern, all the results of his leadership, and some, too, of his attempts at leading!

"*Curavimus Babylonem et non est curata*—was an awkward omen"—so he wrote to Rogers. Texts had often, before, supplied him with "omens." When he was at Falmouth, before his voyage, he had been comforted by those words from the Psalms which he could not think the organist "had chosen on purpose." Before the Peel election, a verse from Isaiah had roused him to do battle for the Church. So, now, in the lesson for the eleventh of August, in the midst of his anxious self-suspicions, there had come this warning from Jeremiah, "We would have healed Babylon, and she hath not been healed"! Alas, it was too true; he had been attempting to heal the Church of this people, but it had not been healed; his work, like himself, was "hollow." The New Anglicanism was uttering many words, but they were "unreal"; it was gaining numbers, but there was no life in them. Then, at the end of all, while he was still striving to resist the Divine call, there came upon him that second "omen," those "palmary" words of St. Augustine, *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*—which he had heard so often before, and realised so little. He fought against them while his friend was with him, as he used, in old days, to fight against Froude's "proses." And now, as then, the more he fought with his mind, the more what he fought against entered into his heart. When his friend departed, the words, he says, "kept ringing in his ears." *Securus! Securus!* It was his heart's desire. Give him but "freedom from care"! For this, he was ready to make any sacrifice, any submission. And whither should he go for it, where hope to find it, except in——?

"Rome":—that was the answer. The word came, not *from* him, but *to* him. It was the work of a moment; but the result was for his life. "The thought," he says, "for the moment, had been, 'The Church of Rome will be found right after all;' and then it had vanished. My old convictions remained as before." Was that so indeed? We shall have a word to say hereafter about Newman's "convictions." Meanwhile it suffices to note the statement that precedes this: "He who has seen a ghost cannot be as if he had never seen it."

§ 123. "*The spirit that I have seen may be the devil*"

There is a curious similarity between the thoughts that occurred to Hamlet and Newman when these two excitable souls, after having seen their several ghosts, relapsed into the inevitable cold reactionary fit of caution.

> (1) "The spirit that I have seen may be the devil:
> I will have proof more relative than this."

> (2) "I felt on consideration a positive doubt . . . whether the suggestion did not come from below . . . That new conception of things should only so far influence me as it had a logical claim to do so."

Turn verse into prose, and what is the difference between the two expressions? Yet there was a difference in their actions. Hamlet *did* take definite means to get at the truth; Newman's principal work hereafter will be, not to get at new truth, but to ascertain whether, having these notions of truth, he can remain in the Church of England. He says, indeed, "I determined to be guided not by my imagination but my Reason." But to this we are obliged to answer, "Yes, but by *which of your two 'Reasons'*? By popular Reason that weighs evidence? Or by that philosophic 'Reason' which includes *all* means (except sensation) of arriving at the truth? In the last sense, your 'Reason' *includes* your 'imagination.'" In effect he answers our question for us, a dozen lines further on: "If it (*i.e.*, the ghost, or vision) came from above, it would come again—so I trusted,—and with more definite outlines and greater cogency and consistency of proof. I thought of Samuel, before 'he knew the word of the Lord': and therefore I went and lay down to sleep again." That represents the fact. He did not really intend (however he may have persuaded himself momentarily that he had the intention) to be guided, in any ordinary sense of the word, by his "Reason," nor to determine the "logical claim" of his vision upon him. He would "lie down to sleep;" he would wait to see if the ghost came again. If it came twice, it *might* be from heaven; if it came *thrice*, it *must* be.* Why? Because the Voice came *thrice* to Samuel. If *this* was being guided by Reason, then, but not otherwise, he was determined to obey that guidance.

What kind of logical position suggested itself to him soon after the shock, we gather from another letter (3 October) in which he soliloquizes, as it were, to Rogers, putting down arguments on paper to see how they look, and rejecting them as he writes. He did not mean to soliloquize when he began the letter. He meant simply to ask Rogers to give Keble some suggestions for his preface to the second volume of Froude's *Remains*. Rogers had said that there ought to be some explanation "about R. H. F.'s off-hand expressions." Naturally, Newman himself would have communicated this opinion to his co-editor Keble; "but somehow," he says, "I seem to want the faculty of judging of anything of Keble's." And, again, "I so little enter into people's difficulties that I am not able to tell whether he has met them . . . and, as I feel I cannot do justice to your meaning, I wish you would write a line about them." All this, he says, he had written to Rogers before, and he had torn the letter up. Now he writes it again.

He is evidently completely unnerved. He does not know where he is. He does not wish to write to Keble. True, Keble is his spiritual director; and here is a case of conscience. Rogers has already warned him that, if his present scruples continue, he ought to give up St. Mary's. Why does he not consult Keble about this? He dares not. He does not mind entrusting his doubts and fears to his friend Rogers, and even to the flighty "scaramouch" Henry Wilberforce: but to Pusey and Keble, not a word. We can understand his silence to Pusey. Pusey, he says, never could understand his difficulties. Pusey was clad in a panoply of confidence which made him impervious to the real meaning of half-expressions of hinted doubts. But might he not have tried Keble? Was it that he thought that the cloud might blow over, and then that all this fuss would be about nothing? Then why trouble younger * men with it when it might only unsettle and disturb them? The explanation is, perhaps, partly, that he *could not* express what he felt in a formal letter. To Henry Wilberforce he told the secret during a walk in the New Forest. With Rogers, he could chat on paper; but not with Keble, not quite in the same way. What he had to reveal was a *feeling*, not an argument; and the personality of Keble deterred him to some extent from such revelations, as the personality of Pusey deterred him altogether.

In this nerveless condition of mind, taking up the pen to write to Rogers about one thing, he drifts into another. Beginning with Froude's *Remains*, he passed into a soliloquy about his present logical position—that of an Anglican believing, in his heart, that "Rome will be found right after all." Rogers was a particularly shrewd listener—stimulated thereto, perhaps, by his weak eye-sight; a cool judge of men and things, with a singularly keen sense of what was demanded by honesty, honour, consistency, and common-sense. Naturally, therefore, his judgment had a special value for Newman, who submits to him two "views." First, might not grace be given in a schismatical Church? Even in the Roman calendar there were saints who had adhered to an anti-Pope and, he believed, had died in that adherence: if so, "As the Archbishop of C. is *Pope* to those who are not better informed, so he may be to those who, born and ordained in the English Church, afterwards *are* otherwise informed."

Is not this style of arguing pathetic? Does it not illustrate (and almost justify) Newman's sense of the inutility of words, and his habit of using them so recklessly, when, even in a soliloquy, he can put down on paper such a logical cobweb, which, in the next line, the very thought of his friend's common-sense whisks to the winds?—"But this you will not allow. You will say, 'Light is given for some end. What do they in consequence of their light who remain as they were ?'" Beaten by himself from his own position, he takes up a new one :—

> "Well, then, once more : as those who sin after baptism cannot at once return to their full privileges, yet are not without hope, so a Church which has broken away from the centre of unity is not at liberty at once to return, yet is not nothing. May she not put herself into a state of penance? Are not her children best fulfilling their duty to her—not by leaving her, but by promoting her return, and not thinking they have a *right* to rush into such higher state as communion with the centre of unity might give them. If the Church Catholic, indeed, has actually commanded their return to her at once, that is another matter ; but this she cannot have done without pronouncing their present Church good-for-nothing, which I do not suppose Rome has done of us.
>
> "In all this, which I did not mean to have inflicted on you, I assume, on the one hand, that Rome is right ; on the other, that we are not bound by uncatholic subscriptions."

It would be interesting to know what Rogers replied to this. But we have no evidence beyond the fact that he never reversed his opinion that Newman ought to give up St. Mary's if his feelings continued. The new "view," however, set forth in the last paragraph, is the one Newman adopted and acted on, during the last years of his Anglican career ; and, on that account, it demands consideration. Yet it seems one which a serious person, with full mental self-control, could hardly have put down on paper, much less deliberately adopted.

But Newman had against him, here, something more than the strain of excitement and the nervous feeling that there *must* be some way out of the straits in which he found himself. His subtle rhetoric, his dexterous art of shading away terms in a kind of "fallacy of adumbration," whereby black is so gradually transmuted to white that the reader is unconscious of the change—

this actually imposes upon the rhetorician himself! Strange, that a man who despised rhetoric should be deluded by rhetoric of his own! Yet, so he is:—or perhaps, not quite "deluded." For he was so indiscriminately contemptuous of logic that he was never *quite* persuaded by any argument, however sound. All his knowledge consisted of "views." But the worst of it was, in this case, that the "views" had to do, not with mere abstract questions, but with right and wrong courses of action; and yet Newman, when writing about them, instead of using the words "right" and "wrong," would sometimes use the word "intelligible." It will be in place here, as showing that he maintained this "view" for four years at least, to quote a letter of September, 1843, not printed in the Correspondence, but in the *Life of Ward*. Newman—

> "— speaks in it of 'those who feel they can with a safe conscience remain with us while they are allowed to testify in behalf of Catholicism, and to promote its interests; *i.e.* as if, by such acts they were putting our Church, or at least a portion of it in which they are included, in the position of catechumens. They think they may stay while they are moving themselves and others, nay, say the whole Church, towards Rome.' He adds, 'Is not this an intelligible ground? I should like your opinion of it.'"

To return to the letter before us, as a specimen of "adumbration." When Newman says about those who have sinned after baptism, that they "*cannot* at once return," this means, *are not able* to return, *because it is impossible*. But this prepares the way for a statement about the whole of a heretic Church that "it is *not at liberty* to return"—and this, to the true Faith and the true Church! Then comes the question, "*May* she not put herself into a state of penance?"—where "may" means "is it lawful?" But, of course, it is *also* "lawful," and, so to speak, *much more lawful*, that she should return to the true Church. Then there is a leap from the heretic "Church" to "her children." Then, instead of telling us what the children of a heretic Church *ought* to do, when they have discovered their heresy, he tells us "how they may best fulfil their duty to *her*," *i.e.* to a mass of heretics; but, on Newman's own theory, each man's first business is the salvation of his own soul. Then these now orthodox children of a heretic Church are told—not that they have no *right* to ask for immediate reconciliation to the true Church, for that would be too palpable an absurdity, but—that, by not *thinking* they have a "right" to "*rush*" into the Catholic Church, they will be best *doing their duty to the heretic Church!*

Surely all this, like the first set of arguments, ought to be scattered to the winds by the reply—unanswerable from Newman's own point of view—"Assuming, as I do, that Rome is right, I am *safe* in the Church of Rome; I am *not safe* in the Church of England." And then the transparent sophism of suggesting that "the Church Catholic has not actually commanded heretics to return to her at once"! And finally the bathos in the admission that this argumentative fabric rests on the "supposition" that Rome has not pronounced the Church of England "good-for-nothing"! The last words of all, "that we are not bound by uncatholic subscriptions" open a new question, not of a logical but of a moral kind, and would seem to require a separate letter to explain, or justify, the assumption. Altogether, the impression left on us is, that Newman had been so unsettled by his vision and his omen that he was incapable of using his reason so as to balance his imagination; but that he might use it so as to gain a breathing space, and prepare himself to obey—with some sort of appearance of deliberation and logical consistency—the faculty which he could not permanently control.

§ 124. "*We do it wrong, being so majestical*"

Newman's own comment on the consequences and duties involved by his vision is found in the sermon on "Divine Calls" (27 October) written some weeks after the letter just quoted, during which he had taken a holiday in the vicarage of his brother-in-law, E. T. Mozley. It is an autobiography. We have seen that he likened his "call" to that of Samuel. So, here; he is "Samuel." "Samuel was from a child brought to the house of the Lord; and in due time he was called to a sacred office and made a prophet. He was called, and he forthwith answered the call. He did not understand at first who called and what was meant; but on going to Eli he learned who spoke and what his answer should be." The only difference was that Newman did not "go to Eli," that is to say, Keble, but to Rogers and Henry Wilberforce. Then, after considering a number of instances of Divine calls, and pointing out their characteristics:—they "require instant obedience," they "call us we know not to what," they "call us on in the darkness," "Faith alone can obey them"—he adds that such "calling" is not a thing of the past; "for in truth we are not called once only but many times": "they who are living religiously have from time to time truths they did not know before, or had no need to consider, brought before them forcibly, truths which involve duties and claim obedience." These Divine calls "are commonly, from the nature of the case, sudden now, and as indefinite and obscure in their consequences as in former times"; if men look back on their past lives and consider their marvellously changed notions of Divine truth, they will see that these are produced by "calls which they are to obey, and which if they do not obey, they lose place and fall behind in their heavenly course."

He then enumerates some of these calls. Looking back, perhaps, to his own first "call," when the message had come to him at school that his father's bank had failed, and when Walter Mayer's influence had converted him at Ealing, he seems distantly to refer to it in words about "a letter, or a message, or a person, whereby a sudden trial comes on him, which, if met religiously, will be the means of advancing him to a higher state of religious excellence." At all events, he certainly has his sister Mary in view when he speaks of "the loss of some dear friend or relative," "which shows us the vanity of things below, and prompts us to make God our sole stay;" and then, when we look back on our life, "we find that that sad event has brought us into a new state of faith and judgment, and that we are as though other men than we were." Or again, perhaps, "something occurs"—the Peel election—"to force us to take a part for God or against Him." We have "to determine and avow what is truth and what is error"—as in the crisis before the issue of the Tracts—"or, again, we get acquainted with some one"—Froude—"whom God employs to bring before us a number of truths which were closed on us before; and we but half understand, and but half approve of them; and yet God seems to speak in them and the Scripture to confirm them."

Or again, "some thought may suggest itself"—such as *Holiness rather than Peace*—"which is a key to a great deal in Scripture"; "we may be able to enter into the manner of life of the early Christians as recorded in the Scriptures, which before was hidden from us, and into the simple maxims on which Scripture bases it"; "or again we may have a resolution grow on us"—as it did in 1829, although it was not carried out till 1842—"to serve God more strictly in His house and in private than heretofore. This is a call to higher things; let us beware lest we receive the grace of God in vain; let us beware of lapsing back. . . God may be bringing us into a higher world of religious truth; let us work with Him." No one, he continues, may excuse himself from obedience to a call by taking another's lower standard of holiness for his own: "If God calls us to greater renunciation of the world, and exacts a sacrifice of our hopes and fears, this is our gain, this is a mark of His love for us, this is a thing to be rejoiced in." Then follows a passionate aspiration after "earnestness," and an exaltation of the blessedness of those who can love "in sincerity," and can express their love "sincerely": "What can this world offer comparable with that insight into spiritual things, that keen faith, that heavenly peace, that high sanctity, that everlasting righteousness, that hope of glory, which they have who in sincerity love and follow our Lord Jesus Christ? Let us beg and pray Him day by day to reveal Himself to our souls more fully . . . that we may sincerely say, 'Thou shalt guide me with Thy counsel and after that receive me into glory.'"

Who can fail to sympathize with this sincere and earnest prayer for earnestness and sincerity? It is an awful warning against mental inexactness, intellectual hurry, and a quasi-spiritual contempt for understanding and experience, that the mere neglect of facts and evidences and reason should lead an honest man thus to suspect himself of moral dishonesty and to be, at times, more a stranger to his own heart than if it belonged to some one else. Those who believe that genuine prayer is always heard, piercing through all the barriers that humanity sets up between itself and God, can feel no doubt that these words received their answer,—an answer necessarily modified by the defects of the man who uttered them, but still fraught with blessing and leading to such ultimate sincerity and such ultimate peace as were still possible in accordance with the eternal laws of Retribution.

But our main object in studying this sermon was to ascertain the way in which Newman regarded his "call" after he had taken time to review it and all its circumstances. And, from this point of view, what is the result? Surely it is this—which indeed we might have expected—that Newman even less permanently entertained the thought of his vision being Satanic than Hamlet entertained the same thought about the majestical figure of his royal father. As to analysing or testing the call by means of Reason, Hamlet would as soon have struck at the crowned phantom with his sword to test its reality. Has the sermon a single trace of the feeling that "the suggestion might be from below"? Is there the least evidence of any disposition to regard a "call" of this kind (and to teach others to regard it) "only so far as it had a logical claim?" And could such a "call" leave his "convictions" unchanged? He thought it did, and says it did; and, in some men, it might, but not in one whose convictions were so permeated by his imagination. "My old convictions remained the same as before"—this we must reject. "He who has seen a ghost cannot be as if he had never seen it"—this we must accept. Never again can Newman be what he was. He *was* an Anglican. He *is* henceforth a Romanist.

CHAPTER XXX

CONFUSION

§ 125. "*Being guided by his Reason*"

We now enter on what may be called the drifting period of Newman's life. Explicit and implicit Reason* are called to his aid; but still he drifts. He goes through the form of reasoning; but the form does not affect the results. The wind of Anglicanism has suddenly dropped. The tide of Romanism has set in strong from the first, and daily stronger. The captain puts out oars, but they are far too small for such a craft. The rudder is plied violently and obtrusively; but it does not touch the water. It is a mere handle, that makes a good show on deck. Anchor he cannot, for he has no bottom where an anchor will hold; all is loose, floating, illusive. The shore which he is nearing is close at hand, the end is a mere question of time. Meanwhile he can do nothing but row and steer with instruments that effect nothing. This Newman calls "being guided by his reason." Let us take one or two specimens of the process.

When he revealed his secret to Henry Wilberforce, he "deliberated whether, if a hundred of the party saw their way to it, it might not be their duty to join them in secession." Why "a hundred"? Because, in the

New Testament, *single* conversions are not found, except when accompanied by some miracle; and therefore the Tractarians ought not to secede except in some numerical force. This we shall also find hereafter explicitly stated in one of Newman's letters.* Take another instance. In December 1838 he had insisted that Temporal Adversity was a Note of the *true* Church. Now he is disposed to consider that it may be a Note of a *corrupt* Church. At least, he fortifies himself *against* Rome by reflecting that "Bellarmine had reckoned Temporal Prosperity among the Notes of the Church," and the Roman Church had *not* been very prosperous in the nineteenth century. How are we to explain Newman's entertaining this last notion, so alien from his ascetic modes of thought? Simply because he wanted a "controversial basis" against Rome; and this supplied it.

At the very time too at which he was appealing to his "Reason" to protect him *against* Rome, he describes himself as already convinced by "Reason" that his prejudice against Rome was *false*: "Though my reason was convinced, I did not throw off for some time—I could not have thrown off—the unreasoning prejudice and suspicion, which I cherished about her, at least by fits and starts, in spite of this conviction of reason"; and elsewhere, as to his prejudice that Rome was Antichrist: "I had a shrinking from renouncing it even when my reason so ordered me, from a sort of conscience or prejudice." The true explanation of all this mystifying language must be looked for in that passage of the *Apologia* in which Newman, in a first edition speaks of making a certain belief "less terrible to the *Reason*," and, in later editions "less terrible to the *Imagination*." His Reason (in the philosophic sense) *was* Imagination (in the popular sense). Hence in the present conflict, or appearance of conflict, Reason was to play no part. Two Imaginations were contending together. On the one side was the deeply-rooted but fading Imagination of his youth—that there *must* be something wrong, if not positively Antichristian, about the Church of Rome; on the other side, the fresh, strong, and expanding Imagination that "Rome was always right." Whichever of these two prevailed, "Reason" would submissively follow in the train of the victor. But she would do no fighting. She was not a combatant, but a camp-follower.

Towards the end of the year Newman gives just a glimpse of some of his troubles to his favourite sister. The Vice-Chancellor, he says, is against them; the Heads of Houses are "getting more and more uneasy"; he expects the country clergy will be "getting uneasy"; he would not wonder if the Bishop "got uneasy"; in which case, he supposes he should resign his living; the question of the Fathers is "getting more and more anxious"; people will not find in them what they expected, *i.e.* authoritative expositions of high Anglican doctrine. "Many have embraced the principle of appeal to them with this view. Now they are beginning to be undeceived."

> "I never can be surprised at *individuals* going off to Romanism, but that is not my chief fear, but a schism in the Church: that is, those two parties who have hitherto got on together as they could, from the time of Puritanism downwards, gathering up into clear, direct, tangible forces, and colliding. Our Church is not at one with itself, there is no denying it."

There is not a single suggestion throughout this letter that *he himself* has changed his views, or has had new truth revealed to him. When he began

"The Library of the Fathers," he felt blindly confident that "it could not lead to Rome," and led others into the same belief. Now, he says, "*they* are"—he ought to have said "*I* am"—"beginning to be undeceived." Yet he prepares her for the worst by telling her that he can fancy things gone so far as to make him resign even his fellowship. "Had I my will," he adds, "I should like to give up preaching." The sting, however, of this last sentence, is removed by the reason alleged for retaining his charge: "It is more than probable that any person appointed would be liked less than myself." His sister—like others of his friends hereafter—must have been sorely perplexed and mystified by these avowals of possible intentions to do desperate things, on no apparent grounds. But it was not his fault. It was his nature, his *fibre* (so to speak) to express himself in this tortuous fashion, and in this case he had the additional motive of affection. He wanted to prepare his sister for his future action, without paining her by letting her know his present thoughts.

"The Heads of Houses," said Newman above, "are getting more and more uneasy." It will be observed he does not here complain of them for this. But Dean Church does. They accepted, he says, any bit of contemptible gossip collected by ignorance or ill-nature as a proof of heresy, and were always ready to suspect it where it was not. Yet Newman—who will complain in the *Apologia* bitterly enough about their subsequent conduct—here, in his letter to his sister, no more accuses the Heads than the Bishop, or the country clergy. Is it not probable that what was going on in Oxford among the young Tractarians whose watchword was *tendimus in Latium*, may have justified some uneasiness? We, at this distance of time, can scarcely imagine the wild mad things that were said and done by the more perfervid of the Tractarians; and the author of *The Oxford Movement* throws over them an affectionate veil of generality which is not helpful to a dull imagination. They might be forgotten in detail if their collective effect were represented by the impartial historian. But the Dean has hardly done this.

Here, for example is an instance, connected with the name of one of Newman's most zealous followers, twice mentioned by the author of *The Oxford Movement*, but without any allusion to the following picturesque incident. During Newman's absence from Oxford in the early autumn he had twice entrusted the pulpit of St. Mary's to Mr. J. B. Morris, familiarly called "Jack Morris." He had shown symptoms of extravagance before, and Newman had given him a caution. But—I quote Newman's own language—"What does he do on St. Michael's Day but preach a sermon not simply on angels, but on his one subject, for which he has a monomania, of fasting; nay, and say that it was a good thing, whereas angels feasted on festivals, to make the brute creation fast on fast-days. . . . You may conceive how the Heads of Houses . . . fretted under this; but the next Sunday . . . he preached to them *totidem verbis*, the Roman doctrine of the Mass; and, not content with that, added, in energetic terms, that every one was an unbeliever, carnal, and so forth, who did not hold it. To this he added other speculations of his own, still more objectionable."

Was not this worthy of insertion in *The Oxford Movement*, as an illustration of the fervour of the times, and as at least an extenuation of the fears, say even of the panics, of the Heads of Houses? Newman in the letter describing it, says, "I wish *all* this kept secret please; for it is not known even here." Can it be that Dean Church himself never knew of it? Certainly its ludicrous aspect should not have excluded it from a serious narrative. For what could be more to the purpose? Here was a Tractarian, one of the rank and file—talkative, noisy, extreme, and extravagant, but still, one of many, one who was not too extravagant to prevent Newman from trusting him to fill his place in St. Mary's—who could venture to preach the Roman doctrine of the Mass from the University pulpit! And we have reason to believe that, what "Jack Morris" preached in St. Mary's, Ward was saying in High Street, and in every Common Room in Oxford. Well might Newman himself say, as he does, "This was too much for any Vice-Chancellor."

With such things going on around them; with the young Tractarians boasting that, give them ten years of the present rate of progress and they would make the Church of England their own; and with some of the more violent, not improbably, improving on Newman's old aggressive utterances about "riding over" recalcitrants, "as Othniel prevailed over Chushan-rishathaim"—it is not to be wondered at that the Oxford authorities began to suspect, and prepared to attack, the doctrine that produced such fruits. Dean Church charges them with want of learning. They did not know, he says, the traditional High Church doctrine which countenanced the Tractarians. They had not studied the great Church of England writers. That may be. But they judged Tractarianism by what the Tractarians themselves were saying and doing everywhere; and they knew enough about that to be certain that it was incompatible with loyalty to what had been known for nearly three centuries as the Church of England. If they had been also able to judge the cause by the secret plans over which its leader was brooding, the two judgments would have coincided; for he was proposing to himself to remain in the Church of England as a heretic Church—a Church that was to put herself "under penance" with a view to "promoting her return" to the Church Catholic. It is not necessary to be unjust to the Oxford authorities in order to do justice to Newman. The circumstances were novel. The Vicar of St. Mary's was groping his way *towards* Rome; Oxford Heads were determined to keep the University teaching *from* Rome. It was necessary that the two should collide; it was not necessary that the Tractarian historian, half a century afterwards, should condemn his opponents with an asperity which the Leader himself, at the time, knowing the facts, did not feel, and could not pretend to justify.*

We return to Newman towards the end of 1839, supplying himself with a logical basis and endeavouring to work himself into a state of tranquillity, by writing an article in the *British Critic* about the Catholicity of the English Church. He also preached a sermon (22 December) on "Equanimity." The article, he afterwards said, quieted him for two years. We shall see that his memory deceived him. Nor was there anything solid in the "Equanimity." The pendulum had, for the moment, swung back again to "his own feelings." We left him, at the conclusion of his last sermon, praying for "sincerity." Now he makes his "sincerity" a proof of the Divine favour: "When man knows himself to be in earnest, he knows that God looks mercifully on him." "Rope of sand," must be the reply—"how often have you told us that *no* man can know he is in earnest; and that we *can but guess* whether we have faith or not!"

If the logic of the article in the *British Critic* was of the same texture as this, it is not surprising that it had given him, as he tells his sister, "much anxiety." It appeared in January, 1840; but February shows him anything but "quieted": "I have got into a desponding way about the state of things"—so he wrote to his best friend, Bowden—"and I do not know why—QUITE." Newman did not insert a stop before, nor did he emphasize, the last word. But the position of it is eloquent. He always likes to spare Bowden pain. So he sails as near the wind as he can, in concealing painful facts from him. But after he had written as far as "why," he felt that he was on the verge of a falsehood. The article in the *British Critic* had *not* effaced the memory of "the ghost" or the "omen" of last autumn. He DID know why he desponded. But he only knew in his heart. He did not know definitely, logically, completely; he did not know—"QUITE."

Next to this word "quite," the most important part of the letter is a sentence about Pusey's project of an institution of Sisters of Mercy. "I despair of such societies being *made* externally. They must be the expansion of an inward principle." Here is expressed the difference between him and Pusey (as the latter was at this time). Pusey felt that in the Anglican Church there *was*, Newman that there was *not*, "an inward principle." All the rest of the letter is of little importance:—that the Bishops were not so favourable; that the authorities were getting more cold and averse; that he has been obliged, in the "Church of the Fathers," to give out their "views about celibacy and miraculous power," and so on. *The* cause for despondency was—as we know, and as he almost knew, and as he lets slip here—that, in his opinion, there was no "inward principle"—*i.e.*, no *life* in the English Church. The *Via Media* was pulverized; he was nearly a pure Protestant; Lutherans had a sort of theology; so had Calvinists; he had none.

All that he could do was—the very thing which conscience, and good taste, and reverence, and the memory of Hurrell Froude, concurred to make a painful and suspected course—to attack Rome at the very time when he felt at the bottom of his heart "Rome will be found to be right after all." In this unspeakably distressing position, not being able to impugn the *theory* of Rome, or the Church of Rome *in itself*, he determined to attack the practices of some Roman *agents*, and, in particular, to fasten a quarrel on the English Romanists for combining with O'Connell and the Liberals for political purposes. In this spirit he furiously inveighed in the *British Critic* against the convert-makers of Rome for "smiling and nodding, and ducking to attract attention, as gipsies make up to truant boys, holding out tales for the nursery, pretty pictures, and gilt gingerbread," &c., &c. He also attacks Rome itself (apparently) in the words, "we see it attempting to gain converts among us by unreal representations of its doctrines, plausible statements, bold assertions," &c.

Of his hostility to Rome he gave a further token intelligible to every Englishman—by refusing to meet at dinner a Roman convert who had come to Oxford to induce Anglicans to pray for unity with the Catholic Church. He considered the convert, he says "*in loco apostatæ*" from the Anglican Church. By the words "*in loco*" he perhaps intended some subtle distinction between this and the plain English "apostate." Even then the condemnation was severe enough. But this was his way of putting into practice the theory that a man has "no right" to "rush" into reconciliation with the Catholic Church. This convert, it would seem, ought to have remained in the Anglican Church —though convinced of her heresy and of his own liability to damnation in remaining—in order to "promote her return." At the present time especially, the alliance of a dogmatic religion with "Liberals" appeared, he says, "a providential direction against moving towards Rome." Shall we urge this as an excuse for Newman's exaggerated and almost wilful fury? He precludes us from doing so in the *Apologia* by begging Mr. Spencer's pardon for "the excess of being very rude." * And Newman could have hardly had "a providential direction" to speak of a man as "*in loco apostatæ*" for having received a "call" to Rome and having obeyed it at once.

Yet on the other hand was it "rudeness"? Was it not his way of "quieting" himself, of supplying himself with the conviction that he was acting on "a logical basis"? He wished to hold aloof, for the present, from Rome; consequently he wished to find a "sign," or "providential direction," bidding him hold aloof. He found it in the alliance between the English Romanists and O'Connell. But it was so shadowy a "sign" that he could not easily believe in it. Hence, to *make* himself believe in it, he *said* that he believed, and said it with a vehemence that he himself called "savage." Even that was not enough. For none knew better that one must *do* something in order to make oneself believe in anything; so he *did* something, and did it very violently. There was no "rudeness" here. It was uneasiness, self-distrust, perplexity, impulsiveness, that I-must-do-something sort of feeling which was a frequent motive in Newman—but certainly not "rudeness." As little was it a merely calculated and hypocritical indignation. He knew indeed that it paid. He knew that he disarmed suspicion by it; and, for that very reason he suspected himself; and this, in the end, made him more "uncomfortable" than ever. Yet still he persuaded himself that Providence did dictate this course. Rather than convict Newman of rudeness or of hypocrisy, I would find him guilty, once more, of "cerebral excitement."

§ 126. *A breathing-space at Littlemore*

It is intelligible that when, in later years, Newman came to review the process of his conversion to Rome, he should try to explain why he remained so long in the Church of England after first contemplating secession; and, in order to do this, he would naturally represent himself as contending successfully against the divine vision and voices, quieting himself by logic, and waiting calmly for more light. But though this is natural, it is not true. There was no calm, no quiet, no successful resistance at all, no real mental waiting; it was an almost continuous journey, always in one direction. With the exception of one little oasis, which we shall now describe (would that there were a few more such pleasant halting-places!) it is all a barren and dry wilderness, with descent after descent, dropping down to a Dead Sea.

In the *Apologia*, Newman "thinks" that the disquieting effect of "the ghost" had "gone" by

21 February, 1840, because in his birthday letter on that day to Bowden, he says it made him "for *a while*" very uncomfortable. But he forgets that this very letter begins with an avowal of "desponding," and that the whole tone of it reveals the deepest disquiet. The month also, in which the "quieting" article was published, exhibits him in a state of something like panic. The conscientious Rogers appears to have been speaking plainly to him, perhaps warning him of the tendency of things, or telling him again that he ought to resign St. Mary's. Afterwards he said something soothing. "One kind word from you," replies Newman (8 January), "will make me forget anything, but really you frightened and depressed me very much." A letter to his sister, written four days after the letter to Bowden, is still more despondent, "Everything," he says, "is miserable." * Carlyle, Arnold, Milman, the political economists, the geologists, all these, and others, "are uniting and forming into something shocking. But this is not all. I begin to have serious apprehensions lest any religious body is strong enough to withstand the league of evil but the Roman Church"; it is true that "good principles have shot up" in a marvellous way, but "I am not clear that they are not tending to Rome—not from any necessity in the principles themselves, but from the much greater proximity between Rome and us than between infidelity and us, and that in a time of trouble we naturally look about for allies." The writer must have been far gone indeed in melancholy to pour out on an affectionate sister such a flood of troubles as this; nor is the force of the letter neutralized—indeed it is rather accentuated—by the final disclaimer; "all this is a miserable prose and regular talk

worth nothing, and soon to be falsified by the event."

But now comes the one oasis in this depressing pilgrimage, an interval of real quiet, a brief period of profound peace, during which he is bright, happy, exuberantly joyous. The sudden departure of a curate obliged him to leave Oxford and to go into residence at Littlemore. Detachment from books, and contact with simple duties and plain human nature, did for him, at once, what the article in the *British Critic* had failed to do. His Oxford duties had to be divided among seven persons; two printing presses were stopped; a third postponed. Friends protested in vain. His first duty was to Littlemore. To Littlemore he went accordingly, and Littlemore well repaid him. He finds in it a bath of refreshment. The more things are against him, the happier he is. He has a bad cold; he has lost his voice, his throat is choked up, yet he has morning and afternoon prayers daily. He has an incapable schoolmistress, and is busy reforming, or lecturing against, the uncombed hair and dirty faces of the school-girls. His curate has left no papers or hints to guide him in anything. Yet everything goes well. He catechizes the children every Sunday during Lent, and the young "Apostolicals" flock out to hear him. It is done with such spirit, they say, and the children take such pleasure in it, so "well-up," for example, in "the orders of angels"! He gains courage, feels he is "getting on"; the children have reformed their hands and faces, and are improving in their singing. He has had the audacity to lead them in the choir, and teaches them new tunes. He lectures the girls with "effrontery" on keeping their work clean. He sets them to knit stockings. No wonder that he adds—in a charming letter to his sister—"I think I shall be a good deal here in future."

In this way Lent passes, and now Easter is at hand. The curate comes and takes tea with him on Easter Eve. Then the two go to church, and with much care arrange the altar cloth.

> "It looks beautiful. As to Mrs. Barnes, she dreamed of it, from astonishment at its elaborateness; and Eliza B. and several others, who are workwomen, look at it with amazement. . . . Indeed we are all so happy that we are afraid of being too happy. We have got some roses, wall-flowers, and sweetbriars, and the Chapel smells as if to remind one of the Holy Sepulchre.
>
> "Really I have everything my own way, and I quite dread some reverse, because I am so favoured."

We can hardly bid good-bye to this one pleasant scene in the troubled, restless course of Newman's Anglican leadership, without asking ourselves how things would have gone, if he, too, had done as Keble did, and had left his rooms at Oriel for a country vicarage. "The world would have been a loser by it:" is that, after all, quite so certain? He would have retained his marvellous power of style though he would have applied it in other directions. Domestic influences and the gentle pressure of Nature might have softened, purified, and spiritualized his theology. We should have heard less about Reason, and more about Truth. Controversy would have been less; progress might have been greater. The *Apologia* would not have been written; but there would have been no need to write it. He might have recast or retouched his sermons; but some feeling, perhaps domestic,* might have forbidden that addition which tells us that "love," in theology, "does not mean love precisely," and he would have cancelled those passages which warn us that nature is evil for us in itself.

§ 127. *Project of a Monastic House*

Why, he now asks himself, should he not permanently reside at Littlemore? He has little or nothing to do at Oxford parochially, but a good deal here. Might he not take theological pupils in this quiet place? Perhaps, if he did, his house might come to be looked on as a sort of Hall depending on Oriel:—"Supposing a feeling arose in favour of monastic establishments, and my house at Littlemore was obliged to follow the fashion, and conform to a rule of discipline, would it not be desirable that such institutions should flow from the Colleges of our two Universities, and be under their influence?"

It is odd that, to Rogers of all people, he should express himself so indirectly. For the meaning appears to be, "If I started a monastic house at Littlemore, might I not originate a feeling in favour of such establishments, conformed to a rule of discipline after my pattern? Doing this, at first, under the supposed sanction of the University of Oxford, might I not, by degrees commit first Oxford, and then Cambridge following in her train, to the definite approval of them?" Such an attempt was lawful enough; but, to Rogers, it might have been expressed more definitely. He does not add—and perhaps he only felt dimly and, as it were, with his "implicit Reason"—another advantage of this plan. This would be, that he might work out his religious problems quietly and peacefully at Littlemore, not on paper, but by *living a life of duty* as he had been doing lately with the happiest results. Perhaps too,—who could predict the future?—in such a Monastic House there might be trained up soldiers for that "army of Gideon" which he and Froude had so often contemplated; which, if the sign were given, might go forth from the Anglican Church in a compact body to do battle—where? In a revived Anglican Catholic Church? or in the Church of Rome? This he could not decide. This the Light must reveal. It might be twenty years before a decision was arrived at. One step at a time for him. He could not go wrong in carrying out the resolution which he had planned, and neglected for ten years—to serve God in a more "strict" and "religious" life.

The project went on apace. He bought nine acres. May and June brought plans for planting and building. There was to be a library, a common room, and also a number of sets of three small rooms (sitting-room, bed-room, bath-room). These "sets" he calls "cells"—a curious use of the word which the reader should note, as something will come of it hereafter. The "cells" were to be added as required. The "oratory or chapel," was to be a matter for future consideration. The "cells" might perhaps be upon "a cloister." A "refectory" was not forgotten. Every one of these words in inverted commas represents something that will exist; of which, before very long, Newman—such was the nature of his memory—will positively deny the existence.

His return to Oriel changed all this. Or the change may have been due in part to the importunity of those who looked to him for guidance. Among these was a Miss H., who, having been converted to Tractarianism, wished to convert others by publishing her views. She pesters him with letters and papers, which if they were proportioned to the length of Newman's patient and gentle replies, must have been a deluge on the leisure of a busy man. Persecuted, perhaps, by her worrying importunities, he lets drop at last the following answer —a sad falling off from the peace of Littlemore :

> "Be assured that I have my doubts and difficulties as other people. Perhaps the more we examine and investigate, the more we have to perplex us. It is the lot of man : the human mind in its present state is unequal to its own powers of apprehension ; it embraces more than it can master. I think we ought all to set out on our inquiries, I am sure we shall end them, with this conviction. Absolute certainty, then, cannot be attained here ; we must resign ourselves to doubt as the *trial under* which it is God's will we should do our duty and prepare ourselves for His presence. Our sole question must be, *what* does a merciful God, who knows whereof we are made, wish *us to do under* our existing ignorance and doubt ?"

It can hardly be said that this is the utterance of a quiet mind. He has indeed such peace as may spring from a resignation to "doubt," as *the* "trial" appointed for us by God ; but even that includes only doubts about minor details. There remains the terrible "sole question," as to which, apparently, neither doubt nor error is allowable, "*What* does God wish *us to do ?*" In other words, what must he *do* to be saved ?

§ 128. "*Implicit and Explicit Reason*"

As usual, the sermons of this period reflect its incidents. Just before his retirement to Littlemore, he seems to be goading himself on to obey the Divine "call" at once, by insisting that men "are not hindered" from doing the will of God except by their want of love : "We have a depth of power and strength lodged in us ; but we have not the heart, we have not the will, we have not the love to use it." As for the world's ridicule or censure, loss of prospects, loss of admirers or friends, loss of ease, endurance of bodily pain—how easy to bear these when we have once made up our minds! The spectacle of younger, bolder men, perhaps rasher, venturing more for the Cause than he had ventured, filled him with shame: "The unlettered, the ungifted, the young, the weak, and simple, with sling and stone from the brook, are encountering Goliath as having on Divine armour. The Church is rising up around us day by day toward heaven, and we do nothing but object, or explain away, or criticise, or make excuses, or wonder. We fear to cast in our lot with the Saints lest we become a party." In subsequent sermons there is a gradual rise towards a more hopeful tone, yet always with the assumption that some artificial self-denial is needful: "Sinners as ye are, act at least like the prosperous heathen, who threw his choicest trinkets into the water that he might propitiate fortune."

On Lady-day, in his solitude at Littlemore, his mind recurs to Sicily. Having no one to hold friendly communion with him, he communes with his former self. Pen in hand—not in a sermon, but in his diary— he wanders again among the Sicilian hills, recalling each stage of his sickness and miraculous recovery. On his bed lies the old blue cloak which had nursed him all through his illness: "I have brought it up here to Littlemore, and on some cold nights I have had it on my bed. I have so few things to sympathize with me that I take to cloaks." Meditation on God's miraculous favour to him combines with the peaceful routine of Littlemore to restore his calm. On the following Sunday, "Endurance of the World's Censure" bids the young Tractarians bear, without fuss or fretting, the petty persecutions of the worldly—"carping, slander, ridicule, cold looks"; next week we are led to the thought that, "even at present, to live in obedience to God is far happier than to live in obedience to Satan"; and finally the misery that Newman felt to be the deepest of all, "a sort of bad conscience," is described as being submerged in the sea of God's favour: "Is there any one who does not know how very painful the feeling of a bad conscience is . . . . ? And why? It is the feeling of God's displeasure and therefore it is so painful." Hence, God's favour is "just the reverse; like life from the dead, most exceedingly joyful and transporting."

Forced to return to Oriel, and to cases of conscience, he takes up in his next sermon an entirely new subject —henceforth destined much to occupy him. It is the Notes of the Church. He finds, now, no satisfaction in Bellarmine's view that Temporal Prosperity is such a Note. Once more he recurs to his old views. "If we are too happy," he asks, "is it not possible that, so far, we really do lack a note of the Church?" But, by an abstruse argument, he seems to have previously persuaded himself that the Anglican Church may claim the merit of the persecutions which have befallen the Church of Rome. If the Church is not persecuted in Britain, what follows? "Either Christianity is shut up in Britain or not: if it is, Christ has no longer a Catholic Church"; if it is not, then— "we are bound to sympathize in the troubles which Christians," in other lands, "undergo for the name of Christ." Taken literally, the conclusion is a truism; but Newman appears to imply this—"we are bound to consider ourselves one with the Church of Rome which has the Note of Adversity." He concludes by declaring that the strength of the Church lies in "her proper gifts," and among those great gifts is that of being persecuted.

While carrying out, during this period, his intention of being "guided by his reason," it was impossible for him not to recur to the subject he had so often recently treated. On 29 June he devotes another University Sermon to "Implicit and Explicit Reason."* His object seems to be to reduce to a mystery, or an arbitrary rule, all those mixed processes of reasoning by which we arrive at other than mathematical conclusions. He returns for the most part to his original definition of Reason, abandoning the sense in which he had last used it. "How a man reasons," he says, "is as much a mystery as how he remembers." He then attacks, not without justice, some of the dicta of Tillotson and Paley. They were based on his popular definition of Reason; and he has little difficulty in showing that they are incompatible with his philosophic definition of it. "True reasoning" is the faculty "of an active, ready, candid, and docile mind, which can throw itself into what is said, neglect verbal difficulties, and pursue and carry out principles." Surely a "candid mind" ought to "neglect" *nothing*. And surely, too, Newman ought to have learned, at last, by bitter experience, the evils of "throwing himself into what is said." Had he not "thrown himself generously" into what was "said" by the Anglican divines, in so "active, ready, and docile" a spirit, that he had read the Fathers with their eyes? And what had followed?

The ultimate result is that Implicit Reason is our only reasonable guide to God, and that Implicit Reason is an affair of impression, mood, impulse, the accident of the moment. Instead of condemning, he acquiesces in, this state of things: "how very differently an argument strikes the mind at one time and another according to its particular state or the accident of the moment. At one time it is weak and unmeaning—at another it is nothing short of demonstration. We take up a book at one time and see nothing in it; at another, it is full of weighty remarks and precious thoughts."

Newman exemplified this. He took up the *Dublin Review* and "did not see much in it"; a few hours afterwards, it had "pulverized" his *Via Media.* Truly it may be said of him, that his memory is mysterious, and "how he reasons is as much a mystery as how he remembers."

§ 129. *He asks "leave" to retain St. Mary's*

During the solitude of the Long Vacation of 1840, the uneasiness which had recurred with renewed violence on his leaving Littlemore, became so intolerable that he once more consulted Rogers, "Should he resign St. Mary's?" Rogers had told him, last year, that he ought to, "if his feelings continued." They *had* continued—spite of the article in the *British Critic.* The answer of his friend might therefore have been anticipated. It was reluctant; he was unwilling to believe that it must be so; but it was "Yes." Rogers was a man "than whom," says Newman, "I know no one of a more fine and accurate conscience."

Unable to act on his own conscience or reason, "explicit" or "implicit," or convictions, or imaginations, or whatever name might be given to the motive power within him, he might have been content, one would have supposed, to be guided by the conscience of one whom he so esteemed and trusted. Yet, when it came to action, to throw away such a position as the pulpit of St. Mary's, so splendid a vantage ground for preaching a true theology—if only he had had any positive theology to preach and had not been reduced to pure negative Protestantism—was too decisive and too sensational a step to take without some further consideration. In proportion as Rogers pressed him, his judgment perhaps began to rebel. Yet he would not trust to himself. He would go to one whom he had once treated as his spiritual adviser, and whom he himself describes as "the friend whom it was most natural for me to consult on such a point." This, of course, was Keble; whom, however, ever since the quarrel about the Breviary and the rise of the Yes-or-No party, he does not appear (so far as the evidence of the Letters goes) to have consulted at all. *Not a single letter* in the Correspondence is addressed by Newman to Keble from December, 1838 to March, 1841.* His motive, in writing to Keble, he states fairly enough in a subsequent letter to Rogers: he desired *a decision in favour of retaining St. Mary's*: "What I wanted to get from him [*i.e.* Keble] was *leave* to do so [*i.e.* to remain]." This correspondence deserves attention. It throws more light upon Newman's method of dealing with facts, and of "interpreting and colouring evidence," than all the University sermons on Faith and Reason put together.

His first letter to Keble begins by stating, at very great length, arguments *against* remaining at St. Mary's: he is not effecting any parochial successes; the Oxford authorities are hostile; he may be leading his hearers to the Primitive Church, but not to the system of religion "which has been received for 300 years." The only important point here is the "300." It seems to give up the "Non-Jurors" and to make no distinction between the orthodoxy of the seventeenth century and the heterodoxy of the sixteenth. Yet perhaps Froude himself would hardly have maintained that the system of "Charles I. and the Non-Jurors" had ever taken such a hold of the nation that it could be said to have been "received." To Keble, so far, these reasons must have seemed strangely weak, the scruples of a too subtle and anxious mind in a state of excessive tension. He knew nothing whatever—and this fact we must keep continually before us—of the "ghost" and the "omen" of 1839, and of the deep despondency about Anglicanism which, with a short interval, had weighed on Newman's mind for now a full year. And as for the notion that the man who was consulting him had, twelve months ago, proposed and was now acting on the proposition—to retain an official position in the Church of England, as a heretical Church, in a state of "penance," with a view to promoting its "return" to the Church Catholic, Keble would have resented the very suggestion of it as a slander. Consequently, so far, it was certain that Keble's ignorance of the facts must induce him to reply: "You have a duty to the Church which is above your parochial duty and above deference to the mere feelings of Vice-Chancellors. To the Church—not unfortunately as it *is*, but as we hope it soon *will be*, the revived Anglican Church—you are doing your duty by remaining at St. Mary's. Therefore, remain." But of course Newman would feel bound to give Keble a little more light than this. Now therefore he shoots two or three arrows somewhat nearer to the truth; but he blunts them all by appending to each an inadequate reason, or a qualification, or an interrogation, or a hypothetical conjunction.

1. He "fears," for example, that he is disposing his hearers towards Rome. But why? "Because Rome is the only representative of the Primitive Church besides

ourselves." Granted : but why should not "ourselves" be as attractive as "Rome"? Is not Keble also trying to dispose *his* hearers towards the Primitive Church? What is Newman doing that Keble is not doing? This, to Keble, must have seemed an argument of straw.

2. "Next, because many doctrines I have held, have far greater, or their only scope, in the Roman system."

This is, so far, the most serious reason for resigning. And of course, the reader now expects Newman to describe exactly, first, what is the precise force of *have* in "*have* held," *i.e.* which of these doctrines he *has* held, but *holds no longer;* and which he *still* holds. Then, the next question would be, as to "greater or only scope." "Are these doctrines *opposed* to, or merely *additional* to, the Anglican system? Do they extend so far as to involve the belief that Rome is right and England wrong? or that Rome is Catholic, and England is, or may be heretic?" But, instead of giving Keble this absolutely essential information about a matter of vital importance, he hurries on to other reasons, some hypothetical.

3. "If we have, in process of time, heretical Bishops or teachers among us ——" The answer is obvious : 1st, wait till this occurs ; 2nd, how is it to the point?

4. "And if again (what there are at this moment symptoms of) there be a movement in the English Roman Catholics to break the alliance of O'Connell and of Exeter Hall——" The same two answers apply, 1st, wait ; 2nd, how is this to the point?

5. Now comes what is to happen if these two contingencies are realised : "strong temptations will be placed in the way of individuals, already imbued with

a tone of thought congenial to Rome, to join her Communion,"

"Individuals"! Is this fair? Let the reader put himself in Keble's position and reflect that he knew nothing whatever of Newman's qualms of conscience, but knew a great deal about his nervous, fidgety disposition; let him reflect that on the other hand Keble was sure to know all about "Jack" Morris's escapade of last year, and of Ward's startling excesses, —and it will be obvious that he would suppose Newman to mean these and the other young and foolish Tractarians by the word "individuals"; and that he would never dream for a moment that Newman *included himself among them.* Then too, the hypothetical nature, and remoteness, and futility of the conditions could not but impress him. "*If* we get a heretical Bishop or two, and if the Romanists in England break with Liberalism"! "How," he would say, "could any sane and sober Anglican—anyone at least who was an Anglican *in heart*—be driven towards Rome by such coincidences? If such a monomaniac as Jack Morris is driven, is Newman responsible? Is he to resign St. Mary's because Jack Morris is mad? He must stay where he is."

6. Still Newman's conscience is not satisfied. He shoots again. But, once more, he slackens the flight of this arrow by a contrary consideration, and blunts it with an interrogation:—

> "People tell me, on the other hand, that I am, whether by sermons or otherwise, exerting at St. Mary's a beneficial influence on our prospective clergy; but what if I take to myself the credit of seeing further than they, and of having, in the course of the last year, discovered that what they approve so much, is very likely to end in Romanism?"

Again, it is impossible not to feel that Keble is unfairly treated. What had really happened "in the course of last year" had been, that Newman had received so severe a shock to his Anglicanism that he had never been at peace (beyond a month or two at Littlemore) since that time. But of all this Newman has hitherto revealed nothing. Keble knew that the young Tractarians in the course of last year had given their leader a great deal of trouble, and had made him nervously anxious about his responsibility for them. "What *they* approve so much, is very likely to end in Romanism," meant, to Newman's mind, "*for me* as well as for my followers." But Keble had no means of knowing this, and no right to suspect it.

7. Next comes another hypothetical revelation effaced by a contrary statement:

> "The *arguments* which I have published against Romanism seem to myself as cogent as ever, but men go by their sympathies, not by argument; and if I feel the force of this influence myself, who bow to the arguments, why may not others still more, who never have in the same degree admitted the arguments?"

Here the vague hypothetical suggestion "*if* I feel the force of this influence myself" is immediately dissipated by the direct statement that he "bows to the arguments"; and every suspicion is shifted from his argumentative and reasonable self to his unreasonable followers.

8. Coming at last somewhat nearer to the mark, he reveals that Rogers had thought, a year ago, and still thought, that he ought to give up St. Mary's. But this is "if his feelings continued"; and the last words of all are that Rogers "expressed great reluctance to believe it must be so,"—which seems still to leave

loop-hole of hope. In the same paragraph he states a reason (though qualified with a "seem") which, in itself, from Newman's point of view ought to have obliged him to resign St. Mary's without consulting anyone. For Newman's view was, that no one could lawfully retain an official position in the Church of England, who could not feel himself able to attack Rome. That being the case, the following words assume an importance greater than is at once apparent :—

> "Nor can I counteract the danger by preaching or writing against Rome. I seem to myself almost to have shot my last arrow in the Article on English Catholicity. It must be added, that the very circumstance that I have committed myself against Rome has the effect of setting to sleep people suspicious about me, which is painful now that I begin to have suspicions about myself."

Possibly Keble was not so much moved by this last consideration as Newman was. Certainly it was weakened by the words "seem" and "almost," which implied that the writer might change his mind. And indeed the "Article" in question had been so violent, and almost abusive, that a milder tone against Rome might seem to many of Newman's friends not to be regretted. Most certainly Keble must have been influenced, and influenced in quite a wrong direction, by Newman's misleading expression that he was now *beginning* to have suspicions about himself—whereas he had been haunted by them, off and on, for fourteen months.

Left thus in the dark, or, at best, in the twilight, Keble gave Newman the desired "leave" to remain. But it was distinctly provisional. He assumed that Newman did not at present see his way for himself. "Till you see†," he replied, "I should certainly advise you to stay." He also, very naturally, pressed on his consideration the mischief that his resignation would do to the Tractarian Cause; but he did not bid him sacrifice his conscience, even to the Cause; he might remain *till he saw*† [*his way*], and no longer. These are the words in which he describes the consequences of Newman's resignation: "It would be said, 'You see he can go on no longer with the Church of England except in mere Lay Communion'; or people might say you repented of the Cause altogether." That, of course represented *the fact*. The *Via Media* had been absolutely "pulverized" by the vision of Rome. Newman *did* repent; or rather, he had now no Cause, no Theology, to repent of. It had vanished: it had left him "very nearly a pure Protestant."*

Of all this, Keble was quite ignorant. Naturally, however, his advice prevailed. Rogers had said, in effect, "Go by your *feelings*. You have *felt* for more than a year that you are in a false position. Give it up, then." Keble, not knowing what Rogers knew, said, "Wait till you see. Perhaps the cloud may pass away." To Newman this would seem less "wilful" than "going by his feelings." True, the "world" might censure it as not quite honest. So much the better. Then he should feel more convinced than ever that he was right in tarrying the Lord's leisure and waiting still upon Him. The result was that Keble in the dark * gained the victory over Rogers in the light; and Newman waited.

§ 130. *He justifies the "leave" by "Explicit Reason"*

Keble had now sanctioned his friend's remaining at St. Mary's. Yet Newman was not easy. He knew, in his heart, that he had treated Keble unfairly in not supplying him with the full facts that might have afforded him a basis for deciding. This sanction, therefore, could not dissipate his uneasiness, unless he could supply it, as it were, with a "logical basis."

This Newman could do with ease. *Facts* he *could not* state correctly, but *proofs* he had at hand, in any number, capable of proving anything by means of the logical faculty which he called the "explicit reason." So he sits down, only half assured by Keble's provisional assent, to make himself wholly assured, and to prove both to Keble and to himself that the assent was justified, and that he ought to remain at St. Mary's. With the view of establishing this, he will suggest that, by remaining, he is contributing to the "infusion of Catholic truth" into the English Church; which must be a good thing, whatever might come of it. He will add, too, that, in the University Pulpit, he can do battle against the rationalism of the day, of which Milman's writings were a sort of earnest. But, of course, these two good projects might be met with the rejoinder that a man must not "do evil that good may come of it"; and that it was "evil" for a man with Romanizing tendencies to remain officially holding a prominent Anglican pulpit. The Romanizing tendencies he cannot deny. But he can put the matter differently. He can demonstrate logically that he is simply teaching in St. Mary's *what all the "doctors" of the Church of England have been teaching in a continuous series.*

Such a demonstration claims our attentive consideration. For note the difficulties in the way of it. I have already stated Newman's theory about the necessity of hostility to Rome being essential to any honest tenure of an official position in the English Church. This was not a novel nor a discarded theory, but one that he held *now*, as before. "I have felt all along"—so he wrote in a private letter in 1845—"that Bishop Bull's theology was the only theology on which the English Church could stand. I have felt that opposition to the Church of Rome was part of that theology; and that he who could not protest against the Church of Rome was no true divine in the English Church. I have never said, or attempted to say, that any one in office in the English Church, whether Bishop or Incumbent, could be otherwise than in hostility to the Church of Rome." Taking Newman's own view of the subject, pronouncing no opinion of ours about the lawfulness of his remaining at St. Mary's, but putting ourselves in his place, we seem forced by our "explicit reason" to a conclusion of this kind, "I am an Anglican Incumbent. I cannot any longer avow myself to be in hostility to the Church of Rome. An Incumbent who is not in hostility to the Church of Rome is no true divine in the Church of England. Therefore I can no longer call myself a true divine in that Church. Therefore I am in a false position and must resign."

Again (2), last year, he had imparted to two friends the secret that it was possible that he might be forced to join the Church of Rome; (3) he had mooted to one of them the question whether the Church of England might not have "grace," even though she were "schismatical," and might not be allowed at least "to put herself into a state of penance"; (4) he had suggested to the same friend that it might be their duty by remaining in the heretical Church of England, to "promote her return" to the Church of Rome; (5)

the opinions thus expressed to this friend a year ago remained substantially unchanged; (6) he *has* (so he found afterwards) spoken his last word as an Anglican in 1839, besides avowing to Keble that he "seemed" to have shot "almost" his last arrow against Rome in 1840; (7) not only in the letter to Rogers, but in the *Apologia* he tells us that he had begun "to wish for union between the Anglican Church and Rome, when and where possible"; (8) he now felt "sore about the great Anglican divines as if they had taken him in." Some of these statements are weaker than others. It seems fairest to put down the weak as well as the strong. But the reader will note that the strongest are those that occur in private letters, nearest the time of the thoughts themselves, and therefore most likely to represent his thoughts with exactness: and they all converge to the same conclusion as that given above: "The great Anglican divines have taken me in. They made me attack Rome when I ought not to have done so. I cannot now attack Rome. I am 'sore' about the Anglican divines, and I can no longer preach in their spirit from St. Mary's pulpit. Therefore from St. Mary's I will go."

What can be clearer? But now see the consummate, though unconscious, art, with which the "explicit reason" will becloud and obfuscate what seems to us so clear, mystifying and confusing the reader all the more because the writer has mystified and confused himself, so that at last he and his reader drift quietly and easily into the haven of the desired conclusion, viz., that he and the Anglican divines are doing precisely the same thing.

"Say, that I move sympathies for Rome: in the same sense does Hooker, Taylor, Bull, &c. Their *arguments* may be against Rome,

> but the sympathies they raise must be towards Rome, *so far* as Rome maintains truths which our Church does not teach or enforce. Thus it is a question of *degree* between our divines and me. I may, if so be, go further; I may raise sympathies more, but I am but urging minds in the same direction as they do. I am doing just the very thing which all our doctors have ever been doing."

Every step is worth noting here for the delicacy of its admirably graduated suggestiveness.

1. In the first place, introducing the great Anglican divines, he does not say—which was the truth—"their arguments *were* against Rome," but "their arguments *may be* against Rome"; and then, instead of saying "but the sympathies they raised, although they *were not actually* towards Rome, *ought* logically to have been so"; he continues, "the sympathies they raise *must be* towards Rome."

2. Then he introduces that most fallacious of truisms the "question of degree." It is a "question of degree" between a horse's hair and a horse's tail. But of what use is such a statement except to mislead? And it is preceded by a "thus." The "thus" suggests that what preceded *must be* satisfactory, since the conclusion that follows cannot be denied: "*Thus*, it is a *question of degree* between our divines and me."

3. "I may, if so be, go further; I may raise sympathies more."

This is an understatement disguised under a "may." Would "the Anglican divines" have had to make anything like Newman's confession about "disposing their hearers towards Rome," or have talked about "tending to Latium," or have had to admit that followers of theirs had preached "*totidem verbis*, the Roman doctrine of the Mass"? Take away the rhetoric, and the passage ought to have run "I *do*, I must frankly admit, go, in my own mind, a great deal further. And I do (as I find from practical experience) raise sympathies a great deal more towards Rome."

4. "I am but urging minds in the same direction as they do."

Having used "I may" above, where he ought to have used "I do"; he now compensates for this by using "I am" for "I may perhaps be." Again, a pin and a dagger may be "but" urged "in the same direction": yet the result will not be *the same thing*. Yet the cleverly inserted "but," meaning "only" and being combined with "same," gives the reader the *vague impression* of "only the same thing." And now, with the notion of "only the same thing" floating before his mind, the reader, or rather the writer, drops gently into the conclusion, which would have astounded him if he had not been so smoothly and imperceptibly led towards it, viz., that *every* Anglican Divine worthy of the name, in *every* period of the Church of England, has not only done what Newman was doing then, but has *ever been* doing it:—

5. "I am doing just the very thing which *all* our doctors have *ever been* doing."

The processes of Newman's "explicit reason" were less honourable—if indeed logic can be referred to a standard of honour or dishonour—than his actual conduct. Attempts to defend the former are stultified by the following simple statement of fact in the *Apologia* immediately following this elaborate self-justification. "I may add that from this time I had a curate at St. Mary's, who gradually took more and more of my work."

CHAPTER XXXI

THE RALLY

§ 131. *Preparing to "prove" the cannon*

ONE reason alleged by Newman to Keble for retaining St. Mary's was, that they had not yet made fair trial how much the English Church would bear. "I know," he adds, "it is a hazardous experiment—like proving cannon. Yet we must not take it for granted that the metal will burst in the operation. It has borne at various times, not to say at this time, a great infusion of Catholic truth without damage." What this means is, that the Church of England under Charles I. had received—and, under Victoria, was at that very time receiving—"Catholic" interpretations put upon her formularies, and "Catholic" usages added as being in accordance with those formularies; and that this process of "infusion" might be still further continued*.

But what precisely was the danger contemplated in the words, "that the metal will burst in the operation"? It is the danger of a "split" or a "schism" which he has repeatedly contemplated in preceding letters. In a later letter, this very metaphor is repeated: "In twenty years, things must either get much better or the poor Church must have got much worse or have broken to pieces." This then is the "hazard," that the Anglican Church by the voice of its constituted authorities may definitely reject Tractarian doctrine. Then one of two things may happen. The Tractarians may submit, conciliated perhaps by one or two trifling concessions. The result of that would be a miserable compromise, and the Church would "grow much worse." Or they may refuse to submit. Then there will be a great secession. The right-principled party, formally declared schismatical, will be driven out, either to Rome, or to a separate Anglican Catholic Church. If the Tractarians were numerous, disestablishment would probably follow; the High and Dry and the Evangelicals would form two separate sects; the Liberals, perhaps, a third. Thus there would be a schism or a "split," and the "poor Church" would be "broken in pieces." In that case, the Church would not have borne the "infusion" and the cannon would have "burst."

At this point the impatient reader probably asks, "Why all this labour to explain what is patent to a child?" Because it was not patent to Newman himself. In 1864, defending himself against Kingsley's attacks of something like treachery to the Church of England, Newman reviewed this metaphor of the cannon and said to himself, "But this *is* treachery; that is to say it *looks* like it—that I, an Anglican Minister, should deliberately try an experiment that might blow the Church to pieces! This will not do. I could not have *meant* this. What I must have *meant* was, not the concrete National Church, but the *Catholicity* of the Anglican Church, that is, my *subjective idea* of that Church." And accordingly—between two paragraphs of his letter to Keble—he interpolates this explanation in the *Apologia*:—

> "Here I observe, that, what was contemplated was the bursting of the Catholicity of the Anglican Church, that is, my *subjective idea* of that Church."

Is there any one to whom the meaning, "patent" a moment ago, may seem suddenly clouded by Newman's interpolation? To him I recommend the simple expedient of substituting for the pronoun "it," in Newman's original letter, the phrase which he himself suggests, in his subsequent explanation: (1) "*It* has borne at various times, not to say at this time, a great infusion of Catholic truth without damage;" (2) "*The Catholicity of the Anglican Church, that is, my subjective idea of that Church*, has borne at various times [*e.g.*, under Charles I. and Charles II.] not to say at this time, a great infusion," &c., &c. But this is nonsense. This interpretation being dismissed, the only question now is how Newman could possibly so misinterpret his own plain words. That indeed would be hard to answer if we had not heard him previously tell Rose that he must not be called inconsistent if, in accounting for what he has said, he gives "different reasons at different times." Not that Newman—with his peculiar incapacity for seeing plain things as plain men see them—was really treacherous. He had a right, under the circumstances, to "prove the cannon." His duty, as he rightly felt at times, was, above all, to truth. He was justified in determining not to quit the English Church till he had definitely ascertained whether it would, or would not, allow him to remain within its pale and teach what he conceived to be Christian doctrine. As to the result, that was nothing to him. If the Church was what it ought to be, it would not burst; if it was not, the sooner it burst the better.

Treachery to the English Church, from his point of view, there was certainly none, not at least in his present course; but he was not perhaps quite true to himself. A long letter to Rogers written (25 November) while he was preparing for his new enterprise, shows that he could not feel sure that he might not secede to Rome. Pugin had deterred him by saying that "if two hundred of the ablest and best of our men were to go over, they would be received coldly." Still his mind is fixed on Rome. "I think our way certainly is to form alliances with *foreigners;* the jealousies (natural) with R.C.'s at home preclude anything good." It is true that he is "more comfortable" than he was; but he cannot "draw out" his "reasons for it"; and the renewed assurances of "comfortableness" die out with an "if"; with a doubt whether he can trust himself; with a mention of "conscience"; and with a suggestion that his present peace of mind may not "continue."

> "The upshot is, whether I continue so or not, that I am much more comfortable than I have been. I do not fear at all any number of persons as likely to go to Rome, if I am secure about myself. If I can trust myself, I can trust others. We have so many things on our side, that a good conscience is all that one wants."

Five weeks later (2 January) having spent the interval in "drawing out" controversial reasons for believing the Anglican Articles to be susceptible of Roman interpretations, he reproves Rogers for catching at "that Lutheran's saying that Dr. W[iseman] was an unscrupulous controversialist." "I dare say he is," he replies, "but who is not? Is Jeremy Taylor, or Laud, or Stillingfleet? I declare I think it as rare a thing, candour in controversy, as to be a Saint." Under these circumstances, his present occupation was not likely to conduce to his remaining "comfortable." "A good conscience" was all that he wanted. But, by his own confession, he was destroying his chance of it by engaging in a task which almost involved a bad conscience. The task was now completed. In the first week of March, 1841, Tract No. 90 was given to the world, and in the last week in February—weary under the reaction from excitement of composition, disgusted with himself and his work, sick of his scruples, and, still more, of his possible "unscrupulousness"—Newman reached the very depth of "uncomfortableness." In answer to his sister's birthday congratulations, he replies, "I never had such dreary thoughts as on finding myself forty. Twenty-one was bad enough."

§ 132. *The sermons that preceded Tract* 90

The "Subjection of the Reason and Feelings to the Revealed Word" (*i.e.* to the letter of the Scriptures) was written (13 December 1840) while Newman was subordinating his own Reason to his feelings in the interpretation of the Anglican Articles. It seems to urge others to the same course. God is pleased, we are told, when we offer Him the sacrifice of our reason. An example is held up to us for imitation. When we hear of "a dreadful fire," we "become frightened in a measure far exceeding what a mere calculation of probabilities requires"; we fix our thoughts on the chance of its happening to *us* "in a way quite contrary to what reason suggests." This morbid excrescence of unmanly folly, Newman would have us recognize as a kind of first-fruits of faith acceptable to the Supreme Truth: "What Almighty God, then, requires of us is, to do that in one instance, for His sake, which we do, so commonly, in indulgence of our own waywardness and weakness"! Again, in "Faith the Title for Justification," he regards Faith as a kind of legal bond, guaranteeing us justification at some time or other. The extreme austerity of the views which insist on Baptism as essential to salvation is, in this sermon, softened by the statement that even the unbaptized, if they possess this title-deed of Faith, will be saved somehow—not indeed by Church Privileges (for they are cut off from these) but, if need be, by miracle. He seems here and there to be pleading, not for the heathen, but for those who (like himself perhaps) were in a Christian land, yet not in the Catholic Church: "Thousands who are in unconscious heresy or unwilling schism, still are, through Faith, in the state of Cornelius, when his prayers and alms went up before God." Compare this with the expression in Newman's letter to his friend Church in the same year (25 Dec.), "I am very sanguine . . . that our prayers and alms will come up as a memorial before God, and that this miserable confusion will turn to good"—and we see, at once, that Newman is putting himself and his party in the position of "Cornelius," not yet *in* the Church, but preparing, by alms and prayer, for admission into it. To other correspondents we shall find him using the story of Cornelius with the same application. A similar thought follows in this sermon. He deplores "the consequences of our anomalous state," "the inconsistency of even our good men," and asks, "What does all this show but that God's Spirit indeed is striving among us, but that the Church of the living God is hardly here?" And then, after declaring that "He has hid His face" and that we have "aids, but not Gospel graces," he concludes with one of those hypothetical encouragements to the select few more ghastly than any warning: "But let *us** praise God, my brethren, if He has placed *us*, as we trust, *within* the bounds of His kingdom."

How few of his hearers would know the weakness of that "trust," the vagueness of the locality mentally designated by "within the bounds," and the horror of that IF! But *we* know it, because he was within a month of his fortieth birthday, "the most dreary day of his life," as he called it to his sister. And how could it be otherwise if his "Faith" was his guarantee—faith, as to which we "can but guess" whether we have it or not? The "dreary day," having passed, prepares us to find him in his next sermon, a week afterwards, commenting on the "long and dreary delay" between Faith and its reward. "Cornelius" again recurs to his mind as a "specimen of that long and miserable delay which so often occurs now, when the times of the Law seem to have returned, and men believe and embrace what they died without possessing." Here we catch the echo of that never forgotten thought recorded in the Sicilian diary, when he described himself as "loving" the truth but "not possessing it," and as having "very little love," though a certain amount of "faith." And this may prepare us for what follows in the sermon, a passionate eulogium of "love," in which (a rare thing for him) he anticipates the Revised Version and improves upon the Prayer Book, calling it "that most excellent gift of love" and protesting that "whereas faith is the essence of *all* religion, and of the Jewish inclusive, love is the great grace of Christianity."

In that same week Tract 90 appeared; and the excitement it created relieved him for some time from religious anxieties. This, and Lent, induced to correct his recent lapse into subjective religion in his next sermon (21 March) which warns us that, though the defect of "love" cannot be remedied by any one means, "yet still, it does seem as if abstinence and fasting availed much towards its removal; so much so, that, granting love is necessary, these are necessary."

§ 133. "*The proving*," *or Tract* 90

"My only solicitude has been to have an answer in *controversy* why an *individual* is not bound to leave the English Church"—these words, written during the composition of Tract 90, truthfully describe the object of it. In the *Apologia* he gives, as "the actual cause of his writing this Tract, the restlessness of those who neither liked the *Via Media* nor his strong judgment against Rome." Of course, this also was true in part: but it was not the whole truth. "I had been enjoined," he says, "I think by my Bishop, to keep these men straight." That may be so; but what he ignores is, that he also wrote it to *keep himself straight.* As he wrote the Article in the *British Critic*, so he wrote Tract 90, with the view of being "guided by his Reason," in order to ascertain the "logical claim" upon him of the Vision of 1839. In private letters and conversations, he could allege, as a reason why an individual should not leave the Church of England, that the New Testament does not, so to speak, countenance individual conversions, unless accompanied by miracles. But this reply would hardly pass in controversy. Tract 90 was to supply an answer "in controversy," by showing that an Anglican might sign the Thirty-nine Articles and yet virtually accept the whole cycle of Roman (not, of course, Papal) doctrine. The inference would then be obvious. If a Romanizing Anglican could lawfully Romanize where he was, why should he not stay where he was?

In the face of some of the statements in the Articles, *e.g.* that "the Church of Rome hath erred," and that certain Romish doctrine is by name condemned, an attempt so consummately audacious cannot be defended by such a general statement as that of James Mozley, "that the Articles were expressly worded with a view to bring in Roman Catholics." This transparent fallacy is based on the omission of the word "some." The Articles were worded so as to include *some* who had been Romanists but who were willing to go a great way with the Reformation; and so as to exclude *other* Romanists who would go no way, or only a little way. When vague generalities of this kind came to be tested by application to particular Articles, it was felt both by Newman's friends and his enemies that he had failed. I have mentioned above, Newman's extraordinary way of evading the statement that "General Councils have erred," by *excepting those cases in which General Councils have been called together "in the name of Christ."* Such an evasion Newman's own ardent follower, W. G. Ward, was forced to reject. Ward also rejected the distinction* drawn by him between "the sacrifices of *Masses*" which the Articles condemn, and "the sacrifice of the *Mass*" which, says Tract 90, "is not spoken of."

Still more unhappy is Newman—because he is guilty of historical inaccuracy as well as of logical quibbling—in his evasion of the Article which condemns "the

Romish doctrine concerning purgatory, pardons, &c." On this, the Tract says, "By 'the Romish doctrine' is not meant the Tridentine [statement] because this Article was drawn up before the decree of the Council of Trent." But Bishop Thirlwall, remarks, that the history of the text of the Article—first, as framed, and then, as promulgated by authority—shows Newman's explanation to be an error. It was "the doctrine of *the Schoolmen*" that the Article originally condemned. The epithet "Romish" was afterwards substituted, *after the Tridentine decrees* and *with* "*distinct reference*" to them.

Different readers will be guided by their different temperaments and trainings (much more, perhaps, than by their theological beliefs) to different shades of condemnation of these interpretations. Newman's kindly Bishop—who bore a good deal of unpopularity owing to the imputation of favouring the Tracts—declared No. 90 "objectionable," and afterwards declared that he disapproved of a principle of interpretation that might make the Articles "mean anything or nothing." Ward, the logician, zealously defended the Tract on the ground that he had a right to sign the Articles in a "non-natural" sense, and, under that shelter, to hold "the whole cycle of Roman doctrine." Archdeacon Hare pronounced some of the interpretations to be "sophistical." To Bishop Thirlwall they seemed likely to impress "ordinary readers" as "excessively refined and artificial"; concerning Newman's construction of some of the Articles, the Bishop says that it "could scarcely have occurred to the writer if his judgment had not been biassed by his wishes"; and this impression he retains after all that he has seen adduced in defence or explanation of the Tract, although he thinks it "sufficient to repel the imputation of a conscious obliquity of view."

Thirlwall, besides having an eminently judicial mind, had received a legal training. This adds a special weight to his decision, and gives him a great advantage over Dean Church, who stands almost alone in defending Newman's method of interpretation as "dry" indeed and "logical," but "such as a professed theologian might use"; and as "the way in which" Articles "would be likely to be examined and construed by a purely legal court." He will not even allow that any of the interpretations *are* "far-fetched and artificial." He will only admit that some of them "seemed" so at the time. Pusey, at all events (according to Church's own testimony in a contemporary letter) appears to have been "much annoyed." Both Pusey and the Bishop of Oxford found "a great difficulty" in the fact that Newman had "committed himself to leaving 'Ora pro nobis' *an open question*." This was the point on which Newman had previously quarrelled with many of his own party. That being the case, was it surprising if the Oxford authorities found it startling? Condemnation of some kind being inevitable, some may prefer to call the writer "unconsciously oblique;" others "biassed by his wishes"; others "unwittingly sophistical"; but having regard to Newman's natural capacity for using words inaccurately and unnaturally, I should prefer the word coined by his follower Ward, and briefly say, "The interpretation of the Articles in Tract 90 was 'non-natural.'"

§ 134. *What was amiss in Tract* 90

It does not follow, of course, because his detailed application of his principle was unsatisfactory, that the principle itself was wrong. He assumed that, instead of "the particular belief of the writers" of the Articles, the "belief of the Catholic Church" ought to be adopted as the standard for their interpretation. Thereby he certainly broke the ordinary rule of construing documents according to the known opinions and intentions of their writers. But this rule, though it should almost always regulate our interpretation of private documents, cannot be extended to public. How often do judges "drive a coach and four" through a clumsily worded Act of Parliament, entirely disregarding what the authors of it *meant* to say, if the Act does not *say* it. This they sometimes do even when the intention of the Act (which they neglect) is good, and when the wording of it (by which they are guided) leads to unfortunate results. And, of course, this is still more justifiable where the intentions of the Act have been proved by experience to be unwise, and where the wording of it suggests an evasion for the public good. Substitute "Articles" for "Acts of Parliament," and "belief of the Catholic Church" for "public good," and what have we here but Newman's principle of interpretation?

Nor can it be said that, though applicable to legal documents, this method is unworthy of such religious formularies as the Anglican Articles. On the contrary, some would agree with Dr. Hampden that it would be best, in the abstract, that the clergy should be bound by no such documents, but simply by the indirect restriction arising from the Services of the Church. The thoughtless, or brainless, or unscrupulous—they would urge—are not likely to be excluded by such barriers, while they might needlessly deter men of excessive scruple, however excellent in character, purpose, and ability, and loyal to the English Church. Even those who would maintain the Articles, because "the freedom of the clergy means the servitude of the laity," would mostly allow that Formularies of this kind should err rather towards breadth than towards narrowness. Many of the clergy who are very far from Newman's school of theology have availed themselves to some extent of Newman's principle. Some, without any sense of disloyalty to the National Church, hold some doctrine about probation after death which would appear to involve a theory, widely different indeed from that practically in force among Romanists, but still one that can hardly disown the name of "purgatory." Again, that the Eucharist is an act of spiritual sacrifice, would be maintained by some who would strenuously object to call it the "Sacrifice of the Mass," or to make subtle distinctions between this and "Sacrifice of Masses." So far therefore, as concerns the *principle* of Tract 90, it appears to be one that the legal and the clerical professions in England would not condemn. If any clergyman, at all events, were to pass an unqualified condemnation on it, and did not soon feel compelled to qualify his words, when he came to reflect on his own position and on that well-known proverb which forbids the throwing of stones, the chances are that he would either be very young or not much given to reflecting.

It was the execution, then, and not the principle, that was to blame. It was in the "drawing out of his reasons" that he went wrong. And here his error was twofold. In the first place, he seemed to assume that every opinion, however extreme in the direction of Rome, that had been once expressed by any one High Church Bishop or Divine, and had not been authoritatively censured, at once became part of justifiable Anglican doctrine. This view is thus set forth in the *Apologia :*

> "I claimed, in behalf of who would in the Anglican Church, the right of holding with Bramhall a comprecation with the Saints, and the Mass all but Transubstantiation with Andrewes, or with Hooker, that Transubstantiation is not a point for Churches to part communion upon, or with Hammond, that a General Council, truly such, never did, never shall err in a matter of faith, or with Bull that man had † in Paradise and lost on the Fall, a supernatural habit of grace, or with Thorndike, that penance is a propitiation for post-baptismal sin, or with Pearson that the all-powerful name of Jesus is no otherwise given than in the Catholic Church. 'Two can play at that,' was often in my mouth, when men of Protestant sentiments appealed to the Articles, Homilies, or Reformers ; in the sense that, if they had a right to speak loud, I had the liberty to speak out as well as they, and had the means, by the same or parallel appeals, of giving them tit for tat."

Yet he himself had admitted that "No opinion, however extreme any way, but may be found, as the Romanists are not slow to reproach us, among its Bishops and Divines." Surely then, it is, so to speak, an extreme of extremes, to say that an Anglican may hold *all those extreme opinions that tend towards Rome* simply because *one* Bishop or Divine may have held *one* of them and may not have been censured for it. This he calls, a "large bold system of religion, very unlike the Protestantism of the day," but "the concentration and adjustment of great Anglican authorities"! Whether it would have been "large" enough to include the Evangelicals and Liberals, in the event of the Tractarians becoming predominant in the Church, is perhaps doubtful. "Bold" it certainly was ; bold enough to disturb what he elsewhere calls "the religion which has been received for 300 years" in England. And, being so "bold," it ought at least to have been put forth with great and almost tender consideration for those whose feelings it was sure to wound. In law, custom of "300 years" would count for much; but Newman in his Tract seems to have let it count for very little indeed in religion. As a specimen of a too narrow and almost provoking legality take this summary of part of Tract 90 from the *Apologia*. In it he proves that the Anglican Articles indirectly teach us to treat the apocryphal Book of Wisdom (as well as the book of Tobit) as the infallible word of God:

> "Let the reader observe:—the 35th Article says: 'The second Book of Homilies does contain *a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for these times*, as doth the former Book of Homilies.' Here the *doctrine* of the Homilies is recognized as godly and wholesome, and concurrence in that recognition is imposed on all subscribers of the Articles. Let us then turn to the Homilies, and see what this godly doctrine is: I quoted from them to the following effect:
>
> "1. They declare that the so-called 'apocryphal' book of Tobit is the teaching of the Holy Ghost, and is Scripture.
>
> "2. That the so-called 'apocryphal' book of Wisdom is Scripture; and the infallible and undeceivable word of God."

If we turn to his references we find that the Homilies do not "declare," but *imply*, the authority of the Apocrypha, *e.g.* "the holy apostles and disciples of Christ . . . the godly fathers also, that were both *before* and *since* Christ, *endued, without doubt, with the* HOLY GHOST . . . St. Paul . . . Isaiah the Prophet teaches us on this wise . . . And *the holy father Tobit* giveth this counsel. And the *learned and godly doctor Chrysostom* giveth this admonition." And again, "the same lesson *doth the* HOLY GHOST *teach* in sundry places of the *Scripture*, saying 'Mercifulness and almsgiving' &c, [Tobit iv.]." It is irritating* that these casual remnants of unreformed usage should be held up as suggestions for interpreting the Articles. It is still more irritating (and hardly fair) that the *Apologia* should omit that the Sixth Article expressly *excludes* the book of Tobit and the book of Wisdom from the list of the books of Scripture, and declares that the Church does "not apply them to establish any doctrine." The Tract itself is not so unfair here as the *Apologia*. The former recognizes more distinctly that subscription to the Articles does not bind the subscriber to accept each statement in the Homilies. Still, the spirit of the Tract is litigious, and sometimes sophistical. For instance, in dealing with "General Councils," "gathered together by princes," and pronounced by our 21st Article liable to error, what are we to say to Newman's way of getting rid of the liability: "The Article merely contemplates the human prince, not the King of Saints"?

Again, take his assertion (quoted on p. 248) as to Hammond's opinion. It is intolerable, as Archdeacon Hare* has pointed out, that he should cite no authority for a statement of this kind, and yet should ignore such sayings of Hammond as this, "Councils are only *denied* by us *the privilege of infallibility*, not that of being useful and venerable in a lower degree." It is this combination of the sharp practice of ultra-legality on the surface, with gross, fundamental injustice of mind—not deliberate, but arising from a blindness, and a contentedness to be blind, to what is fair and honest, in all matters of religious controversy—which, even now makes it difficult for those who love justice to review some of Newman's interpretations without impatience. In order to be fair to him, we need constantly to remind ourselves of his low standard of controversial scrupulousness; of his sense of the impotence of words in their application to religious questions; of his intense nervous excitement during composition; and of his absolute inability to judge his own logic and arguments, and still less to see how they would look to others. It is his blunted sense of reason that compels him to exaggerate everything. He is like an all but deaf composer trying his own music on the piano, and not satisfied that there is any tune in it unless he plays it with such an excess of loudness that he catches some sound of it himself.

Take, for example, the way in which he treats, as a whole, the difficulties in the Articles for any one holding what Newman called "Catholic doctrine." His followers—Ward for example—recognized them very keenly. In the eyes of the world they seemed so manifestly insuperable that, to ignore them, a man must be either a fool or a hypocrite. Why then did Newman affect to ignore them, and the opposition that his treatise must provoke? In part, no doubt, he was really blind. But in part he assumed blindness. In private, to an intimate friend he could recognize the novelty of the "principle" that he asserted, and the reasonableness that he should be persecuted for it, "If you knew all," he writes to Bowden, "you will see that I have asserted a great principle, and I *ought* to suffer for it." But in public, in the Tract itself, nothing can exceed the audacious tranquillity with which he denies the very existence of any difficulties at all, in the way of his theory. There *are*, he says, *real difficulties* to "a Catholic Christian in the ecclesiastical position of the English Church; but the statements of the Articles are not in the number."* Throughout the Tract he seems to be putting in practice his own theory, recently avowed in his Sermons on Reason, in which he had described, among other duties of a candid and truth-seeking mind, that of "neglecting verbal difficulties" and allowing faith to "interpret" and "colour" the evidence.

§ 135. *Signs of danger*

People who "prove" fire-arms are mostly prepared for an occasional explosion. Newman had described his enterprise as a "proving" of this sort; yet he was unprepared for what followed. In Keble—out of the world and old-fashioned—one could have understood this; but Ward, who, besides Keble, had seen the Tract, predicted a hot reception; why was the author taken by surprise * ?

There were more causes than one. It was often Newman's way to prophesy hard things for himself, and then to be surprised when they came. His feeling too about the risk of the enterprise would wear off during the excitement of composing the Tract. Moreover, unexpected circumstances contributed to increase the shock caused by it. Immediately before its publication, the Press had been freely discussing the Movement. Enemies and friends had agreed that "Puseyism" was by no means an affair of vestments and ceremonies. One hostile critic declared that for earnestness and strength, there had been no parallel to it since the Reformers and Puritans. The recent publication of a Tract inculcating "Reserve in communicating Divine Truth" had aroused in some minds, and heightened in others, the suspicion of concealed Romanism. Before the Tract on Reserve, says Mark Pattison, Newman was called "mystical"; after it, "popish."*

In the House of Commons the Movement had been publicly identified with Oxford. Lord Morpeth had made a fierce attack on the University, as a place where people who were paid for teaching Protestantism were doing all they could to bring things nearer to Rome. The *Times*, on the other hand, at this stage took Sir James Stephen's view, and—while keeping clear of theological questions—repeatedly eulogized the zeal, energy, success, and progress of the Tractarian Party. In Evangelical and Nonconformist England, it was natural to interpret the New Anglicanism in connection with the attitude of the University toward the Dissenters' Disabilities Bill. Under Newman's leadership, the Tractarians had played a prominent part in keeping Protestant Dissenters out of Oxford; now they seemed bent on letting Romanists in. The Oxford authorities, who had long endured in silence the public identification of their University with the Tractarian Movement, were roused at last by the reflections cast on the honour of Oxford in Parliament. Just when they were desiring, and might naturally have been seeking, some pretext for a disclaimer, Tract 90 was flung in their face.

They resolved, at once, on action. Dean Church, at this point, gives evidence in two distinct characters. As the author of *The Oxford Movement*, he asserts that it was the Heads who "dared not risk an appeal to the University at large." But, as the writer of a very interesting letter to Rogers, written at the time when the Tract came out, he adds that Newman* and Keble themselves dreaded the appeal to Convocation. It seems far more probable that, not through any fear whatever as to the decision of Convocation, but through the desire to strike quick as well as hard, the Heads determined to act with a celerity only possible to a small body.* Youthful Tractarians—such as Dean

Church was in those days—might say that it was not fair that the public should be "humbugged" by the Heads into thinking that their joint action was a formal act of the University. But the Heads might have rejoined that the public had been "humbugged" already into thinking that the action of the Tractarians was an act of the University, and that it was time to undeceive them. They met twice before 14 March. At the first meeting nothing was settled, because many had not read the Tract—an objection, by the way, which, in the case of Hampden, had not been always considered an impediment to action. After the second meeting, the decision was referred to a Committee. Meantime Newman, aware of the object of the meetings, began to write an explanation of the Tract. Informally, through Pusey and another, he communicated his purpose to the Heads. On the 15th Newman passed his explanatory pamphlet* through the press; but on that same day the Heads had printed a strong resolution that "'No. 90 suggested a mode of interpreting the Articles which *evaded* rather than explained' them, and which 'defeated the object, and was inconsistent with the observance of the Statutes' about them."

Meantime (before 20 March) the Bishop of Oxford had sent a message through Pusey, in which, while disconnecting himself from the charge of "evasion," he begged Newman not to discuss the Articles any more in the Tracts. He also expressed "the pain he felt" at Tract 90. He added (apparently at the same time) that he considered it "objectionable"; and that it might tend to disturb the peace of the Church. To Newman, at first, both the action of the Heads, and that of the Bishop, came as agreeable surprises. He had been much harassed by the fear of a censure from Convocation, and had also expected something much more severe from the Bishop. In the fulness of his gratitude, he wrote at once to the latter, offering to do anything the Bishop wished—to suppress No. 90, or stop the Tracts, or give up St. Mary's. A very kind reply encouraged Newman to "open his heart" to the Bishop "rather freely" (20 March) in a second letter (apparently the one in the *Apologia* dated 20 March) in which he vindicated himself from the charge of wantonly disturbing the peace of the Church, declaring that "collision must at some time ensue between members of the Church of opposite sentiments," and that he still felt "obliged to think the Tract necessary."

This letter, if it did not withdraw, prepared the way for withdrawing, the offer to suppress the Tract. There followed a series of letters from Newman to the Bishop through Pusey (dated 24 March and following days)†. In these, beginning by professing himself still ready, but more and more reluctant, to suppress No. 90, he finally avowed his resolution to resign his living also, if the Bishop "publicly intimated" that he must suppress the Tract, or if he "spoke strongly in his Charge against" it. On or before 25 March, the Bishop had requested Newman to save him the pain of a public or episcopal condemnation, by taking the following course. Newman was to write to the Bishop stating that "at his bidding" he would suppress Tract 90. Thus, no episcopal reasons would be given, no doctrine condemned. The Bishop might be thought to be bidding its suppression simply for the sake of peace. But this plan did not now satisfy Newman. He had changed his views. On 15 March he had rejoiced because the Heads, while condemning him personally for "evasion," had condemned no "doctrine." Now, ten days afterwards, he discovers that the Heads "have thereby indirectly condemned the views of doctrine in the Tract." Hence, the Bishop, even though putting his "bidding" on the ground of peace, would "virtually, in the eyes of the world," be censuring the *doctrine* also. He therefore proposes that, if he is to suppress the Tract, he should also resign his living. Should be suppress it, the Bishops, he says, would still "be charging against it. This the Bishop of London announces."

A treatise, withdrawn by its author as soon as published, might possibly—however heterodox or disloyal to the Church of England—have been passed over by most of the Bishops on the ground that the author himself, by suppressing it, had pronounced its condemnation. But Newman seems to have felt that even this course might not save him: the Bishops would "still be charging against it." If this was likely to happen, even in the event of his suppressing the Tract, much more would it happen (one might have supposed) if he did not suppress it. This seems obvious to every one. What the causes were that prevented it from being obvious to Newman, and made him imagine that he might continue to circulate his Tract with the tacit sanction of the Bishops, the next chapter will explain.

CHAPTER XXXII

TAKING THE ENEMY IN FLANK

§ 136. *Newman out-manœuvres his Bishop*

In no part of the *Apologia* does its author show himself more inaccurate and unfair than in his account of a supposed "understanding" between himself and the Bishops after the condemnation of Tract 90 by the Heads of the Oxford Colleges. His own conduct towards his own Bishop * will appear, to say the least, a poor return for the kindness that had befriended him against popular clamour; judged severely, it would only escape the charge of sharp practice under cover of the excuse we have been so often obliged to allege —excessive excitement. Yet blaming others, and not for the first time, for his own fault—he poses in the *Apologia* as an injured and deceived person, and this, too, repeatedly. Casting on the whole of the Episcopal Bench the charge which he brings against the Anglican divines, he says, in effect, they have "taken him in"; he is "sore about them." Even his own kind-hearted, easy-going, unsuspicious Bishop he only exempts from the severity of this accusation by imputing to him what—to many minds—will seem certainly more contemptible, possibly more immoral. The Bishop of Oxford,—we shall find Newman virtually saying—broke his word and condemned Tract 90, not because he wished to speak ill of it, nor because he thought ill of it, but because the other Bishops made him.

So unmerited, so easily credited, and, if true, so calculated to bring contempt on the Church of England, has been this charge of treachery against the whole body of her Bishops brought by one who could hardly be acquitted of something approaching to treachery if he were quite responsible for his actions, that I have not hesitated, and shall not hesitate, to inflict on the reader, at this stage, a number of somewhat minute details, necessary if he wishes to gain—what the *Apologia* is far from giving—a correct notion of what happened after Tract 90.

On 28 March, the Bishop of Oxford sent Newman a final message. The latter was to write, immediately, a letter intended for publication, but addressed to the Bishop, in which Newman *himself* was to "publish his own condemnation." * The intention obviously was that by pronouncing his own condemnation, Newman should spare his Bishop the pain of publicly condemning him. Two days did not elapse before Newman, writing to his sister, misinforms her as to what the Bishop's condemnation really was :

> "The Tract affair is settled on these terms, which others may think a disappointment, but to me is a very fair bargain. I am now publishing a letter to the Bishop at his wish, stating that he wishes the Tracts to be discontinued, and he thinks No. 90 objectionable as tending to disturb the Church. I am quite satisfied with the bargain I have got, if this is all—as I suppose it will be."

Here, at once, is a sanguine misrepresentation. If the Bishop had said it was "objectionable, as tending to disturb the Church," he would virtually have acquitted it of any more serious fault. But he said no such thing. The Bishop had pronounced, and Newman was to repeat, *two* judgments, (1) that the Tract was "objectionable" (*presumably, as will appear hereafter, because of its forced interpretations and unconscious obliquity*); AND (2) that it might "tend to disturb the Church." This Newman has elsewhere stated, *e.g.*, in a letter of 8 April, "The Bishop has but said that a certain Tract is 'objectionable,' no reason being stated"—although, even there, he suppresses the fact that the "objectionableness" was based on *other grounds* than those of the possible disturbance of the Church. To some, a slip like this may seem a small matter; but it is the straw of inexactness indicating a wind of confident misrepresentation, which will cause future errors. By 1 April, Newman was full of hope. It was certain, he tells Keble, that they had "made *a great step.*" But his letter to the Bishop had only that day reached London, and he was "anxious" about its reception there: "You know, I suppose, that I am to stop the Tracts, but you will see in the Letter, though I speak *quite* what I feel, yet I have managed to take out on *my* side my snubbing's worth. And this makes me anxious how it will be received in London." He does not think of the odium he may bring upon his Bishop. Characteristically enough—because he looks on the whole affair as a mere tactical move—he rejoices that the Bishop's singular kindness gives him an opportunity of *saying strong Catholic things under the episcopal sanction:* and he is even more certain that his letter is clever than that it is honest:—

> "I am sanguine about my letter to the Bishop, which was out yesterday. I have spoken quite what I feel; yet I think I have managed to wedge in a good many bits of Catholicism, which *now*

come out with the Bishop's sanction. How odd it is that one should be *able* to act from the heart, yet from the head too; yet I think I have been honest—at least I hope so †."

It was rather hard, this, on the Bishop. Perhaps Newman *could* not believe that the old man really did consider his Tract "objectionable." Indeed, shortly afterwards, he could not "believe his ears" when his own Bishop condemned his method of interpretation as one that made the Articles "mean anything or nothing"; and accordingly he now tells his sister that she may inform people "that the hubbub required the Bishop to do *something*, but that, of himself, he had no wish. This I believe to be the simple truth." Some excuse of this kind seems necessary to justify Newman's conduct in bringing out "bits of Catholicism" under "the sanction" of one who had let him off so easily—thereby going the very way to increase the "hubbub" against him.

The worst feature in this affair is that *what the letter to Keble avows, the letter to the Bishop disavows.* To the Bishop, before passing to his "bits of Catholicism," he uses this disavowal, "Without . . . assuming the soundness of the doctrines to be mentioned, or, by mentioning them"—I italicize the words—"*seeking indirectly a sanction* of them from your Lordship *"! Who can defend this? If Newman were perfectly responsible for his conduct, we could only compare it to that of a thief who might place a stolen purse in the pocket of the too-kindly man who had gone bail for him. However, the poor Bishop, quite ignorant of all this strategy, replied at once—having given but one brief day to the task of fathoming the meanings concealed beneath the surface of Newman's letter of submission—expressing his hope and belief that a calm had succeeded the threatened storm, and praising the letter as one calculated to soften and to silence opponents, as well as to regulate friends. This was on 2 April, before it could be known how people in London would take it.

§ 137. *Newman's notions of an "understanding"*

Of course, the Tractarians in Oxford were exultant. They seemed to have got much the best of it. Their "game" now, as Newman tells Keble (1 April) was to "let the matter drop":—

> "We have got the principle of our interpretation admitted, in that it has not been condemned. Do not let us provoke opposition. Numbers will be taking advantage silently and quietly of the admission for their own benefit. It will soon be assumed as a matter of course."

To a Romanist, who (8 April) expressed surprise, and apparently regret, at the discontinuance of the Tracts, Newman replied in terms of exultation, declaring that his letter to his Bishop had, he trusted, "brought the preponderating *authority* of the Church" on their side. The Tracts, he said, though stopped, were not *suppressed*: no doctrine or principle had been condemned by authority or conceded by the Tractarians: "No stopping of the Tracts can, humanly speaking, stop the spread of the opinions which they have inculcated." Even Pusey, besides praising Newman's "touching simplicity and humility," writes hopefully on the general prospect: "You will be glad to hear that the immediate excitement about Tract 90 seems subsiding, although I fear (in the minds of many) into a lasting impression of our Jesuitism."*

During all this correspondence so far, there has been no mention of any compact, or bargain, except that no further condemnation of Tract 90 was to be expected from his own Bishop, as Newman had pronounced it himself. But on 9 May he writes to Keble, "The Bishops are very desirous of hushing the matter up; and I certainly have done my utmost to cooperate with them, on the understanding that the Tract was not to be condemned." In the *Apologia*, he goes still further and actually asserts that "in not defending the Tract, and in closing the series" he yielded, not to his own Bishop, but to "the Bishops."

What was this "understanding," and when was it arrived at? It is certain that he wrote his letter to the Bishop without any definite arrangement as to the other Bishops; for he tells us that he was "anxious" how the letter would be received in London; and his own Bishop, in replying to it, had not said a word to bind the other Bishops, or to express more than a "hope" about peace. But there was one definite fear that Newman had seriously entertained. He had been alarmed lest the "Bishops *as a body*," should condemn the Tract.* As to this, he may have been told informally that, in the event of his "publishing his own condemnation," and "stopping the Tracts," there was no likelihood, so far as "people in London" could assure him, of any *joint or synodical condemnation*. This would be "a great step," because what he feared, was authoritative condemnation of doctrine; and his theory (expressed in this very year) was that "as to the Bishops' charges . . . they have no direct authority except in their own dioceses." He adds that *only in Synod* do they prescribe *doctrine*.*

Newman himself admits that whatever the "understanding" was, it was conveyed in conversation. If it was so distinctly and definitely in his favour, how was it that one so fond of "relating himself to paper" did not at once write down at least the substance of it? How comes it also that there is no trace of it* in his correspondence, with his sister, or with Bowden, or with Keble, or with Rogers, or with anyone else? Even in the *Apologia*, he can only give the purport of it with the qualification of "I think." Yet he expressly states (minimize it though he does) that he was *warned that some of the Bishops might attack the Tract in separate Charges.* "I think the words which had been used to me, were, that perhaps two or three of them [*i.e.* the Bishops] might think it necessary to say something in their Charges." Elsewhere in the *Apologia*—under the shelter of an "if," and a "they," which means, sometimes the Bishops, and sometimes his unknown partners in conversation—he *entirely ignores his own previous offer to withdraw the Tract*: "First, if I remember right, they wished me to withdraw the Tract. This I refused to do." He declares, on the same page, that "they" allowed him to "continue on sale" that very Tract which the Bishop of Oxford had "condemned as objectionable"—sending his condemnation, and his expression of "pain," to the author, one of his own clergy, who held his Bishop's lightest word *ex Cathedra* as "heavy," and who professed "unreserved and joyful submission" to his authority! This is hard to believe, and would certainly require more evidence than Newman's imaginative memory—recalling, in the *Apologia*, events that had happened more than twenty years before.

§ 138. *The real "understanding"*

The facts—and Newman himself in his Letters is our best and almost our only witness to them—appear to have been as follows. Through the kindness of the Bishop of Oxford—who had endured a good deal of unpopularity, and was risking a good deal more, in the attempt to shelter one for whom he had a liking, and whom he believed to be, at least, loyal to the Church—it was arranged that Newman should not withdraw Tract 90 at the episcopal bidding, as he had at first offered to do, and as the Bishop had requested him to do. But the same thing was to be done indirectly. Newman was to discontinue *all his Tracts*,* not at the Bishop's "bidding," but at his "advice." Thus, no one would be able to say that No. 90 was withdrawn because it was doctrinally objectionable ; and yet it *would* be withdrawn. In return for this, the Bishop would not *publicly* say, what he believed, that Tract 90 was "objectionable" (not because it "might tend to disturb the peace of the Church," but for other and more serious reasons). Newman was also not improbably informed that, if he took this course, and if he also published his own condemnation in a letter to his Bishop, there would be no joint or synodical condemnation of his treatise ; although he was expressly warned that the individual action of the Bishops could not be fettered, and that some would take hostile action. With this arrangement Newman might very well be satisfied. The Tracts had done their work. "No stopping of the Tracts," he wrote to a correspondent (8 April), "can, humanly speaking, stop the spread of the opinions which they have inculcated." On the other hand, he gained a probable immunity from that joint episcopal condemnation which he dreaded as being absolutely fatal. For if the Bishops had officially combined to condemn the Tract, out of the

Church Newman would have had to go. He could not stay in a Church that rejected his interpretation of the Articles. To avoid such an explosion as that, it was quite worth while to suppress a number of treatises which everyone who was likely to read them, had by this time read.

Contrast this with the loose statement in the *Apologia* that "they" not only said they would not condemn the Tract, but also "let" him "continue it on sale"! Where do we find in Newman's correspondence the least reference to anything like this? Even in the very letter quoted above, in which he sanguinely misrepresents to his sister his agreement with his Bishop, there is not a word of any "understanding" with the other Bishops; he tells her he is "satisfied, if this is all—as I suppose it will be." These words, of themselves, are almost incompatible with the existence of such an "understanding," as Newman mentions; and it has been shown, above, that, a few days afterwards, he was very anxious as to the reception of his letter in London, and still quite doubtful about the result. He complains in the *Apologia* that "not a line in writing" was given *to* him at the time; *we* may complain (knowing his habit of recording the most minute incidents) that "not a line in writing" has been left *by* him, either in note-book or letter. The account is incredible, as it is twice given in the *Apologia.* Yet even those two narratives concur in stating that Newman was warned that the Bishops, *individually*, would "charge" against the Tract: "they" said "they" could "not answer for what some individual Bishops might perhaps say about the Tract in their own Charges." In the account last quoted, it was "one or two"; now it is "some."

Those who have studied Newman's style will know how to interpret the "might perhaps," the "say about," the "some," or the "one or two." It ought to be patent to all, even from the *Apologia*, that Newman was expressly warned that the individual action of *the* Bishops (not "*some*" of the Bishops) *would* (not "*might perhaps*") not be in any definite way influenced by his arrangement with his own Diocesan. Some, even though he quietly dropped Tract 90, would think it necessary to *condemn* it (not "say something about it"). Some might not. There was no "understanding" at all that could affect the individual right of the Bishops to speak or to keep silence.

In addition to this, the silence of the Letters is almost conclusive. That no such "understanding" had been made by 5 April is certain. For on that date he writes to his sister contrasting his own kind Bishop with "the moving powers of the Church" who "will be severe, the more men yield, and will shrink and give way, the more men threaten. We are hit because we are dutiful." He can only trust that "honesty is the best policy;" the Tractarians, he says, "are ducks in a pond, knocked over, but not knocked out. At least, so I trust." It is equally certain that the "understanding" did not exist on 10 April, for on that date he makes no mention of it in a letter to Keble, in which he speaks of the Bishops as fearing a secession to Rome, or a division within the Church. And he is evidently talking on mere rumour when he says, "I am sure" *they cannot like* "the Hebdomadal Act. We may do anything if we keep from disturbance. The more we can yield the better policy. We can gain anything by giving way." Curious, that, on

5 April, the more they yield, the more they are "hit;" and on 10 April, the more they "gain"! But it is worth noting as an instance of mutable excitement.

Again, in October 1841, after many of the Bishops had in their diocesan Charges animadverted on the Tract, a correspondent, J. R. Hope, consults him on "the course that Catholics should follow" in consequence. To him—an intimate friend whom he frequently consulted on legal or quasi-legal questions—Newman replies, as above, that such Charges "have no direct authority except in their own diocese:" but not a word about any "understanding" which the Bishops were breaking. His silence to Hope in the following November is still more convincing. He is consulting the latter about a protest he wishes to make against a proposed Jerusalem Bishopric: Bunsen, he fears, is Protestantizing the English Church; it is a great crisis; if he delays to protest, things will slip through his fingers, and the mischief will be done: "*They* act," he says, "why may not *I* . . . . Why may not I be troublesome as well as another?" This "as well as another" is bathos—*if an "understanding" had been broken with him;* for he had, in that case, a *special* right to be "troublesome," not "as well as," but *more than*, "another." From that date to the very conclusion of the Correspondence, although there are several references to the hostile charges of the Bishops, there is *not a single assertion that, in making them, they were breaking an "understanding."**

When it was said above that Newman had left nothing in writing to attest the "understanding," as he regarded it, between himself and the Bishops, one exception might perhaps have been made. He thought it worth while to preserve, and the Editor of the

Letters consequently thought it worth while to print – a lithographed circular dated 27 April, in which the Bishop of Bath and Wells "hears with surprise and concern" that some of his clergy propose an "interference with reference to the (so-called) Oxford Tracts," and asks to be allowed to observe that it would be "more correct and judicious" for them "to leave the important questions now in discussion at Oxford, to the decision of the Heads of Houses and to the Bishop of that Diocese." This is just the sort of evidence that would convince Newman that "the Bishops are very desirous of hushing the matter up." The circular is probably indebted for its rescue from oblivion after fifty years to the fact that, in the absence of any other documentary evidence, and in the vagueness of his recollections about what he "thought" to be the words of the "understanding," he treasured up the only scrap of paper that presented anything that approximated to an excuse for his groundless and disappointed expectations.

§ 139. *Who broke the "understanding"?*

But now suppose there had been an "understanding." That implies two sides, and an engagement on each. What was Newman's engagement? and how might *that* be understood by the other side? In his letter to his Bishop he gives it as follows:—

> "Your Lordship's message is as follows: That you consider the Tract No. 90 in the Series called the *Tracts for the Times*, is 'objectionable, and may tend to disturb the peace or tranquillity of the Church,' and that it is your Lordship's 'advice that the *Tracts for the Times* be discontinued' . . . . Accordingly, on the late occasion, as soon as I heard that you had expressed an unfavourable opinion

of Tract 90, I again placed myself at your disposal, and now readily submit to the course on which your Lordship has finally decided in consequence of it."

First for a short comment on the last sentence in this extract. Who would guess from "placed myself at your disposal" that Newman had first made an offer to his Bishop; then withdrawn it; then threatened to resign his living if some compromise were not made; and was now publishing this letter of "ready submission," very "unwillingly"? Yet, that it was "unwillingly," in a sense, appears from a letter to Manning. "I published that letter to him [*i.e.* the Bishop] (how unwillingly you know) on the understanding that *I* was to deliver his judgment on No. 90 *instead* of him;" and again, "You know how unwillingly I wrote my letter to the Bishop in which I committed myself again" [*i.e.* by attacking the Church of Rome] "as the safest course under the circumstances." But this is only one of many inconsistencies. The question before us now is, *What* was "the course" on which the Bishop "finally decided" and to which Newman "readily submitted"? To this, then, we return.

"Accordingly . . again," in the extract above quoted, refer to preceding words showing how Newman previously (in 1838) "submitted the Tracts entirely" to the Bishop's proposal. He had then offered to withdraw any that were under his control; and declared that he could feel a more lively pleasure in such a submission to the Bishop "than in the widest circulation of the volume in question." This points to the conclusion that *now*, when he "*again* placed" himself at the Bishop's "disposal," the "discontinuance" of the Tracts in the *present* offer, was to be like the "entire submission" of the Tracts in the *first* offer.

That the Bishop would interpret it in this sense seems certain. How could he suppose that one who held the high Ignatian views about the deference due to episcopal authority, would profess to make a "ready submission" to him, and yet reprint a treatise which had caused him "pain," and which he had pronounced "objectionable"? His view of the matter he might have expressed to Newman in some such words as these: "You offered to suppress Tract 90. I wished you to do so. You drew back. I then suggested that you should say you suppressed it 'at my bidding.' You still declined, unless, at the same time, you resigned your living. To save your conscience, I would not *order* you officially to *suppress* this *particular* Tract, but '*advised*' you to '*discontinue the* Tracts,' understanding that Tract 90, with the rest, would *fall quietly out of circulation.*"

That this interpretation was commonly put upon the words by the public appears from the *Apologia*: "Many were the publications of the day and the private letters which accused me of shuffling because I closed the Series of Tracts, yet kept the Tracts on sale, as if I ought to comply, not only with what my Bishop asked, but with what he did not ask and perhaps did not wish." "*Perhaps*"—like "if"—is "a great peace-maker." But even the "perhaps" can hardly serve here to avert the charge of inaccuracy. We *know* that the Bishop *did* wish him to suppress Tract 90; for he had actually asked Newman, in private, to do it, and the latter had, upon re-consideration, declined. The Bishop had also pronounced the Tract "objectionable," and had advised Newman to "discontinue the Tracts." Putting all these facts together, how can we doubt that the Bishop "wished" that No. 90 should quietly drop out of circulation, and that, by way of saving Newman's scruples, it should be withdrawn, not by itself, but in company with the other Tracts? This Newman too ought to have known, and even his "perhaps" will hardly justify his conjecture about the Bishop's "wish."

There is good reason for thinking that, at first, Newman himself took the view that he was pledged to "cease to reprint" the old Tracts. Writing on 7 April, eight days after the "bargain" had been settled * to his satisfaction, he says: "No stopping of the Tracts can, humanly speaking, stop the spread of the opinions which they have inculcated." If "the Tracts" were *still to be sold*, would not the opinions which they *had* inculcated, be *still* inculcated as before, and does not that reduce the sentence to nonsense? It has been suggested to me that the words, "no stopping of the Tracts," may refer to some *future* suppression of them. But this, besides being far-fetched, is rendered improbable by a letter written on 1 April: "You know, I suppose, that I am to stop the Tracts." The natural meaning, therefore, of the letter of 7 April quoted above, appears to be this, "I am to stop the reprinting of all the Tracts that are under my control, including Tract 90: but, as they have done their work, it matters little: the stopping of their circulation *now*, cannot, humanly speaking, stop the spread of the opinions which they *have inculcated*." I do not say this is certain, but it is certainly the most obvious interpretation.* And it is confirmed by the fact that, on the very day on which Newman published his letter to his Bishop condemning his own Tract, he also published a new edition of the latter his object (apparently) being to do at once, what afterwards he would feel precluded from doing. As soon as the Letter was out, he had no right to print any more Tracts; he was to discontinue them *all;* but he conceived he had a right to sell off those that were already printed.*

§ 140. *Newman is "quite satisfied with the bargain"*

In weighing the evidence for and against the truth of Newman's attack upon the Bishops,* we must recollect that we are hearing only one side. We hear their opponent attacking them, twenty years after the event; and our only appeal from that evidence is to other evidence, *still their opponent's*, but uttered at the time. What is the former? It is a loose, vague charge brought against their whole body—with "might," and "perhaps," and "they," and "I think," and "one or two," or "some," all suggesting the writer's uncertainty—that they had pledged themselves not to charge against the Tract.

On the other side, as regards the supposed episcopal undertaking, there is in the first place the strong *a priori* improbability that the Bishops would so commit themselves, as well as Newman's own admission in the *Apologia* that he had been warned that some "might" (he says "might") charge against the Tract. There is also the fact that his own Bishop, of whom Newman speaks in terms of the highest respect, *did* condemn the Tract, and that, more than once, and severely. Again, Newman's letters, written at the time, while silent as to the existence of any such understanding, show an anxiety and a distrust—just at the time when the compact would have been made, if made at all—which are incompatible with its existence; and the correspondence covers the ground so completely, from day to day, during the critical period after the publication of No. 90, that if there were any such understanding as Newman speaks of, it seems impossible that we should not find some trace of it. To this we must add the fact that an informal assurance on the part of the Bishop of Oxford as to the improbability of any *joint* episcopal condemnation (in the event of Newman's publishing the suggested self-condemnation) would, so to speak, "save the phenomena." That is not *a priori* unlikely; and it is quite characteristic of Newman's sanguineness that he should construe a statement (supported, perhaps, by extracts from letters) that the Bishops would do nothing *jointly*, into a definite promise that they would do nothing *at all*. Lastly, those who deem it improbable that the English Bishops should have combined to do what, as English gentlemen, they ought (if we accept Newman's story) to have been ashamed of doing, will let this improbability weigh for something in the scale.

Again, as to Newman's part in the engagement which he made with his Bishop, we have, fortunately, the very words of the bargain before us, and can see how a misunderstanding may have arisen. We have also before us the two partners to the compromise—or as Newman called it, the "bargain"—one, as the *Apologia* tells us, "of noble mind, and as kind-hearted and considerate as he was noble," who always sympathized with Newman in the trials that befell him; the other, a man who could not help taking an ultra-legal view of any document on which anything religious directly or indirectly depended, and who, just now, with his back to the wall, was fighting, so to speak, for his Anglican existence, for his right, and the right of his followers, to remain in the Church of their fathers.

For, however much we may think Newman in the wrong, we are still bound to make some attempt to place ourselves in his position. He was contending for a great cause, as he conceived it, the cause of Catholic Truth, as well as the real interests of the English Church. He could not afford, therefore—nay, it was not right—to throw away any advantage that Providence might put in his way. He regarded his agreement with his Bishop as a "bargain." He made it "unwillingly" at first. He may have conceived himself bound to stop all the Tracts, old and new, as soon, at all events, as the present stock was sold off. But when he came to examine the terms of the Episcopal message, he found that the Bishop's desire to avoid the use of any harsh, or even authoritative word had left him a kind of providential loop-hole by which he might escape from doing an injury to the cause, and might turn what looked like a defeat into a victory. He was not to "withdraw," nor to "suppress," the Tracts (including No. 90), he was merely to "discontinue" them. This, he argued, (and, it must be owned, he had the *letter* on his side) clearly meant that he was to discontinue, not the sale of the Tracts, but the Tracts *themselves*, that is, the Tracts, regarded *as a series*. This being so, he might reprint the Tracts already printed. True, Tract 90 caused his Bishop "pain"; and it was awkward for him to continue to circulate a Tract which his diocesan had pronounced "objectionable." But he had got over this difficulty by publishing a second edition of it with additions and qualifications designed to meet objections. Having thus freshly republished the Tract, and published a defence as well—and this on the very day on which he published a "condemnation" of it in his Bishop's name—he could afford, for the future, or at all events for some time, to leave Tract 90 alone. Thus, he had withdrawn nothing and seemed to have gained everything. To be sure he had bound himself to publish no more Tracts. But what did that matter? New Tracts could be published as before, only not under his editorship, but in the shape of larger treatises, with the names or initials of the authors (like Pusey's Tract on Baptism). As for the Tracts that had led up to the outcry they would be sold just as much as before, or more.

On the other side, what had he gained? He had asserted for Romanizers a place in the Anglican Church. He had captured for them, so to speak, a position within the entrenchments of the Articles themselves. Numbers, he said to himself, would soon be taking a silent and quiet advantage of this victory. The Bishop of Oxford, under whose sanction he had now brought out so many strong "Catholic" sayings, would henceforth be regarded as the champion of Rome on the English Episcopal Bench. The other Bishops, he sanguinely imagined, had bound themselves by an "understanding" to connive in the Tractarian advance. Even Pusey, who had been against the Tract, took the following, equally sanguine view: "The pseudo-traditionary and vague ultra-Protestant interpretation of the Articles, has received a blow from which it will not recover. People will abuse Tract 90 and adopt its main principles." Under these circumstances we cannot be surprised that Newman was "satisfied with the bargain." The cannon, it seemed, had been "proved," and the metal had not burst. Nay, more, besides avoiding calamity, the Leader had dexterously improved his position beyond his amplest expectations. How natural for him, under such circumstances, with all the just complacency of a skilful general who has over-reached and out-flanked his enemy, to write (1 April) that he is "sanguine," and that it is their "game" to "let the matter drop at present," and, "I do really think that things had better be quiet," and, "We are all in good spirits here"! But how natural for us, wise after the lapse of half a century, to reflect on the great importance that Newman attached to small coincidences, and to wonder whether, in after days, he looked back upon, and took note of, the particular day of April on which he committed this dream to paper!

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE EXPLOSION

§ 141. "*Simplicity*"? or "*Jesuitism*"?

A FEW weeks sufficed to show that Newman's dream of the first of April had not been realised. The Bishops were not quite so incredibly silly, or timorous, or blind to their duty, as he had supposed; and, if they had been, the voice of the people would soon have enlightened and quickened them. Tract 90 was one of Newman's controversial "blows in the stomach." The public was staggered by it for the moment. Presently they began to breathe again and to act as Englishmen naturally would under the circumstances. In part the Tractarians themselves, by their subsequent conduct, increased the rising indignation. If Newman could only have persuaded them indeed that their "game" was to "drop the matter for the present," the Bishops might have been quiet; the popular outcry might have subsided; the clergy might have quietly adopted the Newmanian interpretation of the Articles, and the whole of the National Church might have been speedily, yet unobtrusively, permeated with a Roman spirit which, nominally Anglican, would have effectually promoted the return of a large section of the

Anglicans in the upper classes into the pale of the "Catholic" Church.

But, besides being unable to restrain the audacity of his followers, Newman himself had been too audacious for success. His "touching simplicity and humility" had been extolled by Pusey; but when men came to look beneath the surface of it, what did they find? His letter of submission had proclaimed his humble readiness to give an unreserved and cheerful obedience to his Bishop. The latter had declared Tract 90 to be, in the Bishop's words, "objectionable." Yet on the same day that Newman published the letter, he republished the Tract! What kind of "humility" was this? Again, the Bishop, as well as Pusey, had been troubled by Newman's leaving the Invocation of Saints an open question. The Tract had, in fact, implied that Invocation was *not* condemned by the Thirty-nine Articles. In his letter to the Bishop, how had he withdrawn, or explained, this doctrine? Thus: "The holier the man, the less likely are they" [*i.e.* such Invocations] "to be injurious to him." This indeed was a "touching simplicity:" —to suppose that the clergy were likely to be deterred from Invocation of Saints by having it held up to them as a practice that called for superior holiness! Was it not also "simple" to suppose that the laity and the Bishops would be satisfied with such a shelving of the Article, and this in a letter in which Newman agreed to "publish his own condemnation"?

It was this combination of "touching simplicity and humility" with continuous and dexterous encroachment, this art of conceding without making concessions—that angered some of his opponents even more than his original offence. The *Apologia* gives us no notion of this. It describes his tone, at this time, as being that of an imperious Reformer: "I would not hold office in a Church which would not allow my sense of the Articles. My tone was, 'This is necessary for us, and have it we must and will, and, if it tends to bring men to look less bitterly on the Church of Rome the better.'" Certainly this is not the "tone" of the letters to the Bishop of Oxford and to Dr. Jelf. A little of this imperiousness would have been refreshing in those documents; their "simplicity" and their "humility" produce the opposite effect. A still more objectionable feature in the letter to his Bishop is, that, so far from "leading men to look less bitterly on the Church of Rome," he *attacks* the Roman Church in language which (if we have regard to his inmost feelings at this time) must be pronounced inexcusable. It is true, he soothes his conscience by *quoting previous attacks* that he had made against Rome; but still he himself admits that, by being quoted they are "made a second time" his own; and Dean Church * actually refers to this letter (and seemingly to these quotations) as a proof that the writer was, at this time, at heart an Anglican! The best extenuation of this very serious offence,—Newman's nearest approach to deliberate insincerity—is that he subsequently repented of these attacks, and, even at the time, committed himself to them with such misgiving that he afterwards described himself as writing them "unwillingly."

His letter to Dr. Jelf in explanation of Tract 90, besides exasperating opponents, drove the most logical, and one of the most straightforward, of his friends, into print, for the purpose of making clear what Newman left obscure. In it, Newman attempted to vindicate himself from the charge of maintaining the compatibility of the Articles with the authoritative teaching of Rome on the points specified :

> "I only say that, whereas they were written before the decrees of Trent, they were not directed against those decrees. The Church of Rome taught authoritatively before those decrees as well as since. Those decrees expressed her authoritative teaching, and they will continue to express it while she so teaches. The simple question is whether taken by themselves in their mere letter, they express it ; whether in fact other senses short of the sense conveyed in the present authoritative teaching of the Roman Church will not fulfil their letter, and may not even now in point of fact be held in that Church."

To these distinctions and qualifications, Ward's biographer justly attaches the epithet "subtle," adding that they eventually led Ward to enter the field, and to attempt "to absolutely clear what Mr. Newman preferred to leave to some extent undefined."

§ 142 *Ward makes things "absolutely clear"*

Hence, indirectly, arose calamity on calamity for the Tractarians. The storm had broken out in March. Ward rushed to his leader's defence in April and the following months ; and, spite of the best intentions, did everything possible to rouse the storm again. Leaving Pusey far in the rear, he went beyond even Newman's ostensible position. Yet Newman did not, and could not, disown him ; for he had consulted his leader at every step. He professed himself ready to "give up"—I do not understand how a man can "give up" by *saying* he "gives up," but that was his affair ; at all events Ward was ready to "give up"—"any theological opinion he was inclined to," if he "knew Newman to differ from it." Rebuked by Pusey for causing a schism and scandal in the Party, Ward had an unanswerable reply: Newman had told him, said Ward, that he did not know a single sentiment in Ward's pamphlet "in which he did not altogether concur."

Yet the differences between the leader and his champion were apparently great. The former had left it open whether the Reformers were Catholic or not; the latter maintained that they were non-Catholic, and that this avowal was necessary for the Tractarian position. The leader had maintained that, though there were "real difficulties" to Catholics in remaining Anglicans, the Articles were "not among these"; his defender affirmed that the Articles were a real difficulty but not an insurmountable one. Newman had offered to withdraw the term "ambiguous formularies" applied to the Articles; Ward placed his whole trust in this term. The author of Tract 90 was for signing the Articles in "their literal and grammatical sense," the author of "A Few Words in defence of Tract 90" would subscribe them only in a "non-natural sense."

Here were differences, perplexing, at the best; but almost scandalous when it was found that many of Newman's friends, as well as his enemies, regarded Ward's "Few Words," and "Few Words More," as only a plain and open avowal of opinions which the Chief of the Tractarians—to quote Ward's biographer "either from the difficulty of his position, or, as some said, from the over-subtlety of his mind, declined to state expressly."

Is it surprising that, when friends took this view, some of his opponents who did not know him, took one still more unfavourable? And as for the great mass of English Protestants, who viewed everything through a mist of exaggerations, was it not inevitable that they should realise Pusey's own fear, and receive "a lasting impression of the Jesuitism" of all the Tractarians in general, and of Newman, in particular, as the Arch-Jesuit? The mouth was the mouth of Ward, but Ward was everywhere in Oxford proclaiming that the mind was the mind of Newman. He had written nothing, he said, without his leader's sanction. Here then was the author of Tract 90, nominally silent in deference to his Bishop, but practically defending, not merely the Tract, but an ultra-Roman version of it.

To such a point of Romanism had Ward reached that, in July, Pusey demanded from him a pledge that he would not join the Church of Rome; and Ward refused to give it. To Anglicans the demand for such a pledge may seem immoral; for it amounts to asking a man not to do what his conscience bids him do. But to Tractarians it did not seem immoral; and for a Tractarian to refuse such a pledge was a serious thing. If then such a demand could be made by such a theologian as Pusey from one who had merely expressed Newman's opinions with Newman's sanction—only in a straightforward way—why might it not be demanded by the outside world from Newman also? and, if Ward refused to give it, why might not English Protestantism assume that Newman too, if pressed, would make the same refusal?

As if to commit the Tractarians still further, a Romanizing manifesto from the advanced section had been published on the Continent. Scarcely had Newman's letter of submission to the Bishop passed through the press when there appeared—first printed in the *Univers* and then circulated in Catholic Germany and Italy an anonymous letter declaring that the presentiment that the "afflicted" Church of England would soon be united to their Catholic brethren was amply justified by what was "now passing in the University of Oxford, the heart of the Anglican Church." "The author of the Tract," so ran the letter, "looks upon the Thirty-nine Articles as a burden which God in His anger has placed upon us for the sins of our ancestors"; the Tractarians, "love with unfeigned affection the Apostolic see which" they "acknowledge to be the head of Christendom." The existence of the Church of England was described as "three centuries of schism and of heresy." This manifesto was dated from Oxford and professed to be written by a follower of Newman.

In the correspondence of the *Univers* there soon appeared an expression (from a well-known Tractarian of moderate views) of disbelief in its genuineness. It was written, said the correspondent, by an enemy; Newman did not wish re-union until Rome had greatly changed, and unless she renounced the doctrine of Papal supremacy. In reply, the writer had no difficulty in proving that he was what he professed to be; and his sentiments were not disclaimed by Newman or by any member of the advanced party. Thus, even on the Continent, men were being led to the conclusion that the Tract which had been condemned by the Bishop of Oxford, and as to which the author had professed to make a cheerful and unreserved submission in the letter in which he published his own self-condemnation—so far from being quietly dropped, was being pressed and emphasized by the author's followers and with the author's sanction, as being an under-statement, not over-statement, of their tendencies to Rome.

Of course, it may be said that Newman was not responsible for this. When he wrote the letter of "submission" to his Bishop he virtually—says the *Apologia*—gave up his place as leader of the Movement. Even if that were true, the public could not be expected to make nice distinctions between a leader and his followers, when the latter claimed to be his interpreters, and, besides not being publicly disavowed, were privately recognized and sanctioned. But the *Apologia* does not represent the facts. Newman did not ostensibly continue to lead, but he led in reality - at all events for some months after the correspondence in the *Univers*. Nothing passed in Oxford among the young Tractarians without his knowledge: "Everyone I know"--he writes to his sister, 16 November, 1841—"tells me everything about himself; and there is nothing done, said, or written but what in some way or other I see (though I do not mean to make myself responsible for everything). . . ."

§ 143. "*Hoist with his own petard*"

All this happened before, or during, July; and up to that time the Bishops had not begun in any numbers to charge against the Tract. But from July onwards they repeatedly attacked it. The only Bishop who, if anyone, was to blame for this, was the only one whom Newman exempts from blame—the Bishop of Oxford; who certainly had some kind of "understanding" with Newman, viz., that the latter was to pronounce his own condemnation so as to spare him the pain of publicly condemning. Yet he also, in two charges, censured the Tract with great severity. On reviewing Newman's letter and subsequent conduct, he must have soon perceived that the "understanding," in his view of it, had not been fairly carried out. The letter contained no real self-condemnation; and while disclaiming any desire to procure episcopal sanction for what were called distinctive Tractarian doctrines, it practically circulated them under his authority. The Tract which he had pronounced "objectionable" was still circulated in his diocese; and the other tracts had not been "discontinued" in accordance with his "advice" as he interpreted it. Lastly Tract 90 was being defended in Oxford by one of Newman's followers, and, as was publicly avowed, with Newman's sanction, upon grounds which increased the scandal that it had already caused. A similar defence was being circulated on the Continent.

These, if they were the Bishop's reasons, were ample and sufficient reasons. Yet Newman—while praising him as an honourable man and revering his memory as if he were a truthful one—imputes to him the incredible weakness of doing what he did, at the bidding of great people in London, and the still more incredible perfidy of condemning his Tract three times, and each time with increasing severity, not because *he* felt what he said, but because *other people* felt it! It is a terrible warning to us how far we may allow mere intellectual demoralization to creep almost into our hearts and to affect our moral judgments, when we find such a one as Newman first, in his letters, assigning to himself the part of an Autolycus, who has cheated the English Bishops into making a silly and immoral bargain; and then, in the *Apologia*, by contrast, holding up the Episcopal Bench to perpetual infamy as a set of treacherous swindlers who have broken faith with his confiding self—while he excepts from the charge that one Bishop above all, who, on Newman's own showing, *did* break a compact, and excepts him on the ground that, although he broke it, it was not because he thought ill of Tract 90, but because he wanted to yield to his brother Bishops, to "soothe" the London clergy, and to still the "popular hubbub"!

If the Bishop of Oxford was severe, it may well be imagined that some of the other Bishops were more than severe. Newman's followers were within their right in complaining of exaggerations, distortions, and the other inevitable results of panic and suspicion, wherever such manifestations occurred in the condemnations pronounced by Bishops, clergy, or laity. But what else was to be expected by a leader who had gone, from the first, on a principle of "startling" people; of saying extreme things in order to lead people on to the mean; of hitting enemies controversial blows in the face and the stomach so as to "take their breath away"; and who had at last crowned his aggressions by an attempt (so it seemed to plain people) to undermine the Anglican Church? "In every part of the country," he complains in the *Apologia*, "and every class of society, through every organ and opportunity of opinion, in newspaper, in periodical, at meetings, in pulpits, at dinner tables, in coffee-rooms, in railway carriages, I was denounced as a traitor who had laid his train and was detected in the very act of firing it against the time-honoured Establishment." Why not? What else was to be expected?

We need but quote the Tractarians themselves to show the reasonableness of this popular outburst. In the first place, the Leader himself had predicted the danger of his task. It was like "proving" cannon he had said. Well, people who do that sort of thing are prepared for inconvenient explosions. Again, the

Oxford Heads had pronounced his interpretation of the Articles to be an "evasion:" but had not his pupil Ward justified such an imputation against his teacher when, with his sanction, he interpreted them in a sense which the interpreter himself afterwards boldly called "non-natural"? Did not Pusey clearly imply that common people were not altogether to blame if, as the result of Tract 90, they formed a lasting impression of the Tractarian "Jesuitism"? And would not such an "impression" have been deepened if the English people had been able to read some of the Tractarian correspondence? Newman, had, some time ago, proposed to remain in the English Church, believing it to be corrupt and bound to be "under penance," with the view of "promoting its return" to a system not clearly distinguishable from Romanism. Ward, almost in this very year (perceiving objections "to an immediate union with St. Peter's See") described himself as impressed with "the great importance (if it be lawful) of remaining" in his present position "with the hope of 'poisoning' as many as possible." Might not such expressions as these seem well to justify the popular impression of "Jesuitism"?

In Newman's enterprise we seem to have before us a general mining a besieged city. He had himself devised, planned, and executed the mine on his own responsibility, against the wish of some of his more cautious colleagues. It fails. For the failure, we do not blame him at all; for the attempt, not much. But what we do, and must, blame, is the extraordinary inaccuracy, and self-partiality, the blindness to fact, or at least to any fact that does not tell in his own favour, the want of honourable consideration for those who have dealt honourably with him, the weak, unfair, and almost childish querulousness with which, finding himself defeated, he rails at and slanders the defenders of the beleaguered place; urging that he had made an "understanding" with them that he was allowed, while waving a flag of truce, to direct the mining operations through his officers without let or hindrance, and that they, in the meantime, were to look on quietly and do nothing; and yet, in spite of it all, they broke their word and would persist in counter-mining him, with the result that the assailant was "hoist with his own petard"!

§ 144. *The three blows*

"The ghost had come a second time," says the *Apologia*, describing what happened in the Long Vacation of 1841. It was not surprising. In the first place, he was alone with his books, engaged in abstruse theological reading. In the next place, he had sinned against Rome; and of course her "ghost" would haunt him. In a letter of 1843, he declared that, since the summer of 1839, that is, since the first appearance of "the ghost," he had abstained generally from attacking her, having written little or nothing in modern controversy except the article on the Catholicity of the English Church. But he had not been justified in writing even that. And he had aggravated his offence by quoting freely from it in the following year in his letter to his Bishop. True, he extenuates the latter fault by saying that he "committed himself, again," very "unwillingly," as being "the safest course." But that is, at best, an extenuation. It admits the fault.

He had written against Rome with the object of setting to sleep people who suspected him of Romanizing; and for two years he had more than suspected himself. If this was "painful" to him in 1840—as he told Keble it was when he had only sinned once in this way—it must have been more painful to him now, after he had repeated the sin. In the *Apologia*, describing his feelings in the spring of 1841 about the "ghost" of 1839, he declares that, at that time, the "thoughts" which "had profoundly troubled" him "had gone." An astonishing lapse of memory! A delusion, shown to be a delusion by the correspondence quoted above; which proves that, almost continuously since September 1839, the shadow of Rome had darkened his inmost thoughts. During the spring and early summer of 1841 he was in communication with Romanists on the subject of union, and the correspondence indicates that his *chief* reason for remaining in the Anglican Church was the "horror of the principle of private judgment." "That my *sympathies*," he says, "have grown towards the religion of Rome, I do not deny; that my *reasons* for *shunning* her communion have lessened or altered,"—let the reader note the caution of the following words—"it would be difficult, perhaps, to prove. And I wish to go by reason, not by feeling."

This reveals the struggle going on within his mind; a struggle in which we know, though he did not, how unequally matched were the contending forces. The excitement that immediately followed the publication of Tract 90 could not but lift the cloud for a while; but as soon as he found himself alone, it was sure to return, darker than ever. It came while he was reviewing the Arian history, which he was supposed to know already, having written a book about it. "I had not observed it," he says, "in 1832. Wonderful that this should come upon me! I had not sought it out!" No more had Brutus "sought out" the ghost of Cæsar before Philippi. But he had struck that "most unkindest cut of all" at Cæsar; and Cæsar appeared. Just so, in 1840, spite of Froude's protest from his death-bed, and spite of the "ghost" and "omen" of 1839—Newman had used what he himself called "savage and ungrateful words" against Rome. These he had repeated in 1841. Twice, sinning against his conscience, he had smitten with sacrilegious hand, the Church of St. Athanasius and St. Leo. What more natural than that her majestical "ghost" should appear to him again?

Henceforth, more convinced than ever that "Rome will be found right after all," he is at his wits' end to find reasons to deter himself and those most in sympathy with him from taking what would seem the right, natural, and honest step, of joining the only true Church. Besides the argument that *individuals* must not quit their religion except when led by a miracle,* he urges on another correspondent—a lady who longs for a monastic life in the Church of Rome—what amounts to this, that such a life, and such a Church, *are too good for her*: "Who are you to covet, with James and John, the right and left of your Lord's throne? Know your place. Be humbled, be content to pick up the crumbs even, under the King's table."

In this attitude of suspense, looking always for some external "sign" to teach him the will of God, he oscillated, with every breath of circumstance, between hopes and fears for his evanescent Tractarianism. At one time he comforts Keble because possibly Sir Robert Peel will be giving preferment to some of their party; at another, he is cast down because an episcopal charge has attacked Tract 90 ; or because a Bishop of Jerusalem is to be consecrated on such terms as to commit the English Church to the recognition of Protestant Churches abroad. This last affair he describes as "fearful," "hideous," "atrocious," and as one of "three blows" that eventually drove him from the Church of England ; the other two blows being the appearance of the "ghost" and the series of hostile episcopal charges. The last of these "three blows," he tells us, he "recognized as a condemnation ; it was the only one in their power." Short of a formal synodical condemnation, it was indeed the only one in their power. Ought he not then to have accepted it as a "sign"—even without the Jerusalem Bishopric—that the Church of England had rejected his "infusion of Catholic Truth" ? His "tone" about Tract 90, he tells us, had been this : "I would not hold office in a Church which would not allow my sense of the Articles." Well, the Church had shown that she would *not* allow it. Why then did he continue to "hold office" ?

The answer appears to be, that he could not bear at once to give up the hope of doing something effectual to unite the Church of England to Catholicity. Partly too, perhaps, he revolted, now and then, with a touch of obstinacy, from the appeals of those more logical Tractarians who pressed upon him conclusions that seemed to follow naturally from his premises. He let them reason as they would ; but when it came to action, he made a stand. And then, of course, there was the immense terror of following "private judgment"; and the fear of wilfulness ; and the reluctance to believe that his grand schemes had failed ; that his glorious and (as he thought) heaven-prompted enterprise had led him and his followers into a defile where fighting and flying were alike impossible, so that there was nothing for it but to surrender at discretion. Hence, in the autumn, we find him emphasizing the fact that the condemnations even of *all* the Bishops have no authority except in their own dioceses, for they had not met "in Synod;" and "only in Synod do they prescribe doctrine." About the same time, he is corresponding with Romanists, pointing out that, if the Tractarians joined Rome "one by one," there would be no chance of the removal of any corruptions of Roman practice; but that, "if our Church were prepared for a union, she might make her terms; she might gain the cup; she might protest against the extreme honour paid to St. Mary; she might make some explanation of the doctrine of Transubstantiation." At this distance of time, it is difficult to realise this sanguine exaggeration of the numbers of the Tractarians who were disposed to go to the same length as their leader, and, still more, this innocent hope that Rome would ever buy converts by making public and substantial concessions. But realised they must be, if we are to understand why Newman still lingered on within the Anglican pale, long after he had received "the three blows which broke" him.

CHAPTER XXXIV

KEEPING THE PARTY TOGETHER

§ 145. *Drawing the vanguard back*

Consistency of expression is hardly to be looked for in one who regulates his conduct by external "signs," and thinks it almost profane to have a plan. Panic-stricken, for example, at the proposed Jerusalem Bishopric, he writes to Bowden (10 Oct.), "If any such event should take place, I shall not be able to keep a single man from Rome. They will be all trooping off sooner or later." On that same day the Bishop was consecrated; but three weeks afterwards, Newman sees "no sign at all of any *immediate* move." For the most part, however, he seems now to have adopted the latter conviction—that years might elapse before any secession took place; that then they must move *en masse*, if at all; but that at present it was their duty to wait; and that the only way to keep in the English Church was "steadily to contemplate and act upon the possibility of leaving it."

Sometimes, however, even in the same letter, he suggests two opposite policies, as for example to Church (Christmas 1841) who had forwarded to him some questions from a Moderate Tractarian as to the right course in certain contingencies. He begins cheerfully with the hope that, as the clergy are improving, they may reasonably defer the consideration of these difficulties. Then comes a postscript, to the effect that they cannot be sure that the Bishops will not be drawing up some stringent declarations of faith, and ending, "Am not I shilly-shally?" Next day, he writes that he has been "dreaming" about the matter all night, and ought not Church's correspondent to see that "it is unwise, unfair, and impatient, to ask others, what will you do under circumstances which have not, which may never, come? Why bring fear, suspicion, and dissension into a camp about things which are merely *in posse?*" such questions, he says, do harm; there are things which he "neither contemplates nor wishes to contemplate; but when he is asked about them ten times, at length he begins to contemplate them." Very sensible advice, this, and worthy of a good general. But how unlike that recent order in which he instructed his followers that "the very best way to keep in the Church of England was steadily to contemplate, and act upon, the possibility of leaving it"!

In the very same letter in which he thus blends a prophecy of evil with an injunction not to anticipate evil, he encourages the clergy of a certain diocese to "denounce the heresy of their diocesan;" so as to "do their duty" and relieve themselves "of the share they will otherwise have in any possible defections of their brethren." He is also inciting Keble not only to circulate a protest against the episcopal rejection of a curate of his who was candidate for Priest's orders, but also to appeal to Sir Herbert Jenner against his diocesan, justifying resort to "a lay judge in an ecclesiastical court" by the precedent of St. Paul who appealed to Cæsar! He distrusts the Bishops, he says, altogether: "It is not love of Rome that unsettles people, but fear of heresy at home." He had, in his own name, previously sent to his own Bishop a protest against the Jerusalem Bishopric. A letter accompanying it says that "if the English Church is to enter on a new course," he, at least, will have borne witness against it. "I augur nothing but evil, if we in any respect prejudice our title to be a branch of the Apostolic Church;" he foresees that "men who learn . . . . that our communion is not a branch of the One Church . . . . will be tempted to look out for that Church elsewhere." This he sent to the Bishop against the advice of Keble, who was "frightened" at it. But he justifies it both to him and to Bowden on the ground that "there are certainly* plans on foot in some quarters (but I don't wish it mentioned) for effecting a great extended union of Protestants, the Church of England being at its head."

All this looks as though the Tractarian leader, so far as he had any plan of tactics at all, was at this time keeping his men together, preventing the advanced section from dropping off singly to Rome, but working up the moderate section to face the prospect of secession, by protesting, and inducing others to protest, against the action of the Bishops. The *Apologia* tells us that his letter of Submission to the Bishop was a resignation of his place in the Movement. This was far from being the case, if we consider, not the externals, but the essence of leadership. There was nothing done, said, or written, but what in some way or other he saw—so he assures his sister;—and "unless some strange change comes over me, there is *no fear* at present." Note this, that, "unless some strange change comes over" *Newman*, there is "*no fear*" that the *rank and file* will desert to Rome. To Keble, who seems to have desired to preach a sermon warning the Bishops of the danger of an immediate secession of young men, he sent a similar assurance: "I know of none such . . . . the persons in danger are far too serious men to act suddenly, or without waiting for what they consider God's direction." This means that *he* was waiting for a "sign" from heaven, and that *they* were waiting for a "sign" from *him*. "Every one I know," he declares, "tells me everything about himself: he saw and heard everything that was "done," "said," "written,"—and perhaps we may add "thought"—by his young Oxford followers. Practically, therefore, he was still their leader, and still directing the Movement, keeping back the advanced guard.

§ 146. *Pushing the rearguard on*

Towards the Moderate Tractarians, however, he presented a different aspect. These were not to be kept back from Rome but impelled slightly towards Rome. These, he tells us in the *Apologia*, were annoyed at him. They could not tell whither he was going; and were still further annoyed when he persisted in viewing the condemnation of Tract 90 by the public and the Bishops as so grave a matter, and when he threw about what they considered mysterious hints of "eventualities" and would not simply say, "An Anglican I was born and an Anglican I will die." How strong this annoyance was, Church had reported to Newman after a visit to the country. Newman (in a letter † from which extracts have been given above) writes to express the sadness this account has caused him. He is shocked to hear that one Tractarian has a strong "view of the sinfulness of the decrees of Trent." Such a "view," he says, "is as much against union of Churches as against individual conversions." He then makes what seems an extraordinary confession of neglect for one in his position. The extract is also remarkable, as an instance of the extent to which what "Palmer thinks," and what "Charles Marriott does not scruple at," are held up as inducements to believe something about something which the Tractarian leader has never taken the trouble to investigate:

> "To tell you the truth, I never have examined those decrees with this object and have no view; but that is very different from having a deliberate view against them. Could not he say *which* they are? I suppose Transubstantiation is one. Charles Marriott, though of course he would not like to have it repeated, does not scruple at that. I have not my mind clear. Moberly must recollect that Palmer [of Worcester] thinks they all bear a Catholic interpretation. For myself this only I see, that there is indefinitely more in the Fathers against our own state of alienation from Christendom than against the Tridentine decrees."

He proceeds to defend himself from the charge of having startled people by Romanizing utterances:

> "The only thing I can think of [that I can have said of a startling character] is this, that there were persons who, if our Church committed herself to heresy, *sooner* than think that there was no Church anywhere, would believe the Roman to be the Church; and therefore would, on faith, accept what they could not otherwise acquiesce in."

Now, in his public Protest against the Jerusalem Bishopric, he had said "that the recognition of heresy," *e.g.* in the matter of the Jerusalem Bishopric, *went far to destroy* the claim of the English Church "to be a branch of the Catholic Church." The inference is obvious, viz., that the English Church had *gone far* to commit herself to heresy, and that therefore, the "persons," mentioned above, must be also *far on the way* to "believe the Roman to be the Church." Newman cannot deny the inference. All he can do is to deny that the danger is "immediate." He expresses the hope that "seven † years" hence (it used to be in his former letters "twenty" years hence, and the change is perhaps ominous) they may all be in a better state of mind to consider these matters. On the following day he continues his letter. No one has any right, he says, to suggest these dismal eventualities—forgetting that it is he himself who has been "startling" people by suggesting them. He then adds a protest against the obstinate Anglicanism of Church's correspondent: "He surely does not mean to say that *nothing* could separate a man from the English Church; *e.g.* its avowing Socinianism; its holding the Holy Eucharist in a Socinian sense."

Then follow words intended to prepare for a Tractarian secession *en masse*. The position of events, he says, is more serious now than in the seventeenth century; then it was discipline, now it is *doctrine* that is in question: "If such dreadful events were realised, I cannot help thinking we" [*i.e.*, we Tractarians] "should all be vastly more agreed than we think now." Then, without mentioning Rome, he suggests that there *is no alternative but Rome*: "But let this be considered, as to alternatives. *What* Communion could we join? Could the Scotch or American sanction the presence of its Bishops and congregations in England, without incurring the imputation of schism, unless indeed (and is that likely?) they denounced the English as heretical?"

Then—still without mentioning Rome—he urges that the right course is "to do simply *what we think right* day by day: shall we not be sure to go wrong if we attempt to trace by anticipation the course of Divine Providence?"

§ 147. *Janus-leadership*

"Doing what we think right day by day" is an admirable course when we can trust our own conscience to tell us what is "right day by day":—but not otherwise, not if a man has to consult other people's consciences, or books. Still more, if a man must be ever watching for "signs" to help him to discern what is right and wrong, then, "doing what we think right day by day" means simply drifting. This Newman was now doing; and, on the whole, spite of little occasional reactions, in one direction—towards Rome. But still, while being thus steadily led on by what he thought the Light, he was also doing his best to lead others; or rather (as has been said before) to lead some, and draw back others.

This double task explains the difficulty of his position. In his own heart, he had already taken wings and was, by anticipation, at rest, in Rome. But his duty (as he considered it) to the Catholic Church, and the responsibility of leadership which he could not feel it right to cast aside, obliged him to remain in a painful, and doubtful, and (so to speak) double-faced position. Even if the Bishops had, at a blow, committed the Church to heresy, things were not as yet ripe for secession. His own party was not of one mind. If Ward and Oakeley were hurrying too fast, the Moderates were lagging as much too slow. Hook had actually subscribed to the

Jerusalem fund, Palmer had defended it. In a recent election to the Professorship of Poetry, the candidate recommended by Pusey as "a person whose known religious views would ensure him making his office minister to religion" had withdrawn after a virtual defeat; and this, too, though he was really something of a poet, while his successful opponent was little more than a cultivated scholar. Even Manning and Samuel Wilberforce had not supported Pusey's candidate. That was bad enough. But still worse was the ominous fact that some of the advanced Tractarians themselves (so Newman tells his sister) were not ill pleased at the result: "They look out, with some sort of relief, for signs of our Church retrograding and withdrawing* her Notes." Again, Keble had disapproved of Newman's protest. Even Pusey could not always be depended on. "In his first impulse," Newman bitterly complains, Pusey "was ready enough to grant the Archbishop the term 'Protestant,' who asked him to allow it. I think he would, if left to himself."*

Hence a constant clashing in the duties and utterances of the Leader. To the impetuous vanguard he had to cry aloud that they were *not* to contemplate eventualities; but the loitering rearguard had to be reminded that "the best way to keep in the Church was steadily to contemplate, and act upon the possibility of leaving it." The former were to be forbidden to bring fear into the camp; the latter were to be continually frightened by rumours that the Bishops were unchurching and Protestantizing them. The mischief of private judgment, the wilfulness of single conversions, the still-remaining Notes of the Anglican Church, the sin of doing anything sudden in changing one's religion —these were the words of command for the advanced

Party: but the laggards had to be quickened and stimulated by being told that "the Fathers" were far more opposed to the Church of England than to the Tridentine decrees; that the Notes of the Church were fast going, if not already gone; that if the Church was still further "unchurched,"* men must look out for the true Church elsewhere; that in "twenty," or perhaps in "seven" years, or perhaps sooner still, all of the Party might be of one mind, and prepared for some joint movement towards some other communion, which, apparently, *could not be that of the Scotch or American Church.*

Any leader might be distracted, if thus forced, Janus-like, to ride between two battalions and to give orders with two mouths, urging the van to keep back, and the rear to come on faster. And how much more if the leader himself hardly knew whether to advance quickly, or slowly, or to stand still and wait, and if what he called his "reason" varied with each "sign" and "omen" of the moment, whether it was some flight of birds, or passing cloud, or the neighing of his own horse! Newman—by nature a Greek of Greeks, with nothing Roman about him except a tendency to superstition, and a certain Romanesque craving for external system—was proud to believe that he had in himself something of the organizing spirit of the great warriors and legislators of the Eternal City; and true it is that the Roman generals were practical men and yet went largely by omens. But they could scarcely have conquered the world if they had so given up their minds to the anticipation of these prognostics, that they were of no mind, or of two minds*, when the battle had once begun.

§ 148. "*Bigotry*," *the sin of Whately*

Between the Sermons, and many of the letters, of 1841, there is naturally something of a contrast corresponding to the contrast between the Advanced and the Moderate sections of the Tractarians. The letters, for the most part are written to those who are outside Oxford, whom the leader wishes to contemplate steadily the possibility of leaving the Church of England ; but the sermons, being addressed to his own more immediate followers, bid them remain in the Church and (for the most part) *not* contemplate eventualities. Of course, however, there is a great difference between the sermons before, and after, the second appearance of "the ghost" in the summer of 1841.

A sermon preached before the University (1 June, 1841), on "Wisdom as contrasted with Faith and Bigotry" represents his last utterance, as an Anglican, on a subject to which he will not return till he publishes his mature views as a Romanist, in *The Grammar of Assent*. The next few months will drive him from such comparatively unimportant and professorial subjects to the vital questions, "What are the Notes of the true Church ? and do they exist in the Church of England ?" Meantime, he makes it his business to narrow the office of Reason (in Religion) to the task of finding such analogies and presumptions as will justify and illustrate facts stated, or doctrines taught, in Scripture ; and he suggests that Bigotry is nothing more than an intellectual error, a kind of pedantical conceit, characterizing men of narrow views who have formed no conception of the wide range of Catholic truth. Hitherto he has been content to perplex his readers by merely using the word " Reason " in two senses. Now he introduces a new sense for " Evidences," denying the name to any but "such investigations into the relation of idea to idea, and such developments of system, as have been described." Ignoring experiment and experience as means of originating theory and ascertaining truth, he declares that the employment which he destines for Reason is that " to which the Reason of Newton dedicated itself," as well as that of Athanasius, Augustine, and Aquinas. Thence passing to the distinction between Faith and Bigotry, he gives an entirely new definition of the latter.

Bigotry, with him, is an intellectual error: it "professes to understand what it maintains, though it does not" ; persists in "arguing only in one way" ; takes up, "not a religious, but a philosophical position ; and " lays claim to Wisdom." Much of this reads like an attempt to show that Whateley and his followers are the ideal bigots ;—men who have " clear and decisive explanations always ready of the sacred mysteries of Faith " ; " consider that the premisses with which they start, just prove the conclusions which they draw and nothing else " ; "have drawn their lines, and formed their classes, and given to each opinion, argument, principle, and party, its own locality " ; "profess to know where to find everything . . . . are vexed at new principles of arrangement," "grow giddy amid cross divisions," and " cannot separate words from their own ideas and ideas from their own associations." Such a disposition of mind exists, and deserves to be noted and censured. But it is not what is commonly understood by Bigotry.

The real difference between religious Faith and religious Bigotry arises from the difference of their *objects*—the one being trust in a wise and loving Father* ; the other, a desire to propitiate tyrannical Powers. Hence Faith, recognizing the brotherhood of men as a truth inseparable from the truth of the Fatherhood of God, can dictate nothing cruel or unnatural, while Bigotry—permeated with selfish fears, and conscious that it knows nothing whatever of the whims and caprices of its Tyrants save through books, omens, dreams, and priests—finds nothing too revolting, inhuman, and unnatural, to perpetrate for the sake of averting Their* wrath. Newman—who does not *really* recognize in his heart the love of man as preparation for the love of God—knows nothing of this essential difference. Always confused in these subjects, he is seldom more confused than here. Sometimes he speaks as if Bigotry were inferior to Faith in being unselfish. Faith, he tells us, differs from Bigotry in that the former is a "practical principle," and "judges and decides because it cannot help doing so for the sake of the man himself . . . who exercises it." In other words, if Torquemada burns us for the sake of *our* souls and not his own, he is a bigot and not acting in faith ; but if he does it for the sake of *his own* soul, he is acting in faith and is not a bigot!

The preacher concludes with a reference to "persons of narrow views"—interesting because, though his direct aim seems Whately*, he seems to be striking a side-blow at himself. The reader will recollect that he had disavowed Keble's charge of being "fidgety" about making things "clear and square," first to himself, and then to others. But he was too self-suspicious not occasionally to think that the charge might be true.

Hence, when we find him saying that "True Catholicity is commensurate with the wants of the human mind; but persons are often to be found who are surprised that they cannot persuade all men to follow them, and cannot destroy dissent, by preaching a portion of the Divine System, instead of the whole of it"; it is hardly possible to doubt that he is meditating on his own failure; on the "pulverization" of the *Via Media* under the blows of Leo and Athanasius; and on the possibilities of future revelations "of the whole counsel of God." Consciously or unconsciously, he seems to be describing his own position (and preparing the way for the "ghost" which was again to appear to him three or four weeks afterwards) when he thus describes the conflict in the minds of those who suddenly receive new knowledge:—

> "What they did not know, or what they knew but had not weighed, suddenly presses upon their notice. Then they become impatient that they cannot make their proofs clear, and try to make a forcible riddance of objections. They look about for new arguments and put violence on Scripture or on history. They show a secret misgiving about the truth of their principles, by shrinking from the appearance of defeat, or from occasional doubt within. They become alarmists and they forget that the issue of all things, and the success of their own cause (if it be what they think it) is sealed and secured by Divine promise; and sometimes in this conflict between broad fact and narrow principle, the hard material breaks their tools; they are obliged to give up their principles. A state of uncertainty and distress follows, and, in the end, perhaps, bigotry is supplanted by general scepticism."

This was written in June, 1841. Before that summer had passed away, Newman was to realise much of this. He had prepared the way for the consequence by going through the needful antecedents. He had "become impatient that he could not make his proofs clear"; he had "tried to make a forcible riddance of objections"; he had "looked about for new arguments, and put violence on Scripture and on history"; he had "shown secret misgivings about the truth of his principles, by shrinking from the appearance of defeat and from occasional doubt within." Soon—in the studies of the Long Vacation—"what he did not know, or what he knew but had not weighed" in the early history of the Church, was "suddenly" to "press upon him." The "hard material" would "break his tools"; a "state of uncertainty and distress" would follow; and, in the end, his narrow Anglican prepossessions "would be supplanted," not indeed by "scepticism" (for Newman himself by his "perhaps" leaves us an alternative), but by the opposite pole of absolute credulity.

§ 149. *Sibthorp's† conversion*

The autumn brought many changes, and, as a consequence of these, a great change in the tone of Newman's sermons. The "three great blows" had fallen. These have been described above; but something else had occurred which made a great impression at the time. After Tract 90, Ward and Newman had been corresponding with Romanists as to possibilities of union. The former, with one or two others, had visited Oscott, and had been much impressed. Communications had been opened with Bishop Wiseman. The feeling on the Roman side was "Come over at once." On the side of advanced Tractarians it was, "We are disposed to come over; but we wish to come over, if at all, in a body; and upon terms." In a letter of September in that year Newman had sketched the terms. Papal supremacy is not mentioned as a difficulty ; nor is the Invocation of the Saints ; on the Continent, too, things might remain as they were ; but the Anglican Church was to be allowed to make some "explanation" of Transubstantiation, some "protest" against "the extreme honours paid to St. Mary" ; and she might hope to "gain the cup." But it was indispensable that the Tractarians, if they were to go through even the semblance of negotiating with Rome, should present a firm front to her just now, and not desert to the Roman camp by one, and twos.

Just at this crisis, happened the first desertion. Mr. Sibthorp, an Anglican clergyman, "had been gradually rising from a low church state" and was "developing" in his chapel at Ryde. Whether as a consequence, or not, of his "development," one of his congregation became, or was on the point of becoming, a convert to Rome. Sibthorp, a Fellow of Magdalen, came suddenly to his old College, about the middle of October, to ask his friend Bloxam for an introduction to Wiseman, intending, apparently, to expostulate, or to make some explanation, about this member of his flock. "He certainly," says Bloxam, "went to Oscott without the slightest intention" of being converted himself. It so happened that Newman met him in Magdalen cloisters, Sibthorp said, "I am going to Oscott." "Take care," was the jesting reply, "they do not keep you there." But the jest became real earnest. In a few days Sibthorp returned, after having been "received" at Oscott ; and Newman had to pay a second visit to Magdalen to warn Bloxam against "monkeys who had lost their tails and wished other monkeys to lose theirs."

This, as it perhaps encouraged the Romanists, greatly discouraged and annoyed the advanced

Tractarians. People had no business, they said, to rush into the true Church, in this way, "on Wesleyan principles," guided by their own feelings. They ought to go upon authority, not upon private judgment ; to wait for some "sign," or for God's "direction" ; and, above all, they ought to move altogether, or not at all. A little before this, a letter of Newman's (whether the one just mentioned, or not, does not appear) had altogether misled his own followers, by inducing them to suppose that the hour for secession was at hand. Newman had disavowed that interpretation, while acknowledging that the meaning had been conveyed by his words ; but, of course, besides making his followers restless, it had excited eager expectations among the Romanists. "You may perhaps have heard from Bishop Wiseman," writes Ward (28 October) to a Romanist friend, "that we all (naturally enough, as he acknowledges), misunderstood part of Newman's letter, and imagined him to have put the case of his own coming over with others, much more positively than he ever intended to put it." Ward then proceeds to state what "seems to be, or rather certainly is" "his feeling on the subject." This, "seems to be, or rather certainly is," is an amusing indication of the perplexity of Newman's followers caused by the enigmatical and tortuous nature of his utterances, even when he was endeavouring to make clear what he had before expressed obscurely. However, the "feeling" was, to wait. But the writer must be quoted ; for he shows that the waiting was to be indefinite : Newman's "feeling" was that "we ought hardly to look beyond the present hour, but wait in quietness and obedience for plainer indications of God's will concerning us ; that we have been hitherto so singularly guided and protected, things have so baffled in their issues all human calculation, that any more self-willed course of conduct may forfeit to any extent the blessings which we humbly hope are in store for us; the message might come to us any day which would warn us to change our position; it may be a duty for many years to remain as we are."

This letter, begun before the news of Sibthorp's conversion had reached Oxford, was continued a few days afterwards. Evidently the Tractarians were discouraged by this inconvenient incident. Ward now hopes they will not be thought "very rude" if they ask their correspondent to put off his visit to Oxford; and then there is a long demonstration of the amount of Catholic work and doctrine going on among Anglicans for which his correspondent hardly gives them credit. "Your Church," he says, "should assume" that "wherever are found strictness and purity of life, anxious conscientiousness, &c., these are her friends. These qualities and the persons possessed of them, really belong to her, and should be looked on as secret fellow-workers with her." He then deprecates anxiety on the part of the Church of Rome that Tractarian "individuals" should "join her by short cuts": to feel such anxiety, is, he says, "to take up a sectarian position." Thus, in private among themselves, and in their correspondence with Romanists, the Tractarians treat Sibthorp as the "monkey" that had cut off his tail, or as a hasty goer "by short cuts" whose example is to be deprecated. How that impulsive convert will be treated by their Leader publicly, in the pulpit, the next section will show.

§ 150. *Preventing desertions*

Sibthorp's desertion, would, of course, make it harder than before for Newman to keep the party together. On what principle, worthy to be called a principle, could he prevent others from following the example? Had he not taught them that, in religion, each man's first business was to look after himself and his own "safety"? What would be the consequence? Sooner or later the question must arise among his young men, "Are we *safe* with you?" "Are you *sure* you can give us absolution?" If they *did* ask that, he knew he could not say, "Yes." His only course, then, was to *prevent* them from asking it by preoccupying their minds with the belief that they had within them, or about them, some "signs" or "notes" of "safety." Accordingly, his first sermon after this desertion—one of his best in literary beauty and emotional expression—is an attempt to reassure them by appealing to "signs" within them. "How great a blessing is it . . . especially in an age like this, that the tokens of Christ are not only without us, but more properly within us!" He goes on to say that "the outward signs" have "well-nigh deserted us;" God has "in judgment, obscured the visible and public notes of His Kingdom among us:" "how few even of serious men could remain peaceful and steadfast, or be secure about themselves, that they would not run any whither, if they judged merely by what is seen!" Then follows a series of hypothetical adjurations. He appeals to his congregation—if they have "come to Service and been favoured" with "the peace or the illumination" they "needed"; if, when they "visited holy places," they "certainly gained there a manifestation such as the world could not give"; if sermons have come to them with power or have been blessed to their spiritual good; or if their soul has been, as it were, transfigured within them when they came to the Most Holy Sacrament; or if Lent and Passiontide have brought to them what they had not before; or if, at Ordinations, they have been partakers of an indescribable influence, though they "realised it not at the time;" or if "strange providences, and almost supernatural coincidences," have "hung about the Church's ordinances"—to pause before they doubted that there was a Divine Presence among them still.

Beautiful words! But no more than words,—not even if we add his appeal to an experience of mercies, judgments, and death-beds—and availing little indeed to quiet the anxieties of a true and well-instructed Tractarian, anxious for Sacramental grace, but distrustful of his own feelings! However, on the next Sunday he returns to the subject in "Outward and Inward Notes of the Church." And now Sibthorp is brought upon the stage in order to hold up the English Church to hatred and contempt:—

> "We English, as if some abomination of desolation were coming on us also, scorn almost all Christianity but our own; . . . peace we know not, nor faith, nor love . . . Instead of acknowledging that our brother has left us because we have left God, that we have lost him because we have lost our claim to keep him, we forsooth, think 'we do well to be angry,' and can but enlarge on his impatience, or obstinacy, or wilfulness, or infatuation."

Who would have guessed that this "brother" was the "monkey" that had "cut off his tail," and had been censured for deserting the Church "on Wesleyan principles"? Still, he goes on to show why the "brother" is not to be followed. The sermon concludes by noting how "a feeling" has kept many persons, acting quite independently, from quitting the Anglican Church. Accepting this unintentional agreement as a kind of heaven-sent message, he bids his hearers "beware of turning a deaf ear to what may prove to be a Divine token."

If this was not "going by one's feelings," it is hard to say what is. Like so many other of Newman's positions, this, too, was one of unstable equilibrium. Some more definite and solid basis was needed. Accordingly, the following sermons might be expected to grapple with the difficult question of the *outward* Notes of the Anglican Church. But how could he do this, when he had repeatedly said that God had "obscured" these Notes, and that they were practically non-existent? From this network of difficulties Newman's Implicit Reason extricates him by the help of analogy. What the schismatic Church of Israel was to the orthodox Church of Judah, that the Anglican was to the Roman. The Tractarian Church is "Samaria"; he is Elijah. Elijah "did not worship at the Temple, and was cut off from those 'with whom was the adoption'"; "Elijah and Elisha kept the people shut up under that system, if it might be so called, in which they found them; and sought rather to teach them their duty than to restore to them their privileges"; Elijah "had no heart for that outward glory of holier times; he passed by Jerusalem," and "went his way to the desert."

And now, after having told his hearers in his previous sermons that the English (and presumably the English Church) had "left God," and "know not peace, nor faith, nor love," he passionately adjures them to *have faith* in this recreant Church instead of returning to the true one! "What want we but faith in our Church? With faith we can do everything; without faith we can do nothing." There follow words still less justifiable for one in Newman's position. He himself had twice been shocked by "misgivings" as to the English Church, misgivings which every day was now making stronger: he was more than half disposed to regard them as suggestions from above; yet he here exhorts his hearers to regard them as coming from below; "If we have a secret misgiving about her, all is lost; we lose our nerve, our powers, our position, our hope."

I find it difficult to explain how Newman could have brought himself to use language like this, unless * he seriously believed that one can, so to speak, pump up "faith," and pump out "misgivings" by the mechanical processes of repeating prescribed prayers and creeds, and doing prescribed works. The comment of Ward on these sermons is interesting, especially as addressed to a Romanist: "I think you would have been much pleased, for he neither said nor implied anything whatever against Rome, and spoke of the visible notes of our Church as either gone or fast going." With this we may well agree. But does it not follow that Anglican and Protestant England, hearing, not without exaggerations the substance of these Advent sermons preached by the Vicar of St. Mary's Oxford, would *not* be "much pleased"?

§ 151. "*Grounds for steadfastness*"

In the last of these sermons, "Grounds for Steadfastness in our Religious Profession," while still protesting that "the only satisfactory test of religion is something within us," Newman appeals (as before) to "wonderful providences" and "answers to prayer" as proofs that the Church in which such things occur may be a branch of the true Church.

On this, being mere repetition, we should not need to dwell, but that he adds another Note, not previously mentioned. It consists of supernatural punishments inflicted on unworthy partakers of the Lord's Supper. These, by testifying to the reality of the Sacrament, testify indirectly to the apostolical grace of those who administer it, and therefore to the validity of Anglican Ordination. Possibly Newman had in his mind the case of his sexton at St. Mary's. Knowing his character, Newman had hesitated before giving him the sacrament. But he had given it, and, shortly afterwards, the man had committed suicide Whatever instance, or instances, may have been in his mind, this must be accepted as a proof that the preacher had searched far and wide for Notes, and was hard put to it to find anything besides those subjective tokens which, in his heart, he quite distrusted. The passage deserves quotation. "Our Church," says the preacher, "as if to give us a test of her Catholicity, boldly declares of her most solemn ordinance, that he who profanes it, incurs the danger of judgment"; now "we really have proofs among us" of "clear punishment coming upon profanation of the holy ordinance in question"; "sometimes," he adds, there are "very fearful instances." What follows? If there be "profanation," there must be "something to be profaned." And this answers the question whether our Sacraments "really have with them the presence" of Christ. Everything turns on this, for :—

> "If so, we are part of the Church; if not, then we are but performers in a sort of scene or pageant, which may be religiously intended, and which God, in His mercy, may visit, but, if He visits, will, in visiting, go beyond His own promise."

To base a defence of the Church of England on such "proofs" of "punishment" as this, will seem to many to be a kind of tergiversation. If this is the result of remaining in a heretic Church "in order to promote her return," we may well think that Ward described it better when he spoke of "remaining in our position with the hope of" "poisoning as many as possible." Even though we grant that, among the congregation, there were Newman's own advanced followers whom he was keeping *back* from Rome; still we have no right to assume there were not many others who would be what Ward calls "poisoned." *

Yet the evidences of profound gloom and intense spiritual anxiety are so strong that our resentment against what seems Newman's unfairness is almost lost in sympathy with his fears. It is a terrible and pitiable condition of soul when a minister of the Gospel has to appeal to such "notes" as the death or sickness of profane communicants in order to show that the National Church "in spite of its manifold disorders, is a safe Church to die in." These ominous words "die" and "safe," coming at the conclusion of the course of sermons, are like two sword-thrusts, under which the whole of the argument falls dead. The time will soon come when, not in the pulpit, but in privacy—where there can be no gush of rhetoric, no veil of verbiage—a young man will look him in the face and say, in effect, "Am I safe if I die to-night?" and "Are you sure you can give me absolution?"—and then, where will our rhetorician be?

There is nothing of real faith in all these sermons except the passionate hope that somehow, and at some time, God will lead him and his followers to some good conclusion. And certainly, too, there is none of that faith in their Church which, to a Tractarian, was essential, and which Newman entreats his hearers to have, as though his entreaty could give to them what he himself did not possess. All is unconsciously rhetorical, and unwittingly hollow. He is working himself up, and trying to work others up, to believe in that in which they do not believe. He himself puts before them the possibility that they *may be* "but performers in a sort of scene or pageant." That dismal hypothesis will soon press itself upon him and his followers as a still more dismal probability. To *play* at celebrating the Sacrament—and it will seem a play *to them*, if Anglican Ordinations are really not valid—will seem a "pageant" of a portentously awful kind—such an imposture as Satan himself might originate, encourage, and laugh at. Come a few months, and a friend will say to Ward, "Bear in mind that you are, on our principles, really a priest of God." Then Ward will break off the discourse, saying, "If that is the case, the whole thing is infernal humbug." * Strong language; but not too strong, under the circumstances! That will be the beginning of the end. What Ward says to-day, Newman must say to-morrow. One will say "humbug," the other will say "pageant"; but they will both mean the same thing.

CHAPTER XXXV

RETIRING TO ENTRENCHMENTS

§ 152. *Torres Vedras*

Early in 1842 Newman resolved to leave Oxford for Littlemore. His reasons vary, as usual, with the persons to whom he gives them. "I went up there to say my prayers"; and, "for what I knew, my doubts would vanish if the newspapers would be so good as to give me time and let me alone"—such is the account to the world in the *Apologia*. Yet even there he adds, "I had thought of giving up my Living a year or two before"—he means *two years and a half* before—"and this was the first step to it." To his sister he says that he feels out of place and superannuated at Oxford; that the Heads are taking measures to keep the men from St. Mary's; and that his preaching there is a cause of irritation. Lastly to his young men he describes his retirement as a piece of military strategy. "I called Littlemore my Torres Vedras, and thought that some day we might advance again within the Anglican Church as we had been forced to retire."

Naturally, the world took the last of these three views: and in the main, it was the true one. No doubt, the attractions of a quasi-monastic life helped to draw Newman from Oxford, partly for the good of his soul, partly because ascetic meditation appeared to him likely to lead to a solution of his religious problems. This thought appears in many of the letters of this period, and notably in a sermon preached (23 January) a few days before he left Oxford: "Let us turn from shadows of all kinds. . . . Let us attempt, through God's grace, to advance and sanctify the inner man. We cannot be wrong here." But that was not his only object. He felt that he was still responsible for the guidance of many who had been induced by him to participate in the Movement. Some of these he intended to invite to join his retirement. Thus he could prepare them, as he was preparing himself, to receive the divine message that might at any time arrive, to go forward, either within, or without, the Anglican Church.

It was a most difficult position. He compares it to that of the surgeon and the chaplain on board a man-of-war, who had persuaded a sailor to have one leg off, and then broke it to him that he must have the other off too; upon which the poor fellow replied, "You should have told me that before, gentlemen"; then he deliberately unscrewed the tourniquet and bled to death. The one leg was ordinary Anglicanism; the other leg was Tractarianism; bleeding to death was atheism; surviving with both legs off, was, I suppose, Romanism. How did he know that his followers, when he broke it to them that they must lose their second or Tractarian leg, would not prefer to "bleed to death"? But, besides the pain of this hard responsibility, it was trying to his own morality. It was lawful, perhaps, here and there, to see certain Romeward-tending results of his doctrine, and "though he saw them not to say that he saw them"; but when it came to a large question like this, to what was indeed the whole question, was it lawful for him to "see" and "not to say he saw"?

Did he know beforehand that his young men must lose the Tractarian leg? If he did, was he not bound to tell them? If he did not, must we not say, having regard to all the circumstances, that he was not competent to act as a doctor, and that it would have been well to give up doctoring? It would have been humiliating, no doubt, to make a plain confession of present incompetence to guide others; but it would have been ultimately better for others as well as for his own self-respect. Perhaps, however, he could not give up the notion that Providence intended him to be somehow a guide, and would give him the necessary guidance; and he may have regarded his new plan as a providential means of exercising that personal influence which he recognized as the most powerful instrument for diffusing religious truth. Purposing to retire from St. Mary's, he threw himself into the project he had suggested to Rogers, of starting a monastic house, which might possibly be a pattern to similar houses; or, as he had put it, might be "obliged to follow the fashion and conform to a rule of discipline."

Accordingly a monastic establishment was now started at Littlemore. The plans had been sketched by Newman in June 1840. There were to be "cells," each consisting of a "dormitory" and two other rooms; "a refectory"; possible "cloisters"; also a "chapel" in prospect. Everything was very rough, and life in Lent roughest of all. A biographer of Newman, who derives his information from "Littlemore men," tells us that Newman's letter to his Bishop does not give "any idea of his primitive austerities and observances." During Lent, he says, "the monks" ate nothing till five, and then "the solitary meal was of salt fish." One of them soon had a serious illness, and the doctor told them they would all be speedily dead if things went on thus; after which, relaxations were made. They breakfasted, standing, at a board erected "in the improvised refectory." "The Chapel was hardly more pretentious than the dining-room;" but "it had a large crucifix bought at Lima. . . . It was what was called 'very pronounced,' with the all but barbaric realism of Spanish religious art." A table supported the base, and on the table were two candles, which Newman himself lighted at prayer time, having made them necessary by veiling the windows with hangings. Of an altar there was no pretence, for they could use the Littlemore Church: "The disciples stood in a row on either side of the chapel for the recitation of Divine Office; . . . . the days and hours of the Catholic Church were duly kept; and the only alteration made in the Office was that Saints were invoked with a modification of Newman's making—the '*Ora* pro nobis' being changed in recitation to '*Oret*.'"

§ 153. *Newman defends his position with "irony"*

We have Tractarianized in the English Church a good deal since 1842. But, half a century ago, it is not surprising that the English press busied itself a good deal with these doings of the Vicar of St. Mary's Oxford. The Bishop himself, forced at last to take some notice of the reports, wrote to Newman that he was not in the habit of paying much attention to charges against him in the newspapers as so many of them were false and calumnious:

> "In [a newspaper], however, of April 9 there appears a paragraph in which it is asserted as a matter of notoriety, that a so-called Anglo-Catholic Monastery is in process of erection at Littlemore, and that the cells of dormitories, the chapel, the refectory, the cloisters, all may be seen advancing to perfection, under the eye of a parish priest of the Diocese of Oxford."

I suppose it will hardly be denied that "monastery" (especially when qualified by "Anglo-Catholic") is substantially the same thing as *μονή*, or "monastic house," or "monastic institution" (Newman's names for it). If this be conceded, there is not a word in this paragraph that was not literally true. The expression "cells of dormitories" was quite correct; only, the reporter should have gone further and said "cells of dormitories, sitting rooms, and bath-rooms," for each "cell" was to contain *three* rooms. The "refectory" had been mentioned by Newman himself as a thing of course. The "Littlemore men" called it "improvised"; but there *was* one. The "chapel," or "oratory," had been contemplated by Newman, and has been described above, again on the testimony of "Littlemore men." The "cloisters" will be also found in Newman's plan.

Yet, though the newspaper was right, Newman was not precluded from a reply, that would have been both dignified and truthful. He might have said that he believed in collegiate religious life, even without vows; that our great cities would perhaps be the better if such houses as these existed in their midst; that he, at all events, intended to try the experiment; and that in this there was nothing inconsistent with perfect loyalty to his Bishop and his Church. A little quiet scorn might have been pardonable, perhaps, at the alarm which made Protestants shiver because a suite of rooms was called a "cell," and a dining-room a "refectory."

Instead of this, however, Newman prefers to ride off on a mere verbal evasion that is not even verbally justifiable. After two close octavo pages of querulous lament that his private aspirations after piety must needs be discussed by a prying public, he continues:

> "As to the quotation from the [newspaper] which I have not seen, your Lordship will perceive from what I have said that no 'monastery is in process of erection,' there is no 'chapel,' no 'refectory,' hardly a dining-room or parlour. The 'cloisters' are my shed connecting the cottages. I do not understand what 'cells of dormitories' means."

What *he* "meant" by denying he knew the "meaning" of *his own words*, it is hard to say. Presumably —and this is quite in accordance with Newman's controversial method—he had forgotten that he had himself used the word "cell" in this novel sense, and thought himself justified, when another person did the same, in treating it as nonsense. He then takes full advantage of the answer which the kindly Bishop had put into his mouth: "Of course I can repeat your Lordship's words, that 'I am not attempting a revival of the Monastic Orders in anything approaching to the Romanist sense of the term.'" This he could readily do; but this was no answer to the charge that he was instituting "*a so-called Anglo-Catholic Monastery.*" Nor was it substantially truthful to add, "I am attempting nothing ecclesiastical, but something personal and private.*" Probably he took for granted that the Bishop was on his side; and he felt that he was justified in "answering a fool"—not the Bishop, of course, but the newspaper reporter—"according to his folly." It was, I suppose, an exaggerated instance of that love of wantoning with words which made Newman sometimes say reckless things in order to evade what he considered impertinent curiosity. It was a mixture of "irony" and "economy"; an auxiliary faculty to which, when hard pressed, he could no more help resorting than a cuttle-fish can prevent itself from sheltering itself in its retreat from a superior enemy by an efflux of innate ink. If, however, Newman's letter was published, I do not see how the "men of Littlemore" themselves could help being somewhat scandalized at hearing, on the authority of their "Vicar," that their "cells of dormitories," their "refectory," and their "chapel," had no present, and apparently no contemplated, existence. And how can we blame those who owned to the name of Protestants, if, comparing the facts with Newman's denial of them, they were confirmed (in accordance with Pusey's prediction) in the impressions they had already formed of Tractarian "Jesuitism"?

One of the most popular paragraphs in the *Apologia* describes, in very touching language, Newman's misery at being molested in his religious retirement by jealous, inquisitive, vulgar Protestant eyes. He burns with indignation against the Oxford authorities, who, like "mounted patrols," walked their horses round his "poor cottages." Why may he not go to Littlemore to "say his prayers," but the Protestant Press must needs be at him? Why may he not "creep into a hole" and be let "die in peace"? And so on, for the best part of a page. Yet, when carefully examined, there is not one of these pathetic cries that will not be found to be a mere exemplification of Newman's habit of laying the blame on others when he has done wrong himself. Each of these complaints is either an unconscious equivocation, or virtually admits that he himself had done something to be complained of. This might have been shown, if the Oxford authorities and Protestant England generally—who have received scant justice from the historians of the Tractarian Movement—had been allowed to have their say in the matter. Let them be allowed now.

"I had thought," he says, "that an Englishman's house was his castle." *So it is*, replies Protestant England; *but you, the Vicar of St. Mary's, chose to call it a "monastic institution," and to call your young pupils "monks," and your dining-room a "refectory," and your sets of rooms "cells," and to invite young Oxford men to repeat the "Offices" and to observe the "Hours" of Rome—and all this within walking distance of Oxford, and in a parish which you held as Fellow of Oriel. All this makes a difference. Besides, if you regarded Littlemore as merely "an Englishman's castle," how will you explain presently the fact that you will call Lockhart's secession a kind of "breach of trust" which will oblige you to write to the Bishop about it, and to give up the service of the Church of England? What does it concern your Bishop—the secession, against your will, of a young man who happened to be in your "castle"?* "Heads of Houses, as mounted patrols, round my poor cottages." *True, but you yourself admit, in the previous sentence, that there was "a flight of undergraduates"* inside your "poor cottages." You have yourself called the Heads "the guides and governors" and "legitimate guardians" of these young men. May not the Heads have come to look after these undergraduates whom you (unwillingly) had attracted into your "poor cottages"?* "Have I not retreated from you? . . . Why will you not let me die in peace!

Wounded brutes creep into some hole to die in, and no one grudges it them." *Yes,* reply the Oxford Heads, *you have* RETREATED : *but is it not to* ENTRENCHMENTS ? *Can you honestly say that you did not retreat in order that you might "some day advance again within the Anglican Church"? Did you not (secretly, and to your young men, at all events) call your Monastery* TORRES VEDRAS ? *And did you think* TORRES VEDRAS *"a hole to die in"?*

"When the Warden of Wadham"—says one of Newman's most friendly and genial biographers—"a flourishing Evangelical, knocked one day at the door, Newman opened it himself:—nothing so human as a housemaid entered the 'monastery' where the inmates took the duty of door-opening for a week by turns. 'May I see the monastery?' insinuated the visitor. 'We have no monasteries here,' replied Newman, and closed the door in his face—less than civil." Perhaps. But, still more certainly, "less than true." Let us put ourselves in the position of the Rev. Dr. Symons as he retraced his ineffectual steps to Wadham College. Might he not naturally say to himself, and not without a touch of envious admiration, "What clever fellows these Tractarians are! And what a thing it is to have what Newman has in such perfection - a nice use of words! Now if I had asked to see the μονή or the 'monastic house,' or the 'monastic institution,' I suppose he could not have said 'no' to *that.* Well, these fellows are too sharp for us in words. The best way is to disregard *words* and tackle them with *deeds.* I wish I might get a chance." The following year will show how the Warden of Wadham got a chance, and used it.

§ 154. "*Ask Pusey*"

"From the end of 1841, I was on my death-bed, as regards my membership with the Anglican Church, though at the time I became aware of it only by degrees"; "it is a season," continues the *Apologia*, "when doors are closed and curtains drawn, and when the sick man neither cares nor is able to record the stages of his malady." It is a season, indeed, which even those who feel the utmost repugnance to Newman's doctrine, would pass over as quietly as possible, were it not that one of the most chaotic utterances of this chaotic period, the *Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles*, cannot be thoroughly understood, or have sufficient allowance made for it, unless we appreciate the circumstances in which it was composed. His religious position, at this time, was enough to over-balance almost any mind. It was not even one of unstable equilibrium, it was no position at all; it was simply falling. He had scoffed at "sound Church-of-Englandism" as "standing on *one* leg." But he, now, had *no* leg to stand on. He was attempting to carry with him, and to keep, for the present, from Rome, a number of young, enterprising, yet anxious and religiously-minded young men, upon a theory which avowed that he can have "a much more definite view of the promised inward Presence of Christ with us in the Sacraments, now that the outward notes of it are removed. And I am content to be with Moses in the desert, or with Elijah excommunicated from the Temple." What heretic might not use such language as this?

External distractions, as well, combined, one after another, so to unsettle him as to make him incapable of accurately recording the simplest incidents, even at the very time of their occurrence. Hearing, for example, his Bishop's Charge, he describes it as "very favourable to us, or rather to our Cause, for some of us suffered," and speaks of some "delicate wording" as to Tract 90 for which he would "look anxiously in the Charge when published": but he understood the Bishop to say "that he thought No. 90's interpretation not the obvious, that he wished to take the obvious, that he was against all interpretations which made the Articles anything or nothing . . ." Then, three weeks afterwards, "The Bishop's charge gives great satisfaction. It is plain which way he leaned, and everything I hear goes the same way. He means to pay me a visit at my new abode, not as a Bishop, but as a friend, out of kindness." His sister ventures just to express a doubt whether the Bishop and he quite understand one another. Returning certain papers which Newman had sent her, she says, "I should hope the Bishop quite understands you; he seems to do so." That the Bishop, before visiting the "Monastic House," expressly informed the "Vicar" that he should visit it as a friend, and "not as a Bishop" is likely enough; and it sounds wise, as well as kind. But it is susceptible of a different explanation from Newman's. Compare, however, with this complacent view of the Charge, that which he takes in a later letter:—

> "Even my own Bishop has said that my mode of interpreting the Articles makes them mean *anything or nothing*. When I heard this delivered, I did not believe my ears. I denied to others that it was said . . . Out came the charge, and the words could not be mistaken."

Both impressions cannot be accurate. And the right view seems to be this, that every one who heard the

Charge, except Newman, heard it right; that Newman (owing to his sanguine prepossessions) heard it wrong*; that when his mistake was corrected, he contradicted those who were in the right; that afterwards he found he had been himself wrong.

Besides such anxieties as these—and we should do Newman an injustice to suppose that even his most sanguine prepossessions were not often suddenly pierced by haunting doubts that he might be deluding himself—there was now upon him the burden that he could least bear, the responsibility of spiritually supporting, steadying, and guiding, a number of young men of devout temperament and religious disposition, many of whom were unsettled and anxiously seeking for some solid footing. This was a very different task from his old parochial tasks in Littlemore—leading the choir, lecturing girls on cleanness and neatness, and catechizing them upon the orders of angels—which had in old days brought him such novel sensations of peace and happiness.

Among these young men was one named Lockhart. He had been unsettled and impelled in a Romeward direction a few months before; and he now* came to the Monastery by the desire of his parents that he might be kept from Rome. "I received him," says Newman, in a letter to his Bishop, "on condition of his promising me, which he distinctly did, that he would remain quietly in our Church for three years." This was not the fact.* No promise was exacted till Lockhart had been two or three months in the Monastery. The point is of importance as showing Newman's inaccuracy even in cases where he was bound to be most strictly accurate. But what follows in the letter is still more important. For it shows, either how ignorant Newman must have been of the real inward feelings of those under his charge, or else how the most shocking incidents—one may almost call them "ghastly," but the Tractarian term is "uncomfortable"—could slip out of his mind at times when it was inconvenient to remember them. Here is Newman's account (written in 1843) of Lockhart's last twelve months at Littlemore.

> "A year has passed since that time, and, though I saw nothing in him which promised that he would eventually be contented with his present position, yet for the time his mind became as settled as one could wish, and he frequently expressed his satisfaction at being under the promise which I had exacted of him."

"As settled as one could wish"—that is Newman's account; but the young man himself will presently tell us that he was "unconvinced," "perplexed," "dreadfully unhappy"; in such a state of mind at the time of making the promise that Newman himself never "expected" him to make it; and that, among other causes for alarm, he perceived, "for the first time," that Newman, too, was "seriously shaken." How was it possible that the young man's mind could be "as settled as one could wish," after his appeal, "*But, are you sure that you can give me absolution?*" had been answered in the manner thus described by Lockhart?

> "Once I had been to confession to him; and in other ways he knew I was in great distress about the position of the Church of England ever since I had read Milner's *End of Controversy*. After I rose from my knees I said to him, 'But are you sure that you can give me absolution?' He did not speak for a few moments; then he said in a tone of deep distress, 'Why will you ask me? ask Pusey.' This was the first indication I had received that he himself was seriously shaken as to his own position in the Anglican Church. He soon perceived that I was more unsettled than ever. One day

he came to my room and said, very kindly but abruptly, as if it were something unpleasant that he must say; 'Now I must tell you that you must leave us at once, or else you must promise to remain with us for three years.' 'I answered, 'In my present state of mind I could not promise that.' He said, 'Will you go and see Ward and have a talk with him?' I assented, and the next day I went by appointment into Oxford to see Ward at Balliol. I remember he took me for a walk. I think we talked for three hours, walking round and round the Parks, beyond Wadham College. In the end, I found myself without an answer, thoroughly puzzled, but unconvinced. I went back to Newman, in a state of perplexed conscience: but not seeing what else to do, and hesitating in my judgment about the duty of submission to Rome, since I saw that such a learned, wise, and saintly man as Newman did not see it to be his duty, I gave him a promise to remain for the stipulated three years at Littlemore. Years after, I found that Newman had not expected me to have given the promise. I kept my promise for about a year, but I was dreadfully unhappy."

This incident could not but be the precursor of a collapse. Ward could confidently bid Lockhart wait; Newman could not feel sure about it, even when he bade it. Pusey could answer that deadly question about absolution with a Yes; Newman felt more than half afraid that the answer ought to be No. Was it likely that the General in "Torres Vedras" could himself either judge rightly, or trust his own judgments, when he thus revealed his own want of confidence to his own followers, and when he shifted the responsibility of leading to this or that lieutenant, because they at all events could give some orders, while he could give none at all?

§ 155. *The Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles*

It was during these distractions that Newman finished his *Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles.* It seems to have wearied him. "I thought," he says, "it would never come to an end." It ought not to have come to an end when it did ; for it everywhere shows signs of insufficient labour. It is the kind of work one might have expected from one who makes it a principle that faith should "interpret" and "colour" evidence, and who regards the outrage of Reason as an acceptable sacrifice to God. Yet the distractions of the time have also stamped it with their peculiar mark—a fitful alternation of unnecessary concessions to unreasoning scepticism, with extravagant, audacious and aggressive demands upon credulity, all of them disguised and confused by a smoothly flowing rhetoric and by that subtle and shifty use of words to which, when he was hard pressed, he sometimes instinctively resorted, as an irrational animal resorts to its natural means of defence.

After needlessly conceding that Ecclesiastical Miracles differ altogether from Scripture Miracles as to evidence, character, and object, he goes on to argue that, because God worked miracles with the object of planting the Church, He must also have worked them in the Church when planted—and this, though one of the Fathers whom he himself quotes, uses this very illustration to explain why miracles, in later days, ought *not* to be expected. He admits that the great mass of ecclesiastical miracles are false : yet, instead of recognizing this as constituting some probability that all may be false, he proceeds (in almost every instance) to dilate on the antecedent probability of their truth. He professes to expect miracles to be as frequent in ecclesiastical history as deeds of prowess in a tale of adventure ; and upon those who will not accept his "principles" he pours contempt as "men of shallow minds."

Proceeding to "inquiries into particular miracles," he makes inquiries that are no inquiries at all; omits reference to authorities; refers to authorities that authorize nothing to his purpose; misinterprets authorities; sometimes even misquotes authorities; neglects to draw obvious inferences from facts; draws impossible inferences from other facts, or from no facts; fails to see some difficulties; evades others; and some, which he can neither evade nor ignore, he overleaps by the device of indefinitely adjourning inquiry till evidence shall be forthcoming which is practically certain never to come.

Those who have any respect for Newman should try to forget this Essay, or to remember it only as an utterance of delirium. It is a work that betrays even those who feel a liking for him and a psychological interest in him, as well as a deep sympathy with his gropings after truth, into expressions of impatience which they may afterwards (knowing all the facts) feel to be justified, if at all, not by the writing of the book, but by its republication. In later years Newman seems to have changed his views, or at all events his acts, in relation to Ecclesiastical Miracles. But the fervour of neophytism had to abate first. In 1848,—though a Romanist, still in Anglo-Catholic credulity—he supported a series of *Lives of the Saints* against the protests of some, his seniors in the Roman Church, who declared that these Lives were "reducing Religion to an unmeaning course of puerilities." Afterwards, under the shelter of an "if," he apparently withdrew from this position. "If," he wrote, "at that time I was betrayed into any acts which were of a more extreme character than I should now approve, the responsibility, of course, is mine; but the impulse came, not from old Catholics or Superiors, but from men whom I loved and trusted, who were younger than myself."

Possibly in this Essay we may trace the influence not only of harassing and wearing distractions, but also of one "younger than himself," who, from the first, had been drawn towards the Tractarian doctrine because it "did not minimize supernatural influences." This was Ward, the man who had been selected for that conversation from which Lockhart returned "mystified but unconvinced." Some things in Newman's almost inexplicable Essay may perhaps be explained by supposing that the "Vicar," as well as the pupil, of the Littlemore Monastic House, was at that time having conversations with this younger and more advanced follower who knew, and cared, nothing for facts and history, but cared everything for a logical and consistent theory ; who was always suggesting to him that "if he said" this, he must, "surely also say more" ; and whom Newman already had in mind when he made the avowal in the *Apologia* : "It might so happen that my head got simply confused, by the very strength of the logic which was administered to me."

CHAPTER XXXVI

HARD PRESSED

§ 156. *Retractations*

MEANWHILE there were not wanting external Romanizing influences; the more effective, because quiet. Dr. Russell, afterwards President of Maynooth, had called on Newman once or twice, passing through Oxford in 1841 and 1842; a gentle, mild, unobtrusive and uncontroversial pleader for Rome; who took the wise course of letting Newman alone and giving him books to read. These began once more to recall to his mind the Doctrine of Development, as a means of justifying the differences between the Roman and the Apostolical Church. They also prepared him to find that, in the Church of Rome, no invocation of Saints, not even devotion to the Virgin Mary herself, is allowed to come between the soul and its Creator: "It is face to face, 'solus cum solo,' in all matters between man and his God"—a statement of which the value is an uncertain quantity until the author of it has defined "matters between man and his God," and has told us whether prayer is one of these.

The sermons were now (1843) soon to cease, and their tone was soon to become a sufficient reason for their ceasing—at all events in an Anglican Church.

In the preceding autumn he had inculcated formal confession, not as expedient but as necessary. In his next Sermon, "The Principle of Continuity between the Jewish and Christian Churches" he led his hearers to the conclusion that "Catholic Christians must not be surprised if—on submitting to Christianity as a religion and not as a mere philosophy, or an opinion, or a sentiment—they are charged by those who do so treat it, with being Jews or even Pagans." Then the last breakwater against Rome—the old Protestant imagination of Antichrist was swept away in "The Christian Church an Imperial Power"; and he now sees in the Medieval Church the fulfilment of the Old Testament Prophecies. The year closes with an implied retractation, from the pulpit, of the attacks that he had made against Rome. That, at least, seems the interpretation to be put on the "hope that, whatever hard things some among us speak or have spoken against that Heavenly Stranger which sojourns on the earth," their sin of ignorance may yet be forgiven through the intercession of Christ, "considering how she is disfigured and deformed by strife and calamity."

This was speedily followed by another, and more formal, Retractation (intended to appear in the beginning of December but accidentally delayed) published anonymously in a newspaper in February 1843. In this, he quotes and retracts several anti-Roman utterances, extenuating his offence by saying that he had wished to follow the divines of his Church: "I said to myself . . . . I wish to throw myself into their system. While I say what they say, I am safe. Such views are necessary for our position." Yet he adds the fear that he was also influenced partly by "an impetuous temper," partly by "a hope of approving himself to persons" he respected, "and a wish to repel the charge of Romanism." The strange thing is that, even now, he does not deny that this hostile attitude was "necessary for his position" as a Tractarian. On the contrary, he adds, "If Rome is to be withstood, this can be done" *in no other way*. Even "the Littlemore men"—one would have supposed—must have perceived the inevitable inference: "Hostility to Rome is *necessary* for the Tractarian position. The Tractarian leader gives up hostility to Rome. Therefore he gives up the Tractarian position."

In the same month he preached his last University Sermon. The subject—ominously (from Newman's point of view) Roman—was "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine." In it he accepts an exuberant dogma as an indication of religious life; declares that, as we perceive things in absent fits and *know* them afterwards, so the Church may, for centuries, have *latent* dogmas not yet expressed; and deprecates a churlish insistence on evidence, and adherence to bare fact in relation to alleged miracles: "If the alleged facts did not occur, they ought to have occurred (if I may so speak)." He seems now at last to have reached a point where he acknowledges that there is no choice between absolute credulity and absolute scepticism or atheism. The arguments used by zealous and earnest men in religious questions, he says, are often "not the very ground on which they act"; "what if the whole series of impressions made on us through the senses be . . . but a Divine economy suited to our need!" Thus he leads his readers up to his well-known climax of contempt for the faculties bestowed on man for the acquisition of knowledge. He proposes to adjourn to another world, in which we shall have some other than "our present senses," the consideration of the relative truth of the scientific and the Scriptural statements about the rest, or motion, of the sun:

> "Scripture, for instance, says that the sun moves and the earth is stationary; and science, that the earth moves, and the sun is comparatively at rest. How can we determine which of these opposite statements is the very truth, till we know what motion is? If our idea of motion be but an accidental result of our present senses, neither proposition is true, and both are true."

Thus, while admitting that we are "forced" to "trust our senses," he leads us to distrust our hope of attaining "substantial truth" through them. He then extends this dreary scepticism to religious truth as well: "What," he says, "is true of reliance on our senses, is true of all the information which it has pleased God to vouchsafe to us, whether in nature or in grace:" "What have we to care whether we are, or are not, given to divide substance from shadow?" So, by degrees,—always avoiding the ugly word "*false*," disguising the beauty of the word "*truth*" under such terms as "philosophical" or "substance," and asking us what it matters "whether our deductions are philosophical or no, provided they are religious"—he lures us on, and himself too, to give up the contest against lies and legends, to swallow anything that will make us feel comfortable, and to say, "What does it matter if our conclusions are *false*, provided they are *religious?*"

To this bad and base conclusion he prefaced one of the most magnificent of his poetic outbursts. It was an eulogium on music. In it, the reader of a modern edition of the sermons will find these words: "There are seven notes in the scale; make them fourteen; yet what a slender outfit for so vast an enterprise!" Why this—which seems mere rhetoric—"make them fourteen"? The answer is to be found in the first edition † which shows that the words originally ran, "There are fourteen notes in the scale": "What do you mean," writes his sister, "by fourteen notes? Do you mean the twelve semitones as some suggest? I am indignant at the idea, and think you knew what you were saying." It was a small matter, but not an accident either. It reveals the double nature of the man. As a poet, he speaks to our hearts without fear of contradiction from fact; and we accept his assurance that the sounds of which he speaks are indeed "outpourings of eternal harmony" that have "escaped from some higher sphere," expressions of "the living laws of the Divine Governance or the Divine Attributes." But when it comes to the simplest fact, he cannot be trusted. To note this in a common-place man of general inaccuracy, would be tedious and absurd. But to note it in a man of soaring faculties who habitually tramples upon facts, and is likely to lead others to do the same, is not only useful as a warning, but needful if we would understand the man himself, and realise how by long practice, he was so strengthening and enlarging his inaccurate habit that, in his moods of excitement, if he was forced to mention facts, he sometimes really did what his sister denies, as impossible: he did *not* "know what he was saying."

And now comes his last word from the pulpit of the University of Oxford: and it is, in effect, this: that, when we know most about God, we know, in reality, nothing as it is. "The most subtle questions of the schools" *may* have "a real meaning"; and, since no question at all about God can be despised, *all such questions are sacred, and all are to be received on authority.** Conceding to the sceptic that even the

Catholic confessions of faith do not adequately represent their divine verities, he would apparently apply this concession *equally* to *all* statements about God, not only, for example, to attempts to answer the question, "Was God anywhere before Creation?" but even to the question "In what sense is the Holy Spirit Divine Love?"

This is of a piece with his previous saying that the doctrine of Episcopal Succession may turn out to be as important as that of the Unity of God. No doctrine, not even that of the Fatherhood of God, seems to him to have naturally and rightly received special commendation to our faith from its intrinsic moral beauty and harmony with our highest aspirations. Hence he finally drives everyone to choose between believing in nothing, and believing in the formal statements of the so-called Athanasian Creed. In a long string of if-clauses he tells us that *if* it is right to apply any attributes to God, *if* we may consider Him other than simple Unity, "if we know anything of Him—if we may speak of Him in any way —if we may emerge from Atheism or Pantheism into religious faith,—if we would have any saving hope, any life of truth and holiness within us,—this only do we know, with this only confession we must begin and end our worship—that the Father is the One God, the Son the One God, and the Holy Ghost the One God; and that the Father is not the Son, the Son not the Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost not the Father."

§ 157. "*Is not my present position . . . a treachery towards the Church?*"

All through the Lent of 1843 Newman and Keble had been "keeping in mind" the question of resigning

St. Mary's. In other words, they had been asking for guidance about it. An impatient layman may be reminded, by this, of the story of the Greek, who consulted Apollo whether he should return a deposit to the man who had entrusted him with it. The god, says Herodotus, was offended with the consulter, and replied that, if he was unwilling, he need not return it, but that the perjurer's race would be blotted out. The man apologized to the god and the deposit was returned. But the curse fell.

Yet the parallel would not be quite a fair one, though it suggests some thoughts that are not unfair. The great difference is, that in this case the "deposit" was a public one, a "deposit" entrusted by the English Church; and it might be a fair question, for some time, whether one's duty to the English Church as it *might soon be*, the ideal Church, might not overweigh one's duty to the English Church *as it was*, the Church of the Bishops, who, one after another, had been charging against Tract 90. But Newman's mind had been developing so rapidly of late that the question, for an honourable man in full possession of his senses, had really ceased to be a question. The pity of it was, that, instead of acting upon his own conscience, he still leaned on Keble's; and Keble, who had been too long kept in the dark * or in twilight, was not now able to follow Newman's imaginative convictions, or to realise his deeply-rooted distrust of the Church he was professing to serve.

Meanwhile, on the side of the Oxford authorities, some pressure was being put upon the Tractarian party to force them to declare their opinions, or disavow them, and to prevent them from entering the ranks of the clergy. Young men now found it necessary to choose between Tractarianism and a Fellowship; candidates for orders were refused testimonials; prospects of country livings, and perhaps of marriage too, had to be given up, if men were still to follow Newman. Many ceased to follow him. But those who remained became more bitter than ever. Celibacy was now a necessity for them. Naturally, therefore, they exalted it as a privilege. Orthodox Anglicanism had cast them out. Naturally they became more than ever heterodox and Roman, and the cry of "*Tendimus in Latium*" rose up louder than ever in their diminished ranks. Coming from his friends, this impulse would move Newman Romewards; coming from enemies, it would drive him back. His resignation of St. Mary's would be a triumph to the Liberals and would give Protestants an occasion to blaspheme.

Much of this has left its traces in the few remaining sermons of 1843. The preacher is now addressing himself mainly to semi-Romanists, to persecuted and somewhat bitter enthusiasts; and—if we put aside the fact that they were not right or fit sermons for a clergyman to preach in an Anglican pulpit, supposing he had been in full control of his mind and conscience—they are interesting reading, though somewhat painful. A brief review of them will prepare us for the consummation.

In "The Apostolical Christian," he tells us that the obvious characteristic of a Bible-Christian is to be "without worldly ties or objects," and cautions the men of Littlemore against repining under persecution. They are to rejoice, but with "the refined joy of the mortified and persecuted." Then "the humble monk and the holy nun" are held up as "Christians after the very pattern given us in Scripture": and it is implied that, if Christ returned to earth, He would find in them pre-eminently "the features of the Christians whom He and His Apostles left behind them." The next sermon is difficult to criticize, because Newman inserted in it, when it was published (without differentiating by brackets or other means), sentences that ought not to have been, and were not, delivered from the pulpit. Among others, a sentence about "sacramental confession" and "the celibacy of the clergy"—as tending to make the clergy "rulers" and the laity "subjects"—not very unnaturally led Kingsley to the conclusion that Newman was unfaithful to the English Church. In thinking thus, Kingsley was thinking what Newman himself privately, about the same time, confessed to be the truth. I italicize the following words, which prove this. Less than three months later, he wrote to Keble that the Bishop's Charges were not only samples of the non-Catholic teaching of the Church of England but also "protests and witnesses to" his "conscience against *his unfaithfulness to the English Church.*" And, when Keble—instead of replying, "In that case resign at once"—objected to his resigning, lest it should propel him towards Rome, he answered, "Is not my present position a cruelty, as well as *a treachery, towards the Church?*" If Newman felt about himself these apprehensions of "unfaithfulness" and "treachery," I do not see why others, who did not personally know him, could be blamed for believing the same thing; and the belief would be still more justified by the additional Romanizing utterances, printed in his sermons, without the slightest notice to his readers that they were not delivered from the pulpit.

But to return to our summary. Of all Newman's gloomy sermons that perhaps is wrapped in the darkest, the most timorous, and the most self-absorbed gloom, in which he introduces us to Lent as "that solemn season of the year when, for a time, we separate from each other, as far as may be, and from the other blessings which God has given us"; reminds us that "to us there are but two beings in the whole world, God and ourselves"; and draws a picture of some future Judgment "which mercy tempers not"; under which "every one will have to think of himself"; and by thinking of which, beforehand, we hope to mitigate the terrors when "that dreadful season" comes. In another sermon of this period we learn why we Christians ought thus to cringe before that Judgment or Day of the Lord, to which the Prophets of Israel looked forward with joy and gladness. The reason is this, that God's "anger" is really an "economy." There is no such thing in reality. We do not *know* that He is "angry" at oppression, injustice, mendacity, and outrage. The notion of His "anger" is as childish as the notion that He has limbs: "as if He could be angry who is not touched by evil!" The inference would be that He may *go through the form* of being angry with disbelief in Episcopal succession just as much as *He may go through the form of anger* against us for adultery or murder. But this "form of anger" may be hell-fire. We must not, therefore, trifle with Him any more than with a fly-wheel or a Nasmyth's hammer; the hammer will crush us, in spite of our best intentions, if we do not keep to rules. So here. We must not trust our conscience, but authority, if we would escape God's punishments. We know nothing whatever about His motive behind them.

As Lent draws to a close, and nothing is yet determined about the question of resigning, we find him once more referring to his favourite Scripture analogy between himself and Samuel. Samuel had received *two* calls from God. So had he. But it is not "always easy to hear His voice;" "Samuel did not know it till Eli told him." Those who can read between the lines discern his meaning. *Three* is a sacred number; Samuel was called thrice; might not he, too, expect to be called thrice, and wait patiently till the third call came? And, as Samuel obeyed Eli, so ought not he to obey Keble, in deciding when, and how, to act in accordance with the Divine call?

But one more sermon remains before the last. It warns himself and the young men of Littlemore (Lockhart perhaps, especially) against individual action, against single desertions to Rome. "Every spirit which professes to come to us alone and not to others" is "a private spirit of error;" if feelings are "violent, abrupt, fitful, partial," we may suspect them. Then, after bidding us raise "the level of religion in our own hearts," for from "the corruption of hearts" springs "the division of Churches," there follows a long and florid exhortation to prefer English scenery to foreign, by way of suggesting that the Anglican Church is to be preferred to the Roman, for the present. The young disciples of Littlemore are told that, during their period of patient expectation, their reward is the "water of life," which they can take from "the green meadow and the calm full stream" (of the Anglican Church of England). They are to leave "the high mountain and the awful solitude and the sun-bright clime, and the rich and varied scene" to "be the boast of the foreigners and the heritage of the South"; and then, finally, "Let us be 'filled with the fruits of righteousness' . . . and let us not doubt that 'if in anything we be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this.'"

§ 158. "*I think the Church of Rome the Catholic Church*"

What did Lockhart think of all this, Lockhart who had asked for absolution and had received—an injunction to "go to Pusey"? Did he think of the plain citizen in Shakespeare's *Coriolanus*, who, when he was longing for food, received from Menenius Agrippa a pretty fable, and declined to be "fobbed off with a tale"? Or did he think of the more familiar contrast in the New Testament, and mutter that all these metaphors were stones for bread? pretty, sparkling stones, but still, stones and nothing else? And what else could the preacher himself call them, when he came to think over what he had said and to contrast it with what he felt? Must he not have soon confessed with sore contrition, when the rhetorical heat had passed away, that in these florid inanities he had touched at last the very bottom of even *his* potentialities of intellectual self-abasement, and that he could make no more such sacrifices to Keble and to ideal Anglicanism?

External causes would aid this just reflection. Pusey had been "delated" for a High Anglican Sermon. Only the day before Newman's recommendation to prefer English scenery to foreign, his friend was suspended from preaching for three years by six doctors—one being that same Rev. Dr. Symons in whose face Newman had slammed the door of the "Monastic Institution." Here there was not (as in the case of Tract 90) an anonymous publication; and Pusey had a moral right to be heard. But the statutes allowed the doctors to deny him a hearing and to condemn him without giving reasons. It was iniquitously unjust; and Newman hoped, not without reason, that the measure might provoke a reaction. But such a hold, now, had the suspicion of Tractarian "Jesuitism" taken on hostile and even neutral minds that I find no mention made of any public protest against the act. A few days later, Lord Ashley, afterwards Lord Shaftesbury, held a meeting in London to petition the Duke of Wellington, as Chancellor of the University, to "put down Puseyism in Oxford." Thus the Tractarian hopes vanished, and the tacit acquiescence in this injustice might well serve as another proof to Newman that the Anglican Church was past helping—at least by him. Then, too, came fresh Charges from the Bishops, and, as the finishing stroke, toward the end of August, Lockhart, spite of his promise, seceded to the Church of Rome.

"You may fancy how sick it makes me," wrote Newman to Keble on the day on which he heard this last news. The weight of the blow will be felt at once by those who have appreciated the fervour of his desire to keep the Party together, ready for a joint secession. Months ago, he ought to have resigned St. Mary's, but an "omen" was needed to give him the requisite impulse. Now it had come, and he resolved to obey it. To his sister he gives reasons for the step. But they are all omitted in the letter as published. Perhaps the Editor attached most importance to what followed the "reasons": ". . . These are reasons enough to make me give up St. Mary's, but, were there no other, this feeling would be sufficient, that I am not so zealous a defender of the established and existing system of religion as I ought to be for such a post." To her expostulations he replies that he wonders his late letters have not prepared her for the step. Perhaps he hardly knew how his desire to spare his sister pain and his own natural indirectness of expression, had left her in the dark as to his religious development. Two advisers, he tells her, concur in it. One of them, Rogers, had told him he need publish no reasons for it, and had said, in effect, "Anyone but you would have taken the step before." To James Mozley, in a letter headed "confidential," he gives only *one* cause of resignation—but it is "the real cause." For once, he uses frank, unmistakable language.

> "I hope I am right in speaking openly to you, which I have not done but to a very few, but now I will tell you the real cause—which others besides those to whom I have said it may guess—but which (as far as I recollect) I have only told to Rogers, H. Wilberforce, R. Wilberforce, and Keble.
>
> "The truth then is, I am not a good son enough of the Church of England to feel I can in conscience hold preferment under her. I love the Church of Rome too well.
>
> "Now please *burn this*, there's a good fellow, for you sometimes let letters lie on your mantelpiece."

To the same effect he wrote to Manning after his resignation, not indeed at first, but after being "pressed" by the latter. His first letter to Manning the *Apologia* admits to be "*ad hominem*." In plainer English, he so told a part of the truth as to conceal the real truth. It is instructive as a specimen of Newman's occasional style. In this first letter he finds it "most difficult to bring out in brief, or even *in extenso*, any just view" of his "feelings and reasons" for resignation, but proceeds to "the nearest approach" he "can give to a general account of them." He then mentions the repudiation of Tract 90 by the Bishops; the repeated censures of his own Bishop; and the fact that, as "the

English Church is showing herself intrinsically and radically alien from Catholic principles," he feels "the difficulties of defending her claims to be a branch of the Catholic Church." He concludes, "I cannot deny that many other independent circumstances" have led him to the same conclusion, but "it is not worth while entering into" them. His last words are, "I do not say all this to everybody, as you may suppose; but I do not like to make a secret of it to you."

"All this," however, did not satisfy Manning. He pressed Newman again. And, this time, the latter did not find it "difficult" to give "in brief" a perfectly "just view" of his "feelings and reasons":—

> "I must tell you then frankly, (but I combat arguments which to me, alas, are shadows,) that it is not from disappointment, irritation, or impatience, that I have, whether rightly or wrongly, resigned St. Mary's; but because I think the Church of Rome the Catholic Church, and ours not part of the Catholic Church, because not in communion with Rome; and because I feel that I could not honestly be a teacher in it any longer."

Still, when he wrote to Mozley, the precise time for resigning had been left undetermined. In the *Apologia* he connects the step too closely with Lockhart's secession. "I felt it impossible to remain any longer in the service of the Anglican Church, when such a breach of trust, however little I had to do with it, would be laid at my door." No doubt, that incident would affix a popular stigma to Littlemore, and indirectly to the Bishop, as sheltering the "Anglo-Catholic monastery;" but it does not appear to have been his fundamental reason for resigning. He varies about it. On first hearing of Lockhart's affair, he told his sister that it would very likely *fix* the time of his resigning. In his frank letter to James Mozley, he says that this "matter of Lockhart's . . . . may have the effect of *delaying*" his resignation! This is bewildering. But "omens," perhaps, are apt to bewilder. Possibly it may have suggested itself to him that, by resigning St. Mary's, he would appear to identify himself with Lockhart, instead of disavowing him. Thus, Lockhart's secession may have been converted into an "omen," not for resigning, but for *retaining* his post. Or the delay may have been again caused by Keble; who now, once more, forbade him to resign immediately. Newman was all submission: "I am ready still to keep St. Mary's if you think best." He proceeds, however, to give three reasons for resigning at once—one of which is that "Lockhart's affair" gives *a* reason (not the reason) for resigning, "as being a very great scandal." He adds: "Should you think it advisable for me to retain St. Mary's awhile, would you object to my trying to get some one to take my duty at Oxford *entirely*, *i.e.* sermons and all"?

§ 159. *Resignation of St. Mary's*

There would seem to be something very unsound in the system of regular confession and regular spiritual directorship, when such a man as Newman could, on one and the same day, write that he was not "a good son enough of the Church of England to feel that he could hold preferment under her," and yet consent, if his spiritual director required it, to hold such preferment indefinitely. The thought of resignation had been before him for now four years. He had declared, before Tract 90, that he would not hold office in the Church unless his interpretation of the Articles was allowed. So far as it could speak through the Bishops, the Church had not allowed it; and he had recognized the fact.* On his own showing, he had no right to an Anglican pulpit, unless he could honestly attack Rome from it; and this, for the last three or four years, he had felt he could not do. His conscience had for some months past misgiven him that he was "unfaithful" and "treacherous" to his nominal Church; and yet, even now, he was "still ready to keep St. Mary's" if his spiritual director "thought best"!

However, the end was at hand. Keble's reply to Newman's appeal of 1 September does not appear; but on 7 September Newman asked his Bishop's leave to resign. If the Bishop gave an immediate assent, Newman did not act upon it at once. Perhaps he shrank from action when the moment arrived; with him, it was always "a nuisance taking steps." Possibly, the delay may have been caused by legal difficulties.* It would be interesting to know whether it was the removal of these, or whether it was some "sign" in the way of a dream, or nightly unrest (in one whose rest, as a rule, was not disturbed at nights, even in the most critical times), that finally drove him to action, as he thus records it in his "chronological Notes":—

> "September 17.—Preached in the afternoon at St. Mary's.
>
> "September 18.—Had no sleep last night, went to town, to Doctor's Commons: resigned St. Mary's before a Notary.
>
> * * * *
>
> "September 25. Littlemore commemoration; Pusey administered sacrament; H. W. came; I preached No. 604, my last sermon."

His last subject was "The Parting of Friends," and his text was—the text of his first sermon, when he first went forth to do the work of the Gospel—"Man goeth forth to his work and to his labour until the evening." Now "the evening" had come. The pathos of this, his last utterance from an English pulpit, almost disarms criticism. Yet, beautiful though it is, it is not fair. It is neither fair to the Church of England nor to his own friends. On the Church (no doubt with what seemed good motives) he had made an experiment which might have resulted in a disastrous schism; yet against it he now inveighs as the Virgin of Israel that bears children and dares not "own them":—"O my mother, how is it that whatever is generous in purpose, and tender or deep in devotion, thy flower and thy promise, falls from thy bosom and finds no home within thy arms?" Did he forget, when he said this, that he was leaving Keble and Pusey and Bowden and Rogers and Church and the Mozleys behind him? or did he assume that they would follow? Many a Scripture parallel does he draw to the bitter close of his Anglican toils. But his principal parallel he finds in Christ. All the other parallels appear to him "but memorials of the Son of Man, when His work and His labour were coming to an end." He "was persecuted by the rulers in Israel"; He "was deserted by His friends"; He thirsted "in a barren and dry land"; "heavily did He leave, tenderly did He mourn over, the country and city which rejected Him."

If there is in all this some trace of the querulousness which makes Newman always find his enemies in the wrong when he is worsted in a conflict that he has himself provoked; if there is just a touch of that egotism which—common, perhaps, to most religious Reformers—caused the Prophet of old to cry that he, even he, was left alone and men sought his life, and which induced the author of Tract 90 to view the condemnation of it by the Bishops as almost branding the Church of England with the stigma of heresy—such feelings are effaced by the passionate and yearning affectionateness of the final farewell.

Here and there, perhaps, there is still a suggestion of reproach: as when he speaks of the parting of Orpah who "kissed Naomi and went back to the world. There was sorrow in the parting, but Naomi's sorrow was more for Orpah's sake than her own. Pain there would be, but it was the pain of a wound, not the yearning regret of love. It was the pain we feel when friends disappoint us and fall in our esteem." But this is rapidly succeeded by the thought of Jonathan, in whom he sees Froude, "that young man" "of a beautiful countenance and goodly to look at," and the sad moment when his friend, "whom these good gifts had gained, looked upon him for the last time." Then comes the farewell of the Apostle, when the elders "wept sore and fell on Paul's neck and kissed him, sorrowing most of all for the words which he spake, that they should see his face no more." Then—after an outburst of reproach upon the unnatural mother who was casting him off—he checks himself and resorts to Scriptural exhortation, since "its language veils our feelings while it gives expression to them." But last of all, breaking through that "veil," and, for the first time perhaps, allowing personal feelings to reveal themselves in the pulpit, he pours forth a passionate petition in which the sensitive avoidance of "I" and "you" gives a tinge of characteristic indirectness that contrasts with the wistful yearning for direct expression—as if the preacher hoped, against his theory, that for once, his soul and the souls of those who loved him, might touch, and really hold communion together*—imploring them that if there were any who knew "anyone" whose lot it had been to help them toward God, or if what he had said or done had ever made them take an interest in him and feel well inclined towards him, they would remember such an one in time to come, though they heard him not, "and pray for him, that in all things he may know God's will, and at all times he may be ready to fulfil it."

CHAPTER XXXVII

NEGOTIATING WITH CONSCIENCE

§ 160. *Proposed censure of Tract* 90

A WEARY two years of uneventful waiting followed before Newman found peace in his rightful home. During all this time he was waiting for a "sign," or at least for something that might give him the necessary heat and internal impulse without which he always remained hesitant and doubtful, chilled by the breath of mere intellectual conviction, finding it "a nuisance to take steps."

Uneventful for him, the years were full of interest for the now leaderless Tractarians, and especially for their advanced section. Provoked by the suspension of Pusey, they determined to prevent Convocation, if possible, from giving the usual formal sanction to the appointment of Dr. Symons as Vice-Chancellor. Regarded as a Party move, this was foolish. It savoured of novelty; which was enough to deter many of the clergy from supporting it. The innovators were defeated by a majority of nearly five to one. This was in the autumn of 1844. Meantime, during the Long Vacation, Ward had published a once well-known book called *The Ideal of the Christian Church*, in which the author had attempted to bring out the full logical conclusions resulting from the theory that faith, and not the intellect, is to be applied to the facts on which the Christian religion is supposed to be based. This "almost-forgotten" volume—says the author of the *Oxford Movement*—"assumes that the Roman Church, and only the Roman Church, satisfies the conditions of what a Church ought to be, and it argues, in detail, that the English Church, in spite of its professions, utterly and absolutely fails to fulfil them." But instead of avowing his consequent determination to leave the latter and enter the former, he claimed to hold his position in the English Church, avowing and teaching Roman doctrine:—

> "We find (he exclaims) oh, most joyful, most wonderful, most unexpected sight! we find the whole cycle of Roman doctrine gradually possessing numbers of English Churchmen. . . . Three years have passed since I said plainly that in subscribing the Articles I renounce no Roman doctrine; yet I retain my fellowship which I hold on the tenure of subscription, and have received no ecclesiastical censure in any shape."

This was too much. It was a kind of excess and parody of Newman's aggressive style. It would have been too much even if Archbishop Whately had not written a letter which was read at the Board of Heads of Houses exhorting them to action. Dr. Symons, the anti-Tractarian Vice-Chancellor for 1845, was not likely to need pressing. In the first outburst of their indignation, the Committee appointed by the heads proposed, not only to deprive Ward of his degrees and condemn his book, but also to impose a new test on all Oxford men. The Statutes, it seems, already allowed the Vice-Chancellor to call on any member of the University at any time to prove his orthodoxy afresh by subscribing the Articles. But this, of course, was useless, as against Ward. He was prepared to sign them all at a moment's notice, but *to sign them in a "non-natural sense."* The Committee of the Heads therefore proposed to prevent subscription from thus being reduced to a mockery, by adding a declaration to be henceforth made by the subscriber, that he took them in the sense in which "they were both first published and were now imposed by the University."

It was not for the advocates of tests to blame this "declaration"; which was simply an attempt (though not perhaps well expressed) to save the test from becoming a nonentity. The Tractarians had vehemently refused to allow Dissenters to enter the University without subscribing the Articles; but, of course, every Dissenter could (if he wished) sign the Articles in a "non-natural" sense. Therefore—by protesting against this Declaration, because it would exclude themselves—the Tractarians were virtually protesting against the exclusion of Dissenters. But fortunately the Liberals—since *they* objected to tests altogether—could protest with a clear mind and a good conscience. The Tractarians joined in their cry and raised it speedily to a shriek. In vain did the Board explain that they wished to enforce, not a new test, but simply honesty. There was a general feeling, perhaps, that the time might come when all such tests might be allowed to die out, and that it was best not to revivify them. Anyhow, every one was against the Board, and the Board gave way.

Defeated at this point, the Board tried to snatch a victory at another. They wished to enforce the principle of non-evasive subscription. But who, or what, had first suggested "evasion"? Was it not Tract 90 which had been condemned by the Board itself for this very offence? Why not take this opportunity, then, of obtaining the sanction of Convocation to the previous condemnation passed by the Heads of Houses? Why censure the pupil when the master went uncensured? The author of the *Oxford Movement* imputes cowardice to the Heads for not appealing to Convocation before: "They dared not risk an appeal to the University at large." The charge, as I have shown, was baseless. But, no doubt, it had been often flung in their face; and this might, not unnaturally, be one of their motives now: Why not crush this falsehood, once for all, by appealing to Convocation now? They determined to do this. A circular was issued, asking signatures for a requisition which requested the Board to propose a formal censure, not on Newman himself, but on "the principles of Tract 90." So far as was known, it received between 400 and 500 signatures; but it was withheld by the Vice-Chancellor from those who had an official right to inspect it; and the proposal was hurried forward in spite of remonstrances. Hereupon the Proctors announced their intention to veto it; but, as they were Newman's personal friends, the Heads assumed that their action would have little weight. The prospect of a veto however was regarded with satisfaction by the younger Liberals, such as Stanley and Jowett, as well as by Tractarians. When Convocation met, Ward's book was condemned by 777 to 386; he was deprived of his degrees by 569 to 511; but the censure of Tract 90 was averted by the Proctorial veto. But for this impediment, the numbers of those who signed the requisition so hastily circulated, indicate that the resolution of censure would have been carried. Nor would it have been unjustifiable. The author of

Tract 90 was at Littlemore; but its "principles" were in Oxford and in England; and it was "the principles of No. 90" (not the author) that Convocation was to be invited to condemn.

Still the censure would have been at this time a mistake. Three years before, when Newman went up to "Torres Vedras"—perhaps even two years before, while he was still Vicar of St. Mary's—it would not have been unseasonable. But now that he had by his own act virtually pronounced himself unable honestly to sign the Articles in any natural sense, and had consequently resigned his position in the Church of England, it would have been hard, and almost cruel, to pass a judgment—even on his "principles"—which he himself had passed already. The good sense of Oxford soon recognized this. There was much to provoke the authorities, even now; much that might have induced them to renew the proposal of censure after the present Proctors vacated office. Newman himself—sanguine as ever—had spoken of the possible "throwing out of the Test" as "a virtual repeal of the censure of No. 90" passed by the Heads of Houses in 1841: and if such language was current in Oxford it was natural that the Oxford authorities should wish to refute it by an unmistakable act. Nor was it likely that they would tamely submit to charges of being "afraid to appeal to Convocation," when they could obtain in ten days between four and five hundred written promises of support. However, the wiser heads in the Hebdomadal Board recognized that enough had been done: and through their temperance there was averted that condemnation the fear of which, four years ago, had caused Keble and Newman so much alarm.

§ 161. *Waiting for a "sign"*

To most of this Oxford stir, Newman, at Littlemore, had been as one dead. What to him were Hebdomadal Boards, and censures of Tract 90, when he was face to face with God, *solus cum solo*, thinking out that problem which alone has results for eternity, "what shall I do to be saved?" From the time when he had resigned his living in 1843, he was simply concerned with his own salvation. Himself unsettled, he gave up the hope of settling and guiding others. "Je mourrai seul"—became henceforth his watchword: "My own soul," he says, "was my first concern, and it seemed an absurdity to my reason to be converted in partnership."

From this, it would appear that he had (1843) given up the notion that there would be a great and united Tractarian secession. This being the case, his own theory demanded that he should wait for some "sign" —not perhaps a miracle, but something of the nature of a supernatural coincidence or special providence. It was not alone the precedents of the New Testament that necessitated this. It was needful for his nature. He required something to convert his intellectual convictions into that kind of faith which might be called certitude. Bowden, his other self, was now (1843) near his death. In touching language Newman records his loving determination not to communicate his own unsettlement to his dying friend: "I could not say, 'Go to Rome'; else I should have shown him the way. Yet I offered myself for his examination. One day he led the way to my speaking out; but, rightly or wrongly, I could not respond. My reason was, 'I have no certainty on the matter myself.' To say 'I think' is to tease and to distress, not to persuade." In the autumn of the following year Bowden died, and Newman made this note, "I sobbed bitterly over his coffin, to think that he left me still dark as to what the way of truth was, and what I ought to do to please God and fulfil His will." He adds, "I had expected that his last illness would have brought light to my mind, as to what I ought to do. It brought none." His "strong view" in favour of Rome remained just what it was: but he could not act on it. He was not "certain." He could only say "I think."

With this explanation, the otherwise inexplicable delay from 1843 to 1845 is tolerably clear. It did not arise from the desire to spare the feelings of those who loved him, deeply though he was distressed by their distress. Even those dearest to him he could not help, now, regarding as instruments, as mirrors in which he might discern some token of the will of God. Were they prepared for his secession? That might be a "sign" that he might now depart. Were they unprepared? That might be a "sign" that he was given over to "private judgment," that he was "wilful," yielding to "gloom and ill temper" instead of patiently waiting for the Lord's time. The *Via Media* had been pulverized long ago, and "Samaria"* had been set up on its ruins. But now, "Samaria," too, had vanished. The stir and din of the Tractarian conflict were to him what the noise of battle would have been to Achilles drowning in the Scamander. Even to his favourite, James Mozley, starting the *Christian Remembrancer* in 1844, he can but wish success, and will "be pleased to find" that Mozley has "found a basis of view on which to go." As for

Ward's main position in the *Ideal*—"that a Church may be utterly without the gift of teaching, yet possessed of the gift of the Sacraments"—Newman "cannot see" it. When consulted on the opposition to the election of the Vice-Chancellor, he has nothing to say; he cannot get his mind to grasp these things; "My own position is so different that I cannot throw myself into them." How could he? What was Dr. Symons to one who was face to face with eternal life or death? "I feel stupid," he says. He was not "stupid"; but he was as one that is deaf and hears not reproach or praise, scarcely even affection, hearing indeed no voices of this world, and nothing but one voice from the next, *Tu mourras seul!*

Truly does Dean Church say about the *Apologia* that its "complete effect as an intelligible whole is wanting." Difficult as it would have been for the most accurate and impassive of men, such a chronological account of his own spiritual pathology was an absolute impossibility for Newman; and we have good proof that he himself distrusted what he wrote about himself, at least so far as regards the "convictions," "opinions," "reasons," "probabilities," and "certitudes," by which he arrived at his goal: for, whatever the first edition of his *Apologia* contains on these points, the second edition is almost sure to alter. Still, we are bound to give the fullest examination to what he says, for the sake of the light that it throws, not indeed on the actual facts, but on his character.

"To be certain," says the *Apologia*, "is to know that one knows." To some it may perhaps occur that the man who can honestly say simply "I know," *is* "certain." He may be wrong, of course; but in that case he will be *wrongly* "certain." Still, he *is* "certain." If he is not, when is he? Newman replies, "when he knows that he knows." Perhaps he means that true certainty must be preceded by *reflection* on what a man, before reflection, is sometimes hastily disposed to *call* his "knowledge"; and that a man often *says*, "I am certain," when he *ought* to say "I think." This, of course, sometimes happens. But the remedy is, to admit that it happens, and to caution people against rashly saying "I am certain" when the right words are "I think." Instead of doing this, Newman gives men a test of "certainty" which is wholly useless and largely mischievous—the power of saying "I know that I know." It is useless, because children, and positive people, will just as soon say "I know that I know," as "I know." It is mischievous, because overmeditative and self-introspective minds will go further, and say "I *think* I 'know that I know,' but how am I to *know* 'I know that I know'?" And some still more subtle intellects, going further still, may crave to *know* that they *know* that they "know they know"—and so on *ad infinitum*, with the result of landing themselves in the port of Know-nothing, which is only another name (in some minds) for Believe-anything.

A few of Newman's sayings about his "convictions" at this time, may help to dissipate the impatient irritation with which, at the first view, even a Protestant may regard his delay to act upon them and to join the Church of Rome. He tells his sister (four days after he had resigned his living) that people "should not act under" "exciting, tumultuous conviction"; for, "in a state of emotion," they cannot "tell whether their conviction is well founded or not. They cannot judge calmly." That is intelligible. He implies also that one *ought* to act on one's convictions when one *can* "judge calmly." This feeling would be deepened by an incident that happened a few days afterwards. The impetuous Sibthorp—who had been so suddenly "received" at Oscott, and whom Newman had described to Bloxam as the "monkey" who had cut off his tail, and to his congregation as the "brother" who had left the English Church because the Church had "left God"—had suddenly returned to the Church of England. The Tractarians were disgusted. It disconcerted all their plans and quite shook their confidence in "*tendimus in Latium*." All Littlemore shrieked at the repentant "brother" as an "apostate," "How unspeakably dreadful," writes Ward to a Romanist correspondent, "it makes one sick to hear of it. I hear that quite moderate people among ourselves are extremely disgusted!" But while assuring his friend that the "brother's" reception among the Tractarians "will be of the most repulsive character," and that the Romanists can "hardly be more shocked at it than they are themselves," he also draws a moral of delay. There are "feelings which restrain people from any change not placed before them by Providence"; and the force of these feelings the Romanists ought not "to endeavour to weaken." No doubt Newman felt this all the more keenly because he, too, had once had fervid, "exciting," perhaps "tumultuous" convictions, of conversion and salvation, as an Evangelical; and these he had been forced to give up. His feeling was "I thought myself right then; how was I to be certain that I was right now?"

§ 162. *Fear of "a judicial delusion"*

Over and above this, for the first time, there appears a still darker spectre:—the very shadow of Satan, darkening his soul and whispering to him that all these anxieties and distresses might be visitations of the wrath of God, who might be punishing him for some secret sin, visiting him with judicial blindness,* and tempting him to quit the Church of his fathers, to leave the great work to which he had devoted his life, and to go he knew not whither—and all for naught except perhaps to drive him into ultimate atheism. The first clear symptom of this terror is in a letter of November 1843, in which he warns a correspondent that "the Enemy," who "has temptations for all states, all occasions," can "turn whatever we do, whatever we do not do, into a temptation, as"—the simile is instructively characteristic—"a skilful rhetorician turns anything into an argument." This helps us to understand—and surely to sympathize with the intense agony of spirit in which Newman was dragged to his ultimate decision. In October 1843 he told Manning that all the events that had followed Tract 90 had not been the *cause* of his "state of opinion." They were only, he says, "keen stimulants and weighty confirmations of a conviction forced upon me, while engaged *in the course of duty*." He adds "this last circumstance is a fact which has never, I think, come before me, till now that I write to you." What he meant by the last sentence is, that if he had *gone out of his way* to study Athanasius and Leo, the "ghost" of Rome might have been more plausibly supposed to have come "from below," but since he did it "in the course of duty," that theory was the less probable. To the same correspondent he explains that he has nothing to reproach himself with, in the matter of impatience, and that he trusts God will keep him "from hasty acts or resolves with a doubtful conscience." The letter ends with words that explain how much Newman's mind rested (for its conclusions) on external tokens, such as the attitude of friends, their expectations that he would join the Church of Rome, their inability to express surprise, or to charge him with "wilfulness," and so on :—

> "This I am sure of, that such interposition as yours, kind as it is only does what *you* would consider harm. It makes me realise my own views to myself; it makes me see their consistency; it assures me of my own deliberateness; it suggests to me the traces of a Providential Hand; it takes away the pain of disclosures: it relieves me of a heavy secret."

In May 1844 he writes to his sister :—

> "Unless anything happened which I considered a Divine call, and beyond all calculation, I never should take any one by surprise, and therefore you need not alarm yourself as if anything were happening. But if I judge of the future by the past, and when I recollect the long time, now nearly five years, that certain views and feelings have been more or less familiar to me, and sometimes pressing on me, it would seem as if anything might happen."

He adds that these "views and feelings" are very much clearer and stronger than they were even a year ago. A few days afterwards (3 June) he assures her that the cheerfulness that has so startled some of her friends who have been visiting him, is not put on; he thanks God that he *is* "cheerful," "though it so entirely depends on Him that I might be cast down for good and all any day." A few days afterwards, he must have been in the spiritual depths again. For Keble writes about an idea pervading Newman's last letter to him, that if, after all, he should be allowed to be erroneous in his judgment, it would be "equivalent to judicial blindness." "I do not exactly see," continues

Keble, "why you should assume this, unless the error were supposed deadly, or fundamental. I can imagine there might be a providential purpose in allowing even a saint to mistake the degree of harm in communicating with, or separating from, a particular portion of Christ's people." Here, surely, was a strong inducement to join the Church of Rome. No Romanist would say that a man might be fulfilling "a providential purpose" in "mistaking the degree of harm" in "separating from" the Church of Rome; yet Keble makes this admission, as regards a man "separating from" the Church of England. Since, then, Newman longed above all things to be "safe" (at least approximately; few, or none, in his opinion, could be really "safe" in this world); since the Anglican Church, speaking through his spiritual director, Keble, virtually admitted that he would be safe in Rome; and since the Roman Church seemed sure to asseverate that (with his light and convictions) he would be safe nowhere but in Rome—why did he delay? Perhaps, because of Keble's postscript: "P.S. Of course you make allowance for the longing to be at rest, as a secondary influence possible in your case."

That P.S. was well meant; but, in its effects, it was a cruel cut and must have pierced deep. Up to this time, Newman had been able to think of his future conversion as a sacrifice, and to reckon the prospects, associations, plans, comforts, friendships, that he was giving up; and every such pleasant tie to be painfully snapped would be an additional proof of his sincerity, and of the depth and permanence of the convictions on which he proposed to act. But now, Keble had pointed out a new "temptation," and one perhaps that was the greatest of all,—the longing to be at rest from wearing doubts, to bathe his soul in spiritual peace at any cost. This must have made Newman distrust himself and "his own feelings" more than ever. Might it not be that the Enemy—that "skilful rhetorician"—was tempting him to Rome with the bait of what he prized most of all, peace for his troubled conscience?

Cast back into asceticism as the only test of sincerity, he redoubled his self-mortifications to the endangering of his health, till a serious warning from his physician forced him to desist. His reply to Keble is not printed. But a letter, three months afterwards, shows its effect. In the sick-chamber of his friend Bowden, he neither dared to say that he knew that he knew, nor even that he felt that he felt. He *did* feel. But he did not trust his own heart enough to believe it. He writes again and again from Bowden's house. When he first wrote, Bowden was dying. Newman seems to have received his friend's last words on the previous day, and had then said that he "never had had pain like the present"; now he doubts it; "One forgets past feelings"; "I suppose it is not so." But he prays to "be kept from gloom and ill-temper."* In losing him he seems to lose Oxford. "We used to live," he says, "in each other's rooms as undergraduates, and men used to mistake our names and call us by each other's. When he married he used to make a like mistake himself, and call me Elizabeth and her Newman. And now for several years past, though loving him with all my heart, I have shrunk from him, feeling that I had opinions . . . . ."

Two days afterwards, his friend having passed away, he is "full of wrong and miserable feelings." Yet when he sees Bowden's little children finding quite a solace for their pain in the Daily Prayer, "it is impossible not to feel more at ease in our Church, as at least a sort of Zoar." *Zoar!* He knew his Bible far too well not to be cut to the heart immediately afterwards by the very word of comfort that he had summoned to his aid! It was an evil omen that he should compare himself to the unconsciously incestuous Lot. He tries to avert the omen by an immediate prayer: "Only may we be kept from unlawful security, lest we have Moab and Ammon for our progeny, the enemies of Israel." It was under these deepening shadows of self-reproach that he wrote his last letter, fresh from the last sight of his second self laid out for burial. How pitiful a change it is, when, in our home, or in the house of an intimate friend, some well-known room, with all its furniture and belongings, endeared to us by a thousand sweet, familiar, and vernacular associations, becomes at once transmuted into an unfamiliar temple of Death, everything in it the same, except—one! To that bitter sense of pitifulness was now added this far deeper pang, that Newman, even as he sobbed over the coffin, felt so chilled and paralysed in heart that he could not feel that he felt, or be sure that he loved his dearest friend. "He lies in a room I have known these twenty-four years. . . . And there lies now my oldest friend, so dear to me—and I, with so little faith or hope, as dead as a stone, and detesting myself."

§ 163. *The white flag*

As the year 1844 drew to an end, both the necessity, and the pain, of taking some step became more pressing. He was waiting for a sign, and Providence sent none; nothing at least that has been thought worthy of inclusion in Newman's letters at the time, though something did occur on which Newman was destined to lay stress in the following year. On 24 June, a monk, Dominic by name, a Passionist, was passing through Oxford, and came to see Littlemore. Newman took him to the Church, and the monk offered up prayer there. What he prayed for might be guessed. What he said, might be afterwards remembered as an omen. It was a play on "Littlemore":—"A *little more* grace, and then the consummation." In *Loss and Gain* Newman afterwards, under fictitious names, told the early story of this Father:—

> "On the Apennines, near Viterbo, there dwelt a shepherd boy, in the first years of this century, whose mind had early been drawn heavenward; and one day, as he prayed before an image of the Madonna, he felt a vivid intimation that he was to preach the Gospel under the northern sky. There appeared no means by which a Roman peasant should be turned into a missionary; nor did the prospect open, when this youth found himself, first, a lay brother, then a Father, in the Congregation of the Passion. Yet, though no external means appeared, the inward impression did not fade—on the contrary it became more definite; and, in process of time, instead of the dim north, England was engraven on his heart. And, strange to say, as years went on, without his seeking, for he was simply under obedience, our peasant found himself at length upon the very shore of the stormy Northern Sea, whence Cæsar of old looked out for a new world to conquer; yet that he should cross the Strait was still as little likely as before. But the day came, not, however, by any determination of his own, but by the same Providence which, thirty years before, had given him the intimation of it."

Nothing seemed to have come of the Father's visit at the time. And if Providence had sent some more obvious "sign," or if the "ghost" of Rome could only have appeared the third time, with the same cogent and majestical aspect as before, nothing perhaps ever would have come of it. But the reader must have studied these pages in vain if he is unprepared to find that, before many months are past, weary with waiting for some more definite token of God's will, Newman will recall the simple earnest piety of this Passionist, and his vivid "intimations," and his "inward impressions," and the strange fulfilment of his aspirations by "Providence," and his coming to Littlemore on that day of all days which is sacred to *St. John the Baptist, who presides over conversions.*

For the present, however, not seeing perhaps anything special in Father Dominic, nor anything else around him, Newman was wrapped in so thick a gloom that, for the first time in his life, he began to suspect even his loving and much-loved sister of not sympathizing with him. He could not understand her position. He did not know how bewildering some of his half confessions and quasi-confidences were, and how difficult they were to follow and to respond to, without perhaps doing him harm by encouraging him in distressing fancies and in mere self-imaginations—put on paper perhaps to-night, and gone next morning. His sister Harriett, when she was bewildered, very plainly wrote back asking him "to be candid": Jemima, not venturing to do this, lovingly passed over some things that she thought it best to ignore. Newman refused to let her ignore them, and complained of her for ignoring them. Elsewhere he has shown traces of this querulous asperity to others. If people assumed that he was going to Rome, he complained that they were driving him to Rome; if others could not believe that he was going Romeward, he, still more wildly, imputes to them the fault of blindness and over-sanguineness. But the last stage of unreason is clearly reached when so affectionate a brother could be so inconsiderately unreasonable with so loving and so clear-headed a sister. The letter that reveals this state of mind reveals also that, so far as "conviction" is concerned, he is in Rome already: "I cannot make out that I have any motive but a sense of indefinite risk to my soul in remaining where I am. A clear conviction of the substantial identity of Christianity and the Roman system has now been on my mind for a full three years. It is more than five years since the conviction first came on me, though I struggled against it and overcame it."

He adds (using "feelings" here in a special sense, for he has told us that his "views and feelings" tend towards Rome) that "all" his "feelings and wishes are against change." And he was right, with the exception of that one "feeling and wish" which Keble had mentioned, the "wish" for peace and the "feeling" that Rome alone could give it. Still, he adds, "unless something occurs which I cannot anticipate, I have no intention of an early step even now. . . . What keeps me here is the desire of giving every chance of finding out if I am under the power of a delusion. . . . I say to myself, 'What have I done to be given up to a delusion, if it be one?'" What, indeed, had he done? And what must have been his notions of God that he could suppose that the Supremely Just had treated him with such supreme injustice?* However, in order to give some kind of consistent and logical answer to these self-questionings about "delusion," he resolved to send Keble a diary of his acts and thoughts in order that the latter might decide whether he really was under such a sentence of damnation. Such a record of his spiritual symptoms, sent continuously for some weeks or months, convinced Keble, and went some way towards convincing Newman, that he was not under a heaven-sent "judicial delusion," and thus helped to remove one more obstacle between him and the haven for which he destined himself.

Still, he dares not act. The "unsettlement of quiet people" which his change of religion might produce, is, he now admits, "quite a reason for not moving without a clear and settled conviction that to move is a duty." But has he not before told us that he *has* a "clear conviction," and has had it for "full three years," that the Roman system is substantially identical with Christianity? The fact was that he still shrank from the almost unpardonable sin of "private judgment," or, in other words, "the nuisance of taking steps" in any religious matter. He does not wonder that a change of religion subjects a man to the imputation of some "wrong motive." No man has the right to take so awful a step simply because he "thinks himself right"! A change of religion "is the necessary consequence of his thinking himself right; and I fully allow that the *onus probandi* that he is not so influenced lies with the person influenced." Then he gives his sister his views of the Anglican Church. Even Roman divines allow "to a Church in schism, which has the Apostolical Succession, and the right form of consecrating the sacraments, very large privileges. They allow that Baptism has the gift of the Holy Spirit, and the Eucharist the Real presence. What they deny to such a Church is the power of *imparting* these gifts. They say that the grace is locked up, though present, and is not fruitful to the souls of individuals." How changed, this Newman, from the old Newman who once discoursed with such point and wit about "sound Church-of-Englandism" "standing on one leg," when he can thus gravely descant upon the ecclesiastical position of a spiritual Mother who has food for her children, but it is locked up, and she has no key! And how deeply must he have distrusted himself, not to have exchanged at once what he deemed to be possibly a home of imposture, for what was—so at least he was convinced—the home of the very truth!

In despair of a "sign," Newman seems at last to have determined to be guided by a comparatively small coincidence. He would wait for "seven" * years—seven being a sacred number—from the time when the "ghost" first appeared to him. By that time, if his convictions were not changed, he would join the Church of Rome. Meanwhile he would spend the interval in working out on paper his theory of Developments in religion. He would endeavour to show how the Roman system, instead of being a collection of arbitrary and sacerdotal fictions, was an organic growth developed by Providence. To publish this would take him till 1846. Then he would decide—or rather he hoped that Providence would decide for him.

In the first edition of the *Apologia* he puts it thus, "I determined to write an Essay on Doctrinal Development; and then, if at the end of it my convictions were not weaker, to make up my mind to seek admission into her fold." "Determined to make up my mind" is a curious expression; but it is in accordance with all that we know about Newman. "Making up his mind," in matters of religion, was, with him, equivalent to "leaping." It was not a deliberate act. What he says, then, expresses what he meant: "I determined to take the leap." In the second edition it runs thus, "I came to the resolution . . . of taking the necessary steps for admission into her fold." Both editions, however, make it clear that the Essay was not intended to convince himself of the claims of the Church of Rome ; it was merely to ensure deliberation upon his present convictions. He was convinced already. It was to satisfy his conscience, not his reason, that he went through this (logically speaking) superfluous task of accumulating probabilities. What he felt was, that such an occupation as this, being a kind of duty, placed him in the best position for hearing the voice of conscience and ascertaining her will. He was ready to accept her terms at once if she would but let him know them. Thus regarded, the book would be a kind of flag of truce, a proposal to negotiate with conscience so far as this, that she would at least signify her will. That done, he would surrender at discretion.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

WAVING THE WHITE FLAG

§ 164. *The Essay on Doctrinal Development*

SINCE the *Essay on Doctrinal Development* did not produce in its author convictions which have been shown to have previously existed, a detailed criticism of it here would be out of place. Little more need be said about it, so far as it bears upon his conversion, than that he succeeded in making out such a case for Rome that he left his previous convictions no weaker, apparently even stronger, than before. But one or two specimens of the argument may be useful, as illustrations of his condition of mind during this period of expectation. I shall give some of those which seem to show Newman at his best.

The Essay deals with the Notes of the Church and shows that Rome has these Notes. One of these is the Note of Logical Sequence; and here, if you concede to Newman his mechanical principle of the nature of the Forgiveness of Sins, you are led on to the acknowledgment of "Monastic Rule" as the perfection of Christian life, with a subtlety of gradation and logical cogency, which shows the author to great advantage. Newman regards forgiveness as an estate, so to speak, conveyable by God to man upon arbitrary conditions, one of which is the Sacrament of Baptism which washes away sins. What, then, as to sins after Baptism? Are they unpardonable? That would be too shocking. Hence, the Church must have the power to pardon. But there must be conditions, as before. Hence sprang four degrees of penance, through which offenders had to pass in order to obtain reconciliation. Then rose the question, Are these penances mere outward signs of inward contrition? If so, they might be dispensed with, as soon as true repentance was discovered. Newman does not clearly show why this should not be done; but if it could be dispensed with, penance would seem to fall from its sacramental footing. He points out that the Fathers considered penance more than an outward sign; it was an expiation, an act done directly towards God and a means of averting His anger. Penance, therefore, is of the nature of a "satisfaction" to God, paying to Him so much pain as a means of propitiating Him.

But what if a man dies before he has paid this debt of pain; is he lost for ever? That again, would be too shocking. Therefore there must be a means of paying God that "satisfaction" hereafter. Hence arises the logical need of a Purgatory. But the man who is once convinced "that sin must have its punishment, here or hereafter . . . . who believes that suffer he must, and that delayed punishment is the greater . . . . has within his breast a source of greatness, self-denial, heroism." The inference appears to be that (in view of heavenly compensations) he will be absolutely indifferent to earthly pains and worldly motives, and that the actions accomplished in this spirit will be, according to the heading of this section, "meritorious works." But if we wish for a course of "meritorious works," where can we find it better than in "the Monastic Rule"? Thus, by an easy, smooth descent of Logical Sequence, we are led on from the Dogma of Forgiveness to the Dogma of Pardons, and from Pardons to Penances, and thence to Satisfactions, and so to Purgatory, and then to Meritorious Works, and finally to the Monastic Rule:—which itself culminates in the greatest and highest "penance," or "satisfaction," that man can pay to God, the surrender of the mind, the intellect, the understanding, and the will, to some ecclesiastical superior: for "it may fairly be questioned whether, in an intellectual age, when freedom both of thought and of action is so dearly prized, a greater penance can be devised for the soldiers of Christ than the absolute surrender of judgment and will to the command of another."

All this symmetrical and subtly-connected fabric collapses like a house of cards if we reflect for a single moment that forgiveness of sins, whether between man and man or between man and God, is nothing but a spiritual process, and that no bodily pains, nor material penalties, inflicted or remitted, have any essential connection with it. But grant Newman's theory of forgiveness, and then—as the ancient false astronomy led on its supporters to their "eccentrics" and "epicycles" in order to "save the phenomena"—so the reader is led to adopt first this, and then that, development, in order to make things square and clear; and the result is a mechanical conclusion worthy of the mechanical premiss.

On other Notes we cannot dwell here. But the reader can imagine for himself how easily the Note of "Anticipation of the Future" will show that the Church consistently maintained against heretics, first, that Matter was susceptible of divine grace; and hence, later on, that reverence is due to saintly bodies, and relics; and that miracles may be wrought by them. The Note of "Preservative Additions," also, bids us not pass over the statement that the worship of the Virgin preserved the worship of the Son; and the frank avowal that "love" is not an initial principle of the Gospel, but a *development*, protecting, but not superseding, the initial "fear."

§ 165. *Thirlwall and Hare on this Essay*

Of course, the right of innovation, implied in this Essay, is irreconcilable with the claims of antiquity. Hence, as Bishop Thirlwall says, we have to enquire who, beside the Author of Revelation, has authority thus to innovate:

> "And then we soon find ourselves drawn into a vicious circle. For the existence of this authority is no more explicitly attested, either by Scripture or Tradition, than any of the doctrines which rest upon its sanction. It must therefore witness to itself, and hang self-supported, like the prophet's tomb in the lying legend. For those who have been trained to look up to it with unquestioning veneration, this absence of all external warrant may create no difficulty. To them it may be sufficient to say, that † 'belief is in itself better than unbelief; that it is safer to believe; that we must begin with believing, and that conviction will follow; that, as for the reasons of believing, they are for the most part implicit, and but slightly recognized by the mind that is under their influence; that they consist moreover rather of presumptions and guesses, ventures after the truth, than of accurate proofs, and that probable arguments are sufficient for conclusions which we even embrace as most certain and turn to the most important uses.'
>
> "But for any one who has not been subject to the influence of such associations, who is required to make a deliberate choice, and to stake his all upon the adoption of a new belief, to content himself

with such 'presumptions and guesses, and ventures after the truth' as those which form the best substitute this author has to offer for 'accurate proofs,' would argue a want either of judgment or of seriousness, which it may be hoped will not often be found in that class of readers for which his work is designed. Nor will that singular combination of the extremes of scepticism and credulity which it exhibits in a degree almost without precedent, recommend it to those who value either freedom of thought or earnestness of faith. To minds constituted and predisposed like his own, it may undoubtedly minister a welcome plea for yielding to that sentimental and imaginative bias, which, as I expressed my belief in my last Charge with regard to other cases, appears to have been the real cause of his own secession, and which alone enables us to reconcile the respect due to his abilities and attainments, with the esteem which we should wish to feel for his character."

On the detailed proofs and allegations in the *Development* we cannot dwell; but a good authority has pronounced a verdict which, if correct, would place it almost below the level of the *Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles.* Archdeacon Hare comments on one error, not so much for the error itself as for its exemplification of Newman's method of piling superstructure of inference on no foundation. "The See of St. Hippolytus," writes Newman, "as if he belonged to all places in the *orbis terrarum,* cannot be located, and is variously placed in the neighbourhood of Rome and in Arabia." Now it is generally recognized that the notion of a See "in Arabia" arose from a mis-translation, and has no foundation in fact. But suppose it true; what would follow? This simply: that authorities were at variance as to the See of Hippolytus. But Newman uses it as one among other proofs that *all Bishops of the Church possessed "a power essentially ecumenical!"*

A single inference of such a nature is worse than a score of slight inaccuracies, and goes some way to justify Hare's severe description of a recipe for a "Development:" "Take a sentence or two here and there from this Father, and a couple of expressions from another, add half a canon of this Council, a couple of incidents out of some ecclesiastical historian, an anecdote from a chronicler, two conjectures of some critic, and half-a-dozen drachms of a schoolman, mix them up in rhetoric *quant. suff.*, and shake them well together,—and thus we get at a theological development."

§ 166. *Its rhetorical skill*

The somewhat bitter criticism just quoted allows the Essay the praise of a persuasive style. And certainly, whatever may have been the amount of cerebral or spiritual excitement under which Newman was labouring during its composition, no injurious effect is perceptible on his rhetorical power. Never perhaps has that been more vividly exemplified than in the famous passage in which he comments upon the imputations brought by the world against the Roman Church as being superstitious, deceitful, and morally corrupt. These things, he argues, have ever been a Note of the Church. They are, therefore, a proof, not that the Church of Rome is false, but that it is the true Church. How lightly, beneath his spell, do we incline, at first, to think it almost obvious that, since the Pagan Neronian empire scorned and despised the Church, therefore the Christian Victorian empire may naturally scorn and despise it too!

But the best way to appreciate the marvellous sleight of the rhetorical hand will be to place that passage by the side of another from the Lectures "On the Present Position of Catholics in England," which proves just the opposite. The former says, in effect, "Of course every one that is not in the Church of Rome fails to recognize her true nature. It was so from the beginning; it needs must be so now." The latter, "Of course every one, except our insular English selves, recognizes the true nature of the Church of Rome. Even infidels see it. What fools the English must be that they alone fail to see it and remain outside her pale!"

"Development."	"Lectures."
"If there is a form of Christianity now in the world which is accused of gross superstition, of borrowing its rites and customs from the heathen, and of ascribing to forms and ceremonies an occult virtue; a religion which is considered to burden and enslave the mind by its requisitions, to address itself to the weak-minded and ignorant, to be supported by sophistry and imposture, and to contradict reason and exalt mere irrational faith;—a religion which impresses on the serious mind very distressing views of the guilt and consequences of sin, sets upon the minute acts of the day, one by one, their definite value for praise or blame, and thus casts a grave shadow over the future;—a religion which holds up to admiration the surrender of wealth, and disables serious	"Considering, what is as undeniable a fact as that there is a country called France, or an ocean called the Atlantic, the actual extent, the renown, and the manifold influence of the Catholic religion,—considering that it surpasses in territory and in population any other Christian communion, nay, surpasses them all put together,—considering that it is the religion of two hundred millions of souls, that it is found in every quarter of the globe, that it penetrates into all classes of the social body, that it is received by entire nations, that it is so multiform in its institutions, and so exuberant in its developments, and so fresh in its resources, as any tolerable knowledge of it will be sure to bring home to our minds,—that it has been the creed of men the most

persons from enjoying it if they would;—a religion—the doctrines of which, be they good or bad, are to the generality of men unknown; which is considered to bear on its very surface signs of folly and falsehood so distinct that a glance suffices to judge of it, and careful examination is preposterous; which is felt to be so simply bad, that it may be calumniated at hazard and at pleasure, it being nothing but absurdity to stand upon the accurate distribution of its guilt among its particular acts, or painfully to determine how far this or that story is literally true, what must be allowed in candour, or what is improbable, or what cuts two ways, or what is not proved, or what may be plausibly defended;—a religion such, that men look at a convert to it with a feeling which no other sect raises, except Judaism, Socialism, or Mormonism, with curiosity, suspicion, fear, disgust, as the case may be, as if something strange had befallen him, as if he had had an initiation into a mystery, and had come into communion with dreadful influences, as if he were now one of a confederacy which claimed him, absorbed him, stripped him of his personality, reduced him to a mere organ or instrument of a whole;—a religion which men hate as pro-

profound and the most refined, and the source of works the most beneficial, the most arduous, and the most beautiful; and, moreover, considering that, thus ubiquitous, thus commanding, thus intellectual, thus energetic, thus efficient, it has remained one and the same for centuries,—considering that all this must be owned by its most virulent enemies, explain it how they will;—surely it is a phenomenon the most astounding, that a nation like our own, should so manage to hide this fact from their minds,—as habitually to scorn, and ridicule, and abhor, the professors of that religion. Was there ever such an instance of self-sufficient, dense, and ridiculous bigotry, as that which rises up and walls in the minds of our fellow-countrymen from all knowledge of one of the most remarkable phenomena, which the history of the world has seen? This broad fact of Catholicism, as real as the continent of America, or the Milky Way, which they cannot deny, Englishmen will not entertain; they shut their eyes, they thrust their heads into the sand, and try to get rid of a great vision, a great reality, under the name of Popery;—they will not recognize, what infidels recognize as well as Catholics, the vastness, the grandeur, the splendour, the

"DEVELOPMENT."	"LECTURES."
selytizing, anti-social, revolutionary, as dividing families, separating chief friends, corrupting the maxims of government, making a mock at law, dissolving the empire, the enemy of human nature, and a 'conspirator against its rights and privileges';—a religion which they consider the champion and instrument of darkness, and a pollution calling down upon the land the anger of heaven;—a religion which they associate with intrigue and conspiracy, which they speak about in whispers, which they detect by anticipation in whatever goes wrong, and to which they impute whatever is unaccountable;—a religion the very name of which they cast out as evil, and use simply as a bad epithet, and which from the impulse of self-preservation they would persecute if they could; if there be such a religion now in the world, it is not unlike Christianity as that same world viewed it when first it came forth from its Divine Author."	loveliness of the manifestations of this time-honoured ecclesiastical confederation."

§ 167 "*He did not intend to work out any problem*"

It is an extraordinary instance of the thoroughness and depth of Newman's self-deception to find him—notwithstanding, and in the midst of, these splendid displays of misleading rhetoric—imitating the language of Socrates, who, having no religious issues at stake and nothing but the truth to seek, really did follow wit single-hearted devotion wherever pitiless Logic led him And Newman actually thinks he is doing the sam thing: "We cannot manage our argument and hav as much of it as we please and no more." Never wa pantomimic sword of lath more "manageable" an capable of producing more sudden transformation than argument in Newman's hands.

After perusing, with mingled admiration and repulsion, some of his most brilliant displays, we feel incline to be no longer irritated with him for his morbid, restless self-suspicions, and to understand with almost painful clearness why he likened the Tempter to a "skilful rhetorician," who "can turn anything into a argument." Light is thrown then upon some of hi perplexing sayings, which not only bid us believe first and conviction will follow, but also warn us that we cannot be said to believe even that about which w have no doubt, until our minds are familiarised with it. Except as "familiarising" him with views of which he was "convinced" already, this Essay seems unfitted to produce any influence. It might, indeed, suggest to him that the Roman system was largely adapted to the infirmities of human nature; that in certain period of history, and especially among the nations of the South, it had "worked" well, or at all events had worked very grand and imposing ecclesiastical results. But what sort of argument was this? An argument appealing, not only to the weaknesses and moral infirmities of mankind, but also—which was far wors —to private judgment, and to experience. Such a view of the Roman Church could do no more than represent to his mind, somewhat more vividly than before, the connected subtlety, yet breadth, the symmetry of organic growth, the unity of vital principle, in the development of medieval from Christian Antiquity. But this, upon reflection, he must have perceived to be an appeal to the Imagination, not to the faculty that produces intellectual convictions. Hence our study of the Essay itself drives us to the conclusion to which external evidence has pointed, viz., that Newman, in writing it, was simply spending his time in what seemed a pious manner, likely to be acceptable to God, and thereby to hasten the coming of that "sign" for which his soul panted, as for water in a dry desert. The testimony of his brother-in-law comes in aptly here to prove that we are doing him no injustice.

"I cannot remember," says Mr. E. T. Mozley, "when, or how, Newman told me—what must have been in his own anticipation—that, if I was ever to go over, it would be, and indeed ought to be, by a superior act of volition over-ruling and containing † my own. The Almighty would give me the opportunity, and the call, as well as the power and mode, of conversion. . . . I could not realise his sitting down deliberately to give two years to working out the problem. The fact was he *did not intend to work out any problem at all*, but to wait for further Light from his Heavenly guide."

This probably represents the facts—except in one point, which is little more than a matter of words. It will be remembered that Newman professed to believe in God and in Christianity upon accumulated probabilities, which somehow or other—as water at a certain point becomes steam—were, at a certain stage to be converted by Divine aid into certitude. So far, then, as the composition of this Essay could help him to accumulate "probabilities," that is to say, "presumptions, guesses, ventures after the truth, rather than accurate proofs,"—if *this* was working out a problem, then to work out a problem was really Newman's intention. He would take up pen and paper and work away at "presumptions, guesses, and ventures after truth"; not that, at this stage, he had any faith in them; but it was an act of obedience to a Divine ordinance. If he was caught, as it were, thus, pen in hand, co-operating with God in the attempt to "arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities," God would be all the more likely to say suddenly to him, by means of some sudden "omen" or "sign," at some appointed instant, "Now you *are* certain." And then he *would* be certain.

CHAPTER XXXIX

SURRENDER AT DISCRETION

§ 168. *Still waiting for a "sign"*

MONTH after month of 1845 passed away, adding yet page after page to the *Essay on Development*; but in spite of all this toil there was still wanting that last essential touch which was to transmute this host of nebular probabilities into one solid and compact certitude that would release the soul from the dread of acting upon private judgment and leave it free to pass into the haven where it was fain to be. And here, if we would understand that final scene to which we are fast approaching, and which will close this drama—tragedy some would call it, and perhaps rightly—of one of the most interesting human souls that ever lost their way in the labyrinth of doubt, it seems right to collect the broken or tangled threads of motive which we find in the *Apologia*, and, if not to disentangle and unite them, at least to indicate the knots and points of severance.

How Newman arrived at conclusions, we, by this time, pretty well know. But that is not enough. In order to understand his character, and sympathize with his perplexities, we ought to endeavour—though it is no easy task—to ascertain how he *thought* he arrived at them. For this purpose, our best plan will be, to put side by side, first Newman's earlier, and then his later and corrected statements, about the means by which we attain truth. It will appear that he has hardly ever made a statement on this subject in the early editions of the *Apologia* and the *Essay on Development*, which he has not subsequently corrected. The first place is due to a passage in the Essay we have just been discussing. He is speaking about the principle of "Faith," as he calls it in the later edition, or, "the preference of Faith to Reason" as he calls it in the first. Those words in one edition which are omitted in the other, are italicized and bracketed :—

1st Edition.	Later Editions.
"—such again was its special preference of Faith to Reason, which was so great a jest to Celsus and Julian. 'The latter principle [*when brought out into words*] is as follows ; that belief is, in itself, better than unbelief ; that it is safer to believe ; that we must begin with believing [*and that conviction will follow*] ; that, as for the reasons of believing, they are for the most part implicit, and but slightly recognized by the mind that is under their influence ; that they consist moreover rather of presumptions [*and guesses*], ventures after the truth than of accurate proofs ; and that probable arguments are sufficient for conclusions which we even embrace as most certain, and turn to the most important uses."	"This principle which, as we have already seen, was so great a jest to Celsus and Julian, is of the following kind ;—That belief [*in Christianity*] is in itself better than unbelief [*that faith, though an intellectual action, is ethical in its origin ;*] that it is safer to believe ; that we must begin with believing ; that, as for the reasons of believing, they are for the most part implicit, and [*need be*] but slightly recognized by the mind that is under their influence ; that they consist moreover rather of presumptions and ventures after the truth than of accurate [*and complete*] proofs ; and that probable arguments [*under the scrutiny and sanction of a prudent judgment*] are sufficient for conclusions which we even embrace as most certain and turn to the most important uses."

The reader will see at a glance the excitement under which the writer of the first edition was labouring: "begin by *believing*, and—conviction will follow"! And "the reasons for believing" are, largely "guesses"! And there is no mention of the need of "the scrutiny and sanction of a prudent judgment." It is obvious to remark that the writer *had*, at the time, "conviction," yet dared not act upon it. But what can be the meaning of "believe—and conviction will follow," except "*say* you believe, *though you do not*—and, in time, you really will believe?" *

Next will come his statements in the *Apologia* as to the manner in which he was led to final conviction and action upon it. It will be found that the changes in the later edition, while aiming at greater exactness, really obscure the actual processes of Newman's mind and hide from us the guess-work, and the groping, and the imaginative feeling, by which he was principally led.

1st Edition.	Later Editions.
"And now I have carried on the history of my opinions to their last point before I became a Catholic. I find great difficulty in fixing dates precisely; but *it must have been some way into* 1844, before I *thought*, not only that the Anglican Church was *certainly* wrong, but that Rome was *right*. Then I had nothing more to learn on the subject. [*How 'Samaria' faded away from my imagination I cannot tell; but it was gone*]."	"I have nothing more to say on the subject of the change in my religious opinions. On the one hand I came gradually to *see* that the Anglican Church was *formally* in the wrong, on the other that the Church of Rome was *formally in the* right; [*then that no valid reasons could be assigned for continuing in the Anglican, and again that no valid objections could be taken to joining the Roman*]. Then I had nothing more to learn; [*what still remained for my conversion was not further change of opinion but to change opinion itself into the clearness and firmness of intellectual conviction*]"

To this add the passage which describes his state of mind at the time of resigning St. Mary's in September 1843:—

1st Edition.	Later Editions.
"I had only one more advance of mind to make, and that was to be CERTAIN* of [*what I had hitherto anticipated, concluded and believed*]; and this was *close upon my submission to the Catholic Church.* And I had only one more act to perform, and that was the act of submission itself."	"I had only one final advance of mind to accomplish [*and one final step to take*]. That further advance of mind was to be [*able honestly to say that I was*] certain of [*the conclusions at which I had already arrived*]. That further step, imperative when such certitude was obtained, was my SUBMISSION* to the Catholic Church."

In the former passages, the later version endeavours to be more exact than the earlier. Instead of "*thinking*" that the Anglican Church is "*certainly* wrong"—a curiously illogical expression but probably an accurate representation of the state of Newman's mind*—he substitutes "*see* that the Anglican Church was *formally* in the wrong." The correction is necessary. For he is describing his state of mind when it was "some way into 1844." Now we know from his letter to Manning that in October 1843 he had resigned St. Mary's because, to use his own words, *he thought* "the Church of Rome the Catholic Church and ours not part of the Catholic Church." * Even Newman would hardly have deemed such an inconsistency excused by saying that in 1843 he resigned St. Mary's because he *thought* it *was* so, but in 1844 he *thought* it *was certainly* so.

The tedious insertion, in the later edition, of the words about "valid reason," and "no valid objections," seems intended to suggest the deliberateness of the logical stages of his advance. The next insertion indicates that, even after he had "learned" everything, he had still only "opinions," and these "opinions" must be changed into "the clearness and firmness of intellectual convictions." On the other hand, the later edition drops altogether the picturesque and suggestive image of "Samaria," and the significant reference to the "imagination,"—which really was the most adequate explanation of Newman's change of mind.

The second passage shows the same tendency to exaggerate the patient slowness of the logical processes by which he arrived at his conclusions. Instead of "to be certain," the author substitutes "to be able honestly to say that he is certain:" and instead of admitting that his earlier conclusions were merely "anticipated, concluded, and believed" (in plain English, "imagined") he substitutes "arrived at," as having a more reasonable sound.

Lastly, let us set down the two accounts in the two editions of the *Apologia*, both of which are attempts to re-state what he believed in 1843-4 as to the manner in which we are to arrive at "certitude."

"Speaking historically of what I held in 1843-4, I say, that I believed in a God on a ground of probability, and that I believed in Christianity on a probability, and that I believed in Catholicism on a probability, and that—

1st Edition.	Later Editions.
all three were about the same kind of probability,—	these three grounds of probability, distinct from each other, of course, in subject-matter, were still, all of them one and the same in nature of proof, as being probabilities—probabilities of a special kind;—

a cumulative, a transcendent probability, but still probability; inasmuch as He who made us has so willed, that in mathematics indeed we [should, om. in first ed.] arrive at certitude by rigid demonstration, but in religious inquiry we [should, om. in first ed.] arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities :—

1st Edition.	Later Editions.
inasmuch as He who has willed that we should so act co-operates with us in our acting, and thereby bestows on us—	He has willed, I say, that we should so act, and, as willing it, He co-operates with us in our acting and thereby enables us to do that which He wills us to do, and carries us on, if our will does but co-operate with His, to—

a certitude which rises higher than the logical force of our conclusions."

How then are we to "act," according to Newman's scheme, so as to obtain certitude in religious inquiry? The earlier and shorter version of the scheme (which I prefer to quote because the later seems only to make the process a little less clear and a little more mysterious) tells us that we are to "act"; and then God "co-operates with us in our acting, and thereby bestows on us a certitude which rises higher than the logical force of our conclusions." But *how* has God "willed us to act"? Going back for our answer to the previous words, "willed that we should *so* act," we find ourselves once more carried back (after Newman's fashion) to what again precedes, "God has willed that in religious inquiry we should arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities." Our "acting," then, is to be "arriving at certitude by accumulated probabilities." We obtain therefore—upon an exact and grammatical interpretation of the passage—this result, that we, on our side, are to *arrive at* "certitude by accumulated probabilities," and, *if* we do this, God, on His side, will *bestow* on us "certitude." Obviously

Newman does not mean this. He means that we are to *attempt* to arrive at certitude. But ought one who thinks he has "found a definition of Reason," and who sets up for a teacher on the subject, to write about it in such an unreasonable way?

Englishmen are loose in "thinking": we "*think* we will do"—anything that we have resolved to do; we decline a hospitable offer with an "I *think* not, thank you"; we "venture to *think* that" two and three make five. But put all these statements of Newman's together, and we must surely say that he out-Englishes Englishmen, and proves his unique competency to write a "*Grammar of English 'thinking,' adapted for the loosest of theological 'thinkers.'*"

Reviewing all these offences, aggravated (as the reader must be aware) by many that have been noticed in the course of this book,—which ought to prepare him to credit the assertion that very many more have been left unnoticed;—considering those just alleged in the light of his statements in the Letters about the *clear "conviction"* which he had for so long a time *in favour of Rome;* then adding those other passages in which, after seeing the "ghost," he said that his "convictions" against Rome *remained as before* and that he intended to be guided by his *reason and not by his feelings,*—which again must be compared with another passage in which he tells a correspondent that "anyone can *reason*, only disciplined, educated, trained minds, can *perceive*": and bearing in mind that the *Apologia* was written more than twenty years after his theory of Faith and Reason had been brought out in his University Sermons, I do not see how it can be called prejudiced, or unfair, or anything but necessary, to conclude that Newman did not really believe heartily in—

he certainly did not adopt—the subtle distinctions that he drew for others between the various faculties of the mind.

When he speaks about "opinions," and "convictions," and "reason," and "feeling," and "knowing that one knows," and "being able honestly to say that one knows," and "thinking that this or that *is*," and "thinking that this or that *certainly is*," he is deceiving himself, and tending to deceive us, by talking about that of which he really knows nothing, because he has never had any experience of it—I mean deep intellectually honest, rooted *conviction*. He throws himself generously into loose, varying, and inconsistent descriptions of the logical processes by which we are to prepare ourselves to receive religious certitude, and then patches and touches them up with afterthoughts to make them look like new, but with no other result than to show that they are still unsound, with defects covered rather than cured. From top to bottom, Newman's theory about Reason is like a house with irreparably bad foundations and consequently shifting walls, showing everywhere cracks, and chinks, and gaps; which the landlord paints over but does not effectively repair, partly because the mischief is irremediable, and partly because he does not himself intend to occupy the house. So it is with Newman and his logic. He lets it out to others, he does not inhabit it himself. He does not intend to work out his problems in the method which he inculcates on his followers. It is not logic that carries him on. He is waiting for some "interposition," some "call," some "omen," some "superior act of volition," some "sign," or "Providential coincidence," which may assure him that he is obeying a voice from above, and not from below, and that he is not the prey of "a judicial delusion." Without this or something like this, not all the arguments in the world, no, nor the force of Reason, explicit and implicit to boot, will induce him to take that awful leap to which the Tempter, he fears, may possibly be luring him with the promise of rest and peace.

> —"the devil hath power
> To assume a pleasing shape ; yea, and perhaps,
> Out of my weakness and my melancholy
> —As he is very potent with such spirits—
> Abuses me to damn me."

§ 169. "*Show some token upon me*"

Yet the Enemy was pressing him on the other side, too. Towards the end of 1844 he had been led to see that there was no medium for him between Atheism and Romanism ; to the feeling that "not to believe more," as he writes to his sister, "is to fall back into scepticism." This terror would soon overweigh the fear that had so long kept him back. "What keeps me yet," he says in the same letter, "is what has kept me long, a fear that I am under a delusion ; but the conviction remains firm under all circumstances, in all frames of mind." Against such terror as this, nothing could be done by friends or reasons. On the soul of such a sufferer, the kind prattle of Keble's gossiping letters, recommending him to think over old friends and old times, would fall with as much effect as a little child's fingers lovingly patting the shell of a pet tortoise. Keble suggests thinking about "the day of laying the first stone at Littlemore," or "another day when we walked up with old Christie," or some other "of the old days when we most enjoyed ourselves together, either with dear Hurrell Froude, or in thought and talk of him

—if such indulgences are not unfit for this season." But they *were* "unfit for that season." Presumably Keble (20 February) meant Lent; but Newman was not fasting in the Wilderness, but wrestling in the Agony: it was the Day of Judgment in anticipation; and he was alone to face it, forgetting and deeming himself forgotten, as a dead man out of mind, cut off from the land of the living. How could he bear to hear even about Hurrell Froude when there was ever tolling in his ears the intolerable *Je mourrai seul, Je mourrai seul*?*

The thought of his sister's anguish stung him most deeply, but he was learning to steel himself against that as inevitable. The risk to his soul in moving, the still greater risk in remaining, tended now to become his one all-absorbing thought; scarcely to be lightened, much less removed, by the hard and exciting work of composing the *Essay on Development*. Yet still he fights and struggles for an appearance of deliberateness. He vehemently inculcates on a correspondent that "nothing but a simple, direct call of duty is a warrant for any one leaving" the Church of England: "The simple question is, Can *I* (it is personal, not whether another, but can *I*) be saved in the English Church? am *I* in safety, were I to die to-night? Is it a mortal sin in *me*, not joining another communion?" Gradually, however, he began to prepare for the end. In the spring of 1845, he warned his sister of his intention to give up his Fellowship in the following October. He had always intended to do this some time before taking any further step; and she understood it as an omen of something worse to happen next year. Her expostulations called forth two replies, one written on the eve of Palm Sunday, the other, next morning. The first is a passionate appeal to his own good faith ; he is giving up so much, he says, making himself an outcast ; he beseeches her to "pity" him ; what has he done thus to be deserted ? thus to be left to take a wrong course ?

> "Continually do I pray that He would discover to me if I am under a delusion ; what can I do more ? What hope have I but in Him ? To whom should I go ? Who can do me any good ? Who can speak a word of comfort but He ? Who is there but looks on me with a sorrowful face ?—but He can lift up the light of His countenance upon me. All is against me—may He not add Himself as an adversary ! May He tell me, may I listen to Him, if His will is other than I think it to be !"

Next morning brings quite a different tone. He is "somehow in better spirits this morning," and he speaks as he feels. "What right" has his sister to judge him ? Has the multitude who will judge him any right to do so ? Who of his equals, "who of the many who will talk flippantly" about him, has a right ? Then, more mildly, "Surely I have to bear most ; and, if I do not shrink from bearing it, others must not shrink" : "May I do my best ! Am I not trying to do my best ? May we not trust it will turn to the best ?"

A few days afterwards he writes again to the same correspondent to whom he had mentioned the "direct call of duty." "My own convictions," he says, "are as strong as I suppose they can become : only it is so difficult to know whether it is a call of *reason*, or of *conscience*. I cannot make out if I am impelled by what seems *clear*, or by a sense of duty." This disposes, at once, of Newman's dictum, above quoted, "What still remained for my conversion, was" to change *opinion* itself into the *clearness and firmness of intellectual conviction*. His "conviction," it now appears, was *as strong as it could become:* and yet he could not act upon it. He proceeds:

> "You can understand how painful this doubt is; so I have waited hoping for light, and using the words of the Psalmist, 'Show some token upon me.' But I suppose I have no right to wait for ever for this. Then I am waiting, because friends are most considerately bearing me in mind, and asking guidance for me; and, I trust, I shall attend to any new feelings which came upon me, should that be the effect of their kindness. And then this waiting subserves the purpose of preparing men's minds. I dread shocking, unsettling people. So, if I had my will, I should like to wait till the summer of 1846, which would be a full seven years from the time that my convictions first began to fall upon me. But I don't think I shall last so long.
>
> "My present intention is to give up my Fellowship in October, and to publish some work or treatise, between that and Christmas. I wish people to know why I am acting, as well as *what* I am doing; it takes off that vague and distressing surprise, 'What can have made him!'"

This letter—introduced with the words, "Now I will tell you more than any one knows except two friends," and expressing his most secret thoughts—shows (what is absolutely hidden in his formal statements about his conversion) that, for guidance in a change of religion, he was almost totally dependent upon external "signs." Even the mere fact that his friends would expect him to go to Rome would be a kind of "token" that God *meant* him to go: his constant prayer is "Show some *token* upon me." Yet still no sufficient "token" came, and the strain threatened to become intolerable; heart and mind were almost tired out, he says, and a dull aching pain, as of the heavy hand of God, pressed on him without intermission.

§ 170. *Some kind of "sign" at last*

This could not last much longer. However much he loved analogy and yearned for coincidences, and though a text from the Old Testament appealed to him more powerfully than the history of a century, yet in such a season of darkness, there must be a limit to analogies and inferences from texts. Jacob had waited for "seven" years; but Jacob was not imperilling his eternal salvation. Newman *could* not wait till 1846. He could not finish the *Doctrine of Development*. Something *must* happen; if not a "sign," then a special Providence, or at least a coincidence. Accordingly, it happened.

On 29 September Dalgairns was "received" into the Church of Rome at Aston by the same Father Dominic who had visited Littlemore, seen Newman for a few minutes, and offered up a prayer in the Church on the Day of St. John the Baptist in the preceding year. The new convert now came to Newman. Doubtless, it was from Dalgairns that Newman heard the strange story of Father Dominic's early aspirations and their fulfilment, his remarkable powers, his simple holiness, his being sent to England "without his own act," and this, too, "after thirty years (almost) waiting"—"thirty" being the number of years that our Lord is said to have waited before He began His mission. In default of other more striking "signs" and "tokens," these facts—and the fact that the day on which the Father had visited Oxford last year had been sacred to "St. John Baptist"—produced (as will be seen hereafter) a deep impression upon Newman's mind. A week after the reception of Dalgairns, in a preface (6 October *) to his Essay, he avows that the obstacle between him and Rome was "destitute of solid foundation." Yet the *Apologia* tells us that he worked at the Essay *till* "October," and, "*before*" *he* "*got to the end*," "resolved to be received." Why did he delay more than six days to join the true Church? After his reception, he added a few more lines to the preface; but they fail to answer this question. An extract from these (in which I italicize some significant words) tells us that—

> "when he had got some way in the printing, he recognized in himself a *conviction* of the truth of the conclusion to which the discussion leads, so *clear* as to supersede further deliberation. *Shortly afterwards, circumstances gave him the opportunity of acting upon it*, and he felt that he had no warrant for refusing to do so."

"Conviction"! How many months had passed since he had "recognized" in himself "conviction"! How many epithets such as "clear," "deep," "unvarying," "as strong as they can become," &c., &c., had he not applied to them! And what is the meaning of those other strange expressions? Why "shortly" afterwards? Why not immediately? Why wait for "circumstances" to "give him" an "opportunity"? Why not *make* an opportunity? These mysterious words require to be explained: and the explanation is, apparently, as follows.

"Conviction" Newman did not need; but he could not act upon "conviction." He needed something more. The first edition of the *Apologia* quoted above, tells us what he needed. He had "determined," it tells us, if his convictions in favour of Rome were not weaker by the time he had finished his Essay, to—*make up his mind* to do something. The Essay was not finished, but his "convictions" were as strong as ever, stronger than ever, if that was possible. But he could not *make up his mind:* it was still "such a nuisance to take steps"; it was "so difficult to know whether it was a call of *reason* or of *conscience*." For "reason" he had as supreme a contempt as for conscience he had reverence. It was his conscience that was not yet satisfied, even now. His conscience it was that made a coward of him, as of Hamlet, "sicklying o'er" his "resolution with the pale cast of thought"; and perhaps, but for Dalgairns, even now the great "enterprise" might have been "turned awry" and have "lost the name of action."

§ 171. *Newman "assents to a proposition made to him"*

Of all this the *Apologia* gives us not a hint. The first edition is very mysterious indeed. From that, no one could help supposing * that Newman took the natural course of sending for Father Dominic at once, or else that the Father came to Littlemore on a chance visit, without being sent for. There is not the least intimation that pressure was put on Newman *by some one else who sent for him.* The words which I italicize in a paragraph inserted in the later edition, show that Newman did *not* send for him: yet these, as will be seen, suggest a new difficulty:—

> "One of my friends at Littlemore had been received into the Church on Michaelmas Day, at the Passionist House at Aston, near Stone, by Father Dominic the Superior. At the beginning of October, the latter was passing through London to Belgium; and, as I was in some perplexity what steps to take for being received myself, *I assented to the proposition made to me that the good priest should take Littlemore in his way, with a view to* his doing for me the same charitable service as he had done to my friend."

From this we might infer that the Passionist came to Littlemore "with a view to" receiving Newman into the Church of Rome. But the letter in which Newman announced his conversion to his friends, states that the Father, when he came, *did not* "*know*" *of Newman's* "*intention*"; and implies that Newman had made up his mind to be received, but—for some reason or other—kept the Father in ignorance of his purpose.

Why all this mystery? Why this tedious "with a view to"? If "view" must be used, why not say *whose* "view"? Why, too, this "assenting to propositions"? Whence this "perplexity"? And why leave Dominic in the dark? He was not *quite* in the dark, if we may believe a sympathetic biographer, who, writing from the Roman point of view, states the facts as follows: Soon after the reception of Dalgairns, Father Dominic "*received a message* bidding him go *quickly* from Aston to Littlemore 'to *fulfil a work in God's service*'"; the Father had "no *knowledge* of what was required, but he set off at the instant." This bidding to "come quickly," this "setting off at the instant," this message about the "work in God's service," if they did not convey "*knowledge*," must have assuredly supplied grounds for at least a very strong conjecture. Why did the *Apologia* tell us nothing about all this? It seems worth looking into.

On this, the most momentous crisis of his life, and on his own part in determining it, Newman can hardly be supposed to have been grossly inaccurate. The different accounts can be reconciled by a close study of detail, and by bearing in mind Newman's too subtle discrimination in the use of words. Reading between the lines, and asking ourselves, "Who was it that sent the message to the Passionist?" we seem to see the order of events, thus; and, if correct, the explanation shows Newman consistent to the last.

The passage quoted from the later editions of the *Apologia* says that Newman "was in some perplexity what steps to take for being received." It would appear that this "perplexity" included in its scope the *time*, as well as the manner and means, of being "received." Otherwise, how could there have been any "perplexity" as to the "steps" to be taken? Was there not old Father Newsham of St. Clement's, Oxford, who would have been only too happy to receive him, and who, after his conversion, is recorded to have called at Littlemore "perpetually breaking out into ripples of laughter," because, "at last, grace had done its work, and he had as his parishioner at St. Clement's the great Mr. Newman of St. Mary's." True, there was more romance about the Passionist's career, and Newman might prefer to be received by the latter. But, where faith exists, one priest, we must assume, can "receive" a convert as validly as another. And in a question of this kind, "Am I safe, if I die to-night?" it seems incredible that Newman—*if* he had really made up his mind—should have delayed six or seven days risking his eternal salvation on mere points of taste and personal feeling. The inference is that, although Newman had *determined* "to make up his mind," yet his mind was NOT yet made up, and *he could not make it up.**

At this crisis, therefore, Dalgairns urged him at least to let the Passionist give him a call at Littlemore: and he probably represented to Newman that, about this time, the Father was to go to Belgium,* so that he might, without much inconvenience, take Littlemore in the way; and that, even if nothing came of it, there would be no harm in a mere passing visit of that kind. Newman's consent was obtained, but on the express condition that the Father should *not be informed of what was, possibly, pending*, so that Newman might hold himself still free, not committing himself to anything definite. Dalgairns, a recent and fervid convert,* obeyed the letter rather than the spirit, of the condition to which he had bound himself. He did not indeed tell Dominic that he must come at once to "receive" Newman, but he bade him "come *quickly* to Littlemore *to fulfil a work in God's service*." Dominic, who is said to have combined in a singular degree piety and "shrewdness," could hardly fail to understand what this meant, especially as he had probably been already prepared by Dalgairns at Aston for something of the kind. Naturally, therefore, he "set off at the instant."

Whether Newman was afterwards informed by his friend of the nature of the message forwarded to Aston, and of the extent to which he was committed, there is no evidence to show. In any case, the general drift of concurring events now at last determined him to take action which less sceptical and less imaginative minds would have taken years before. On 8 October, while expecting Father Dominic every hour, he wrote a circular letter, which was not to go till he had been formally received. To his Tractarian friends he enumerated the "tokens" above mentioned;—how the Passionist from his youth had been "led to have distinct and direct thoughts, first of the countries of the North, then of England," how, "after thirty years (almost) of waiting," he was sent to this country "without his own act," how Newman saw him last year "for a few minutes on St. John Baptist's day." The letter concludes, "He does not know of my intention ;

but I mean to ask of him admission into the one Fold of Christ. . . . ." In his letter to his sister, with affectionate considerateness, he simply announces his intention, and adds that the letter "will not go till all is over." He spares her the "tokens."

§ 172. *The end:—"Faith and Reason are incompatible, perhaps"*

All was soon over. Newman had laid it down as a rule that men must not act under "exciting, tumultuous conviction." But what was a man to do who *could not* act, in religious matters, under any but "exciting and tumultuous" convictions? What could he do, what could he have done, more, in the way of attempting to act with deliberation and reasonableness? The thing was impossible. He could no more commit himself than Hamlet could, to the awful act before him, in cool deliberation. Hence we can well believe the description of the final scene as Newman's biographers give it, telling us how the Passionist Father arrived late in the evening and amid torrents of rain; how he was shown into a room where he stood for a while alone, drying his drenched garments at the fire; and how, suddenly turning round, he saw the Leader of the Tractarian Party on his knees before him passionately declaring that he would not rise till he had received the Father's blessing and assurance of being received into the one true Church of Christ.

"The Father bade the neophyte rise, 'conscious,' says one of his friends, 'of a great miracle of grace.'" At eleven o'clock, on that same night, Newman, and two other friends, had begun their confession. Alas! in the morning (as usual) the hot excitement had passed away. Once more the soul had fallen beneath the cold spell of mere intellectual conviction ; no fresh " sign " had arrived ; faith was felt to be chilled ; and the following words seem written as if in a dream, with the spiritual faculties all benumbed, yet yearning for the touch that shall release them from their torpor :—

> "I am to be received into what I believe to be the one Church and the one Communion of Saints this evening, if it is so ordained. Father Dominic the Passionist is here, and I have begun my confession to him. I suppose two friends will be received with me.
>
> " May I have only one tenth part as much faith as I have intellectual conviction where the truth lies ! I do not suppose any one can have had such combined reasons pressing in upon him that he is doing right. So far I am most blessed ; but, alas ! my heart is so hard, and I am taking things so much as a matter of course, that I have been quite frightened that I should not have faith and contrition enough to gain the benefit of the Sacrament. Perhaps faith and reason are incompatible in one person or nearly so."

These words about " faith and reason " are perhaps the last committed to paper by Newman before he was formally received into the Roman Church : and not many minutes were to pass before he was destined to give a proof of his sincerity in writing them, and of his determined thoroughness in putting them in practice. The story has been referred to above, but it comes appropriately here on the threshold of the convert's new life. It happened that, in the afternoon, the Office which Father Dominic was to recite with the catechumens, contained " the record of how St. Denis, after his martyrdom, put his head under his arm and walked about." Thinking that this might be " a difficulty to beginners," the Father—says one of Newman's biographers, who derives much of his information from

Littlemore men—would have passed over this incident. But it was no "difficulty" at all to the author of the *Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles.* He had gone so far, now, that returning was more "difficult" than going forward. The only "difficulty" was, that even this simple, uneducated, holy, earnest-minded Italian of peasant birth, should have been himself so far alive to some laws of nature and principles of common sense as to suggest their existence to the late Fellow of Oriel in that solemn moment when the latter desired to offer up that supreme sacrifice which, as he thought, men of intellect can present most acceptably to Almighty God —the sacrifice of the reason and the understanding. *That* was the difficulty for Newman and his friends. It was the Passionist, not the miracle, that was a stumbling-block to them; "in truth," says the biographer, "the neophytes were a little scandalized at *him*, and not at all at it." But like all other difficulties, this too was surmounted. The converts refused to be thus treated as "beginners." The chief of the catechumens insisted that the headless martyr should be allowed to walk in accordance with the Office. That was the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual act—a kind of tragic act. The sacrifice was consummated. Faith—or what seemed Faith—came. Reason at last—after nearly twenty years of struggle—recognized her "incompatibility" and fled for ever.

CHAPTER XL

AFTERWARDS

§ 173. "*Fierceness and Sport,*" again

REASON fled. But in her place came something to which Newman had been for nearly a quarter of a century a stranger, and which he, feeling what he felt, might accept as a welcome substitute. What Protestant or what Agnostic can find it in him to grudge the weary wanderer that almost perfect freedom from religious fears and doubts which he henceforth appears to have enjoyed? How intense must have been the sense of relief with which the conscience henceforth restricted itself to minor duties in a limited area, recognizing that it is not for any individual to play a part in the judgment of religious doctrines! For now, at last, the groper had groped his way to the truth after which he had been feeling, and which, for many years, he had been all but touching, that, whereas † "the supremacy of conscience is the essence of natural religion, the supremacy of Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop, is the essence of revealed."

Is it not pardonable, if, in the rebound from the special depression of the last six weary years, the joyous convert somewhat overstrained and exaggerated the note of complacency? Dean Church describes it as something more than exultation. He speaks of the pain felt by Newman's former followers, who remained in the Church of England, on hearing "from the lips of old friends the most cruel and merciless invectives which knowledge of her weak points, wit, argumentative power, eloquence, and the triumphant exultation, at once of deliverance and superiority, could frame." And certainly, at first sight, it is difficult even for those who make allowance for Newman's sudden variations, to find excuses for some of his utterances after his change of religion. But we have to take into account not only the individual, but the system. "People say," —wrote a Roman convert to Mark Pattison, in 1846 —"that converts are 'cocky'; but that impression arises in part from the fact that they who have it have no more than doubtful evidence for what Catholics have certain proof [of]. This is not a conviction arising from my own case, but from all I see around me. It would be 'cocky' in me to say so: but I don't care what it is, so as I may urge you not to be slow about the '*unum necessarium*' of caring for your own soul." He adds "Depend upon it that you cannot expect more than probability out of the Catholic Church, and that you really ought to act on that, whether you feel inclined to do so or not." Newman himself went further and declared in 1849 that "a convert, if justifiable on the grounds of his conversion, must be an enemy of the Communion he has left, and more intensely so than a foreigner who knows nothing about that Communion at all. You do me injustice," he adds, "if you think . . . . that I speak contemptuously of those who now stand where I have stood myself."

With this explanation, Newman's "cruel and merciless invective" was surely logical, and it was *not*, in a sense, "cruel." In many, perhaps, of his rhetorical ferocities, he set out with the desire to seem, not to be, "cruel." Except perhaps occasionally, when he was carried away by his own rhetoric so that he was half persuaded that he was wholly in earnest, he *did not mean all that he said.* He "*spoke* contemptuously,"—there can be no doubt of that, spite of his denial of it above —but he did not *mean* "contemptuously." As he confessed to Rickards and others, in old days, that he did not mind saying "extreme" things in order that he might drag others on to "the mean," so now, he sometimes said *a little more* than he meant, and that deliberately, in order that the dull souls of the multitude might understand him to mean *just what* he meant. This habit explains his deliberate avowal to Sir W. H. Cope about the tone of the *Apologia.* "A casual reader would think my language denoted anger, but it did not. . . . It would not do to be tame and not to show indignation."

Yet, surely, it would have been better to *be* angry and to *show* he was angry! Was not he bound to be angry with the adversary who, as he maintained, had called him "a liar and knave" to his face, and of whom, in return, he had declared that his "word of honour" was equivalent to nothing?* As one who desires to take the most favourable view of Newman's sincerity, I prefer to believe that—in the case last mentioned—he *was* angry, and that, after Kingsley's death, looking back at the signal triumph he had (for the time) obtained, he *thought* that he had not been angry, though he really *had* been. In other words, here, as in his previous life, he may have given "different reasons at different times for what he had said."

I do not know whether this consideration aggravates or extenuates the seemingly "cruel" words which he hurled, as a Romanist, against his former Anglican friends. Ought we not to feel impatient when a man, who himself waited on and on in the hope of some "sign" or "token," delaying to quit the Church of his Fathers long after he had received a clear conviction that it was in a state of schism, afterwards expresses his astonishment that others, still in the position in which he once was, do not do at once what he took so long to do? Under no circumstances could Newman be called "cocky"; but there is perhaps a deliberate audacity in the tone in which—to that same friend to whom he had confessed that "faith and reason" were perhaps nearly "incompatible"—he writes: "You have, excuse me, no pretence to say you follow the Church of England." Part of his proselytizing novel entitled *Loss and Gain* is said by his most sympathetic biographer to be "a shade too farcical." Some would go further and say, perhaps, that parts of it degenerated into something like buffoonery. But farce, pardonable in a novel, is less excusable in controversial Lectures. There, it may almost commit the speaker to the appearance of saying what he knows not to be true. Take, for example, the following. "No sober man, I suppose, dreams of denying that, if the National Church be impure and unapostolical now, it has no claim to be called, 'pure and apostolical' last year, or twenty years back, or for any part of the period since the Reformation,"—where he practically denies "sobriety" to his dearest friend Hurrell Froude for dreaming of the age of "the

Nonjurors," and "the Anglo-Catholic divines" as "apostolical." Elsewhere, after disposing of popular English prejudices against Rome, he approaches higher arguments against her, and this is what he says of them:—

> "Doubtless there are arguments of a different calibre, whatever their worth, which weigh against Catholics with half a-dozen members of the University, with the speculative church-restorer, with the dilettante divine, with the fastidious scholar, and with some others of a higher character of mind; whether St. Justin Martyr said this or that; whether images should be dressed in muslin, or hewed out of stone; what criticism makes of a passage in the Prophets—questions such as these, and others of a more serious cast, may be conclusive for or against the Church in the study or in the lecture-room, but they have no influence with the many."

It is not creditable that so thin a plank as "and others of a more serious cast," should be the only intervention between the words used, which are just consistent with honesty, and other words which would be inconsistent. Again, he almost imputes to some of his old friends a kind of utterance of false coin in the following passage, "The principle of those writers was this; an infallible authority is necessary; we have it not; for the Prayer Book is all we have got. But since we have got nothing better we must use it as infallible." What is this but, "Sterling coin is necessary; we have it not; for base metal is all we have got. But since we have got nothing better, we must use it as if it were sterling coin"? Does not such a charge savour of the Old Bailey?

Perhaps however the following is still worse:

> "Though it is impossible to bring the matter fairly to an issue, yet for that very reason, I have as much a right to my opinion as another to his, when I state my deliberate conviction that there are, to

say the least, as many offences against the marriage vow among Protestant Ministers, as there are against the vow of celibacy among Catholic Priests."

It would have been quite right and just to say that Protestant notions on this point exaggerated the evil; or did not discriminate between this and that part of the Continent; or attributed to modern times the vices of medievalism. But as it stands, this passage betokens a wilful blindness. The reader may refer above to the impressions formed by Newman and his friend Froude about the morality of the Romanist clergy in Sicily and Naples. Would Newman have maintained that, if he had been an Italian, a short visit to any part of England would have given him the same impressions about Protestant Ministers? He had not much to go upon; but what he had did not justify a statement that is, besides, against nature and against history. In Protestant Churches has it ever been found necessary to pass canons excluding from the houses of Ministers all women except their mothers, sisters, or aunts, and sometimes excluding even these? Yet, while defending the restrictions which have contributed to make such frightful regulations necessary, Newman can venture to say, "It is not what the Catholic Church imposes but what human nature prompts, which leads any portion of her ecclesiastics into sin" * !

Perhaps, however, Protestants hardly make enough allowance for the exaltation of mind consequent upon introduction into a new atmosphere where there is no doubt at all about anything which the Church decrees to be right or true. In recompense for the ability to believe anything soever that Authority might bid him believe, ought we to be surprised that the convert placed all his faculties at the disposal of the Roman system? Why should Dean Church blame the tone of "exultation and superiority"? He *did* exult; he *did* feel superior. That being the case, why should not his words express the facts? The only blame to be brought against him would be if, here and there, his language expressed *more than the facts.* And even if this was so, we have to consider how great and sudden was the change, how likely to lead to inflation of language.

Let us place ourselves in Newman's position on the morning of 8 October, 1845. At present we do not believe in Transubstantiation. But in twelve hours, or twenty-six hours at most, we shall believe not only in that—a miracle that cannot be verified or contradicted by experience, and therefore comparatively easy to accept—but in any legend, however grotesque, that the Church may impose upon us, possibly even in any that it may commend to us. What wonder, then, if, when we thus become new beings, all things become new to us, yes, and all persons as well? It was now with Newman, as it was when the *Via Media* was in its beginnings and he was its prophet. Then he renounced his brother, and put it "upon a syllogism"; he was so changed, he tells us, that people who had known him before, met him in the street and "did not well know that it was" he. All this was now being re-enacted. He was really the same as before; but his Anglican friends could not "know" him. Now, as then, his behaviour "had a mixture in it both of fierceness and of sport." We may also add what follows in the *Apologia*, "It gave offence to many." Probably, too, if Newman had written an account of this period of his life, he would have said, about this phase of it, what he says about the other: "nor am I here defending it."

§ 174. "*The Home of Christian Mirth*"

In time, the fervour of the neophyte passed away and—but for an occasional outburst or two, more or less deliberate and calculated—Newman grew mellow with old age and settled down into that gentle quietude which he had not cheaply purchased. By a singular and surprising turn of things, the close of his Romanist career proved almost unromantically cheerful, agreeable—one may almost say, mirthful. There is a kind of irony in the destiny which made Newman, the austere Anglican, at St. Mary's preach a severe asceticism, and warn the young Oxford undergraduates that Adversity is a Note of the Church, and that they must look to it lest they should have forfeited the privilege of affliction:—and then, as a Romanist, in the Oratory at Birmingham, take to a life that had no pretence of asceticism, which indeed "was not contemplated by the Oratory Rules."* His prayer for himself and his friends, he said, was, not for those heavy trials some saints have asked for—persecution, calumny, reproach—but simply that they might be overlooked, passed over as members of the crowd. Those who knew him at this time have testified to the width and versatility of his tastes and interests—the delight which he could derive from a good story from *Pickwick*, or from one of Miss Austen's novels; the fund of anecdote, wit, and humour with which he enlivened the social evenings of the Oratorians over their coffee; the youthful enthusiasm with which he would throw himself into a musical entertainment, or assist the boys in getting up a play, or rehearsing a play of Terence, and the almost excessive histrionic power with which he would represent a drunken slave, or a cunning parasite, or a passionate young lover; and all this is the more delightful because there was nothing in it that was not in conformity with the Rule of the Patron of his order, St. Philip Neri.

The object of St. Philip was to put the theory and the practice of the Roman Church before unbelievers in a mild, genial, persuasive, and, we may almost say, worldly fashion, so as to insinuate it even into somewhat carnal and pleasure-loving minds. The Principal of the Birmingham Oratory has himself thus sung (alas, "sung"? or "said"?) the praises of his Patron:—

> "This is the Saint, who, when the world allures us,
> Cries her false wares, and opes her magic coffers,
> Points to a better city, and secures us
> With richer offers."

St. Philip himself appears to have been an ascetic, according to Protestant notions, as we may judge from Newman's "song" (or shall we say "verses?") on the Saint:—

> "If scanty my fare, yet how was he fed?
> On olives and herbs and a small roll of bread.
> Are my joints and bones sore with aches and with pains?
> Philip scourged his young flesh with fine iron chains.
>
> "A closet his home, where he, year after year,
> Bore heat or cold greater than heat or cold here;
> A rope stretch'd across it, and o'er it he spread
> His small stock of clothes; and the floor was his bed."*

But perhaps this last poem was intended to help the young Oratorians to bear a simple and non-luxurious life by contrasting it with their Patron's superior self-denial. Perhaps the most interesting feature of all in St. Philip's system, and the one which ought most to make us rejoice to find Newman conforming to it, was the stress which he appears to have laid on "love." During his early Anglican career, Newman, it will be remembered, put "love" far off, as being, at that time, a luxury, and laid stress on the necessity of "hate." But now, if he was duly imitating his Patron, he must have altered his thoughts :—

> "Love is his bond, he knows no other fetter,
> Asks not our all, but takes whate'er we spare him,
> Willing to draw us on from good to better,
> As we can bear him."

It is refreshing to read that, amid these peaceful pursuits, the English St. Philip seems to have found his heart more open than in the earlier part of his Roman career, to those whose religious opinions differed from his own. He was very free, we are told, in his readiness to give his blessing to, or to say mass for, Protestants ; always strong on the "good faith," or "invincible ignorance," of pious people "who died outside the Church ; and one would almost have supposed that, in his judgment, they lost nothing on that account." Here, then, we may take leave of this once anxious seeker after a system of salvation ; nor shall we have the heart to say, "*Talis cum sis, utinam noster esses.*" On the contrary, for his own sake, as well as for ours, we must say, though with regret, that it was well that he should go out from among us because "he was not of us."

One of his pupils at the Oratory has thus described the sacrifice demanded from the followers of St. Philip :—"'A man's perfection,' taught St. Philip Neri, 'lies in the space of three lines' and, so saying he placed his fingers on his forehead. It was 'mental asceticism,' what the Italians bluntly call 'the sacrifice of the Intellect,' that was demanded of Newman as an Oratorian priest." To a similar effect is Newman's eulogy of the Order of the Jesuits written but a few days before his joining the Church of Rome:—"It may fairly be questioned whether, in an intellectual age, when freedom both of thought and of action is so dearly prized, a greater penance can be devised for the soldier of Christ than the absolute surrender of judgment and will to the command of another." To this effect, also, was his last utterance on his Anglican death-bed, which avowed the probable incompatibility of faith and reason. For one who thought thus, it was better, perhaps, that "reason" should be sacrificed. At all events, it was better that, having been once slain, it should not rise again. What friend of Newman, what friend of humanity, could wish that it had been otherwise, or could have desired that in the later days of a prolonged life he should have felt one momentary misgiving at the course to which he was irrevocably committed? Nevertheless, sympathize with him as we may, we are not precluded from feeling a sense of relief, and even a sense of fitness, when he carries his convictions beyond the pale of the English Church. Such sacrifices as he consummated are not of an English —I trust, not of an Anglican, atmosphere.

Newman never repented, never looked back with sorrow. Strange perversity, nay, happy perversity of things! The contemplated Anglo-Catholic monastery at Littlemore suggests to us tentative gropings in the dark after a truth that seemed to evade the touch; confused and almost chaotic wanderings of thought; agonizing searchings of heart—yes, almost too much of the New Testament Blessing of Adversity and

Privilege of Affliction; but in the Oratory at Birmingham the Principal will find liberally poured out upon him not only that peace which comes from a confidence, first in Ecclesiastical, and then (for Newman will live to see that "Development") in Papal Infallibility, but a rich measure also of the Old Testament Blessing of Prosperity, and gladness of heart, and cheerfulness of countenance. To that we now leave him. There, in his new home, he will do a work worthy of the English St. Philip: he will "put from him monastic rule and authoritative speech, as David refused the armour of the King." No state, no dignity, for him. He will be but an ordinary individual priest as others; and his weapons shall be "but unaffected humility and unpretending love." All he does will be done "by the light and fervour and convincing eloquence of his personal character and his easy conversation."

In these words did Newman at once describe the life of his Patron and predict his own faithful imitation of it. We cannot but linger over the strange contrast between his past and his future. In the hard, cold, "austere" Oxford days, he had once, after the manner of John the Baptist, rebuked the young Oxonians for venturing to rejoice in the Lord, and, prophet-like, had chidden the priests of his people for "dropping one whole side of Christianity, its austere character"; but now he himself will, with such a delicate geniality and unworldly worldliness commend the non-austere side of the Roman System to his countrymen, that he will even be suspected by some of his own Church to be minimizing the claims of religion. Following in the joyous path of his Italian patron he will make it his object that "his room shall go by the agreeable nickname of 'the Home of Christian Mirth.'" Yet let none suppose that in this peaceful and pleasurable retirement he will not be doing good service for the Church of his adoption. The good taste and good feeling which will make him sometimes abstain from attempts to proselytize in his old age, when strangers come to consult him, will probably be far more destructive of anti-Roman prejudices than all the mordant irony and cruel wit of the *Lectures on Anglicanism.* Not even his most jealous rivals in the Church of Rome will be able to deny that he is still a champion militant for them, wearing the light armour of St. Philip Neri with effectiveness as well as with vivacity and grace. It will not be magnificent ; but it will be war.

With what words shall we Protestants, to whom he will be, henceforth, theologically dead, bid our fascinating enemy a final farewell, as we escort him to his tomb ? If we regard the strange story of his ever-circling yet ever-narrowing career as a history, not of a "quintessence of dust," but of that "piece of work called man," so "noble in reason," so "infinite in faculty," and "in apprehension so like a god," we can honestly call it by no other name than a Soul's Tragedy. Yet it is a tragedy with compensations ; it is one in which the end brings with it a mournful yet resigned recognition of necessity, fitness, and retribution. It is not as we would have it : but, things being what they were, it could not have been otherwise. We would have managed the play better, of course. We would have made Hamlet kill his uncle like a soldier and a gentleman, marry Ophelia like a lover, and die a respected King of Denmark. But the great Artist decreed otherwise ; and we cannot help liking his Hamlet better than we should have liked our own. Some things our tragic heroes have taught us to do ; some things to abstain from doing. Let us be grateful for both. Turning the last page of this drama of spiritual involution, we may feel inclined to give a religious tone to our good-bye. Yet, somehow, we cannot like a tribute paid in the language of Scripture. It is enough to have recognized that, in the centre, though not in the precincts, of his heart, there was some spark of that vitalizing faculty which he called "trust," and which partially redeemed what he called his "faith." But we cannot bid him farewell in the phrases of St. Paul or Luther.

Insensibly we fall back again into scenic language. We are the Chorus in a Greek play. Poor, blind, old Œdipus, after all his harrowing adventures, has now at last received honourable burial, and his tomb will be henceforth a shrine. He has passed through horrors, such as no mortal could have chosen. Still, it is over now, and he is a name, at least in literature, for more than one generation. Cast out from what he deemed the fogs of his native Bœotia he has migrated to a more serene air, where strangers will make much of him. Why not? Stolid Bœotians as we are, we bear him no grudge. We forget his curses, we remember nothing but his sufferings. The play is finished; we are marching off the stage, and we sing in the words which the Poet has put into our mouths, "Break off, and mourn no longer; for of a truth these things are fitly decreed and fixed for ever."

THE MORAL

§ 1. *Positive*

What has been gained by the English nation and the English Church from a man who, whatever may be his defects, is felt by many to have had that rare and precious quality which we call genius? A little of this keeps a whole century alive. It is therefore to be treasured and made the most of for public as well as for private use. What have we here to treasure?

The same biography of the Cardinal which tells us of the story of resolute faith in the legend of St. Denis, describes him on its title-page as "The Founder of Modern Anglicanism"; yet, among their debts to Newman, would modern Anglicans recognize such a faith as this? Again, Newman himself habitually said, both publicly and in private, that Tractarianism was indebted for its first rapid and startling successes to something "in the air." By this he meant (and sometimes specified in detail) the influences of the poets, the novelists, the growing reaction from English insularity, and a general tendency to thoughts and theories of life, deeper and fuller than those of the 18th century. That there were influences at work, favouring Tractarianism, none can deny, although perhaps Newman somewhat exaggerated them, even to the extent of underrating his own part in the work. Much, very much, was doubtless due to the attractiveness and incisiveness with which he, at the outset, placed the objects of the Movement before the public; much also to the indefinite and indescribable personal influence by which he pressed workers into his ranks, and infected them with his own zeal. But on the other side we have to set the uneasiness, at first, and the division, at last, which Newman's undermining restlessness and ever-innovating subtlety caused in the ranks of his own Party; and, in particular, the terrible shock which Tract 90 gave to thousands, clergy, laity, Anglicans, and Dissenters. Hence rose that long-enduring suspicion of "Jesuitism" which the author of the Tract bequeathed as his legacy to the Party which he was soon to leave. Then came his secession to Rome, a terrible blow, sufficient—one might have supposed—to destroy the Tractarian hopes root and branch. As if that were not enough, in later years, their versatile Chief, turning on his own friends with merciless irony, rhetorically demolished them. He proved, if rhetoric could prove, that they had no right even to exist, and, being, so to speak, their spiritual parent, he ought to have known. If they were not destroyed, must there not have been something in their favour over and above a leader of irregular and uncontrollable genius? Was there not something indeed "in the air," the "stars in their courses" fighting on the Tractarian side?

That they were not destroyed, is a matter, for some, of regret: for others, of exultation; for all, of certainty. They not only exist but flourish. Why is this? May it not be perhaps, because the New Anglicanism, while not going all lengths with its so-called Founder in the depreciation of Reason, has learned (and from him in part) to develop other and wider religious faculties besides those exercised by Evangelicalism? It has made common people dimly perceive that like "the English Constitution," so, too, the "Christian Church" is an organic whole, a growth; not to be hastily discarded, or remade on paper, but to be studied with reverence, and to have lessons derived from it for present and future use. This, too, some have perceived, not only about the Church as a whole, but also about the English Church, which, with all its anomalies, they have come to regard with a mingled spiritual and patriotic affection, as a great national fact, a home of religious freedom and religious common-sense, suited to England and worth making an effort to retain and (some would add) from time to time to reform. Directing the minds of men to these broad and general views the New Anglicanism has probably done good service in diverting them from the study of critical theology till the time should arrive when criticism, commanding a wider field, would at once be ampler, truer, and more temperate, and when Faith, resting on a more solid foundation of indisputable fact, and more confident in her ultimate conclusions, would be more patiently and willingly receptive of the demonstrations, and even the suggestions, of Reason. It has also given to English religion—which had been somewhat bourgeois and gross—a spirit, if sometimes austere, at least unworldly.

Again, has not the New Anglicanism, though with results of mingled good and evil, been unconsciously advancing on lines laid down by Nature? It attempts, at least, to include (and this it may have learned from Newman) the whole of life, and to bring all sorts and conditions of men within its scope. It tries to cover the year with Saints' days, feasts, memorials; the day with appointed "hours" for religious devotions. It endeavours to make all life nominally and formally sacramental. It does not think scorn to learn from Rome methods of appealing to the imagination, to the hopes, and sometimes to the fears, of the unlearned and sensuous multitude, who cannot reason, or compare, or judge, but can feel, and can dimly discern invisible possibilities through visible signs, rites, and ceremonies. Newman knew well, and taught his followers, that no man can be said to *know* anything of religious importance till he has *done* something in consequence of it. So far as he imbued his party with this very practical truth he helped them to success. Whatever is *done* regularly, in the definite name of religion, drives a nail through the character, and fixes a man in his adherence to what he professes.

Of course a great deal depends upon how it is done. God, as some old Father said, "cares more for adverbs than for verbs." One convert may beat a big drum, or start a hymn in the presence of an angry crowd; another may fast; another may give away a tenth of his income in offertories; another may regularly attend early communion; and if all these actions are done simply upon the authority of some spiritual director, without a particle of love for Him in whose name Christians are supposed to do what they do, the doer merely forms a habit of trusting and obeying the *authority*, not Him. Yet some of the actions most enjoined by the Christian Churches are of such a kind that a man can hardly do them regularly without catching something of the spirit in which they ought to be done. One reason why the High Church may have progressed, while Evangelicals have relatively stood still,—may it not be this : that whereas the latter have refrained from enjoining *deeds*, the former have recognized that "doing" is an appointed method of forming a habit, and of learning an art, and among other arts, the art of living rightly ?

§ 2. *Negative*

I have confined myself to those points of the New Anglicanism, in which it seems indebted to Newman. There are others where no such debt can be acknowledged. So far as Anglicans have rebelled against ignoble fears,* narrowing limitations, and the yoke of the letter of the Scripture, we are indebted to other sources. And against Newman's benefits must be set, besides other evils, a confusion as to the meaning and province of faith for which he appears largely responsible. By doing good acts we gain insight into, and faith in, goodness. Learning to love it and trust it, we learn to love and trust the Author of it, and dimly to perceive that His love is illimitable. But a world of such acts would not enable us to learn whether oxygen and hydrogen make air or water ; or whether Anglican Priests and Bishops have preserved the chain of Apostolical Succession without a link unbroken ; or whether Christ was born in Nazareth or Bethlehem. For ascertaining such facts as these, theologians have other faculties bestowed on them ; and we are bound to use them, wherever such facts are seriously and disinterestedly questioned.

No doubt, faith plays a part, indirectly, in all the most important human affairs. Among helps to weighing evidence, comes knowledge of human nature ; the want of which makes a fool believe every one, and a cynic believe no one. Thus, a moral element steps into our judgments about some kinds of evidence, and hence into our judgment about the truth or falsehood of facts; and so it is possible that a man might argue that "God *could* not allow us to be mistaken about Apostolical Succession, or about the place of the birth of Christ." But, on the other hand, we find that God *has* allowed men to make all sorts of mistakes about Him; and these men, not only heathen but Christian; and these facts, not only secular but religious; that is to say historical facts, or facts of nature, recorded in our religious books: so that, on the whole, His principle (if we may so say) appears to have been that by the honest use of *all* our faculties we should gradually, but only gradually, arrive at higher and higher stages of all kinds of knowledge. This being the case, what reason have we for thinking that fasting and almsgiving—though they *must* teach us self-denial, and *may* strengthen us in benevolence—will teach us any more about Biblical or Ecclesiastical history than about chemistry or geology? It is in vain that some theologians still, even in these days, protest that they will resolutely believe in the literal inspiration of the Bible, and will trust to God to guide their steps, believing that such docility must be acceptable to Him. Such faith as this is excusable in the multitude: but in the trained theologian it is, at best, a blindness; at the worst, a sin against the Light. Yet such was Newman's, in part, blindness, in part, perhaps, something worse, which led him to declare as his last Anglican utterance, that "faith and reason were perhaps incompatible or nearly so," and, as his last Anglican act, to demand to be allowed to signify his belief in a patent falsehood.

The taint of this legacy still clings to Anglicanism. And, with the increase of our knowledge of the material world, of the history of religions, and of human nature, it is becoming more and more dangerous. There are signs, however, that the rising generation of High Churchmen may free themselves from it. Besides recognizing the danger of committing Christianity to an internecine strife with nature, some of them appear to be catching a glimpse of a far nobler truth—the spiritual naturalness of the Christian religion. As our faith is adapting itself to the new knowledge of science, so it must adapt itself to our new knowledge of humanity. I do not mean merely its physiology, but its aspirations, visions, imaginations, the processes of its noblest spiritual actions. For want of right notions about faith, and respect for the teaching of facts, some Anglicans appear to be in danger of errors which St. Paul might have called "Judaizing." Newman was certainly a "Judaizer."

The religion of Christ as set forth in the First Chapter of the Fourth Gospel is pre-eminently a *natural* religion, natural, at least, to those who recognize—as Moses and Plato taught—that there is nothing more like God than a good and just man. Why are some Christians so frightened of facts? Why, with all the aids that Christ has given them, can they not endure to see life whole, the evil as well as the good, and why can they not be certain (in the strength of Christ) that the good, in the end, will triumph? Again, what is there so alarming in the most negative views of advanced criticism? I mean, of course, historical criticism, which deals with facts and with intermediate causes, that is to say, true criticism. I do not mean that hybrid pseudo-scientific criticism—which really *is* faith (of a bad sort) though it calls itself science—which would presume to dogmatize about the ultimate causes and motives of things. But, having in mind true and fair criticism of the facts of the New Testament and the History of the Church, I do not see how the full and hearty acceptance of it can prevent a man's heart from going forth to Jesus of Nazareth as being Light of Light, God of God, very God of very God—infinitely more "the very God" than that false phantom of a non-human Christ which haunted Newman like a nightmare, "the Judge severe, e'en in the Crucifix."

Never will such worship as this be shaken by a belief that, when our Lord was upon earth, His finite wisdom, science, prescience, and judgment, were not proportioned to the infinity of His love. Still less will men be repelled by doubts concerning this or that detail of His life, death, and resurrection. They will *expect* errors in all human accounts about these things, as they expect to find light refracted in passing through the atmosphere in which they breathe. They will worship Him, in part, at least, because He has helped them to see that human nature at its best is divine and most worthy of all things to be worshipped; and the more they study and exercise the noblest faculties of humanity, so much the more natural will their worship become.

Thus having nature for their teacher they will grow in reverence for facts and in detestation of lies, and in the end they will find that, whatever facts they may be compelled to deny though they once asserted them, or to assert though they once denied them, they will have lost nothing which is essential to the highest, noblest, and most vitalizing faith. "Fact is corrupting—it is we who correct it by the persistence of our ideal":—is that quite true? Facts *are* corrupting—to a corrupt mind; not to one that hears in them God's Word teaching us what to love and hate. Facts are divine voices; facts cleanse and cool our heated and defiled imaginations; by constant reference to facts we keep our aspirations sane, and our religion honest and sincere; depart from facts, and the ecclesiastic remakes humanity on his monastic pattern and God as the great Archmonk; without facts, ever kept in view, worship becomes hypocrisy or hysterics, and conscience alternates between the inflation of a false prophet and the self-conviction of a morbid hollowness; shut your eyes to facts and you open the inward eye to all manner of servile terrors and creeping fears and diabolical phantoms; through facts, with love and hope and faith as our guides, we pass upward, exchanging the illusive for the less and less illusive, till we draw near to the truth itself, which alone can make us free.

Newman spoke of facts as "illusions"; but he treated them as "delusions." In this belief, he did not so much neglect them as scorn them and take a delight in trampling on them. Hence, though he would take incredible pains not to contradict a Father or a Divine, he wrote as if he enjoyed flying in the face of Nature and History. Sometimes he wrote as an egotist, regarding himself as under the special care of a Providence that would not let him go wrong, and would enable him to do in six months what an ordinary man could not do in six years; sometimes he wrote as one who despised himself, calling himself "hollow," histrionic, a mere "rhetorician," with no "convictions" of his own, hopeless of "possessing the truth." In either case, the result was the same. Beneath an exquisite varnish or veneer of style, the real work was always rough and slovenly and bad. Why not? Why take so much pains about facts, and evidences, and the like, when perhaps the Unknown Artist, in whose hands he was a mere instrument, wished him *not* to take pains, *not* to be elaborate about facts and minutely careful as to evidences, but to content himself with rough and almost random work—"antecedent probabilities," "presumptions," "guesses"—leaving it to *Him* to produce "conviction"?

> "There's a Divinity that shapes our ends,
> Rough-hew them how we will."

There is indeed. But still we, too, have our part, which may well task all our faculties. It may be done thoroughly, seasonably, deliberately, persistently. In one word, it may be workmanlike. And the "shaping" of the "Divinity"—may it not depend upon our "rough-hewing"? So at least Hamlet found it; so, perhaps, did Newman; so may others. If writing about facts is to be our "rough-hewing," we may do well to beware lest it be too "rough." Newman has left us something to imitate, much more to avoid. Our debt to him is negative rather than positive. Not to despise God's facts, and not to be afraid of God's justice, are the two great lessons to be learned by all Englishmen, but especially by English theologians, from Newman's Anglican career.

NOTES

NOTES TO THE SECOND VOLUME

THE following abbreviations are used:—A. = *Apologia* (Newman's); C. = Church's *Oxford Movement;* E. T. M. = Mr. E. T. Mozley's *Reminiscences;* Eluc. = Newman's *Elucidations of Hampden's Bampton Lectures;* Exp. = *Expositor* (Papers in, by Mr. A. W. Hutton); F. = Mr. Fletcher's *Cardinal Newman;* F. W. N. = Professor F. W. Newman's *Early Life of Cardinal Newman;* H. = Hare's (Julius Charles) *Charges;* H. B. L. = Hampden's Bampton Lectures[1]; J. M. = James Mozley's *Letters;* K. = *Keble*, *Life of*, by Right Hon. Sir J. T. Coleridge; L. = *Letters* (Newman's); O. = Mr. Oldcastle's *Cardinal Newman;* P. = *Poems* (Newman's); Phil. = "*Philomythus*," by the author; R. = *Remains of R. H. Froude*, vol. i.; R. H. H. = Mr. R. H. Hutton's *Cardinal Newman;* S. = *Sermons* (Newman's) *Plain and Parochial* (in the first three vols. the earliest edition has been used); Subj. = *Sermons* (Newman's) *on Subjects of the Day;* T. = Thirlwall's (Bishop) *Charges;* U. = *University Sermons* (Newman's); V. = *Via Media* (Newman's); W. = *Ward*, *Life of*, by Mr. Wilfrid Ward; Wh. = *Whately*, *Life of*, by Miss Whately; W. M. = Mr. Wilfrid Meynell's *Cardinal Newman.*

Arabic numerals indicate the page; Roman, the volume. But in reference to the *Plain and Parochial Sermons*, the first Arabic numeral indicates the number of the sermon, and the second, the number of the page. Passages from the *first three* volumes of these sermons are quoted from the *first* edition; but the *number* of the sermon will enable the possessor of the later editions to verify without much difficulty.

Where the date of a letter is given in the text, the reference to the page of Newman's Letters is sometimes omitted in the Notes, as the letters are almost all in chronological order.

The letters a, b, c, &c. after the number of a page in the text, refer to the first, second, third, &c. paragraphs in the text. Thus, "124 (c), S. ii. 12, 143," would mean that in the third paragraph of page 124, there is a reference to the *Sermons* (*Plain and Parochial*), vol. ii., number 12, page (1st ed.) 143.

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[1] I. W. = Isaac Williams's *Autobiography* (1892), which has been used in revising the Notes: he was, for some years, Newman's curate, and on affectionate terms with him till his death in 1865.

CHAPTER XIX (1833–36)

1 (a) C. 113–4; 3 (a) "one who has a right to judge." Mr. Gladstone (W. M. 19); 3 (b) W. M. 19–20; 6 (a) L. ii. 434; 7 (a) W. M. 35; 8 (a) St. Paul, *Rom.* i. 16–18; 11 (b) S. V. 20. 290, 3 March 1839; 12 (a) "Gifts of Civilization," p. 48.

16 (a)* "grovelling worms." I am inclined to think that the late Bishop of Carlisle (*Contemporary*, Jan. 1892) touched the radical cause of Newman's religious fears in saying that Newman attributed to Jesus of Nazareth such attributes as tend to destroy His humanity and remove Him from our affection, so that we need a second Mediator to reveal Jesus to us.

Hence, besides confessing in the Poems that he can never cease to look on Jesus as "the Judge severe e'en in the Crucifix," he regards the "gift of power" as being possessed by Him, not in order that He might manifest His love to men by healing their diseases, but that He "may be feared" (U. 86–7). He speaks of Christ's manifesting Himself to but a few after His resurrection, not as though it were a spiritual necessity arising from the law of Faith, but as if Christ (like some Chinese Emperor or King of Siam) stood upon royal ceremony: S. i. 23. 295–312, "Kings do not court the multitude . . . they act by means of their servants and must be *sought* by those who would gain favour from them. . . . He was no longer a servant, washing His disciples' feet and dependent" [was He *ever* "dependent"?] "upon the wayward will of the multitude. . . . As kings have their days of state, on which they show themselves publicly to their subjects, so the Lord appointed a meeting." So again (ib. 304–5) "In the feelings of inferiors towards superiors fear must ever go before love. Till he who has authority shows he has it and can use it, his forbearance will not be valued duly; his kindness will look like weakness." In other words we cannot love Christ as a Redeemer until we fear Him as a Forbearer. Still more striking is the following (Subj. 139): "The truth is, we Christians know too much concerning Him to endure the open manifestation of His greatness. It is in mercy that He hides Himself from those who could be overcome by the sensible touch of the Almighty Hand. . . . The very secrecy of His coming has its solemnity: is it not fearful to wait for Him, appalling to receive Him, a burden to have held communion with Him?"

The very next sentence tells us that we are to feel "joy" in Him; and all Newman's sermons are full of such incongruities. But the passages quoted describe his fundamental feeling that Christ is "the Judge severe."

I am speaking, of course, simply of Newman's Anglican period. I have noted indications that in the course of his Roman period he shook off something of this feeling, and something also of that essentially anti-Christian sense of spiritual solitude which pervaded his Anglican career. *Cor cordi loquitur*, was the motto he chose, as Cardinal. Contrast this with the note on 30 (a) below.

CHAPTER XX (1836)

22 (a) E. T. M. ii. 147; 23 (a) L. ii. 193; 23 (c) L. ii. 192; 29 (b) S. iv. 20. 300; 30 (a)* Comp. S. i. 2. 23, "And as to those others nearer to us, who are not to be classed with the vain world, I mean our friends and relations, whom we are right in loving, these too, after all, are nothing to us here. They cannot really help or profit us; we see them and they act upon us, only as it were at a distance, through the medium of sense; they cannot get at our souls; they cannot enter into our thoughts, or really be companions to us."

This dreary doctrine—fatal to true Christianity—he calls "sublime, unlooked for." He deduces it (ib. 22) from "the nothingness of the world" which, at length "floats before our eyes merely as some idle veil, which, notwithstanding its many tints, cannot hide the view of what is beyond it;—and we begin, by degrees, to perceive that there are but two beings in the whole universe, our own soul and the God who made it."

30 (a) L. ii. 75; 31 (a) S. ii. 18. 239; 31 (c)* "'trust' not 'faith.'" To Froude (L. ii. 220) of Jan. 1830, he speaks of "vows" (of Celibacy) as, possibly, "evidences of want of *faith*." Revising the letter as a Romanist, he twice corrects "faith" by substituting "trust." There are many indications that he would have accepted this correction, long before he joined the Church of Rome.

33 (a) "Never saw his congregation." Mr. A. W. Hutton (Exp. 1890, p. 237) quotes this as a statement made to him by Newman himself.

CHAPTER XXI (1836)

37 (a)* "It would oblige me," he says (L. ii. 16), "to take up a line of reading somewhat out of my present course; yet it might be the means of giving me influence with the undergraduates." This was the time when he ought to have been systematically studying the Anglican divines.

38 (a) L. ii. 170; 39 (a)* "till 1836." E. T. M. (i. 352) says that Newman, when pressed by Rose to answer Hampden's Lectures, declined owing to the "personal question," *i.e.* his having been supplanted in the Oriel tutorship by Hampden, which, of course, would make N. unwilling to resort to an action that might be imputed to malignity. The same author afterwards (ib. 369) adds that "Newman also had looked into" the Lectures. But all this comes under the general date of 1836. And on the whole it rather confirms, than otherwise, the supposition that, up to 1836, if he had read the Lectures at all, N. had merely "looked into them," but possibly that he had not even done that, and that he did not "look into them" till the eve of the *Elucidations*. There is a significant contrast between "studying" and "looking into" in the following (ib. 368–9): "When Hampden was appointed Regius Professor his lectures were almost as unknown a book at Oxford as Goddard's. The Provost of Oriel no doubt had *followed and studied them*, and had probably *gone some way with them*, Newman also had *looked into them*."

39 (b)† "tone of piety." (In L. ii. 77) it is printed (except as regards the italics) thus: "While I respect the tone of piety *in which the pamphlet is written, I feel an aversion to the principles it professes as (in my opinion) legitimately tending to formal Socinianism.* I also lament," &c. In the *Apologia* (57), after "piety," it runs thus: "*which the pamphlet displays, I dare not trust myself to put on paper my feelings about the principles contained in it; tending as they do in my opinion to make shipwreck of Christian faith.* I also lament," &c.

41 (a)* "title of his lecture." It was *The Scholastic Philosophy considered in relation to Christian Theology.*

43 (b) H. B. L. lxvi.; 46 (a) *Eluc.* 5; 46 (b) *Eluc.* 6; 46 (c) *Eluc.* 40; 47 (a) *Edinburgh Review*, 1836, p. 220; 47 (b) H. B. L. 145–7; 49 (a)* "is not revealed." *Eluc.* 14, "As to the doctrine of the Trinity, Dr. H. holds that Scripture contains certain phenomena concerning the dealings of the Supreme Being with man, which, when compared together, are remarkable and startling, and irresistibly force upon the mind that there is *some* mystery in the divine nature; but what that mystery is, or that it is the very mystery which the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity expresses, is, he considers, NOT REVEALED." The italics are Newman's, the capitals mine.

This is particularly audacious, in the face of Hampden's statement (quoted above on p. 47): "No one can be more convinced than I am that there is *a real* mystery of God *revealed* in the Christian dispensation"!

Newman himself—with his notions about "economies," and "accommodations to our weakness"—would (I should say) be more open than Hampden to the charge (if it is to be made a charge) of reducing Scripture to a record of "phenomena."

49 (b) H. B. L. 149–50.

CHAPTER XXII (1836)

57 (b*) "three such unnoticed omissions." *Eluc.* pp. 24–5. The following passage from Hampden (251–2) is quoted by Newman with the italicized portions omitted, but *with no marks of omission*: "God, no doubt, is abundantly placable, merciful, and forgiving. Still, the fact remains. [*The offender is guilty; his crime may be forgiven, but his criminality is still upon him. The remorse which he feels, the wounds of his conscience, are no fallacious things. He is sensible of them even while the Gospel tells him—'Thy sins be forgiven thee—Go and sin no more.'*] The heart seeks for reparation and satisfaction: its longings are, that its sins may be no more remembered, that the characters in which it is written may be blotted out. Hence the congeniality to its feelings of the notion of Atonement. [*It is no speculative thought which suggests the theory: speculation rather prompts to the rejection of it; speculation furnishes abstract reasons from the Divine Attributes for discarding it as a chimera of our fears. But*] the fact is that we cannot be at peace without some consciousness of Atonement made."

The reader will perceive that the tendency of the omissions is to represent Hampden as setting forth *a purely subjective theory* of the Atonement. For example (to believe Newman) "the fact remains" means "the fact" that the heart of the sinner "seeks for reparation"; but what Hampden meant by "fact" was "the offender is guilty."

The manner in which Dean Church deals with the unfairness of the *Elucidations* constitutes one of the most serious blemishes of his *Oxford Movement*. Newman's pamphlet, he says (C. 146–7), "was a favourite object of attack on the part of Hampden's supporters as a flagrant instance of unfairness and garbled extracts. No one, they said, ever read the Bampton Lectures, but took their estimate of the work from Mr. Newman's quotations. Extracts are often open to the charge of unfairness, and always to suspicion. But in this case there was no need of unfairness. Dr. Hampden's theory lay on the very surface of his Bampton Lectures and pamphlet; and any unbiassed judge may be challenged to read these works of his, and say"—I italicize—"*whether the extracts in the 'Elucidations' do not adequately represent Dr. Hampden's statements and arguments, and whether the comments on them are forced or strained.*"

I do not believe any "unbiassed judge," or even "biassed," of any shade of religious, or irreligious, thought, provided he has the least tincture of literary training, will venture, in the face of the facts collected above, to justify Dean Church's criticism.

58 (a) Wh. ii. 20; 58 (c) Wh. ii. 31; 58 (e)–59 (a) H. ii. 10; 60 (a) F. W. N. 81–7; 61 (a) *Eluc.* 47; 61 (b)* "he," *i.e.* Newman; 61 (c)* "the residents also." E. T. M. says of the *Lectures* (i. 352), "Perhaps they ought to have been listened to, and perhaps they ought to have been read, but the question is one of fact, and they were neither"; and of the *Elucidations* (ib. 362) "The pamphlet became the text of the controversy, to the shame, it must be said, of many who could have turned to the original lectures, and, as self-constituted judges, ought to have done so"; (ib. 366–7) "the great mass of the multitude that inflicted this penalty were very, if not entirely, ignorant of the book which was the *corpus delicti*. . . . The country members of Convocation, as fast as they came up, implored their resident friends, with pitiable importunity, to tell them all about it, generally in vain, for their resident friends knew as little about the book as themselves." He adds that Mr. Gladstone himself (ib. 376) sent a letter to Hampden thirty-four years after the delivery of the Lectures, saying that—I quote E. T. M., not Mr. Gladstone—"as it was utterly past his power to understand them, he had been clearly wrong to condemn them on the information of others."

I do not pretend to have read, much less studied, the whole of the Lectures; but such parts as I have seen would lead me to think that Archdeacon Hare's encomium on them is well deserved.

63 (a) quoted by W. M. 92. The passage specially related to Tract 90.

CHAPTER XXIII (1836-8)

64 (a) L. ii. 177, 197; 65 (a) L. ii. 198; 65 (b) L. ii. 197, "ever since that time," *i.e.* since the period of solitude which intervened between his intimacy with Bowden and his intimacy with Froude. But there are many indications that he had "learned to throw himself upon himself" before this.

65 (b) "some friend" A. 74 (it was Pusey); 66 (c)–67 (a) A. 56; 68 (a) L. ii. 136, 107; 69 (b)* "wrote." The letter is not quoted, but is referred to in L. ii. 185, from which the substance of it may be gathered; 69 (c)–71 (b) L. ii. 185–7 (10 April, 1836); 70 (a)* "answers": He seems to mean "forestall objections and [suggest] their answers"; 71 (a) "disbelieved," L. ii. 107; 71 (c) J. M. 61; 73 (a) L. ii. 475; 73 (b) S. iv. 8. 123–4, 125; 73 (d) ib.; 74 (c) ib. 126; 75 (b) ib. 130, 129: 77 (b) ib. 131–2; 78 (a) L. ii. 185; 78 (c)* "clever arrangement," see L. i. 484, "I wish them called the Oxford Tracts, but I cannot myself so call them, for modesty's sake. So I think that soon I shall advertise them as 'Tracts for the Times, by Residents in Oxford,' which, of course,"—I italicize—"*will soon be corrupted into Oxford Tracts.*"

Compare note on vol. i. 153 (b) above, which shows that, while Newman thus encouraged his followers to use this title, he shrank from publishing to the world the fact that they *did* use it.

79 (b)* "nervous about the dedication." E. T. M. (i. 319) writes on this as follows: "Newman was sometimes asked why he did not enlist the old gentleman more directly in his cause by dedicating to him one of his works. The reason of this he gave in confidence to his friends. It was a painful one. The President had been for a very long time notoriously negligent of the discipline of his college. In his excessive care of himself and his almost morbid craving for longevity—the longevity of Tithonus—he made a rule of caring for no other person or thing, and of letting the college go its own way, as it did. He could even derive amusement from the scandals which the seniors of the college would have prevented if he had given them the requisite authority and support." These "early scruples," he continues, Newman "lived to abandon" (ib. 320): "If a man will save every scruple he will have to sit still and do nothing. Yet it seemed to those about Newman as if a little of his bloom was rubbed off when he addressed what to vulgar eyes seemed a glowing panegyric to the faithless guardian of a great Christian college."

The dedication is "to Martin Joseph Routh, D.D., President of Magdalen College, who has been reserved to report to a forgetful generation what was the theology of their fathers . . . with a respectful sense of his eminent services to the Church and with the prayer that what he witnesses to others may be his own support and protection in the day of account."

I confess my "eyes" must rank amongst "the vulgar." I thought this *was* a "panegyric." But I have no doubt E. T. M. is right in revealing the inner meaning—may we not call it "irony"?—of the concluding words. The "prayer" was intended to suggest that the President *would need it very badly*, and to remind the old man (E. T. M. i. 320) of "'the day of account' in which *he would want* 'support and protection.'" The italics are mine.

79 (b) "passed through the press," L. ii. 20; 80 (b) "blow in the face," L. ii. 251; "basis in reason," A. 66; "the former," A. 68 (instead of "it," A. has "what is called Anglo-Catholicism, the religion of Andrewes, Laud, Hammond, &c."), 67; 81 (b) *Grammar of Assent*, p. 382; "We are not left at liberty to pick and choose out of its (i.e. Christianity's) contents according to our judgment, but must receive it all, as we find it, if we accept it at all";—a statement which conceals an ambiguity or fallacy under each of the following words or phrases (1) "left at liberty"; (2) "pick and choose"; (3) "it" or "Christianity"; (4) "contents"; (5) "judgment"; (6) "receive"; (7) "find"; (8) "accept."

81 (c) A. 67; 82 (b) A. 113; 83 (b) A. 72; 84 (a) L. ii. 249, R. H. H. 83 and 88; 84 (b) Bacon's *Essays*, xvi. 80; 85 (a) Sir John Davies, ed. Grosart, ii. 20; 85 (c) R. H. H. 83; 86 (a)* *Lectures on Justification*, 67. So again (ib. 68), "If a wrong has been done you, and you forgive the offender, . . . you consider him *to have been* what he *has not been*, fair and friendly towards you." It is difficult to believe that a man who writes like this, can ever have forgiven anybody. It would be truer to say, "You consider him to *be* what he has not been," or, "You consider that his true and real self is not represented by the past."

It is strange that, in publishing a work full of such difficulties—which, in his letters, he recognizes as difficult, and on which he had spent so much time and anxiety with such confessedly unsatisfactory results—he should speak so confidently as he does in his preface, saying that (ib. v.) "nothing would meet the evil but" *plain statements on the subject*, "argued out from Scripture," and (ib. vi.) "if in them, or in anything else he has written, there be what readers consider more severe or contentious than such an object admits, let them impute it to his firm belief that no wound is cured which is not thoroughly probed, and that the first step in persuasiveness is decision."

86 (b) ib. 78; 88 (a)* "revealing nothing," Tract 85, p. 19. On this Mr. R. H. Hutton remarks (93), "Newman never seemed to think that the unveiling of God's own *character* was, after all, the main purpose of revelation. . . ." With this I heartily agree; of course, assuming that the revelation of the Image of God is intended to conform man to that Image.

Perhaps the passage may be aimed at "Latitudinarianism," and, says Mr. Hutton (92), "By Latitudinarianism Newman means the view that it is not at all important what doctrine a man holds, so long as he acts up conscientiously to whatever doctrine he does honestly hold."

But, in *this* sense, who *is*, or ever *was*, a "Latitudinarian"? Did ever any so-called "Latitudinarian" hold "the view" that it is "not at all important" whether a man holds the "doctrine" that God may be propitiated by human sacrifice? or worshipped by acts of sensuality? or that a man may violate all the laws of honesty and decency if only he has "the spirit"?

"Let us turn," says N. (ib. 18), "to the *fact* which is urged in behalf of Latitudinarianism. The doctrine, then, that *it matters not what you believe, so that you act up to what you believe*, is grounded," &c., &c. Who could accept so absurd a definition as that which I have italicized? Even Pope's line, "He can't be wrong whose life is in the right," implies a *belief in righteousness*, and an acting up to *that* belief. Perhaps N. might fall back on the limitation to "revealed religion" implied on p. 16: "The Latitudinarian doctrine is this; that every man's view of revealed religion is acceptable to God, if he acts up to it"; but again I ask what Latitudinarian would say that the "view" of the extreme Antinomian, Anabaptist, or Free Lover, was "acceptable to God," however consistent the Antinomian, Anabaptist, or Free Lover, might be in "acting up to" his "view"?

The whole passage singularly illustrates Newman's contempt for Scripture, unless he can get "dogmas" and "doctrines" and "creeds" out of it. The message of the love of God, *unless it can be put into 'producible' dogmatic shape telling us what precise rules we must observe* in order to purchase it, or entitle ourselves to it, does not really seem to him divine at all, though he starts by calling it so (ib. 19): "If there *be* no divine message, gospel, or creed, *producible* from Scripture, this would not lead me one iota towards deciding that there was none at all *anywhere*. No; it would make me look out of Scripture for it, that is all. If there is a revelation, there must be a doctrine; both our reason and our hearts tell us so. If it is not in Scripture, it is somewhere else, it is to be sought elsewhere. Should the fact turn out (which I deny,) that Scripture is so obscure that nothing can be made of it, even when the true interpretation is otherwise given, so obscure that every person will have his own interpretation, and no two alike, this would drive me, not into Latitudinarianism but into Romanism. Yes, and it will drive the multitude of men. It is far more certain that Revelation must contain a message than that that message must be in Scripture. It is a less violence to one's feelings to say that part of it is revealed elsewhere than to say that nothing is revealed anywhere. There is an overpowering antecedent improbability in Almighty God's announcing that He has revealed something and revealed nothing; there is no antecedent improbability in His revealing it elsewhere than in an inspired volume."

89 (a) A. 29; 90 (a) A. 29.

CHAPTER XXIV (1838)

94 (a) L. ii. 252; 94 (b) L. i. 490; 95 (b)* see note in vol. ii. 78 (c), above; 96 (b) "annoyed," L. ii. 265; 97 (a) L. ii. 268; 97 (b) L. ii. 267; 99 (a) L. ii. 269; 99 (b) L. ii. 270; 100 (a) L. ii. 271-2; 101 (a) L. ii. 272; 102 (c) L. ii. 274.

103 (b)* "realise" often means "believe, or feel, *in one's heart*." See L.

ii. 170: it seems opposed to mere "assent" in L. i. 183, "it is so difficult to realise what one believes, and to make these trials, as they are intended, real blessings." See especially S. vi. 18. 263; "How loudly men talk of the shortness of this life, of its vanity and unprofitableness, and of the claims which the world to come has upon us! This is what we hear said daily, yet few act upon the truths they utter; and why? because they do not *realize* what they are so ready to proclaim"; S. v. 22. 321, "when we realize a truth we have a feeling which they have not who take words for things." Hence, as regards the alleged miracle of St. Narcissus (the change of water into oil) N. says (*E. on Eccl. Mir.* 259), "the evidence is not so definite or minute as to enable us to *realize* the miracle": and he goes on to say that, since "belief, in any true sense requires a certain familiarity or intimacy of the mind with the thing believed," "I do not see that we can be said actually to *believe* in a miracle like that now in question." The result of all this, and a great deal more, tedious and lengthy meandering of words, is, that sometimes in the Newmanian vocabulary, "I do not *realise* what I say" means "I say it, but I do not *actually believe* it."

103 (b) * "uncomfortable": this word belongs to N.'s epistolary, not to his pulpit vocabulary. It has a religious sense, like the words "comfort" and "Comforter" in the New Testament, so that to be "uncomfortable" often means to suffer spiritual depression and anguish. N. probably borrowed this antiquated use of the word from Keble.

Keble (L. ii. 473) after "the thunderbolt" of N.'s secession has fallen, writes, "You may guess what *uncomfortable* feelings haunt me, as if I, more than anyone else, was answerable for whatever of distress and scandal may occur." When the reader reflects that "scandal" (in K.'s vocabulary—once more, a little antiquated) means "stumbling-block" or that kind of "offence" on which our Saviour pronounced a "woe"—he will understand why K. (K. 283) should mention it in connection with "the blind leading the blind" where he says, "I suppose I am not really *uncomfortable*. I eat, drink, and sleep, as if nothing was the matter."

Hence, when the "ghost" of Rome pulverizes the *Via Media*, we shall presently find Newman seeing "an *uncomfortable* vista," *i.e.*, the prospect of the collapse of his religious convictions (L. ii. 286). Similarly, in 1842, an ecclesiastical case which may have the effect of helping to "unchurch" Anglicans, is described (L. ii. 389) as "uncomfortable."

103 (c) L. ii. 237; 103 (d) A. 112; 104 (b) Subj. 79 (18 Nov. 1838); 104 (b) — 105 (a) Subj. 64 (25 Nov.); 105 (c) S. V. 17. 253; 106 (a) S. V. 16 (16 Dec.); 106 (b) U. 350; 107 (a) L. ii. 275 (28 Dec.); 108 (a) L. ii. 278 (14 Jan., 1839).

CHAPTER XXV (Jan. 1839)

110 (a) † Tract 85 pp. 1, 2, 30, quoted by R. H. H. 89, whom I have followed, but on verifying it in the 3rd ed. 1840, I find "those who seek Him as He commands"; 115 (a) *Lect. on the Present Position of Catholics in*

England, quoted, but without page, H. iii. 113; 115 (b) U. 187–90; 116 (a) U. 193, 190, 194; 116 (c) U. 189; 117 (b) U. 187.

120 (a) * It should be added that in his next sermon he just touches on our "trust in our senses"; and there, he goes so far as to grant that we *may* have "grounds for it." But he wholly ignores *experience* as having anything to do with it. And subsequently he declares that we trust in our senses "from a secret instinct," apparently intending to deny the claim of experience to be a "ground." The italics are mine in the following (U. 213): "We consider that there is so strong an antecedent probability that they are faithful, that we dispense with proof. We take the point for granted; *or*, *if* we have grounds for it, these *either* lie in our *secret* belief in the stability of nature, *or* in the preserving presence and uniformity of Divine Providence—which, again, are points assumed. As, then, the senses may and do deceive us, and yet we trust them from a *secret instinct*. . . ."

120 (c and e) † U. 206. It is not easy to see why in the former version he describes Reason as "*a* faculty of proceeding," &c., and, in the latter, as "*that* faculty of the mind by which." But he seems to have started with the impression that there might be *several* such faculties, and that Reason might be only *one* of them, "*a* faculty." By the time he has written a few lines more, he recognizes that he has so defined Reason as to include *all* such faculties; it was therefore "*that* faculty of the mind by which, &c."; but he does not take the trouble to correct his previous statement.

121 (e) U. 207; 122 (b) U. 211, 212; 123 (a) * I am not sure, after all, what Newman means by "when their *minds* are roused," and whether he does not mean "passions"; for he says (U. 211) "In practical matters, when their minds are really roused, men commonly are not bad reasoners. *Men do not mistake when their interest is concerned.*" I have italicized the words which appear to indicate (though Newman can hardly have meant this) that when anyone claims, for example, a portion of an estate, he is (so far) less likely to "mistake" as to the facts (because his "*interest*" is "concerned") than the judge whose "interest" is *not* "concerned"! I should have thought that "interest" is a proverbial cause of all sorts of "mistakes" in reasoning.

123 (b) U. 213; 124 (a) * "reason." Of course, however, we often trust, "upon experience and reason," without any *conscious* reference to them.

124 (c) U. 215; 125 (b) U. 215; 125 (c) U. 219; 126 (c) U. 220; 127 (a) U. 220; 128 (c) U. 220, 1st ed. has "bends" for "bows."

CHAPTER XXVI (1839)

129 (a) L. ii. 272; 130 (a) A. 163; 130 (b) * "not expressly named," A. 163: "The most prominent person in it, was a man of elegant genius, of classical mind, of rare talent in literary composition [—Mr. Oakeley," om. in 1st ed.].

131 (a) A. 163; 132 (a) A. 163; 132 (b) C. 321, W. 120, "sources".* I. W. 86, says of Oakeley, "His abilities were rather showy from an elegant pleasing style, than either acute or deep."

Comp. E. T. M. ii. 228, who describes the Oakeley of his "earliest Oxford recollections" as "an elegant and rather dilettante scholar, translating Lucretius into English verse, much at his piano, and avowedly sentimental rather than decisive in his religious views."

133 (a) A. 171, C. 316, J. M. 166; 134 (b) W. 127; 135 (a) W. 216; 135 (c) W. 31; 139 (a) W. 6; 140 (a) W. 7; 141 (a) W. 11; 142 (a) W. 80; 144 (b) C. 316; 145 (a) C. 315; 146 (b) "had to," A. 165, "upset me," A. 170, 168, 165–70; 147 (a) A. 169; 148 (a)* "at random." I mean with reckless exaggeration; in accordance with his belief that (L. i. 488) "energy is ever exaggerated," and (L. ii. 324) that almost every "controversialist" must be "unscrupulous." Hence, without *consciously* exaggerating, N. did not take the *trouble* to try to say the *exact truth.* He thought it hopeless. He was content to throw out words on the chance of producing *an impression* that would conduce to the interests of the Church, the glory of God, &c., &c. All this is quite compatible with an instinctive skill in using just the right words to produce the desired impression.

148 (a) A. 170; 149 (a) W. 207; 150 (a) "unfairly,"* as he had treated Whately (see above vol. i. 304–9) and as he treats the Anglican divines (ib. 330), and the Bishops (ib. ii. 257–92). As an extraordinary instance of N.'s tendency to use language that implies blame, and to complain of what he has brought upon himself, take the following description of his solitary illness in Malta, when he was with the Froudes. It is from a letter to his mother (L. i. 340–1):—

"This is the sixth day since I left the 'Lazaret'; and I have hardly seen or spoken to anyone. The Froudes dine out every day, and are out all the morning of course. The last two days they have been on a visit to a friend. Last night I put a blister on my chest, and never having had one on before, you may fancy my awkwardness in taking it off and dressing the place of it this morning. I ought to have had four hands. Our servant was with the Froudes .... I wonder how long I shall last without any friend about me. .... I am glad Frank has the comfort of friends about him."

And this, to an anxious mother and anxious sisters! Naturally great blame was cast upon Froude for thus abandoning his sick friend; and then N. has to explain (L. i. 378) "In answer to Froude's solicitations, and his offer to sit with me or read to me, I had assured him all I wanted in order to recruit myself was perfect solitude"!

In the same manner, after Tract 90, we shall find him saying (A. 137) "I have asserted a great principle, and I *ought* to suffer for it," but complaining very bitterly indeed when he *does* "suffer for it." As it was a part of his theory about the Church that it *must be* persecuted by the world, and that Truth can never be popular, what in other men would be natural, was, in him, inconsistent. "I used to be surprised," says Isaac

Williams (110), "he had not more learned to look on persecution as a matter of course, what a good man must meet with, and which should be to him a satisfaction, as indicating him to be in the way of truth."

CHAPTER XXVII (1839)

151 (a) A. 94; 151 (b) L. ii. 279; 153 (a) A. 95–100; 154 (a) A. 101; 154 (c) A. 103; 156 (a) U. 215–20; 156 (b) A. 99; 157 (b) S. v. 23. 327 (10 February, 1839), L. ii. 279, S. v. 23. 331; 159 (a) S. v. 23. 337; 159 (b) S. v. 9. 127 (17 February), S. vii. 8. 109 (24 February), S. v. 20. 290, 296 (3 March); 160 (a)† in ed. 1840 the title is *Present Blessings of this Life*; 160 (a)* S. v. 19. 271 (10 March), "of Lent." This is 10 March. Yet 31 March (S. vi. 8. 94) is assigned to Easter Day. Is there not some mistake in the date? 160 (a) "brotherhood"* It should be added that under this head he definitely mentions "the holy marriage bond." Yet elsewhere (Subj. 47) he bids his hearers, "if they desire to be humble" pray not only "that they may never be rich," but also that "their home" may be "solitary." That, however, seems intended as a substitute for a vow of celibacy, recommended to those who purpose celibacy.

161 (a) S. v. 19. 276; 162 (b) S. vi. 8. 94 (31 March); 163 (a) ib. 96; 163 (c) ib. 101; 163 (d)† "keenly," ed. 1840. "full keenly. 164 (a) ib. 103.

CHAPTER XXVIII (1839)

165 (a)* "facts in question themselves." In the next paragraph he says, "Reason makes the particular fact which is to be ascertained the point of primary importance, inquires into its evidence, not of course excluding antecedent considerations, but not beginning with them." But if the "antecedent considerations" *e.g.*, the fact that the only evidence in a charge of murder is that of a man once convicted of felony, who now accuses the person on whose evidence he himself was convicted—are sufficiently *important*, Reason may very well "begin with" them. Does "inferences," in the sentence quoted, mean "*acts* of inferring"? 165 (a) U. 223 (May, 1839); 166 (a)* U. 223 "in its more popular sense (in which, as in former Discourses, I shall here for the most part use it) . . ."

167 (b) U. 227; 168 (a) U. 229—30; 168 (a)* "hardly ever." U. 215, "He bids us examine it indeed with our best judgment" is a passage that might seem to imply the duty of going by evidence, if the preceding sentence did not indicate that it is a merit to go by little evidence.

169 (a) U. 228; 169 (c) U. 234; 170 (a)† U. 234. To this, in the edition of 1872, is added a footnote in brackets—which is the sign of a later addition not to be found in the original: ["It is a presumption, not as being a mere conjecture, but because the mind cannot master its own reasons and anticipates in its conclusions a logical exposition of them."]

This seems to give up the author's original position, and to make him incline toward those (whose position he attacked in the preceding page) who asserted that "Faith is built upon Reason."

But there, too, he had been forced to explain himself by a foot-note added in later editions, defining Reason as "processes of a logical or explicit character." Much of this confusion arises from his two definitions of the word Reason, and from his neglect to observe the simple rule of using the same word always in the same sense.

171 (a)* "exercises of reason are needed to *retain* belief." It is not to be supposed that I here deny, or assert, this proposition; I merely point out that it is quite distinct from the one with which N., seemingly, identifies it.

171 (b) U. 235–6; 172 (a)* "delusion." N. generally uses the word "illusion"; but as he does not (so far as I know) recognize that "illusion" may lead to higher truth through lower truth, and is to be distinguished from "delusion," I use the word "delusion" as being more likely to make his meaning generally intelligible.

174 (b) U. 239; 175 (b) U. 239; 176 (b) U. 240, 241; 176 (c) U. 246.

CHAPTER XXIX (1839)

179 (b) S. vi. 8. 102 (31 March, 1839); 180 (b) S. v. 3. 45; 181 (b) "a good year," L. ii. 280. He adds "this was never done"; 182 (a) S. v. 45, 43; 182 (b) S. v. 22. 319, 326; 183 (b) A. 115; 184 (b) A. 114, L. ii. 285 (15 September); 185 (b) L. ii. 286 (22 September).

185 (d)* "uncomfortable," see note on 103 (b); 185 (e)* "vista." The Editor of the *Letters* quotes an article in the *Dublin Review*, 1869, thus: "He (i.e., N.) said 'I cannot conceal from myself that, for the first time since I began the study of theology, a vista has been opened before me, to the end of which I do not see.' He was walking in the New Forest and he borrowed the form of his expression from the surrounding scenery."

I quote this at full length because it is a useful as well as amusing instance of an error arising from inadequate knowledge of facts. N. was simply using in the New Forest the language he had used a fortnight before in Oriel.

186 (b) A. 116-7, "this was so"*. The facts appear to be these: "About the middle of September" (and apparently *in the first half*—since he had "hardly brought to a close" (A. 116) the "course of reading" which terminated (A. 114) on 30 August—some "friends, who were more favourable to the cause of Rome" than N. was, "put" the *Dublin Review* "into his hands." Possibly R(obert) W(ilberforce) was one of these "friends" (as he is afterwards called not "*a* friend," but "*my* friend," as though he had been *previously mentioned*.) In any case, Newman read it, and "did not see much in it." Afterwards, R(obert) W(ilberforce), to use the words of the *letter* (which are rather misleading) "directed his attention *to the Article*," but, according to the *Apologia*, directed his attention, *not* to the *Article*, but to the *extracts* from St. Augustine in it, which had escaped his attention.

187 (b)* "receptiveness." Newman seems to be deliberately referring

to, and approving, this sort of receptiveness, when, in the following year, in his sermon on Explicit and Implicit Reason, he says (U. 271): "We take up a book at one time and see nothing in it; at another, it is full of weighty remarks and precious thoughts."

190 (b) A. 118; 190 (c) *Hamlet*, ii. 2. 635, A. 119; 191 (a) A. 119, 120, "it *must* be."* This, of course, is not a quotation from N., but is intended to show the spirit in which, even after the second appearance of the "ghost" N. still waited on in 1845, hoping for some third "sign," and (A. 231) "using the words of the Psalmist, 'Show some token upon me,'" though he adds (ib.) "I suppose I have no right to wait for ever for this."

192 (b)* "younger men": comp. I. W. 62, note: "What struck me was, how like Newman it all was. . . . I mean Newman's living with persons younger than 'himself,' a party reflecting his own opinions, his constraint in public, his entirely throwing it off with friends in private." As regards Pusey, he says (ib. 70): "They had been Fellows of Oriel together, and Newman was the senior. But Pusey's presence always checked his lighter and unrestrained mood."

193 (b) L. ii. 288; 194 (c) A. 134; 195 (a) W. 212; 197 (b) S. viii. 2. 17, 22, 24; 198 (b) ib. 25, 28, 29; 199 (a) ib. 29, 31, 32.

CHAPTER XXX (1839–40)

202 (a)* these terms are introduced by anticipation; they are defined in the note on 221 (a).

202 (b) W. 145; 203 (a)* L. ii. 347 (April, 1841) "Nor do I think it God's way, generally speaking, for *individuals* to leave one religion for another—it is so much like an exercise of private judgment. Three thousand *at once* were converted on the day of Pentecost. Where *miracles* are brought before an individual the case is different."

203 (a) A. 129; 203 (b) A. 121, 52, 6 (1st ed. 62); 204 (b) L. ii. 292–3; 205 (b) C. 261; 206 (b) L. ii. 291; 208 (a)* "justify." I. W. (100) speaks of the Heads of Houses as "disturbed, of course, by a self-denying religious reformation, and jealous of the influence obtained by it"; but he candidly admits that "there were also, in some cases, grounds for their distrust."

208 (b) L. ii. 430; 208 (c) S. v. 5. 67; 209 (b) L. ii. 298; 210 (a) "he had none," A. 120; 210 (b) A. 126; 211 (a) A. 122; 212 (c) A. 129; 213 (a) L. ii. 300, "miserable."* The whole passage is interesting: "Everything is miserable. I expect a great attack upon the Bible—indeed, I have long expected it. At the present moment, indications of what is coming gather. Those wretched Socialists, on the one hand, then Carlyle on the other—a man of first-rate ability, I suppose, and quite fascinating as a writer. His book on the French Revolution is most taking (to me). I had hoped he might have come round right, for it was easy to see he was not a believer; but they say he has settled the wrong way. His view is that Christianity has good in it, or is good *as far as it goes*, which, when applied to Scripture, is, of course, a picking and

choosing of its contents. Then, again, you have Arnold's school, such as it is (I do hope he will be frightened back), giving up the inspiration of the Old Testament, or of all Scripture (I do not say Arnold himself does). Then you have Milman, clenching his 'History of the Jews' by a 'History of Christianity,' which they say is worse, and just in the same line. Then you have all your political economists who *cannot* accept (it is impossible) the Scripture rules about almsgiving, renunciation of wealth, self-denial, &c., and then your geologists, giving up parts of the Old Testament. All these and many more spirits seem uniting and forming into something shocking." 214 (b) L. ii. 301, 303; 215 (b) L. ii. 204; 215 (e)* "domestic." See I. W. 61: "The domestic and poetic and social element in our Newman's character appeared to me providentially intended to correct that constitutional restlessness of intellect, that want of balance and repose in the soul. . . . But our Newman, partly from circumstances, and partly under the false guise of mortification, has stifled those his domestic affections, thereby greatly increasing this his intellectual malady; whereas I never thought so highly of him, and he never seemed to me so saint-like and high in his character, as when he was with his mother and sisters."

211 (a)* "very rude." His strong prejudice against Romanists appears in L. ii. 295: "To-day he (Mr. Spencer) called with Palmer, and sat an hour. He is a gentlemanlike, mild, pleasing man, but sadly smooth. I wonder whether it is their habit of internal discipline, the necessity of confession, &c., which makes them so."

Comp. *Apologia* (1st. ed.) 415: "Now first I will say, that, when I became a Catholic, nothing struck me more at once than the English outspoken manner of the Priests. . . . There was nothing of that smoothness, or mannerism, which is commonly imputed to them. . ."

216 (a) L. ii. 303 (21 March, 1840); 217 (b) L. ii. 304 (20 May); 218 (a) L. ii. 311; 218 (d) S. v. 24, 343, 350–1 (1 March); 219 (a) ib. 355, S. vi. 2. 15 (15 March); 219 (b) "I take to cloaks," L. i. 429, S. viii. 141 (29 March; "next week" S. vii. 13. 181 (3 May); 220 (a) S. vii. 14. 199 (10 May; 223 (b) Subj. 272, 271; 221 (a)* "Implicit" and "Explicit" Reason are distinguished as follows (U. 258-9)—They are "two processes distinct from each other,—(1) the original process of reasoning, and next, (2) the process of investigating our reasonings. All men (1) reason, ... but all men do not (2) reflect upon their own reasonings . . . . all men (1) have a reason, but not all men can (2) give a reason. We may denote, then, these two exercises of mind as (1) reasoning and (2) arguing, or as (1) conscious and (2) unconscious reasoning, or as (1) Implicit and (2) Explicit Reason."

I have inserted the numbers in the preceding paragraph for clearness. The *words* would indicate that "reasoning" is "conscious," and "arguing" is "unconscious": but N. cannot have meant that. It is either a slip, or a transposition for the sake of variety.

Of course there is some truth in this: but it ought to be balanced by a profound reverence for facts. And it is obvious how easily "Implicit Reason"—if persons allow themselves to make a habit of saying that they "have a reason" but cannot "give a reason"—may degenerate into mere prejudice and first impression, and become a shelter for laziness, and an encouragement to believe in facts that make them comfortable.

221 (a) U. 275; 222 (a)* U. 272, "recondite reasons," it might be urged that the term "recondite" applies not to the proposition that God is good, but to the argument that "if God is All-powerful He must be also All-good," which I should certainly admit to be "recondite." But on the next page mention is made of these propositions, "that there is a God, that He governs the world, that He wishes the salvation of man . . . . that there is no other way of introducing a Revelation but by miracles," and it is implied that *all* these are "recondite."

222 (b) A. 134; 223 (a)* "The two letters about the resignation of St. Mary's are omitted in the *Letters*, which generally (but not invariably) omit letters contained in the *Apologia*. Possibly other letters have been omitted or lost.

223 (a) "*leave*," L. ii. 318: 224 (b)–229 (a) A. 132–5; 228 (d)† "till you see," i.e. "your way." This meaning seems dictated both by grammar and by morality. The *Apologia* supplies, in brackets (which Newman habitually employs to denote later explanations), "Till you see [your way to mitigate if not remove this evil]," i.e. the "evil" which Newman's resignation would do to the Tractarian cause. But such an interpretation seems less worthy of Keble, and less probable.

229 (a) A. 120; 231 (a) A. 156; 229 (b)* "Keble in the dark," comp. I. W. who says (108) of Keble, "He had not the reasons for apprehension [*i.e.* about N.'s Romanizing tendencies] that I had"; and he tells us that before writing Tract 90, *i.e.*, in the autumn and winter of 1840, Newman "said things in favour of the Church of Rome which quite startled and alarmed me."

232 (a) "union," A. 122, "sore," ib.; 232 (c) A. 136, what follows is mostly from Phil. 217–9; 234 (e) A. 135–6.

CHAPTER XXXI (MARCH, 1840–1841)

235 (a) A. 135, "continued": * comp. I. W. (101), "Of the putting out of Church principles he often spoke as an experiment which he did not know whether the Church of England could bear, or what would be the issue."

235 (b) L. ii. 357; 237 (a) A. 135, L. ii. 185; 238 (a) L. ii. 318–9; 238 (c) L. ii. 324; 239 (a) L. 325; 239 (b) S. vi. 18. 257 (13 Dec. 1840); 240 (a) S. vi. 12. 153 (24 Jan. 1841), 172, L. ii. 378, S. vi. 12. 173: 241 (a)* "*us*," ib., the italics are N.'s; 241 (b) S. vi. 13. 174–7, 185; 242 (a) vi. 3. 29 (21 March, 1841); 242 (b) L. ii. 319 (25 Nov., 1840), A. 78.

243 (a)* "Ward also rejected the distinction." So did Newman in the notes appended, during his Roman period, to the republished Tract in V. ii. 316, where he says, "I do not see then how it can be denied that this Article calls the sacrifice of the Mass itself, in all its private and solitary celebrations (to speak of no other) that is, in all its daily celebrations

from year's end to year's end" [I suppose the rhetoric that follows "that is," has some meaning; but I fail to see it] "*toto orbe terrarum*, a 'blasphemous fable.'" He also says, "Nor can we successfully distinguish between 'Mass' and 'Masses,' as is attempted in the text."

On the other hand Dean Church (249) says that, "when Mr. Newman confined the phrase to the gross abuses connected with the Mass, this was treated as an affront to common sense and honesty. Since then, we have become better acquainted with the language of the ancient liturgies: and no instructed theologian could now venture to treat Mr. Newman's distinction as idle."

243 (b) "James Mozley," L. ii. 325, note, W. 441; 244 (a) Tract 90, p. 24; T. i. 44; 244 (b) T. i. 25–49. Bishop Thirlwall's attitude towards Tract 90, by its perfect and careful fairness, deserved from the extreme Tractarian Party something of that appreciation which Isaac Williams warmly expressed for the Bishop's impartial judgment on the unpopular and much-abused Tract 89.

However, the Rev. Malcolm MacColl attacked Thirlwall as being "a party to the hounding of Dr. Newman out of the Church of England a quarter of a century ago." "A correspondence," says the Editor of Thirlwall's Works (iv. 345) "ensued upon this in the *Guardian*, in which the Bishop showed in the clearest and most convincing manner how absolutely without foundation Mr. MacColl's charge was. A letter also appeared in the same paper from Dr. Newman himself, procured through the intervention of Professor Plumptre, in which he exonerated the Bishop in a 'perfectly satisfactory' manner from the accusation. Dr. Newman had, indeed, in one of his works, referred to the 'courtesy' of Bishop Thirlwall as a marked exception to his general treatment at the hands of the English Episcopate."

245 (b) C. 248, L. ii. 333; 246 (a) *Letter to Dr. Jelf*, V. ii. 371; 248 (b) † A. 94, the 1st ed. differs a good deal, but not in essentials; 248 (c) *Letter to Bishop of Oxford*, quoted by C. 242: 249 (a) A. 82; 249 (e) Tract 90, pp. 73–4, "irritating." * I select this epithet because it is one of those which Newman's friend, Rickards, applied to some of N.'s Tracts.

250 (a) Tract 90, p. 21; 250 (b) * "Hare." See the whole discussion, H. iii. 203–5. After declaring that "the inerrableness of General Councils" is "no matter of faith," "because not founded on any part of Scripture or Tradition," Hammond indicates in what form this belief may be held as "a theological verity which may piously be believed." And it amounts to this: "that God will never suffer all Christians to fall into such a temptation, as it must be in case the whole Church representative should err in matters of faith," i.e. impugn or omit anything in "the body of Credenda which the Apostles delivered to the Church," and should succeed in diffusing this error in the Church at large.

251 (b) A. 137, Tract 90, p. 2. He goes on to say, not that he will *try* to prove this, but: "it may be right, at the present moment, to insist upon this."

252 (b) * "surprise": comp. I. W. (110) "I used to be surprised he had

not more learned to look on persecution as a matter of course, what a good man must expect to meet with, and which should be to him a satisfaction, as indicating him to be in the way of truth." Certainly, this was N.'s theory, and he repeatedly inculcated it.

252 (c)* L. ii. 327, M. P.'s *Essays*, ii. 303, "Popish." The attack on this Tract, if we may take the judgment of so calm and wise a judge as Bishop Thirlwall, was not justified. While severely censuring important points in Tract 90, Thirlwall says (i. 41) about the Tract on Reserve, "we must be inclined to consider it rather as a *protest against reserve* than a recommendation of it," and he speaks of the feeling against it as (i. 40) "*misplaced*."

253 (a) L. ii. 128; 253 (b)* C. 267. "Newman and Keble dreaded the appeal to Convocation," see L. ii. 330 (a letter written by Church to Rogers): "The thought of Convocation harassed him (Newman) and Keble very much." Church adds, about the Heads, "it seems, however, certain that they are afraid to try Convocation" ("seems certain" is a favourite expression with N., who perhaps imparted it to Church).

The former is a statement of *fact;* the latter is a *conjecture*, which will hereafter (see vol. ii. 357) be disproved by facts. But indeed Church disproved his own belief in his own conjecture. A week afterwards, when he had time to think coolly about it, he wrote to Rogers (L. ii. 332), "*We have escaped* the bore and *defeat of Convocation*"!

254 (a) "humbugged," L. ii. 332, "evaded," ib. 331, "pamphlet,"* comp. I. W. (109) "Newman walked with me at the time of the condemnation of it (i.e. Tract 90), much depressed. And he wrote to apologize for it to Dr. Jelf, partly unsaying it. This also was his manner: he was carried away first of all by his own mind, but afterwards, from a very amiable and good feeling, wished to do away with the uneasiness occasioned."

I. W. adds (ib. 108) that before writing the Tract, he "said things in favour of the Church of Rome, which quite startled and alarmed me, and I was afraid he would express the same in this Tract, with no idea (as his manner was) of the sensation it would occasion"; and in this way I. W. explains Keble's neglect to censure the Tract, although he saw it before publication: "He (Keble) had not the reasons for apprehension that I had," i.e. N. *had not imparted to Keble* his full sentiments about the Church of Rome.

255 (a) L. ii. 333, A. 170, L. ii. 335; 255 (b) "following days," so in present editions of A.; but in 1st ed. all the notes are said to have been written on 24 March, see the end of the note on 272 (b).

256 (a) L. ii. 338.

257 (a)* In the *Apologia* (51) he pays a tribute of profound respect to him: "I was rewarded by having all my time for ecclesiastical superior a man, whom, had I had a choice, I should have preferred out and out to any other Bishop on the Bench, and for whose memory I have a special affection, Dr. Bagot—a man of noble mind, and as kind-hearted and as considerate as he was noble. He ever sympathized with me in my trials which followed. . . . May his name be ever blessed!"

He seems, however, to have been a weak man, timorously shrinking from just responsibility, see note on 272 (a). Moreover, by N.'s own account he publicly and repeatedly condemned Tract 90 with great severity, after having entered into an "understanding" not to do so; we have to choose, therefore, between concluding that this "kind-hearted," "considerate," and "noble" man—or else N.'s memory—was very treacherous.

CHAPTER XXXII (MARCH—MAY, 1841)

258 (b) "publish his own condemnation," see A. 90, "they said that this was on condition that I did not defend it, that I stopped the series, and that I myself published my own condemnation in a letter to the Bishop of Oxford." I have given reasons elsewhere (vol. ii. 263–73) for thinking that the agreement was to "stop the *Tracts*," not to "stop the *series*."

258 (c) A. 137, L. ii. 341; 259 (a) A. 138, L. ii. 341; 260 (a)†. *Two* letters were written by N. to Keble on 1 April, and both are printed in the *Letters* (L. ii. 341, 342). The former has signs of omission; the latter has none. A letter from N. to Keble (that it is to Keble is certain from 1st ed. of A.) of 1 April is printed in A. 137; but there is nothing in it that is found in either of the letters published in the Correspondence. Apparently, therefore, it must be an extract from the former of the two letters, which contains signs of omission. Yet, if this be so, it is odd that N. should on the same day, in the same letter, to the same friend, write the same things, after this fashion:—

(1) *Letters*, "I have spoken quite what I feel."
(2) *Apologia*, "You will see in the Letter, though I speak *quite* what I feel. . . ."

(1) *Letters*, "I am sanguine about my Letter which came out yesterday."
(2) *Apologia*, "I wrote it (the letter to the Bishop) on Monday; on Tuesday it passed through the press; on Wednesday it was out; and to-day [Thursday] it is in London."

There are several instances where Newman, in what Keble calls his "fidgety" moods, writes two letters on the same day to the same person; but I do not know of another where he so needlessly repeats himself.

260 (b) "could not believe his ears," A. 220, L. ii. 343; 260 (c)* "a sanction of them from your Lordship." The full sentence is (V. ii. 387): "May I then, without (as I have said) at all assuming the soundness of the doctrines to be mentioned, or by mentioning them seeking indirectly a sanction for them from your Lordship, be allowed to allude to one or two Tracts, merely in illustration of what I have said."

Then at some interval, he refers to the doctrine of the Invocation of Saints; states (ib. 396) that he has been obliged to declare its "lawfulness" "an open question," and expresses his "great apprehension" of the use of the *ora pro nobis* on this ground: "The holier the man, the less likely are they (*i.e.* such invocations) to be injurious to him; but it is another matter entirely when ordinary persons do the same." Again, he says (ib. 38): "If I allude to what has been maintained in the Tracts, it will not be at all by way of maintaining it in these pages, but in illustration of the impressions and the drift with which they have been written." Is this really consistent with "wedging in a good many bits of Catholicism, which *now* come out with the Bishop's sanction"?

261 (a) L. ii. 342–3; 261 (b) "game." The words are "I am not at all sure that our game, if I may use the word, is not to let the matter drop at present."

261 (d) A. 138, L. ii. 344, "Jesuitism."* I. W. says (53–4) "I have lately heard it stated from one of Newman's oldest friends, Dr. Jelf"—it was to Dr. Jelf that N. wrote the letter explaining Tract 90—"that his mind was always essentially Jesuitical." I. W. accounts for this, in part, by N.'s "habit of looking for effect, for what was sensibly effective." But I. W. did not "look for effect," perhaps, quite enough.

262 (a) A. 138, 89–90, 139–40, 207; 262 (b)* "as a body." So he writes to Keble (L. ii. 338), "Pusey says there has been a talk of the Bishops, as a body, condemning the Tract. Is this [legally] *possible*?" The italics are N.'s; and so is his later explanation, "legally."

262 (b) "the Bishops' charges," L. ii. 356, "*only in Synod* do they prescribe *doctrine*."* The view I have taken in the text is confirmed by a great deal of direct and indirect evidence (see pp. 263–73 and the notes upon them) all of which proves that the *individual* action of the Bishops was expressly reserved in any "understanding" or "bargain" that may have been made between N. and his own Bishop. Newman appears to have forgotten this afterwards, and to have imagined that all but a few of the Bishops had pledged themselves *individually* not to condemn Tract 90. Not that he ventures to say this in the *Letters*; it is only in the *Apologia*. In the *Letters*, the very complaints he makes, prove that he had nothing to complain of; *e.g.* L. ii. 385 (19 January, 1842), "It is remarkable, indeed, that the Archbishop should go on. *What have I done!* Last March I submitted, and was told that *therefore* nothing would be done from authority."

Supposing this to be true, the answer is, in Newman's own words: nothing *was* done "*from authority*." "The Bishops' charges . . . have *no direct authority except in their own dioceses*." To this we may add that (1) the "condemnation" which he published was soon perceived to be no "condemnation," and the "submission" no "submission."

263 (a)* "no trace of it." I mean, of course, by "it," the "understanding" as conceived by N., *pledging the Bishops to refrain from charging against him in their several dioceses.*

263 (a) "I think," A. 139; "if I remember," A. 89, 90; 264 (a) "all his Tracts," *i.e.*, to stop, or discontinue the printing of, *all those which were under his control*, all those which he had offered to suppress on a previous occasion in 1838. In these, Tract 90 would be included. Copies printed would not be called in; but when they were sold, no more would be issued. The Tract would quietly drop, by the author's action (or, we may call it, *in*action).

266 (b) L. ii. 343, 346; 267 (b) L. ii. 356, 359, "understanding."* The

only passage that might be so construed (so far as I have seen) I have dealt with in the note on p. 262 (b).

268 (a) L. ii. 346 ; 268 (b) V. ii. 383–5 ; 269 (b) A. 220, 221 ; 270 (b) A. 320.

The following section of notes refers to the "understanding" between Newman and the Bishop of Oxford, and, in particular, to the meaning probably attached by the Bishop to the expression :—

"DISCONTINUE THE TRACTS."

It should be distinctly understood, from the first, that I regard the discussion of this question as interesting rather in its bearing upon the Bishop's conduct and upon the way in which misunderstandings arise out of "understandings," than as affecting our estimate of Newman's moral conduct. *Verbally* the words quite justify Newman's interpretation of them ; and the charge of "out-manœuvering" his Bishop lies outside this verbal discussion. But, for the reputation of the Bishop himself, such a discussion is of vital importance. For if it cannot be shown that he might rationally have supposed that Newman broke the "understanding," then the Bishop himself—since he himself certainly broke it afterwards—stands convicted of being an irrational or a treacherous creature.

271 (b) A. 138, W. 160, "the most obvious interpretation." It is, indeed, the *only* interpretation consistent with strict grammatical construction for "*they*," in "*they* have inculcated," means "the Tracts" previously mentioned, in the "stopping of *the Tracts*." Hence, the reference ought to be to the *old* Tracts, which alone could be said to "*have* inculcated opinions," and it must therefore be the *old* Tracts that are to be "*stopped*."

But it is possible (for N. often uses his pronouns very loosely, particularly in complicated arguments) that the word "they" does not mean (though it ought to mean) "the Tracts" previously mentioned. "*The Tracts*" may mean "the *series* of Tracts considered in the *future*, as well as in the past" ; and "*they*" may mean "the *old* Tracts."

It will be noticed that in the letters written *at the time* (e.g. 1 April, 1841) he speaks of "stopping the Tracts" (and so, 8 April) ; but a year afterwards, when he made up his mind *not* to "stop" them (i.e. their circulation), he uses his words more carefully (L. ii. 392, 14 April, 1842) "I not only *stopped the series of Tracts* on which I was engaged," and so in the *Apologia* (90) "they said that this was on condition that I did not defend it, that I *stopped the series*, and that I myself published my own condemnation in a letter to the Bishop of Oxford."

I am confirmed in the view that "stopping the Tracts" meant originally "dropping the Tracts," by the letter of Church in which the expression to "stop the Tracts" evidently implies a great deal—and (it would seem) more than the mere offer to publish no new Tracts (L. ii. 332, 21 March) :—

"Last week the Bishop of Oxford wrote to Pusey, expressing the pain he felt at the Tract, and enclosing a letter to Newman which contained a proposal to N. to do something, which he hoped N. would not refuse. Newman's anxiety was not a little relieved when he found, on opening the letter, that what the Bishop wished was that N. would undertake not *to discuss the Articles any more in the Tracts.* [The italics are Church's, and clearly call attention to the extreme mildness of the request.] Newman wrote back offering to do anything the Bishop wished, suppress No. 90, or stop the Tracts, or give up St. Mary's."

It has been suggested that the Bishop could not have intended Newman to have suppressed the Tracts; for some of them, e.g. Pusey's Tract on Baptism, was signed by the latter and not under Newman's control.

The reply is that the Bishop intended Newman to do in 1841 what Newman had offered to do in 1838: "I offered," he says in the letter to his Bishop (V. ii. 384) "to withdraw any of the Tracts over which I had control." That was all the Bishop wanted. Tract 90 was "under his control" and would, with the rest, cease to be circulated. It would not be "suppressed"; it would not be "withdrawn"; it would drop.

272 (a)* "printed." Here the following objections have been raised by the friendly censor whom I have quoted before and will now quote again: "(1) Why, if the Bishop knew the Tracts were on sale still, and he wished them stopped, did he not write and say so? And surely (2) 'discontinue' is an odd word to use, if you mean 'suppress.' Both words are technical almost; at any rate, each has a well-recognized sense in reference to periodicals. And (3) I don't believe N. would have printed a 2nd edition, if he had understood he had to suppress the Tract."

(1) First, as to what the Bishop might be expected to have done, I reply as follows. See I. W. (105):

"There was a pastrycook in St. Mary's parish, of the name of Jubber. Newman, on going abroad with Froude, had told me that he had in vain endeavoured to get that family baptized. . . . One of the daughters wished to be married. This, as she persisted in continuing unbaptized, Newman refused to do. On this, the newspapers made a violent outcry against him, and the old-fashioned orthodox shook their heads. Newman wrote to the Bishop, saying, if he desired him, he would marry them, and"—I italicize—"*he was a little annoyed at receiving no answer.*"

Now here I may surely retort upon my censor, "Why, if the Bishop wished the marriage to take place, did he not say, Yes? or, if he wished it not to take place, why did he not say, No?" The answer may be, because he could not make up his mind; or, because he was afraid of unpopularity; or because he was—anything else that characterizes a weak man who shrinks from responsibility. But whatever we answer in the Jubber case, we may also answer in the Tract case. The Bishop perhaps found it "a nuisance to take steps." He *said* nothing. What he *did* was (so we learn from I. W.) "*though he never alluded to the subject,*" to appoint Newman to preach the visitation sermon at St. Mary's, and to show him "the most marked attention and respect."

This was in 1834 (see L. ii. 55–62); and the Bishop may have changed his mind afterwards, in some respects, about Newman. But it was a redeeming feature in so much weakness that, at least, he always respected in Newman, one stronger than himself who had the courage of his convictions (when he could feel certain that he had any).

(2) "'Discontinue' is an odd word, if you mean 'suppress.'" Exactly, but if the Bishop had *publicly* said "suppress," N. would have resigned at least (A. 209) he says he had "almost made up his mind," in that contingency, to resign—his living; and there would have been a little disturbance; and from this the old man would naturally shrink. Indeed the use of "publicly" (which I italicize) in the following (A. 209, L. ii. 341): "I have almost come to the conclusion, if the Bishop *publicly* intimates that I must suppress the Tract, or speaks strongly in his Charge against it, to suppress it indeed, but to resign my living also"—deserves close attention, for what does it mean—from the pen of one who weighs his words as N. did—except this, "If he *privately* arranges with me to suppress it, I am willing to do it, provided that he refrains from saying so *publicly*"?

(3) In the case of a "bargain," it seems to me quite like N. to take the full advantage that the "bargain" allowed him. Assuming that on 29 March (when he published his letter to his Bishop) he supposed himself bound *privately* to "stop," or "suppress," or "quietly withdraw," or "discontinue," or "drop," or "not to continue reprinting" Tract 90, he may very well have conceived that his fulfilment of the "bargain" was not to begin till he had published the episcopal statement that the Tract was "objectionable." Sharp practice though this may have been, it was not so gross a violation of the respect due (upon his principles) to episcopal authority, as it would have been, *first*, to publish to the world that the Bishop called his Tract "objectionable," and *then* to issue a second edition.

I do not know who was responsible for the ultimate wording of the Bishop's message which was so much debated and altered. In any case there can be no doubt that *verbally* it left Newman free to adopt the interpretation which he gave the message in 1842 and after that date, viz., "discontinue the series." The reader may perhaps be interested in another instance in which the Bishop sends a message to Newman, which Newman verbally repeats in his reply, thereby rendering himself liable, in the eyes of ordinary human beings, to the charge of "evasion": see vol. ii. p. 322, where, in answer to the charge that he was instituting "a *so-called Anglo-Catholic Monastery*," he replies, "Of course, I can repeat your Lordship's words, that 'I am not attempting *a revival of the Monastic Orders in anything approaching to the Romanist sense of the term.*'"

The inference from all these rather circuitous proceedings on both sides seems to be that the Bishop said *publicly* "discontinue," with an understanding (tacit or otherwise) that it should be *privately* interpreted by N. to mean "suppress;" that Newman (sooner or later) did *not* so interpret it; that the Bishop considered the "understanding" to be broken by Newman; that then, after his fashion, instead of remonstrating, *he* broke the understanding *too*, and publicly, and repeatedly, and severely, condemned the Tract which (1) had given him so much "pain," (2) had been pronounced by him "objectionable," (3) was still being reprinted in his diocese. (N.B.—Four editions were published in 1841; three of them, after the Bishop had pronounced the Tract "objectionable.")

I may be wrong in my theory. But, if I am, Dr. Bagot, the Bishop of Oxford, instead of being "noble," was despicable.

In answer to these arguments my friend still has something to say:

(1) "Your theory attaches no weight to N.'s withdrawing his offer of suppressing Tract 90. Indeed you say more than once, 'How could he think it impossible to suppress his Tract when he himself offered to do so? but this he apparently ignores.' Which seems proof positive that he made the offer in haste and repented of it. And as the offer did not represent his settled mind, there seems no reason why he should represent it as such."

I have never denied that N. "made this offer in haste and repented of it." He not only "repented of it," but was so ashamed of it that he does not mention it even in his Letters; and in the *Apologia* he poses as one who never could have possibly listened to such a proposal, much less made it himself (A. 89): "For how could I acquiesce in a mere Protestant interpretation of the Articles? How could I, &c., &c., &c." (see the next note for the whole passage.)

But I think my friend means to argue thus, "Since N. so speedily repented of his offer to suppress the Tract, he ought not to be supposed to have afterwards made an 'understanding' to suppress it."

But to argue thus is to ignore the fundamental distinction which N. made between *publicly* and technically "suppressing" at the Bishop's bidding (which might have implied episcopal *condemnation* of *doctrine*) and *private* suppression or "stopping," as the result of a private understanding with the Bishop (which would have involved *no condemnation of doctrine* at all).

(2) "Why may not Church have been wrong as to the fact?" [He means, as to N.'s offer to suppress Tract 90.] Is this a fair or reasonable argument? Is it fair to argue that such a man as Church would make a statement of *fact* about one with whom he was in such close relations and daily intercourse, and almost simultaneously with the alleged fact, without having solid foundation for it? And what ground have we for charging Church with definite mis-statement? Simply that we may save N.'s memory from the charge of being treacherous. But we know, from other sources, that N.'s memory *was* treacherous; we know, from other sources, that Church was generally accurate.

However, there are special reasons for thinking on this occasion that N. not only told Church the facts but also *saw Church's letter*. It was written to Rogers, and Newman himself *added a few lines to Rogers on the flaps of the same letter*, beginning with the words, "Church has told you the scrape I have got into"—which certainly imply that, in Newman's own judgment, Church knew all the facts.

(3) The next objection, though expressed in epistolary vernacular, I prefer to give in my friend's own words that I may not weaken its force. "N. having definitely withdrawn from his offer, it seems out of the question that the Bishop should say, as you make him say, 'Well, if it hurts you so much to kill your baby, kill the other 89, and then you won't hear it squeal.' This seems to me to be the meaning of your paragraph on p. 270, 'To save your conscience, I won't ask you to kill one but all.'

"Surely this is out of the question, especially from a Bishop who seems to have been somewhat weak, and also very much disposed to honour N. and to make things easy for him."

This argument will, I think, seem very forcible to those who do not keep all the facts steadily before them. But it will have no weight at all with those who realise N.'s readiness to do *anything whatever by private arrangement*, if only he could escape that public condemnation of the Tract which would imply condemnation of *doctrine*, and would consequently drive him out of the Church of England.

No pride of authorship, and most assuredly no thought of author's profits, would make him look on Tract 90 or any of the other Tracts under his control, as a "baby": and he would have massacred not 90, but 900 such "babies" with ecstatic delight, if thereby he could have gained over his own Diocesan to be an active champion of the Tractarian Cause.

We may repeat here what N. said to his Bishop in 1838 when he offered to withdraw any of the Tracts over which he had control, if the Bishop would tell him which were those to which he objected (V. ii. 384): "I should feel a more lively pleasure in knowing that I was submitting myself to your Lordship's expressed judgment in a matter of that kind, than I could have even in the widest circulation of the volumes in question."

As to "squealing"—that is a metaphor, of which the substratum of fact is not clear. But another metaphor might suggest, as N. elsewhere suggests, that the Tracts, though dead, would still speak. Their opinions would be reproduced, and would spread.

(4) "The whole of your p. 271 seems disposed of by the letter from Church given in the note, in which he says, 'N. wrote back offering to . . . . . *suppress* No. 90. or *stop* the Tracts, or give up St. Mary's . . . . ;' from which it is clear that 'stop' and 'suppress' are distinguished; and there is no third course. I don't *e.g.* understand what you mean by '*drop* the tracts.'"

Certainly "suppress" and "stop" are distinguished. For "suppress" implies objectionableness and condemnation, whereas "stop" implies no motive at all. As I understand it, N. offered (1) to "suppress" No. 90 in deference to the Bishop's condemnation of it; or else (2) to do still more and to stop *all* the Tracts at his disposal including not only that which had been pronounced objectionable but others too which *had been in no way condemned, and which therefore would be "stopped" rather than "suppressed";* or (3) to take a still more extreme step, that of resigning St. Mary's. This seems in an ascending scale, and a natural way of putting things. [I used the word "drop" to mean "informal suppression."]

According to my friend's hypothesis, the offer was (1) to suppress No. 90; or (2) to publish no more new Tracts; or (3) to resign St. Mary's. To my mind there is a drop in passing thus from (1) to so small a matter as that implied in (2); especially when we remember that the Tracts had been on the point of being discontinued some years before, and N. had told his mother that, if it should come to pass, he could not say that he would be sorry (see vol. i. 377).

(5) My friend adds: "It is a very serious thing to bring a charge against a man – especially when he is dead—for which the evidence to an open-minded reader, as I think I am, is quite invisible, and, on your own statement of it, only hypothetical."

I look at the matter quite differently, not in the light of a "charge," but as an attempt to get at the true explanation of facts. "Serious" or not, this is the "thing" to be done.

We have to explain how the Bishop of Oxford (apparently) entered into an "understanding" with N.; then (apparently) broke it; and then was eulogized by N. as "noble," &c., &c., &c. My theory is that the Bishop used loose and non-technical language in his public message to N., assuming that N. would give it a more stringent significance privately; that N. at first conceived himself bound to give it this more stringent significance; that afterwards (a thing not at all unlikely in a man of his treacherous memory) he forgot this understanding (to which he had not definitely committed himself to writing); or that he interpreted it in a manner more favourable to his desires; or that, when pressed by his friends to make the full use of his position, his "head got simply confused" (as on other occasions), and that he was "quite upset," and hence allowed himself to do what he had, by implication, given his Bishop to understand he would not do.

This theory, without accusing N. of dishonourable conduct, or of anything but what we might expect from him in a state of confused excitement, enables us to acquit the Bishop of base, deliberate, and repeated treachery. For then we can understand why the latter, finding that N. had broken the understanding, conceived himself justified in breaking it as well. Then, too, we can understand why N. eulogized the Bishop as "noble" even though he had accused him of breaking his word; he knew, in his heart, that the Bishop *was* a gentleman and could not have done a base thing. True, his memory of the facts and the theory which he had created in his mind, obliged him to impute to the old man an action that *seemed* base; but in his *heart* N. (quite rightly) distrusted himself so far that he could not trust either his own memory or his own mind. So, with an honourable inconsistency he persisted that the Bishop *was* "noble," though he had broken his word. Then, in order to supply himself with a logical basis for this incongruous conclusion, he invented a fact: "the Bishop did not *want* to break his word, but people in

London made him;" or else, "The Bishop did not want to break his word; he did it to sooth the popular hubbub and to conciliate the clergy and the Bishops."

As to "dead men," we must remember that there are *two* "dead men" in question. One is Newman; the other is Dr. Bagot, the Bishop of Oxford. I do not believe the latter was "noble." But I refuse to believe, without sufficient evidence, that Dr. Bagot had a treacherous heart, in order that I may be enabled to disbelieve—what, from countless sources, I know to be true—that Newman had a treacherous memory.

272 (b) * "NEWMAN'S ATTACK UPON THE BISHOPS."

On so important a subject, the reader may be glad to see the different accounts in the *Apologia* in juxta-position :—

(i.) A. 89-90. "First, if I remember right, they wished me to withdraw the Tract. This I refused to do: I would not do so for the sake of those who were unsettled or in danger of unsettlement. I would not do so for my own sake; for how could I acquiesce in a mere Protestant interpretation of the Articles? how could I range myself among the Professors of a theology, of which it put my teeth on edge even to hear the sound?"

[*The answer to this rhetoric is that he* HAD *done it, and done it* SPONTANEOUSLY. *He had volunteered an offer to the Bishop of Oxford to "suppress Tract* 90" (*see above*, 271 (a), *and had then withdrawn the offer. This, he suppresses, or forgets.*]

"Next they said, 'Keep silence; do not defend the Tract;' I answered, 'Yes, if you will not condemn it—if you will allow it to continue on sale.'"

[*The two things are totally distinct. As to an authoritative condemnation of the Tract by all the Bishops, Newman may have been told that it was unlikely, if he submitted; and the Bishop of Oxford may have said that he need not call in and cancel copies already printed: but this was quite different from reprinting three new editions in the very year in which the author "published his own condemnation."*]

"They pressed on me whenever I gave way; they fell back, when they saw me obstinate. Their line of action was to get out of me as much as they could; but upon the point of their tolerating the Tract I *was* obstinate. So they let me continue it on sale; and they said they would not condemn it."

[*I have pointed out that, so far as there was any ground for this statement, "they" must here refer to a joint condemnation.*]

"But they said that this was on condition that I did not defend it, that I stopped the series [*? stopped the Tracts*], and that I myself published my own condemnation in a letter to the Bishop of Oxford."

[(1) *On the very day on which he published the letter, he republished the Tract* (W. 160) "*with various additions and qualifications designed to meet the objections which had been made to it in its original form,*" *which, I presume, amounted to "defending" the Tract;* (2) *the "condemnation" was no condemnation at all.*]

"I impute nothing whatever to him, he was ever most kind to me." [*Yet he three times condemned Tract* 90, *and once with such severity that Newman* "*could not believe his ears*" *when he heard the condemnation.*]

"Also they said they could not answer for what some individual Bishops might perhaps say about the Tract in their own charges. [*This indicates that the words* "*they would not condemn it,*" *used above, refer simply to a* JOINT CONDEMNATION, *and left all the Bishops, individually, free.*]

"I agreed to their conditions. My one point was to save the Tract.

"Not a scrap of writing was given me as a pledge of the performance of their side of the engagement.

[*What was their* "*engagement*" (*supposing it to have had any existence*) *except that there should be no joint condemnation? And there was no such condemnation.*]

"Parts of letters from them were read to me, without being put into my hands. It was an 'understanding.' A clever man had warned me against 'understandings' some thirteen years [1st ed. "six years"] before: I have hated them ever since."

[*Mere rhetoric, of no value except that the variation between* "*six*" *and* "*thirteen*" *adds one more to the many proofs that N.'s memory was treacherous.*]

(ii.) A. 139-40. "I was in the misery of this unsettlement when a second blow came upon me. The Bishops one after another began to charge against me. It was a formal determinate movement. This was the real 'understanding'; that, on which I had acted on the first appearance of Tract 90, had come to naught."

[*If this means that the English Bishops had combined together to do this, in violation of a compact, it was an act of baseness in Newman to bring forward a charge of this kind against men of whom many were dead, without alleging a scrap of evidence for it.*]

"I think the words which had then been used to me, were, that 'perhaps two or three of them might think it necessary to say something in their charges'; but by this time they had tided over the difficulty of the Tract, and there was no one to enforce the 'understanding.' They went on in this way, directing charges at me, for three whole years. I recognized it as a condemnation; it was the only one that was in their power."

[*It was not. There might have been a joint condemnation.*]

"At first I intended to protest; but I gave up the thought in despair."

[*He might well* "*give it up in despair.*" *For he had nothing to protest against; and—if we bear in mind the rough, dry, audacious style in which he had provoked the conflict—we must add that, even in the exaggerated tone of some of his assailants, he had not much to complain of.*]

(iii.) I must now ask the reader's special attention to the third and latest of the three accounts in the *Apologia*.

It is much more modest than the other two, and much less bitter, the reason being that, *since writing or publishing the two previous accounts,* (younger readers may need to be reminded that the *Apologia* was published in parts) he had *found some of his own letters written at the time* *of the understanding.* He only gives us scraps of them; but even these quite alter the complexion of the case. It now appears—though even now very indistinctly—that he made his submission with the view of averting "*such* a condemnation" of his Tract by collective episcopal authority as would have amounted to "a repudiation of the ancient Catholic doctrine which was the scope of the Tract"—in other words a *joint, episcopal condemnation.*

(iv.) A. 207. "A series of their (the Bishops') *ex cathedra* judgments, lasting through three years, and including a notice of no little severity in a Charge [*there were more than one*] of my own Bishop, came as near to a condemnation of my Tract, and, so far, to a repudiation of the ancient Catholic doctrine, which was the scope of the Tract, as was possible in the Church of England. It was in order to shield the Tract from such a condemnation, that I had, at the time of its publication in 1841, so simply put myself at the disposal of the higher powers in London. At that time, all that was distinctly contemplated in the way of censure, was contained in the message which my Bishop sent me, that the Tract was objectionable. That, I thought, was the end of the matter."

[*Probably the word* "*distinctly*" *seems to N. to justify this statement; and this perhaps is intended to cover the fact that he was warned that the Bishops reserved their individual power to charge against the Tract, and that there was nothing of the nature of a formal compact with the Bishops.*]

"I had refused to suppress it, and they had yielded that point."

[*He had spontaneously offered to* "*suppress*" *it; then withdrawn his offer; then* (*probably*) *agreed to let the Tract drop out of circulation, provided that it was not authoritatively* "*suppressed.*"]

He goes on to say (A. 1st ed. 334–5), "Since I wrote the former portions of this narrative, I have found what I wrote to Dr. Pusey on March 24, while the matter was in progress."

Later editions change "wrote" into "published." The alteration is of great importance. For these notes to Pusey are *quite inconsistent* with the accounts given in the *preceding pages* of the *Apologia.* They show that he *did,* at first, consent to "withdraw" the Tract, the very thing that (A. 89–90) he has told us he *could not have thought* of doing ("For how could I acquiesce, &c. &c. &c. &c.?").

Now, if he found these notes to Pusey since *writing* "the former portions of the narrative," and before *publishing* them, he ought to *have rewritten them.* For they do not convey a true impression.

Recognizing the gross negligence which he was imputing to himself in the first edition of the *Apologia,* he (we are to presume) ascertained that he had made a mistake, and that he had not found these notes till after he had *published* the former portions, so that he *could not* rewrite them. In default of evidence to the contrary we are bound to accept the correction "published," though I confess I have learned always to distrust N.'s memory in matters of that kind.

But still, even if we grant that the correction represents the fact, the charge of gross negligence is only shifted for a year. For how came it that in 1865, and in subsequent years, when edition after edition was reprinted, and when the book became quite a different work from the first edition. he still *omitted to rewrite the earlier accounts?* They do not convey the truth.

Let us now pass to the notes he "wrote to Dr. Pusey on March 24," while negotiating with his Bishop.

"The more I think of it, I said, the more reluctant I am to suppress Tract 90, though of *course* I will do it if the Bishop wishes it; I cannot, however, deny that I shall feel it a severe act. According to the notes which I took of the letters or messages which I sent to him in the course of that day" [so in 1st ed., but later editions alter it into "on that and the following days"] "I went on to say" [so in 1st ed., but later editions have "I wrote successively]:—

'My first feeling was to obey without a word; I will obey still; but my judgment has steadily risen against it ever since.' Then in the Postscript, 'If I have done any good to the Church, I do ask the Bishop this favour, as my reward for it, that he would not insist on a measure, from which I think good will not come. However, I will submit to him. Afterwards I get' [so 1st ed., but later editions "got"] 'stronger still and wrote: "I have almost come to the conclusion, if the Bishop publicly intimates that I must suppress the Tract, or speaks strongly in his charge against it, to suppress it indeed, but to resign my living also. You may show this in any quarter you please.'"

On this we must remark that there is either a singular neglect on Newman's part, or else an omission bordering on disingenuousness. For he tells us that he has now had time to look up the "notes" that he took of "letters or messages" written at this critical time. Is it possible that he took no "note" of the "letter" to his bishop, in which he "*spontaneously offered to suppress Tract* 90"? If he did not, that was a singular neglect. If he did, and omitted to mention it, most people would call the omission disingenuous: for he poses as one who is ready to "submit" to "a severe act," and who will "obey" if the Bishop "insists," while, all the time, the Bishop is *merely asking him to do what he spontaneously offered to do, about a week before!*

I confess I wholly distrust Newman's memory, wherever the interests of the *Via Media* (or any other "Cause") are concerned. I would much rather trust the notes that he wrote to Pusey on 24 March if only they had been printed; but nothing is given us except the scraps I have quoted from the *Apologia.* As regards the date of these letters, it must be observed that even the latest edition of the *Apologia* does not deny that they were all *written* (whether notes or records of messages) on 24 March, only it asserts that some of them were "*sent*" on "following days."

The statement that they were written on 24 March is confirmed by a letter to Keble (25 March) in which he says (L. ii. 338): "I think I am observing my duty to the Bishop by suppressing the Tract, and my duty to my principles by resigning my living." It seems, then, that on 24 March he wrote to Pusey "I have *almost* come to" that resolution, and on 25 March wrote to Keble that he *had* come to it. If so, the alteration in the later editions of the *Apologia* which states that some of these letters or messages were not "*sent*" till "following days" will not amount to more than a difference of a few hours ; and perhaps, indeed, we ought to substitute "day" for "days."

No doubt, it exhibits N. in a rather ridiculous light, when we find him on one and the same day writing (1) "*of course* I will do it" ; (2) "I will obey" ; then (in a Postscript) (3) "I do ask that he would not insist, however I will submit" ; then (4) "I have almost come to the resolution to . . . suppress it indeed, but to resign my living also." It perhaps seemed some kind of extenuation of all these rapid variations, that some of them at all events, though dated 24 March, could be nominally and vaguely connected with "following days."

In the same way I should explain his forgetting (if he did forget) to state that he had spontaneously offered to do the very thing that he now refused to do. For that makes the position of things still more ridiculous ; and accordingly I find no mention made of it either in the *Apologia* or in any of his published Letters. But for the casual mention of it in a letter from Church to Rogers, we should never have known of it.

I may here add that the looseness of "*they* say" and "*they* said," (about the Bishops) in the *Apologia*, may be illustrated by its use in L. ii. 337 "they say the Bishop of London is not to move." This was written on 20 March. Then, on 25 March, "Bishops moreover would be charging ; this the Bishop of London announces."

273 (b) A. 51 ; 274 (a) "second edition," W. 160 ; 275 (b) L. ii. 344.

CHAPTER XXXIII (JULY 1841)

278 (b) L. ii. 344, V. ii. 397 ; 279 (a) A. 130, "a second time," V. ii 385, "Dean Church"*, C. 240, "He hardly spoke stronger in 1834 than he did in 1841 after No. 90."

279 (a) "unwillingly," A. 220, 221 ; 280 (b and c) W. 158 ; 280 (d) W. 177 ; 281 (a) * W. 176 ; 281 (a) "altogether concur." If N. "altogether concurred" with Ward, and if Ward maintained that an Anglican might subscribe the Articles and yet "hold all Roman doctrine," how was N. justified in writing in 1863 (see O. 37–9) a letter in which he says, "I never held that persons who subscribed the Thirty-nine Articles were at liberty to hold *all* Roman doctrine"?

He may not have publicly *maintained* it, but there is the strongest evidence to prove (W. 177–184) that, at one time, he *held* it. If he did not, he altogether deceived Ward ; and, when Ward freely and openly stated the concurrence between himself and Newman, and took full advantage of it, Newman never contradicted Ward's statement. Newman's concurrence with Ward at this time is also confirmed by E. T. M. ii. 225–6. When E. T. Mozley corrected too advanced expressions of Ward's in the *British Critic*, Ward, he says, complained to Newman : "Newman was then in this difficulty. He *did not disagree with what Ward had written* :

but on the other hand he had given neither me nor Ward to understand that he was likely to step in between us."

281 (b) W. 161 ; 281 (c) "declined to state expressly," W. 173 ; 282 (b) "pledge," W. 175 ; 282–284 (a) W. 186–9 ; 284 (a) L. ii. 364 ; 286 (b) A. 89 ; 287 (a) L. ii. 344, W. 199 ; 288 (b) A. 139, 221 ; 289 (a) "painful," A. 134, 129, 189 ; 289 (b) A. 139 ; 290 (b)* "a miracle," L. ii. 347 : "Nor do I think it God's way, generally speaking, for *individuals* to leave one religion for another—it is so much like an exercise of private judgment. Three thousand *at once* were converted on the day of Pentecost. Where *miracles* are brought before an individual, the case is different."

290 (b) L. ii. 348–9 ; 290 (c) L. ii. 351 ; 291 (a) "hideous," L. ii. 352–3, A. 140, 130 ; 292 (a) L. ii. 356, A. 192.

CHAPTER XXXIV (July—Decemebr, 1841)

293 (a) L. ii. 353, 357, 356 ; 293 (a)–294 (b) L. ii. 376–7 ; 294 (b) L. ii. 380 ; 295 (a) L. ii. 360, 361, 366, "certainly,"* the exact words are (L. ii. 360) "seems there are certainly plans on foot" ; it is a frequent practice with Newman to begin with "seem" and then add "certainly" ; and occasionally, in quotations, I may have accidentally omitted the word "seem." I do not pretend to say what is the precise meaning of "it *seems* to be *certainly* so," as distinct from "it seems to be so."

295 (b) A. 148 L. ii. 364, 16 Nov. 1841 ; 296 (a) L. 370, 36. (b)† "a letter," A. 157-62, L. ii. 376 9. It is very difficult to explain what principle has prompted the omissions in the versions of this letter given in the *Apologia* and the *Letters*. The omissions in the *Apologia* are not indicated by any signs of omission. There are also slight differences in the text of the two versions.

298 (a)† "seven years." The *Apologia* has "seven" ; the *Letters* "some." The former is more like N.'s thought and style. For "seven" see vol. i. 405, note on 215 (a).

300 (a) L. ii. 381, C. 274, L. ii. 367, 381, "withdrawing" (*sic*) ; one would have expected "losing."

On the other hand Isaac Williams, his curate, formally separated himself at this time from Newman's religious views ; and Rogers detached himself from the Movement. It must have greatly added to the strain on N. to find that he could no longer count on the sympathy of the latter : and it is sad to read the following account of the separation (I. W. 122–3 :—

"He (Rogers) said that he very much wished he could have broken off from Newman in the way that I (*i.e.* Williams) did" [see note on ii. 301 (b)], "during the latter part of Newman's stay among us, for it was a very painful time to him and has left a very uncomfortable retrospect ; for seeing him daily as a Fellow, living in the same staircase, and having been in the habit of living with him, he entered into constant controversies and disputations with him, which produced at length a sore and irritable feeling, so that there ceased at last to be any friendliness between them, in that his separation from us."

It was a saying of Rogers—standing up, it would seem, for the much-attacked Reformers—that (E. T. M. ii. 230) "Cranmer burnt well."

300 (a) "who asked," *i.e.* "when he, *i.e.* the Archbishop asked"; it is, perhaps a Latinism.

301 (a)* "unchurched," so he writes to Bowden (L. ii. 361). "It is quite plain that our rulers *can* unchurch us, and I have no assurance that, &c."; to Keble (L. ii. 360), "unless a Protest" (*i.e.* against the Jerusalem Bishopric) "is made, others will determine that our Church is given up and uncatholicized."

301 (b)* "of two minds." On this statement the following passage has an important bearing. It relates to a conversation which took place after Tract 90 and apparently (I.W. 123) in 1841, or at the very beginning of 1842, "during the latter part of his (N.'s) stay at Oxford," before he "shut himself up" (6 Feb. 1842) "in his monastery at Littlemore" (ib. 110-1):—

"One evening when alone in his rooms, he told me he thought the Church of Rome was right and we were wrong, so much so that we ought to join it. To this I said that if our own Church improved, as we hoped, and the Church of Rome also would reform itself, it seemed to hold out the prospect of reunion. And then everything seemed favourably progressing beyond what we could have dared to hope in the awakening of religion and reformation among ourselves: that mutual repentance must, by God's blessing, tend to mutual restoration and union. 'No,' he said, 'St. Augustine would not allow of this argument, as regarded the Donatists. You must come out and be separate.'" In consequence of this, Isaac Williams wrote to Newman that they "could not be together" as they had been. But they continued as Vicar and Curate, and with no ill-will on either side.

"All this," he continues (ib. 112), "was long before it was publicly known what Newman's thoughts really were; and he was for some time accused by some of dishonesty and duplicity. But the fact really was that"—I italicize—"*he was wavering very much in his own mind; and the feelings and thoughts he would express to one person or at one time, differed very much, in consequence, from what he might express to another or on another occasion.*"

303 (a) U. 293; 303 (b) U. 300, 305-7; 304 (a) "nothing too revolting." E.T.M. has a remark (ii. 51) about Newman's reception of Arnold's Rugby Sermons, which bears on this point: "His volume of 'Rugby Sermons' had not been received favourably by Newman and his friends, not so much on account of the Sermons themselves, as on account of a note on Genesis xxii. in which Arnold laid down that the Almighty could not do an immoral thing, and that consequently if we thought anything wrong we were bound to believe that He had not done it."

304 (a)* U. 298. On this my censor remarks, "I suppose this paragraph must come here; but you will not be surprised when Mr. —

quotes against you and your definition of Faith, a sentence you omit from the description of a bigot (U. 306) :—

"'They conceive that they profess the truth which makes all things easy. They have their one idea, or their favourite notion, which occurs to them on every occasion. . . . Perhaps they have discovered, as they think, the leading idea, or simple view, or sum and substance of the Gospel; and they insist upon this or that isolated tenet, selected by themselves or by others not better qualified, to the disparagement of the rest of the revealed scheme.'"

My reply is that I should not be surprised at any true 'Newmanian' quoting this against me, because, possibly, a true 'Newmanian' *would* regard the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God as being an "isolated tenet," and as *not* being the "sum and substance of the Gospel." But I do not think Christians in general could take this view. And certainly I am far from saying that it is a "truth which makes all things easy." On the contrary it is very difficult sometimes to hold this belief in the face of facts, and along with the belief that God is a perfectly righteous Judge. Still, it is our duty to hold it, as Christians. And I am not ashamed to confess that it "occurs to me on every occasion"—on which I repeat the Lord's Prayer.

304 (a) * "their." I use the plural in order to include polytheists. But monotheistic bigots may be polytheists *at heart*, believing in one God of Mercy and another God of Justice, or in one God the Redeemer, and another who is an "Offended Majesty," and so on. 304 (b) * "Whately." Here is the kind of language that N. would call "bigotry." It is from a letter written by Whately to N. (1825, L. 1.100) in which the former "classifies" the "errors of Romanists" thus: "As you so much admire my fallacy, I will honour you by communicating a very good way of classifying the errors of Romanists; namely, according to Aristotle's enumeration in the *Poetics* of the manœuvres performed on words; some are *curtailed*, some *enlarged*, some *altered*, some *invented*, some borrowed from *foreigners*, some *transferred* from one sense to another, some tacked on where they are not wanted, and some *confounded* together."

305 (a) U. 310; 306 §¡ 149 "*Sibthorp.*" In the *Letters*, the spelling is always "Sibthorpe"; but the *Times* of 2 Feb. 1892 contains a (posthumous) letter with Mr. Sibthorp's own signature spelt as in the text.

306 (b) W. 190; 307 (a) A. 192, "gain the cup" i.e. the right of administering the cup to the laity in the Holy Communion; 307 (b) W. 193; 308 (a) W. 197; 310 (a) Subj. 318 (28 Nov.); 311 (b) Subj. 336-7 (5 Dec.); 312 (b) Subj. 370, 374 (12 Dec.); 313 (a) Subj. 380; 313 (b) W. 200.

313 (b) * "unless." By these words I do not deny the possibility that he may have believed this. But it seems to me extraordinary that by repeating words formally or incredulously, a man should hope to achieve any other result than that of forming a habit of formality or incredulity. The remedy, I should have thought, would have been to utter regularly such prayers as one *can* utter honestly, in the hope that ultimately one may rise to something higher.

313 (b) W. 200; 314 (b) Subj. 354 (19 Dec.); 315 (b)* "poisoned." In the printed sermons, a foot-note is added stating that these four discourses on the Notes of the Church are addressed to those alone who have lawful doubts on the safety of continuance in our communion. But I have found no evidence that any such warning was issued to those who were in the habit of attending the church. And even such a warning would hardly have excused a preacher who consistently maintained that no one ought to hold office in the English Church unless he could attack the Church of Rome.

314 (b) Subj. 354 (19 Dec.); 315 (c) "safe to die in," Subj. 355; 316 (a)* "infernal humbug," W. 316, "When Macmullen said to him one day" (i.e. during "the closing years of the Movement," (1842-5) "'Bear in mind that you are on our principles really a priest of God,' Ward broke off the discourse, saying, 'If that is the case, the whole thing is infernal humbug.'" Macmullen is described by Church (C. 279) as a man "of high Anglican opinions," who "was known to hold the opinions of the movement school" and was "of course, called a Tractarian."

CHAPTER XXXV (1842)

317 (a) A. 171, L. ii. 386, A. 148; 318 (a) Subj. 12 (23 Jan.); 318 (b) A. 204, 167; 319 (b) L. ii. 303; 319 (c) see above, vol. ii. p. 217, and L. ii. 304, "a biographer," W. M. 39; 320 (b) L. ii. 391; 321 (b) "cells of dormitories," in Phil. 2nd ed. Pref. xxxix. I have, wrongly, taken this as a misprint for "cells *or* dormitories"; 322 (b) L. ii. 394; 322 (d) * "private." I do not see how N. could say he was attempting "nothing ecclesiastical," after describing his plan as he had done to Rogers: see above, vol. ii. p. 216. 323 (b) A. 172; 324 (b) * "a flight of undergraduates." "As I understand it," says my censor, "the 'flight of undergraduates' had come to scoff." The context seems to me to indicate that they had come out of curiosity. And even if they came to "scoff," their "guardians" might have supposed that (like Sibthorp) they would "remain to pray."

But why should we impute such fickleness to the young men of whom we read that, when the question of Ward's condemnation was "pending," (W. 342) "Mr. Ward *was cheered* by the undergraduates as he left the theatre, and the Vice-Chancellor was saluted by *hisses* and snowballs from the same quarter"?

325 (b) W. M. 37; 326 (a) A. 147, "standing on one leg," A. 103, "more definite view," A. 157 quoting a letter of 13 December, 1841, and preceded by these words, "The *Via Media* then disappeared for ever, and a new Theory, made expressly for the occasion, took its place. I was pleased with my new view." This "Theory" or "view" is what he calls "Samaria" (see vol. ii. 312); but it was sketched out by him long before this, in a letter to Rogers quoted above (Vol. ii. 194) and written in October, 1839.

327 (a) L. ii. 397, 398, "his sister," L. ii. 404 (1 December, 1842); 327 (b) A. 220; 328 (a) "heard it wrong."* Every explanation of these

inconsistencies contains difficulties, but this seems to contains the least-I presume that, at first, though he heard the remark about interpretations which made the Articles mean anything or nothing, he could not suppose that it referred to Tract 90.

328 (c)* "now," in the early summer of 1842, "letter to his Bishop," A. 213, "not the fact."* The question about absolution was not put by Lockhart till he had been "a very few weeks at Littlemore" (W. 210), and the promise was not extorted by N. till "a little later" (ib. 329).

329 (a) A. 213; 329 (d) this account is from a Tract written by Mr. William Clement, dated 1890. A similar account (also coming from Lockhart himself) is given in W. 210; 330 (c) L. ii. 400 (31 July). for the statements in 331 (b)–332 (a) see Phil. *passim*; 332 (b) "puerilities," O. 16; 333 (b) A. 168, "my head got simply confused." To such a state of mind E. T. M. (ii. 35) appears to be referring when he says, "Why did Newman pick out from all the extraordinary lives of Saints, the most extraordinary and the most surpassing belief, for Anthony [Froude] to shatter what was left of his convictions upon?"

CHAPTER XXXVI (1843)

334 (a) A. 194–5; 335 (a) "confession," Subj. 41 (30 October, 1842); "Continuity," Subj. 213 (13 November, 1842), "breakwater," Subj. 234 (27 November 1842), "retractation," Subj. 254 (4 December); 335 (b) V. ii. 418–9; 336 (b) U. 343, 345, 347; 337 (a) U. 348; 337 (b)—338 (a) U. 349, 348, 346; 338 (a)† "in the earlier edition." A friend remarks "My edition, which is the *first*, reads 'There are seven notes.' Was the sermon first printed as a pamphlet?"

No, it was not. For the sermon was preached on 2 February; the first edition, which contained the error, is dated 4 February; and his sister had read it, not as a pamphlet, but in the first edition (L. ii. 410) of his *University Sermons*. It would appear, then, that my friend's "first edition" differs from the *real* "first." The volume came to "a second edition" by 7 March (L. ii. 409) and probably before.

338 (b) that they are "to be received on authority" is, of course, not a quotation, but the inference that the *reader* naturally draws. Here is the passage U. 349-50: "It would appear that even the most subtle questions of the Schools may have a real meaning, as the most intricate *formulae* in analytics, and, since we cannot tell how far our instrument of thought reaches in the process of investigation, and at what point it fails us, no questions may safely be despised. 'Whether God was anywhere before creation?' 'whether He knows all creatures in Himself?' 'whether the blessed see all things possible and future in Him?' 'whether relation is the form of the Divine Persons?' 'in what sense the Holy Spirit is Divine Love?' These, and a multitude of others, far more minute and remote, are all sacred from their subject." There is nothing to deny, and much to imply, that he regards them as "all sacred" *alike*.

339 (b) U. 350–1 ; 340 (b)* "in the dark," as compared (for example) with Isaac Williams, to whom N. had said, before the spring of 1842 that "the Church of Rome was right," and the Anglican Church "wrong," "so much so" that Anglicans "ought to join the former" (see note above on 301 (b)).

341 (c) Subj. 275 (5, or 12 February) ; 342 (a) Subj. 20 (19 February) "unfaithfulness," he means, of course, because they showed how great a difference there was between him and the English Church, so that he could not feel at home in it, or justified in professing to serve it. A. 209 ; 343 (a(Subj. 38–9 (26 February), S. vi. 24. 349 ; 344 (a) S. viii. 16. 242 (30 April) ; 344 (b) Subj, 126 (4 June) ; 345 (b) "no more such sacrifices."* It is only fair to state the testimony of E. T. M. (ii. 437) : "During the whole period of my personal acquaintance and communication with Newman, I never had any other thought than that he was more thoroughly in earnest, and more entirely convinced of the truth of what he was saying, than any other man I had come across yet."

But is not this quite consistent with the fact that N. had periods of self-suspicion and self-distrust, which he did not reveal to E. T. M., during which his convictions were so far shaken that he put down arguments on paper to see how they looked, not being at all convinced of their truth or soundness ? Such a revelation would be made to none but a few friends, and those of a particular caste of mind, such as Rogers, but they certainly revealed occasional characteristics of N.'s mind.

I should take exception, in the same way, to the remarks of E. T. M. (ii. 439) on Newman's avoidance of solitude. No doubt, they were true of the latest years of N.'s Anglican career, but not of other periods.

346 (a) L. ii. 415 ; 346 (b) L. ii. 417 (25 August), 418 ; 347 (a) L. ii. 423 ; 347 (e) A. 219, "*ad hominem*," A. 229 ; 348 (b) A. 221 ; 348 (d) A. 213, L. ii. 418 ; 349 (a) L. ii. 423, 422–3 ; 350 (a)* "recognized the fact." In A. 207, he describes the persevering attack of the Bishops on Tract 90 the "ostensible, direct, and sufficient reason" for his resignation ; and he says that their judgments "came as near to a condemnation" of it, "and, so far, to a repudiation of the ancient Catholic doctrine, which was the scope of the Tract, as was possible in the Church of England." 350 (b) A. 213, "legal difficulties" are suggested in A. 214, and may have occasioned the delay.

351 (a) Subj. 407 ; 352 (b) "veils." The meaning seems to be that the amplitude of Scripture conceals to some extent the comparatively petty private examplifications which find expression in it. The full sentence is : "It is far higher and wider than our need ; and its language veils our feelings while it gives expression to them."

352 (b)* "communion together," see extract in note on vol. ii. 30 (a).

CHAPTER XXXVII (1843–5)

355 (a) C. 323-5 ; 357 (a) C. 267, 329, 330-1 ; 358 (b) L. ii. 452 ; 359 (a) A. 217-9 ; 359 (b) A. 225 ; 360 (a) A. 227 ; 360 (b) * "waiting the Lord's

time," comp. E. T. M. ii. 48-9 ; "Always waiting for indication, whatever happened, for good or ill, he acted upon it. It was a providential stepping-stone in a field of uncertainties. No doubt, people may deceive themselves by this sort of reckoning, and many have so deceived themselves. . . . For everything he did there was this foundation in circumstance, and the secret of his career cannot be discovered, if it is to be discovered, without taking into account everything that happened to him."

360 (b) L. ii. 436, "Samaria"* i.e. the Church of England, regarded as excommunicated, and under penance, see vol. ii. 312 (b) ; 361 (a) L. ii. 436, 437 ; 361 (b) C. 235, A. 228 ; 362 (a) L. ii. 424 (23 Sept. 1843) ; 363 (a) W. 201, A. 228 ; 364 (a) L. ii. 428, A. 222, "judicial blindness," see quotations, vol. ii. pp. 365, 371, 397. In the last of these passages he goes so far as to pray that God would not "add Himself as an adversary "against him."

365 (a) A. 222 ; 365 (c) L. ii. 431-2 ; 366 (a) L. ii. 433 (12 June, 1844) ; 367 (b) L. ii. 438, "ill-temper,* see Keble's use of the word above, vol. i. p. 131 ; 367 (c) A. 227, L. ii. 438 (17 Sept. 1844) ; 369 (a) W. M. 41 ; 369 (b) W. M. 100-1 ; 371 (a) L. ii. 445 (24 Nov.) ; 371 (b) "injustice," see note on 364 (a) ; 372 (b) L. ii. 449-50 (30 Nov.) 451 ; 373 (b) "seven," see below, p. 398, and see note on vol. i. 214 (a) ; 373 (c) A. (1 ed.) 360.

CHAPTER XXXVIII (Jan.-Oct. 1845)

375 (b)—377 (a) E. on D. 383-99 ; 376 (b) ib. 394 ; 377 (a) ib. 399 ; 378 (a) "fear," E. on D. 420, on which see Phil. 224 ; 378 (b) T. 104-5 ; 378 (c) † E. on D. (1st ed.) 327, much altered in the later edition : I have continued the quotation given by the Bishop, for the sake of clearness ; 379 (b) H. iii. 96, quoting E. on D. (1st ed.) 264 ; it is not to be supposed of course, that N. alleges this single fact as his foundation : there are several others, e.g. "St. Irenæus, a disciple of the Church of Smyrna, betakes himself to Gaul, and answers, in Lyons, the heresies of Syria," "St. Jerome is born in Dalmatia, studies at Constantinople and Alexandria, is secretary to St. Damasus at Rome, and settles and dies in Palestine" : these facts are alleged as proofs about the "nature of the unity" of the Church, to show that it was "a vast organized association" with a "unity of government," "a kingdom," and "coextensive with the Roman empire." They indicate a disposition to put down anything that came to hand, *dicenda*, *tacenda*, in order to "accumulate probabilities."

379 (a) As a specimen of ecclesiastical developments from "high" doctrines of sacerdotalism, the reader may be glad to see the following extract from Thirlwall's *Letters* (iv. 239) describing a French sermon preached at Bourges in 1862 before the Cardinal Archbishop. The subject was "the dignity of the priesthood."

"One of the most expressive passages," says Thirlwall, "was that in which the preacher expressed his fear lest he should fail to do justice to so great a theme, and his wish that, rather than prejudice it in the minds of his hearers, he might draw his last breath at their feet ! Yet it did not seem as if the sacerdotal dignity could have been much lowered through the inadequacy of his conception of it. For he not only exalted it above that of angels and of the blessed Virgin herself (pointing out that the priest 'engendra le Fils de Dieu'—not in his state of humiliation, but in one as free from all mortal soil as that in which he existed before his incarnation) but, with regard to the rest of mankind, above Le Père Éternel himself. How, you will ask, was that? Well, it was so. In the case of imperfect contrition (one of pretty frequent occurrence), God says to the sinner, 'Thou art impure, an abomination in my sight, I cannot admit thee into my presence,' &c. 'Le prêtre lui dit, ne t'inquiète pas ; je le forcerai de te presser sur son sein.' This I suppose was nearly the climax, and the preacher came down, not struck by a thunderbolt."

I wonder whether such doctrine as this—of course, divested of the southern floridities of the preacher of Bourges, and expressed in our drier and colder northern style—will ever be preached in a (nominally) Anglican pulpit and be logically shown to be the legitimate outcome of Hurrell Froude's and Newman's teaching in 1833 that Anglican priests are not only "the successors of the Apostles" but also intrusted with *the awful and mysterious gift of making the bread and wine Christ's Body and Blood.*

(381-3) E. on D. (1st ed.), 240-2, *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics*, 41-2, both quoted by H. iii. 90-1, 92-3 ; 384 (a) E. on D. 29 ; 385 (b) † E. T. M. ii. 398. It is obvious to suggest "constraining" as a substitute for the possible misprint "containing" ; but it may be a reminiscence of some subtle phrase of N.'s implying that the Divine Volition would, as it were, enfold and include the human. The italics in the extract are mine.

CHAPTER XXXIX (JAN.-OCT. 1845)

388 (a) E. on D. (both editions) 327 ; 389 (a) * "you really will believe," comp. above, vol. ii. pp. 163, 313 ; 389 (b) A. (1st ed.) 325, (later ed.) 200 ; 390 (a) A. (1st ed.) 342, (later ed.) 214 ; 390 (b) * "certain" and "submission" are in capitals to represent N.'s italics ; the italics are mine ; 390 (c) * "I *thought* . . . that the Anglican Church was *certainly* wrong," this slip-shod expression is less excusable here than in the epistolary style of L. ii. 360, "it *seems* there are *certainly* plans on foot." But such phrases are quite in N.'s style.

390 (c) * "the Catholic Church," it seems impossible to reconcile this with the statement of his curate Isaac Williams, that before 6 Feb. 1842 he had told the latter that "he *thought the Church of Rome was right and we were wrong, so much so that we ought to join it*," see note, above, on p. 301 (b).

391 (d) A. (1st ed.) 324, (later ed.) 199, the remarks immediately following are taken from Phil. 76-7 ; 395 (b) A. 229, 16 Nov. 1844, L. ii. 456-7 ; 396 (a), see above, note on vol. ii. 30 (a) ; 396 (b) A. 231 ; 397 (a) L. ii. 460-1 ; 397 (d) A. 231 (30 March, 1845) ; 400 (a).* Writing on 6 Oct.,

his sister says, "I have had a letter, which I have been expecting and half-dreading to receive this week from J. H. N. to say he has written to the Provost to resign his Fellowship. He adds that now anything may be expected any day."

400 (a) A. 234; 401 (b) * "no one could help supposing." Here is the account as given in A. (1st ed. 366-7):

"Before I got to the end [i.e. of the *Essay on Development*], I resolved to be received, and the book remains in the state in which it was then, unfinished.

"On October 8th I wrote to a number of friends the following letter:– 'Littlemore, October 8, 1845. I am this night expecting Father Dominic, the Passionist, who from his youth, has been led to have distinct and direct thoughts, first of the countries of the North, then of England. After thirty years' (almost) waiting, he was, without his own act, sent here. But he has had little to do with conversions. I saw him here for a few minutes on St. John Baptist's Day last year. He does not know of my intention; but I mean to ask of him admission into the one Fold of Christ. . . .'"

Later editions of the *Apologia* insert, between these two paragraphs, the one quoted above, p. 401 (c). They also insert, before the last sentence of the letter quoted here, "He is a simple, holy man; and withal gifted with miraculous powers." It would be interesting to ascertain why N. omitted these words, without giving signs of omission, in the first ed. of the *Apologia*. The letter, as it speaks of Marriott, the Dean of Oriel, having rooms "over the head" of the person addressed, was probably sent to Church, who was a resident Fellow of Oriel. Rogers, I think, was not then in residence.

401 (c) A. 234; 402 (b) Fl. 85; 403 (b) W. M. 47; 403 (b) "could not make it up." This is confirmed by the fact that Dalgairns coming to Littlemore in the beginning of October, *made the proposition to Newman*, *not* when he was resolved to join the Church of Rome, but when he was "at the last gasp of Anglicanism." This, at least, seems the only possible inference from W. M. 42: "And now Dalgairns, who had already been received by Father Dominic at Aston, and who had returned *to find* '*the Vicar' at the last gasp of Anglicanism*. . . . suggested that the Passionist ld again visit Littlemore."

3 (a) That Father Newsham was not precluded by absence from rd from receiving Newman, if the latter had desired it, I infer from . 44, where it is said that for the purpose of N.'s "first Communion," Dalgairns and St. John went into Oxford and borrowed from the Father "an altar stone and vestments."

403 (c) * "was to go to Belgium." This, I suppose, is the latent fact at the bottom of the dubious expression in the *Apologia* quoted on p. 401: "At the beginning of October, the latter (i.e. Dominic) *was passing* through London to Belgium." Literally, this would appear to be inaccurate. Dominic was in his house at Aston when he was told to go at once on "God's service" to Littlemore, and he set out "at the instant": strictly speaking, therefore, he was certainly *not* "*passing through*

London to Belgium" ; but he may have been *intending* to go to Belgium in the course of October. We may call this a "prophetic"—but a very misleading—use of the incomplete, or imperfect, tense. It is not to be imitated.

404 (a) * "a recent and fervid convert." That the impetuous Dalgairns might, in this way, have a little overstepped his commission is consistent with his character as sketched by E. T. M. ii. 13, "Dalgairns was a man whose very looks assured success in whatever he undertook, *if only the inner heat, which seemed to burn through his eyes, could be well regulated.*"

404 (b) see note on 400 (a) above ; 405 (b) W. M. 42 ; 406 (a) O. 11 ; 406 (d) W. M. 45, from which I gathered that, in deference to the feeling expressed by "the neophytes," the Office was read in full. But, since the text was printed, it has been suggested to me that the meaning may be that "the neophytes" were "scandalized" but said nothing about it ; so that the legend was, after all, omitted. In that case, the story loses its point, if it merely tells us that "the neophytes" felt something but did nothing in consequence. However, that may be the true interpretation.

CHAPTER XL (AFTER 1845)

408 (a)† *Essay on Development* (1st ed.) 124: quite different in late editions. The preface to the edition of 1890 says, "Various important alterations have been made . . . . not indeed in its matter, but in its text." But some important alterations extend to "matter," see Phil. 2nd ed. pp. liii.–v. ; 409 (a) C. 350, M. P.'s *Memoirs*, 222, O. 18 ; A. (1st ed. p. 17) "'I forgive you, Sir Knight,' says the heroine in the Romance, 'I forgive you as a Christian.' 'That means,' said Wamba, 'that she does not forgive him at all.' Mr. Kingsley's word of honour is about as valuable as, in the jester's opinion, was the Christian charity of Rowena."

410 (a) "it would not do," Fl. 131 ; 411 (b) "no pretence," O. 15, "a shade too farcical," R. H. H, 197, "no sober man," Hare, iii. 105, quoting p. 44 of *Lectures on Anglicanism* ; 412 (a) ib. 81 ; 412 (c) ib. 223 (Lect. 112) ; 412 (d) ib. 255 (Lect. 129) ; 413 (b)* As an instance of N.'s half-simulated, perhaps half-reckless, exaggerations, take the following contradiction of the rumour that he was intending to return to the Church of England (O. 37) :

"This being my state of mind, to add, as I hereby go on to do, that I have no intention, and never had any intention, of leaving the Catholic Church, and becoming a Protestant again, would be superfluous, except that Protestants are always on the look-out for some loop-hole or evasion in a Catholic's statement of fact. Therefore, in order to give them full satisfaction, if I can, I do hereby profess *ex animo*, with an absolute internal assent and consent, that Protestantism is the dreariest of possible religions ; that the thought of the Anglican service makes me shiver, and the thought of the Thirty-nine Articles makes me shudder. Return to the Church of England ! No ! 'The net is broken and we are delivered.'

I should be a consummate fool (to use a mild term) if in my old age I left 'the land flowing with milk and honey' for the city of confusion and the house of bondage."

The bitterness of this seems, at first, absolutely inexcusable ; it rings false, too ; and it is in bad taste. But he explained it afterwards in a letter to Sir John Cope (Fl. 131). The world, he says, would not believe him if he spoke calmly ; and similarly he explains his reply to Kingsley, "A casual reader would think my language denoted anger, but it did not. . . . It would not do to be tame and not to show indignation."

Which are we to believe? Newman's words? or his explanation of them? Probably neither, without reserve. He was so changeable, and so tortuous, that he could not be sure what he meant when he said anything. In part probably he simulated indignation, in part he felt it ; and as he used the lash dexterously, he sometimes liked to use it, and used it too much.

415 (a)* Exp. (1890) 342, the author adds that "there was no pretence of asceticism about Newman."

415 (a) "his prayer" *S. on Various Occasions*, 241-2, "Terence," Exp. 231 ; 416 (b) P. 310 ; 416 (d) P. 312 ; 416 (e)* "the floor was his bed." In addition to Newman's account of St. Philip, the reader may be glad to see the following, which a friend has sent me, extracted from R. Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*, Parker, 1856, vol. ii. p. 184, and which the author (ib. 188) professes to have "collected from Romanist records":—

"The fancies of Madame Guyon in this respect are innocent enough in comparison with the monstrosities devised by Romish marvel-mongers to exalt her saints withal. St. Philip Neri was so inflamed with love to God as to be insensible to all cold, and burned with such a fire of devotion that his body, divinely feverish, could not be cooled by exposure to the wildest winter night. For two-and-fifty years he was the subject of a supernatural palpitation, which kept his bed and chair, and everything moveable about him, in a perpetual tremble. For that space of time his breast was miraculously swollen to the thickness of a fist above his heart. On a post-mortem examination of the holy corpse, it was found that two of the ribs had been broken, to allow the sacred ardour of his heart more room to play! The doctors swore solemnly that the phenomenon could e nothing less than a miracle. A divine hand had thus literally 'enlarged e heart' (see Görres, *Die Cristliche Mystik*, p. 4, c. 1) of the devotee. t. Philip enjoyed, with many other saints, the privilege of being miracuusly elevated into the air by the fervour of his heavenward aspirations. . . . The noses of eminent saints have been endowed with so subtle a sense that they have detected the stench of concealed sins, and enjoyed, as a literal fragrance, the well-known odour of sanctity. St. Philip Neri was frequently obliged to hold his nose and turn away his head when confessing very wicked people."

417 (a) P. 310 ; 417 (b) "lost nothing on that account," Exp. 340 ; 418 (a) *E. on Development*, 399 ; 419 (a) quoted from N.'s Ideal of a University by Mr. Wilfrid Ward, *Nineteenth Century*, 1890, p. 572,

comp. also R. H. H. 192–3; 419 (b) R. H. H. 193; 420 (b) "fears." I have given given ample reasons for this conclusion in the preceding chapters: but it is confirmed by a passage from E. T. M. He is commenting upon the exaggerations that must be expected from the "imitators" of the Leader of a movement, and thus describes the teaching of a Mr. Seager, who (L. ii. 257) (ii. 143) often acted as N.'s *locum tenens* in St. Mary's: "Newman left Seager in charge of St. Mary's occasionally and for some time. He was a man of sad aspect, with a deep hollow voice, and he preached so continually on hell and all its horrors that the Principal of Brasenose, whose family attended the Church, was obliged to protest and threaten his withdrawal. He could not answer for the consequences on the weaker members of his household."

Such preaching, though (doubtless) inferior to N.'s in respect of taste and literary skill, appears faithfully to represent the tendency of what I have called above N.'s "religion of fear." It shows what his "imitators" were likely to preach. In this respect, then, the New Anglicanism appears to owe no debt to Newman.

421 (b) This termination may seem to some of my readers to savour of a bad kind of predestinarianism. But I intend it only to imply laws of spiritual cause and effect meting out what is on the whole best: and I cannot disguise my feeling that for Newman, being what he was from the first—an essentially solitary soul, with a strong sense of the fearful mystery of the Invisible; with no corresponding sense of the perfect Love and perfect Justice which will be, in the end, found to be identified in the Supreme; and continuously deepening, by his own free conduct, as well as under stress of circumstances, these features of solitariness, timorousness, *self*-suspicion, and *all*-suspicion—it was good, and fit, that he should find a refuge in the Church of Rome. The change must have brought to him a distinct moral gain, if it lifted him out of his fears and delivered him, in part, from his old conception of Christ. He could never have been at home in Teutonic, that is to say, domestic, Christianity. The result was not the best, but it was the best possible.

Partly too I think I was guided to this conclusion by a recollection of one of the many flashes of suggestive truth which are to be found in the *Reminiscences* of Mr. E. T. Mozley, who tells us how, on an occasion when the thesis was maintained that "men never change," Newman took the side of the affirmer; and he adds (E. T. M. i. 207) that N. "always claimed to have been substantially the same from first to last; only in progress and development under heaven-sent guidance, impulses, and assistance."

THE MORAL

429 (b) Amiel, *Journal Intime*, Mrs. Humphry Ward's *Translation*, p. 29; 431 (c) "especially English theologians." I was correcting for the press the last sentence of this work when a friend placed in my hands a pamphlet (bearing date 30 Jan. 1892) entitled *England's Debt to Newman.* This gives all the more point to my final words because it is

written by an "English theologian." The author is the Rev. Dr. Sanday, Dean Ireland's Professor of Exegesis at Oxford, and one of the most amiable of men. It is characterized by even more than his usual amiability but somewhat less than his usual insight.

Dr. Sanday selects one of Newman's earliest sermons, preached in 1831 before the *Via Media* was started, as the basis for a panegyric on the preacher. It is on "Religious Emotion" and contains passages of great beauty and truth. For his special purpose Dr. Sanday chooses an extract in which Newman—after assuming that "the highest Christian temper is free from all vehement and tumultuous feeling"—turns to "our Great Pattern Jesus Christ," and asks, "Can we find anywhere such calmness and simplicity as marked His devotion and obedience?" In the context (which the Professor does not quote) Newman is ready to allow that St. Paul's utterances were sometimes marked by "greater fervency" or "more emotion," as compared with those of "Agar" and "Joshua"; but he declares that the Apostle spoke "with not more acceptableness on that account in God's sight." He half appears to excuse St. Paul as being "accidentally agitated" during the struggle of his life, and calls attention to his greater calmness at the close. But he will not allow that Christ *ever* spoke with "fervour." He asks, in words which I italicize (and these are part of Dr. Sanday's extract) "*When does He ever speak with fervour or vehemence?*" The implied answer is, of course, "Never." To this Newman makes no exception, save "one or two words of His in His mysterious agony and death, characterized by an energy which we do not comprehend and which sinners must silently adore." The extract then goes on to remark "how conspicuous and undeniable is His composure in the general tenour of His words and conduct."

After quoting this extract, which extends beyond two pages of his pamphlet (pp. 8–10), the Professor exclaims, "Can any of us lay his hand on a passage in any other writer which touches a characteristic aspect of the Christian spirit with such inimitable delicacy, sensitiveness, and truth? Just in two strokes, so to speak, to hit the central virtue of the Liturgy, and a central virtue of the Gospel!" And then (I italicize): "*A kind of awe comes over the soul when it thinks of either for ever afterwards.*"

I confess no "kind of awe comes over" my soul when I think of the "two strokes,"—which are, I presume, the two pages—but a kind of wonder when I think of the eulogist's encomium.

First, as regards the latter, is it not a rather poor compliment to our Prayer Book to describe a mere negative quality, the mere abstinence from fervour or vehemence, as "*the central virtue* of our Liturgy"? I call it "negative"; for what is it that he is praising? Newman has said that "the highest Christian temper is free from all vehement and tumultuous feeling," and it is this "freedom from all vehement and tumultuous feeling," that Dr. Sanday selects as the highest merit of our Liturgy. How can this be described as other than a negative quality? Newman himself could hardly hope to make it appear a positive virtue of the highest order by identifying such a negation with the "calmness and simplicity" which "marked Christ's devotion and obedience"; for the retort would be obvious that in our Lord the "devotion" and "obedience" were fundamental and invariable, the calmness was not so: there were occasions when He was not, could not be, ought not to have been, calm. However, even the Professor does not venture to say that it is "*the* central virtue" of the Gospel; *there* it is only *a* "central virtue"—I should call it not even that; it is certainly not a central virtue of St. Paul's epistles—but about our Anglican Prayer Book the Ireland Professor of Exegesis at Oxford proclaims that it is *the* central virtue of it, that it does *not* indulge in the language of religious excitement! I confess, if I were disposed to criticize the inexpressibly beautiful Collects for Ascension Day and the following Sunday, I should say it was their "central virtue" that they express devotion and aspiration, and lift our hearts up to God, not that they avoid excitement and fervour. But Dr. Sanday finds in them the supreme merit of realising, not *sursum corda,* but *ne quid nimis* and *sunt certi denique fines*!

Now to return to the preacher. As long as he confined himself to our Lord's prayers or utterances to the Father, he is on tolerably safe ground. For (in the Synoptic Gospels) they are very few indeed and might be compressed into one of the small paragraphs of a newspaper. Yet even these contain an appeal to God which mentions the word "forsaken," and a petition that the "cup" might pass from Him. Newman calls attention to the fact that the latter petition is "concise"; he forgets to add that He repeated it thrice. But it is more important to observe that Newman passes beyond this province into that of "the general tenour of His words and conduct," mentioning our Lord's "serious words to Judas," His "conduct" when "He is described as washing His disciples' feet," and other instances of words or acts to His followers and His enemies; and all these are to be considered in reference to the extraordinary question, *When does He ever speak with fervour or vehemence?*

When! Why, when (according to the Synoptic Gospels) he called Herod a "fox"; and when He rebuked the ruler of the synagogue as a "hypocrite" for wishing to prevent the sick folk from coming to Him on the Sabbath to be healed; and when He declared that the money-changers had made His Father's house "a den of thieves"; and when He said to Peter "Get thee behind me, Satan"; and when, to certain others, He said, "Fill ye up then, the measure of your fathers. Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell?" I should go yet further and say that in many other utterances of His there was at least a warmth approaching to "fervour," as, for example, in the passionate sorrow with which He cried to the children of Jerusalem, "Behold, your house is left unto you desolate"; and in the reproachful sadness with which He said, "What, could ye not watch with me one hour?"; or when He exclaimed, with an intense exaggeration which nothing but "fervour" can explain, "If any man hateth not his father and his mother, he cannot be my disciple." But I am ashamed, thus, after the fashion of a Sunday School teacher, to go on to enumerate words of Christ which are familiar to all, and which amply demonstrate that, on fit occasion, our Lord could speak with the refreshing force of passionate indignation and honest human "fervour." It was natural that Newman should glide over these. Special pleader that he was, he probably avoided them with an unconscious instinctive skill : they did not suit his purpose, which generally was to exhibit a dehumanized Christ, man only in name. But surely they ought not to have escaped the attention of Dean Ireland's Professor of Exegesis at the University of Oxford !

But this is not enough. Dr. Sanday compares Newman with Wyclif and Wesley, and will "not admit that Newman had claims at all inferior" to either of these ! Lastly, in his eulogy on the *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, he says, "Their influence has sunk deep, and"—the italics are mine—"*of all the agencies which have gone to make the English Church what it is, I doubt if there is any which has been so powerful.*"

Alas, if that were so, for "the English Church"! But I hope better things for it. I cannot help surmising that the writer has forgotten that the English Church implies the laity as well as the clergy ; and such is my confidence in English non-theological honesty and common sense that, before the next century is on us, Professor Sanday's comparison of Newman with Wesley and Wyclif will (I am firmly convinced) if remembered at all, be remembered as a literary curiosity.

But I owe a debt of gratitude to *England's Debt to Newman.* It convinces me that my work, whether written in vain or not, was not written without cause.

FINIS.

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